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Abstract  
For the past thirty years, educators, researchers, parents, employers, policy-makers, 
and the popular press have been concerned about the gender gap in computing. 
Remarkably, there is little evidence of a similar scale of concern or effort at redressing 
gender gaps in other professions. The question is why, as a society, we care so much about 
girls and women’s representation in computing. 
The justification for trying to reduce the gender gap in computing has been largely 
driven by political, social, and economic concerns. My project takes issue with this basic 
premise and argues that the quest to solve the gender-computing gap must also be read as 
an ethical quest of far-reaching consequence regarding how we think about STEM fields in 
the 21st century. The contemporary gender-technology story is dependent on a number of 
transparent social-political-intellectual imaginaries and ill-defined concepts that 
circumscribe ethical, biological, ontological, and methodological explanations of the 
gender-technology relationship and its significance. These imaginaries and concepts are 
themselves grounded in a specifically modernist epistemology and relationship to 
technology, subjects, objects, and ethics that reflects values derived from the intersection of 
modern science and liberal humanism. This dissertation examines the bases of the gender-
technology story by analyzing documents culled from educational research and policy, 
national and international STEM agencies, and the popular (U.S.) press, all largely focused 
around computing.  
The thesis presents a new reading of the gender-technology story through 
intersecting lenses drawn from STS, feminist theory and technoscience, political and 
cultural theory, and philosophies of technology. Using this multi-faceted social discourse 
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analysis, it argues several claims. First, the g/t story helps to constitute the problem it wants 
to solve. Second, methodological and epistemological beliefs, particularly surrounding 
objectivity and method, have made it seem prudent to focus on the gender-computing gap 
as a political problem of (in)equity. Third, the drive for a clear political-educational fix is a 
self-limiting quest. Fourth, in the story, gender and women are used as placeholders for this 
new ethic. Fifth, a culture that is overly skeptical of practices of ambiguity and complexity 
is a huge problem to overcome and limits progress towards the new ethical relationship to 
technology that the gender-technology story is trying to articulate.  
Framing the gender-technology relationship in largely political-epistemological 
terms has made it seem reasonable to believe that bringing more women into computing 
will bring about radical social change. However, just as many tenets of modernism are 
proving insufficient to the challenges emerging in the 21st century (many the result of these 
values), so too, thinking about the gender-technology relationship (and problem) remains 
constrained by these same conceptual boundaries. I deconstruct the gender-technology 
story to reconstruct it as an expression of an emergent 21st century posthumanist desire for 
a new ethical relationship to technology and to the world.  
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Facet 1 
Context 
 My life changed around 1994 when I decided to take up computer animation and 
3D graphics. I had thought I was just getting a hot new skill for a better, but still arts 
related, day job. I wanted to support my real work as a sculptor. I was wrong, in so many 
ways. First, 3D computer graphics and animation turned out to be fascinating and I turned 
out to be quite good at it. However, in ways that never seemed to make sense, being a 
woman made a very large difference. 
 I had been painting scenery for a number of years. As a New York-based “union 
scenic” (United Scenic Artists, LU 829), the pay was decent and men and women by then 
were generally getting the same rates and got to do pretty much the same grueling, often 
dirty, highly skilled (or mundane) work in generally less than pleasant or healthy environs. 
I had seen Teamsters give women scenics due respect (or disperse when things got too 
messy or toxic). This was not always the case, but by the early 1990s, women had gained, by 
and large, professional respect across numerous entertainment and arts industries and their 
credentials, aptitudes, and talents were rarely questioned. In the design and fine arts, 
things were a little murkier; there were plenty of women, such that being a woman was not 
an anomaly even if we tended to be more invisible or missing at the “top.”  
 3D computer animation and graphics was something altogether different. I once 
went to an interview with my very professional 3D portfolio and the young man said my 
work had a distinctly feminine aesthetic. It seemed to me he was instead responding to the  
fact that it looked different from the rampant plasticized programmer aesthetic that was the 
norm of early desktop 3D. Making it more “artistic” apparently made it more feminine.  
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 By the 1990’s, most professions had acquired some (at least publicly) professional 
gender etiquette. But in computer magazines, especially trade magazines on 3D graphics, 
women were almost always portrayed as (clueless) babes while the men and boys were nerds 
or cool dudes of some stripe (suits were rare, and sunglasses and sandals quite trendy)—sort 
of a high-tech version of Playboy. Women were almost never visible as part of the creative, 
technical, or production teams; when visible they tended to congregate in marketing. A 
woman’s technical fluency never superseded her status as woman.  
 In 2001, for the Web 3D Conference in Paderborn, Germany, I organized a panel 
of three women to talk about alternative gaming paradigms. We made the local paper just 
because we were three women talking about computer games. These sorts of experiences 
continued and I became increasingly curious (bemused, impatient, or frustrated also work 
as relevant adjectives) as to why being a woman in computing was such a big deal, especially 
in the arts and animation aspects.  
 After this long and winding path, I started on a PhD to investigate what was going 
on with gender and computing. The idea was to join the search for software or game 
designs that would fix some aspect of the gender-technology problem. From this 
background, I started reading the gender-technology literature in education and this 
dissertation is my response to a theoretical and story construction that I found more 
disturbing and limiting, in many ways, than the problem it characterizes. My thesis tackles, 
essentially, a “re-theorization” of the gender and computing relationship and contributes 
theoretical and practice-oriented ideas and opportunities relevant to game designers; 
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researchers in education, game studies, and gender and women’s studies; policy makers, 
and curriculum and pedagogy at the intersection of technology and games.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
Facet 2 
Story, Methodology, & Exposition 
 
Introduction: Politics or Ethics? 
We think the gender and computing gap is primarily a political problem.1 
Research, policy, and media discourses frame the issues in political terms: equity, access, 
diversity, representation, identity, human resources, a globally competitive workforce, and 
the digital divide, to name a few. This language supports the quest for psychological, 
behavioral, or social fixes to a political problem. Mainstream narratives of gender and 
technology (g/t) often attach an ethical dimension to this gender gap but the arguments for 
this ethic have relied upon essentialized constructs of gender, psychology, tool culture, and 
politics derived from the psychological and behavioral sciences. At the same time, this ethic 
has been politicized to serve largely instrumental and economic ends. That is, the 
justification for trying to reduce the gender gap in computing has been predominantly 
political and economic and women and gender become the conceptual space wherein 
values and ethics will not be trampled.  
My project re-examines how discursive and conceptual practices have sustained this 
relationship and narrative and argues two main ideas. First, the desire to solve the gender-
                                                
1 I use technology and computers interchangeably in this thesis, not because they are the 
same, but because this is how the terms are used across the g/t story. For example, even 
though the central concern is girls and women’s representation in computing, the problem 
is broadly referred to as a relationship between gender and technology. This transposability 
of technology and computing appears to be innocuous only because technology itself, 
within the g/t story, always refers to tools and tool culture. I will not dissect this use of 
technology here; a deconstruction of technology is one of the projects of this dissertation.  
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computing gap must also be read as an ethical story with far-reaching consequences 
regarding how we think about STEM fields in the 21st century and how we situate ourselves 
as ethical beings. Second, there are far too many assumptions and ill-defined concepts 
about the political, ethical, biological, ontological, and methodological dimensions 
attached to explanations of the g/t relationship and its significance. These concepts are 
themselves beholden to a specifically modernist epistemology and relationship to 
technology, nature, and culture. This epistemology and worldview reflects values derived 
from the intersection of modern science and liberal humanism that have driven the 
modern engine of progress. However, just as many tenets of modernism and its values are 
proving insufficient to the challenges emerging in the 21st century (many the result of these 
values), so too, thinking about the g/t relationship (and problem) remains constrained by 
these same conceptual boundaries. This dissertation deconstructs the conceptual 
boundaries and assumptions that ground the g/t story and rethinks this story as a 21st 
century posthumanist desire for a new ethical relationship to technology.2  
Liberal humanism (and its driving epistemologies, technocratic thinking, and ethic) 
has functioned as the dominant organizing logic of the g/t story, yet this logic makes it 
difficult to effect the kind of ethical shift the g/t story is trying to articulate. The 
mainstream g/t story that is told through education, STEM policy, and media 
representations—because it unreflexively depends on these modernist lenses—stands in the 
                                                
2 In this thesis, I rely on three interrelated terms. The g/t story refers to a body of research, 
policy, and media accounts of girls and women’s underrepresentation that has become 
mainstream society’s narrative of girls or women’s different connection with computing. I 
refer to this notion as the g/t relationship, but when making reference to the range of 
consequences of this g/t relationship, I use the term g/t problem. 
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way of the new ethical relationship to technology it anticipates. The story, in part, remains 
beholden to a “feminist ethic-of-care” (e.g. Gilligan, 1982, 1993; Noddings, 1984, 2003), 
that itself is more political than ethical. This ethic-of-care depends on numerous 
assumptions about gender, sex, women, and men that in turn are shaped by our modern 
dependence on reductivist and dichotomous thinking. Gender and technology research 
tends to argue through this ethic-of-care, yet this rationale has not kept up with feminist 
thinking about what it means to be a woman (or man), ideas about what technology is, or 
with cross-disciplinary and complexity approaches that are shaping 21st feminist 
posthumanist ethical (and political) theory. One limitation in the quest for a new ethical 
relationship to technology is the g/t story itself; another is manifest in our epistemological 
and political desires for certainty (e.g. in describing men versus women, technology, STEM 
pedagogy, research findings, and so on). The new ethic demands much more receptiveness 
to a practice of ambiguity that would better respond to the dynamic ontology of the nature-
culture relationship. Examining the assumptions that ground the mainstream g/t story, I 
locate opportunities to make this desired ethical shift more prominent and possible. 
 
A Story Thirty Years in the Making 
For the past thirty years, educators, researchers, parents, employers, policy-makers, 
and the popular press have been enormously concerned about the gender gap in 
computing. Remarkably, despite this concern (and significant federal research dollars spent 
on trying to reverse the gap), there is little evidence of a similar scale of concern or effort at 
redressing gender gaps in, for example, the ranks of Fortune 500 CEOs, U.S. Supreme 
7 
 
 
Court justices, Hollywood film directors, five-star chefs, or the tenured levels of the 
professoriate.3 Thus, the question should be why, as a society, we care so much about girls 
and women’s representation in computing.4 There is a mainstream story of gender and 
technology that tells us we must care, as responsible educators, parents, game designers, 
and policy makers. But is this story about what we think it is about? This thesis examines 
multiple layers of the mainstream g/t story. It looks at the obvious, the taken-for-granted, 
and the hidden—and argues that there is much more to the story than has been assumed. 
Moreover, in missing these other layers, the transformative agendas of g/t research, policy, 
and pedagogy have been, and likely will continue to be, largely unrealized.  
Beginning in the early 1980s, a paradox presented itself. The computer entered 
mainstream society as a new democratic hope for social, political, intellectual, and 
economic change yet it was concurrently perceived as the latest means for continuing 
oppression, automating and deskilling workers, or facilitating more socio-economic 
disparity. The computer revolution brought more than intelligent machines into our lives. 
It also provoked, depending on one’s perspective and position, high expectations for social 
                                                
3 The NSF posted to its website, on August 8, 2007, the book New Formulas for America’s 
Workforce 2: Girls in Science and Engineering. In the introduction, “Origins,” they state that 
the annual budget for the Program for Women and Girls, housed in NSF’s Division of 
Human Resource Development, Directorate for Education and Human Resources, has 
varied from $7 million to $10 million.  
4 I use technology and computers interchangeably when referring to the g/t story, not 
because they are the same, but because this is how the terms are used across the g/t 
literature. For example, even though the central concern is girls and women’s 
representation in computing, the problem is broadly referred to as a relationship between 
gender and technology. This transposability of technology and computing appears to be 
innocuous only because technology itself, within the g/t story, always refers to tools and 
tool culture. I will not dissect this use of technology here because this kind of analysis is 
one of the main threads of this dissertation.  
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transformation or fears over impending ruptures to long-standing traditions, identities, and 
relationships of modern, Western, industrial society.  
One artifact of the incursion of the computer into multiple facets of everyday life is 
the modern g/t “story.” By story, I mean a research, policy, and popular media driven 
narrative that has been overtly concerned with girls and women’s underrepresentation in 
computing fields. The main contributors to this story have been educational research, 
science-technology-engineering-math (STEM) educational policy, and the popular press as it 
reports on g/t research, parental and business concerns, or ongoing controversies over 
computer games. All of these sites have put a great deal of focus on the idea that girls and 
women’s connection to, or experience of, computers, computing culture, or its affordances, 
is substantively different from that of boys and men’s. This “fact” of a gendered orientation 
to computing is presumed to have great consequences for women, technology, education, 
and society. This fact is what I refer to as the g/t problem.5 
I argue that this mainstream g/t story is about far more than we think it is as I 
explore three interwoven ideas. (a) The g/t story is itself a constituting story in that it helps 
sustain (and in part create) the problem it pursues. (b) Despite its intentions to provide the 
means for social-political-economic transformation, the g/t story is severely hampered in 
the ways it relies on a limited set of resources (e.g. theory, methodology, or concepts) and a 
number of ill-defined constructs and black-boxed imaginaries. (c) There are other, better 
                                                
5 In this thesis, I rely on three interrelated terms. The g/t story refers to a body of research, 
policy, and media accounts of girls and women’s underrepresentation that has become 
mainstream society’s narrative of girls or women’s different connection with computing. I 
refer to this notion as the g/t relationship, but when making reference to the range of 
consequences of this g/t relationship, I use the term g/t problem. 
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resources available but finding them requires stepping out of long comfortable 
epistemologies, disciplinary understandings, and prescriptive research methodologies. In 
short, thinking about the g/t relationship (or problem) needs to become much more open 
to alternative ways of thinking.   
In its three decades of influence, the g/t story has been etched into the fabric of 
everyday life through the popular media and through STEM education discourses and 
practices. Across the story, girls, women, or gender (and increasingly, race and class) 
inequities have been the focus and these might be past, present, or predicted. My focus is 
specifically this dominant, mainstream g/t story and I do not include within this story the 
academic scholarship on women and technology that is most associated with science and 
technology studies (STS), studies in the history of technology (SHOT), or feminist 
technoscience studies. The reason I separate these is that the mainstream, education-
engineering-policy-media g/t story is the narrative that most influences how society, girls, 
women, men, employers, and so on think about the g/t relationship in everyday life. The 
mainstream story underlies not only research agendas; it also grounds a broad set of 
expectations about the g/t relationship that carry significant implications. My intention in 
this thesis is to show this landscape to be far more complicated than has been assumed but 
also to highlight significant new opportunities.  
By now, the beliefs and assumptions surrounding the mainstream g/t story are so 
embedded and black-boxed that the story itself is now an important imaginary of 
contemporary society, a story that I characterize as akin to a modernist meta-narrative, even 
if it is not actually such a narrative. Less visible is that this seemingly broadly descriptive g/t 
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imaginary is made possible through a number of other social imaginaries that are in turn 
bound to various disciplinary, social-political, and epistemological commitments that we 
hold dear. Contributing to this g/t imaginary are educational research and policies that 
remain bound to a set of methodological and disciplinary assumptions such that the 
activity of researching the g/t story within education does not simply represent and 
describe the relationship between women and technology but has created or constituted 
the relationship.6 As the g/t story became the dominant cultural understanding of the g/t 
relationship (and problem), particularly in U.S. education, media, and policy discourses, 
(similarly in Europe and somewhat less so, in other parts of the globe), it seemingly has also 
become increasingly intractable, in turn solidifying in status as a meta g/t story.   
Of late, there is some evidence of an emerging discomfort with this meta story on 
more than one front. One example is Corneliussen’s (2009) thought experiment that wants 
to disrupt assumptions of a stable g/t relationship. A second is Abbiss’s (2008) study that 
pokes holes in standing assumptions regarding information technologies and women’s 
marginalization. While this scholarship is headed in what is likely to be a useful direction, 
the research is still in the formative stages and my dissertation contributes to this line of 
thinking. In search of new perspectives and questions, my dissertation enters the fray, via 
an extensive intersectional and multi-faceted reading of the g/t story. I read and reread the 
g/t story that emanates from education, engineering-computer science, public policy, and 
                                                
6 I am using the term education here quite broadly, to include K-12, formal and informal, 
undergraduate, and graduate education, as well as engineering/computer science 
education. I do this because the g/t story itself does this. While individual studies may 
examine one level or type of education, there is really no way to categorize elements the g/t 
story itself by educational levels, in any meaningful or useful way.  
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the popular media, and propose that there is reason to step back and ask a different kind 
and quality of questions regarding the g/t story and relationship as well as their import. 
Broadly, these are: (a) through what ideas and practices have understandings and 
representations of the g/t relationship been built and what do they accomplish? (b) What 
beliefs or assumptions underlie the dominant methods, disciplinary lenses and practices 
used to conceptualize and represent the story; how do these foreground how we 
conceptualize the “problem”? (c) What other possibilities are available for differently 
theorizing, representing, or re-imagining the g/t story or relationship? (d) What other 
social, political, ethical ideas could be usefully engaged to read the g/t story in light of 
cultural-historical contexts within which this story has unfolded (e.g. anxieties responding 
to the reshaping of the human-technology-society intersection)?  
A broad reading of the g/t story reveals that it is largely driven by one dominant 
concern: women’s participation in computing was statistically much higher in the early 
1980s than it is today (e.g. Cohoon & Aspray, 2006b). Not so evident is that research into 
the g/t relationship dates back to approximately this same period, the early 1980s. The 
following graph pairs the growth of g/t research with statistics that document computer 
science degrees awarded to men and women from 1970-2006. 
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Figure 1. Male/female computer science degrees & growth of g/t research.7 
Over the years, while research on girls and women’s underrepresentation in 
computing blossomed, so did the “problem.” My project begins with two questions: (a) 
How has research and its representation—telling the story—contributed to producing the 
“g/t problem”? (b) Is the real concern the quantity of women in computing or technology? 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Higher 
Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), "Degrees and Other Formal Awards 
Conferred" surveys, 1970–71 through 1985–86; and 1986–87 through 2005–06 Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System, "Completions Survey" (IPEDS-C:87–99), and Fall 
2000 through Fall 2006. (From a table prepared June 2007.) The “growth of the G/T 
story” (dotted line) is not taken from the NCE data. The line illustrates a trend—as the 
literature on gender and technology grew, so did the gender gap in computing.   
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What is a “Story”? 
 “For a long time, the story goes,”8 the popular press, educators, educational and 
social science researchers, and policy makers have been concerned about a problem with 
women and technology. There is now a vast literature examining in extensive detail girls 
and women’s characteristics for the ways these intersect with computing technologies and 
cultures. Likewise, there is a desire to combine individual research studies into a 
representative model that will make it possible to effect broad transformation of girls and 
women’s participation in computing. 
 This meta g/t story lays claim to being broadly representative but it is deduced from 
a quite reductivist mix of methods and theory building that brings to mind a passage out of 
Invisible Cities (Calvino, 1972, 1974). 
“I have also thought of a model city from which I deduce all the others,” Marco answered. “It 
is a city made only of exceptions, exclusions, incongruities, contradictions. If such a city is the 
most improbable, by reducing the number of abnormal elements, we increase the probability 
that the city really exists. So I have only to subtract exceptions from my model, and in 
whatever direction I proceed, I will arrive at one of the cities which, always as an exception, 
exist. But I cannot force my operation beyond a certain limit: I would achieve cities too 
probable to be real.” (p. 69 quoted, in italics, in original) 
 
 What resonates for me is the way that Calvino articulates Marco Polo’s initial 
desire to “deduce a model city” through a methodology of reflection and subtraction. Polo 
begins with a belief that through deduction, reduction is possible—which in his case, refers 
to exceptions. These exceptions increase the probability that a city exists and produce the 
                                                
8 This is the opening phrase of Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Vol, I, p. 3. A first 
methodological note: I use  ‘story’ to characterize a long standing set of circulated ideas 
about circumstances, situations, attitudes, and so on that we accept as the way things are 
and that become transparent as a normal way of thinking about a relationship or concern. 
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ideal model of city, which in turn should be predictive of other cities. Quickly he realizes 
that in the end, these reductions construe cities “too probable to be real” (Calvino, 1972, 
1974, p. 69). The g/t story articulates a similar desire and approach, one that deduces and 
reduces perceptions as well as conceptions of women and of technology to a representative 
and predictable model, yet it does so without Polo’s subsequent reflexivity. 
 That is, the g/t story might be “too probable to be real.” Specifically, this story is 
both constituted and constituting such that it effectively produces the idea of girls and 
women as it reduces them in relation to a similarly reduced technology. To be clear, I am 
not out to challenge underlying aims of equity or social transformation; rather, my target is 
the means for going about trying to achieve these ends. If the g/t story is in fact not so 
much “real” but instead a constituted and constituting story that produces girls and women 
as a particular kind of subject in relation to a specifically articulated notion of technology, 
a new approach is in order. 
 I am not developing a thesis or theory of “story.” I use the term in the way that 
Foucault (1975, 1995, 1990) uses it to ground his genealogic method. A genealogic story is 
built from collections of narratives; historical records; chronicles of events relating to 
things, institutions, groups, or individuals; and to events or interpretations of events or 
interactions that have happened or might happen. Rather than a representation of 
subjects’ accounts or experiences, the genealogic story is a kind of excavation of 
continuities and discontinuities from a distance. This distance makes it possible to view the 
events and contexts of social phenomena from a perspective other than the interviews, 
surveys, and observations that are the dominant tools of what Foucault calls the 
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disciplining sciences. The genealogic story that I draw is a composite of these other stories. 
That is, my genealogic story is one that views empirical studies and the understandings 
these have produced from an interpretive distance in order to see what else might be going 
on. I mean to include within the g/t story the many research studies, research reviews, and 
newspaper, academic, popular, and policy accountings of the g/t problem within 
education, educational research and policy, and the popular media. My primary focus is 
the U.S., although I also include a UNESCO document and along the way, occasional 
perspectives from outside the U.S.  
My premise is that the research and discourses that make up our understanding of 
the g/t relationship or problem may be analyzed as a relatively cohesive meta-story, but 
remaining cognizant that there are two points of entry to this story. One is an “education-
engineering” story and the other is drawn from feminist and sociological or historical 
studies of technology. The boundaries between these stories are not fixed and are open to 
interpretation. As I mentioned earlier, I do not specifically include within the meta g/t 
story the g/t research that comes out of STS, SHOT, or feminist technoscience unless 
specific studies fit within the conceptual or methodological terrain of the mainstream g/t 
story.9 The meta g/t story represents a dominant cultural story that largely focuses on the 
characteristics, aptitudes, interests, psychologies, and behaviors of girls and women as these 
                                                
9 This feminist and STS g/t research has tended to examine what technologies do to 
women and how women are shaped by and shape technologies (Anne Balsamo’s 
Technologies of the Gendered Body, 1995, is a prime example). The theoretical emphasis of 
this work in recent years has been the idea that gender and technology are co-constructed 
in and through their everyday and discursive interplay. A version of this constructivism 
infuses the main story, which is why I mention it here, and why the boundaries of stories 
are sometimes porous. 
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are used to characterize or shape their dispositions to learn, teach, play, or persist in 
computing (or STEM) careers. Of late, an overly masculine culture of computing has also 
become a focus of research and policy interventions.   
Despite the reach of this mainstream g/t narrative, this dominant, largely K-16 
STEM education-based story has received little attention in feminist STS scholarship. This 
is a problematic gap given that important and far-reaching notions of computing and 
technology are instilled in society and individuals through educational policies, practices, 
and experiences (e.g. Bowers, 1988; Illich, 1973; Pacey, 1983, 1989). The education-
engineering story can be viewed as the dominant and mainstream g/t story because it has 
such a wide-ranging influence. It serves as the broad discursive and conceptual base that 
reflects and “instructs” society in how to think about technology (as well as girls and 
women). I do not mean to infer that there are two separate and easily bounded g/t stories. 
Rather, this is my way of sorting and managing a vast literature as I read the mainstream 
g/t story through multiple, intersecting lenses. In this dissertation, “the g/t story” refers to 
the mainstream education, policy, and media version. 
The following texts are the primary focus of my readings and analyses:  
• TechSavvy: Educating Girls in the New Computer Age, (AAUW, 2000) 
• From Barbie to Mortal Kombat: Gender and Computer Games, (Cassell & Jenkins, 
1998, 1999b)  
 
• Women and Information Technology: Research on Underrepresentation, (Cohoon & 
Aspray, 2006b)  
 
• “Computers and Girls: Rethinking the Issues,” (Hawkins, 1985)  
• Women, Girls, and Computers: A First Look at the Evidence (Lockheed, 1985)  
17 
 
 
• Unlocking the clubhouse: Women in computing (Margolis & Fisher, 2002)   
• “Researcher studies gender gap” (Mintz, 2007)  
• Program Solicitation: Research on Gender in Science and Engineering FY 2008 (National 
Science Foundation, 2007)  
 
• Gender Issues in the Information Society: UNESCO Publications for the World Summit on 
the Information Society (Primo, 2003)  
 
• “Women in computer-related majors: A critical synthesis of research and theory 
from 1994-2005” (Singh, Allen, Scheckler, & Darlington, 2007)   
 
• “What has driven women out of computer science?” (Stross, 2008)   
• The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Turkle, 1984)  
• “Computational reticence: Why women fear the intimate machine” (Turkle, 1988)  
 
Justifying Sources as Representative  
Critical readers may be wondering how I will justify the salience or significance of 
these texts and other examples that I use to characterize the g/t story. One possibility for 
evaluating is to invoke a procedure academia itself often relies on, namely, the citation 
count. The problem is what exactly, is to be counted. Moreover, what counts? Even if one 
text is heavily cited, the question remains of how to accurately count or evaluate the quality 
of its citations. To gather numbers of citations, Googling is one strategy, but this kind of 
search returns too much information, much of it redundant. A recent editorial in the New 
York Times (Porter, 2009) likened this kind of Google search to polling. Porter describes it 
as a technique that Lawrence Summers, President Obama’s top economic adviser, has used 
to gain a perspective on the extent of American’s anxiety over the economic recession. 
While it does not offer any scientific certainty, Porter argues that a Google search functions 
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well to capture a sense of the extent of interest in a phenomenon, and this is how I use it. 
My sources capture a phenomenon. A more academic alternative is Google Scholar, but it 
remains difficult to know just what one is counting, how much is repetitive or overlapping 
information. Nor does such a strategy resolve the tension between quantities and quality in 
evaluating sources. Web of Science and Scopus are other possibilities, but they tend to leave 
out books, policy, and the popular media, and thus miss too much of relevance. Given the 
murkiness of counting as a reliable measure, other strategies seem more productive; 
specifically helpful are genealogic lineage and associations as these are evidenced in 
bibliographies and in-text citations.   
I am not out to resolve the problem of how to certify the importance of a given set 
of texts; instead, I draw from Foucault’s genealogic approach as well as the social science 
tradition of practical philosophy, as explained by Flyvbjerg (2001) and Schwandt (2004). 
Foucault’s genealogic logic suggests an approach to tracing a lineage of ideas, events, and 
shifts to gather a sense of the patterns or discontinuities in how the intersection of gender 
and technology has been understood and conceptualized across texts. In doing this kind of 
tracing and accounting, concerns over the interplay of power and knowledge make it 
possible to attend to what appears to have been left out of the story or individual texts. 
Practical philosophy (or phronetic social science, as Flyvbjerg (2001) explains it) is an 
alternative to the rule-driven epistemologies of the natural sciences. It builds from cases 
and rather than procedurally driven, research is itself an ethical-reflexive practice of making 
judgments while accounting for the contexts, values, and power relations wherein social life 
and social research unfold. The following ideas ground my selections.  
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First, I rely on the inter-reflexivity of texts—that is, they cite each other—and I make 
use of this cross-reflexivity to the extent that it is chronologically possible. I also select texts 
based on what they offer in terms of representing key themes in the dominant story or 
offer in the way of provocative arguments or potential but unrealized revisions. Texts that 
highlight temporal dimensions of the story, for example aspects and ideas that shift or 
those that have remained stable over thirty years are also foregrounded. My selections also 
tend to be heavily cited by others (e.g. in bibliographies, in Google Scholar citations, or 
regularly noted in within-text citations), although the usefulness of citations varies because 
some texts are quite recent. My justification for the latter is to recognize current thinking as 
it is published, but even here there is a kind of continuity because the texts tend to be 
published by MIT or other highly credible publishers with a visible history of publishing on 
gender and technology. I view this as “authority by association,” which is my way of 
describing an authority conferred by an already well-cited author or through a study’s 
institutional sponsor or publisher. Studies funded by the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) or the American Association of University Women (AAUW) are significant for their 
institutional stature and influence. Often, intriguing inconsistencies emerge because 
different arenas of scholarship, policy, and publication venues coexist in seemingly parallel 
universes; there is just simply so much written on g/t that there is no human way to 
consider them all. Thus, I too borrow a bit from Marco Polo. I reduce thousands of 
potential texts down to a highly select but credible representative few. The texts I have 
chosen represent a cultural moment (1983-2009) and are symptomatic of this moment and 
its tensions. Many other texts could do just as well. 
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The Story, to Date 
The g/t story has largely focused on identifying, describing, and explaining the 
factors that cause inequities and injustices in computing and associating these with m-f 
differences in attitudes, abilities, opportunities, or values as these are expressed regarding 
technology. These studies aim to identify broad, prescriptive programmatic interventions 
that would reshape or accommodate essential m-f differences.  
Conventional approaches to studying the g/t story rely heavily on paths and 
concerns defined by earlier g/t studies, thus a strong recursiveness is valued and 
subsequent studies aim to incrementally and more precisely describe factors that have 
stood in the way of women’s participation in computing. I take a different path and pose a 
different set of questions driven by three concerns. First, I want to understand how the g/t 
story itself is constituted in and through practices of examining and telling the story—how 
it is constructed through social, discursive, and research practices that are conceived within 
a set of social imaginaries that in turn bound how we see and interpret the world around 
us. Second, I consider how the story is also a constituting story rather than simply a 
representation of reality. At issue is how conventions of thinking have framed perceptions 
of the g/t story and women, men, technology, or research that in turn help to shape the 
story through notions the story itself puts into circulation. Third, I grapple with the effects 
and limitations in methodological assumptions and practices, and how these become 
social-intellectual partners in a complex dance whereby discourses and practices can 
themselves be implicated as technologies of the self (Foucault, 1990; Martin, Gutman, & 
Hutton, 1988) and gender (Lauretis, 1987).  
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The constituted and constituting elements and practices of the story are not 
benign, objective, or neutral in representing the g/t relationship or the relationship 
between gender-technology-society. The presumed “neutral” methodological foundation of 
the story needs further investigation for the ways that underlying methods, discipline-
specific knowledge, and ensuing explications of subjects, objects, gender, and technology 
become constituting elements of these constructs and their relationship.  
 
Methodology: Reflexive and Diffractive Double Reading 
The g/t story has largely relied on reductive methodologies to situate and explain 
subjects and objects in relation to specifically targeted educational, behavioral, cognitive, or 
career concerns in order to objectively identify, describe, explain, and potentially predict or 
change future behaviors, attitudes, and circumstances. The goal of the story is to explicate 
an objective and true representation of the g/t relationship, in order that future relations 
may be predicted or altered. I examine and deconstruct this notion of representational 
objectivity and in doing so, I rely on alternative views about objectivity such as those 
offered by Foucault (1972, 1980b), Haraway (1997), and Barad (2007). I aim for both the 
analytic distance of Foucault while also respecting the contextual and situated dimensions 
of knowing that Taylor (1995) or Haraway (1991a), for example, insist upon. These ideas 
foreground the political-ethical nature of knowing. My aim is not to produce an all-
knowing and all-seeing representation of reality regarding the g/t relationship, but rather, 
to show how and why a multi-faceted lens makes visible the range of allegiances, practices, 
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subjectivities, and effects that come into play as gender, technology, and social institutions 
and practices meet and are given meaning.  
Intersectionality, reflexivity, & diffraction. I have devised an intersectional 
approach to examining the meta g/t story, where intersectionality includes within its scope 
both transdisciplinarity and diffraction. While intersectionality has been recently claimed 
by feminist scholars to refer to “the interaction of multiple identities and experiences of 
exclusion and subordination” (Davis, 2008), I use the term more expansively to include the 
intersecting discourses, practices, disciplinarities, methods, and methodologies through 
which subjects and subjectivities are framed, practiced, or experienced. Intersectionality is 
my way of describing the multiple lenses needed for any kind of re-examination or holistic 
understanding to be possible. It is, in essence, an immensely idealistic position, and thus, 
perhaps as improbable to achieve as is Polo’s ideal model. However, my incremental steps 
bring together a genealogic and intersectional approach to reading the contextual and 
temporal shifts that characterize social life—in this case, the g/t story. Thus, 
intersectionality sets off on a more representative or probable path than does reductivism 
because it recognizes at the outset that the “city” one reaches at the end might, in reality, 
have changed or moved since one wrote the guide for navigating or explaining it.  
  Diffraction is Haraway (1997) and Barad’s (2007) methodological approach for 
drawing on multiple lenses in order to “see” from a more intersectional perspective. 
Diffraction builds from transdisciplinary approaches to inquiry but includes a more 
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explicitly interpretive orientation.10 My intersectional strategy is both reflexive and 
diffractive, an alternative to the predominantly reflective and recursive methods of g/t 
research. My reading begins with a concern similar to Calvino’s Marco Polo regarding 
methodological and conceptual strategies that have embraced reductivism in pursuit of 
universal models. That is, g/t researchers, scholars, policy makers, and journalists have 
developed procedures for reducing, describing, and representing subjects or objects that in 
turn contribute to the phenomenon of gender underrepresentation in computing. A 
reductivist methodology helps to constitute the problem it purports to explain or 
dismantle. Through ever better dissections and extractions, the intent of mainstream g/t 
research has been to identify a most probable model, for predictive purposes. I will show, 
however, that this probable model is not benign or neutral. In addition, researchers 
themselves have realized one dilemma of the current g/t literature, namely, a vast quantity 
of exceptions, contradictions, and significant discrepancies between studies have made it 
quite difficult to settle on or effect the transformations sought. Mainstream thinking on 
this particular dilemma is that more precisely articulated problem statements, variables, 
and methods are necessary to better locate the most generalizable models.  
Foucault is one of a multitude of thinkers who see discourses themselves as a 
fruitful object of inquiry. Examining discourse practices is a way of interrogating the 
interplay between language, social practices, and the formation of subjects and 
subjectivities. 
                                                
10 Transdisciplinarity is extensively described as a distinct alternative to inter- or multi- 
disciplinarity (see for example, Klein, 2004; Lawrence & Després, 2004; Nowotny, 2003; 
Ramadier, 2004).  
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What properly belongs to a discursive formation and what makes it possible to 
delimit the group of concepts, disparate as they may be, that are specific to it, is the 
way in which these different elements are related to one another: the way in which, 
for example, the ordering of descriptions or accounts is linked to the techniques of 
rewriting; the way in which the field of memory is linked to the forms of hierarchy 
and subordination that govern the statements of a text; the way in which the modes 
of approximation and development of the statements are linked to the modes of 
criticism, commentary and interpretation of previously formulated statements, etc. 
It is this group of relations that constitutes a system of conceptual formation. 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 59-60)  
 
 What Foucault proposes is exhaustive and multi-faceted, and open to many 
interpretations. My approach combines the reflexive (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000; 
Bucholtz, 2001) and diffractive (Barad, 2007; Haraway, 1997). It builds from an interplay 
of critical theory, social discourse analysis that is both archaeological and genealogic 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, 1983; Foucault, 1972; 1990), and a hermeneutic practice of 
local interpretation attentive to social-historical-political contexts and events (Flyvbjerg, 
2001; Haraway, 1991, 1997; Taylor, 1995). One of my aims is to highlight how 
interpretations and stories are constructed, evaluated, promoted, marginalized, or lost.  
Double reading. My intersectional approach also builds from Derrida’s insistence 
on the necessity of double reading (which I derive from Nealon (1993)). A first reading is a 
“maneuver that, in the end, adds up to a neutralization of the opposition…it rearranges the 
terms” and produces a “scholarly reconstruction of [the] text” (p. 32). A second reading 
examines the range of faulty or problematic constructions that constitute the ground on 
which the first reading is constituted. Derrida’s work on deconstruction makes evident the 
value to be gained through double reading  but I play loosely with the notion of double to 
frame a rationale for multiple readings. Critchley, in a memorial reflection on Derrida’s 
work (2005), described double reading as: “reading the text in its original language, 
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knowing the corpus of the author as a whole, being acquainted with its original context 
and its dominant contexts of reception” (sec. 5.1). Given that I am not focused on the 
writings of any one scholar but rather, a broad story composed of multiple pieces, my 
scholarly, first reading will read specific examples and texts but also locate these within the 
larger “corpus” of the g/t story by pointing to the original contexts, the themes and 
concerns in circulation, as well as paint the spheres of influence to indicate the reception 
and progression of a story that began in the early 1980s (in the US).  
Engaging more of the spirit of double reading, rather than any prescription (which 
Derrida opposed anyway), I draw out a multi-faceted reading of the g/t story. The first 
reading most easily fits within Derrida and Nealon’s model: it describes and analyzes the 
conceptual foundations of the story as it has played out within the literature. I lay out the 
significant terms, relations, perspectives, and proposals articulated in the story, but 
rearrange them in order to portray the grounds for what appears to be a coherent story. I 
explicate what the story itself emphasizes as significant in terms of research questions, 
constructs, relationships, and methods. But what does Derrida mean by a second reading 
that goes beyond simply neutralizing the issues extricated in the first reading, an 
intervention to “displace[…] a mode of thinking that leads precisely to…deadlocks” 
(Nealon, 1993, p. 30)?   
I do not see how this can be done with only a second reading, unless second is 
more metaphor than fact. As I interpret double reading, the first is largely a critically 
reflexive analysis of a text or practice. I have found it useful to think of the second reading 
as diffractive, an idea borrowed from Haraway (1997) and Barad (2007). Diffraction brings 
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additional lenses to the observational or interpretive field with the intent of provoking 
challenging intersections between disciplines and theoretical conventions. The idea is to 
complicate assumptions and to provoke the reformulation of research questions.11  
Second reading aims for more than neutralizing issues extricated in the first 
reading. This reading is deconstructive in that it is a two-fold intervention, one that does 
not stop with criticizing what has been; it aims to articulate what could be (Nealon, 1993, 
p. 30). This is where diffraction plays a significant role—reading through multiple and 
unconventional lenses to avoid simply replacing the kinds of deadlocks that have limited 
the g/t story to date. Diffraction is a strategy for interweaving multiple content perspectives 
(e.g. regarding how we might conceptualize technology or gender) as well as multiple 
analytic strategies. 
Drawing from Foucault (1972; 1975, 1995, 1980a, 1990) and Blommaert (2005), I 
understand a story to be analyzable for the ways in which it is (a) socially constitutive, (b) 
reflective of a number of black-boxed practices and beliefs, and (c) an instrument of power. 
I also build from Foucault, Bohman (2003), and Haraway (1991a), who each in their way 
suggest that doing critical theory is a practice that engages and negotiates interpretive 
understandings, yet also seeks an impersonal, objective explanation. Haraway describes it as 
a strong objectivity. All argue that both lenses are necessary to further the project of social 
transformation. Interweaving these makes it possible to reconsider what constitutes an 
objective g/t story. 
                                                
11 This is also the driving idea behind transdisciplinarity as explained by Julie Klein (2004), 
Helga Nowotny (2003), and Wickson, Carew, & Russell (2006), for example.   
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 Contemporary feminist scholarship adds a needed dimension from two directions. 
One is a more specifically focused intersectionality, which in recent feminist usage 
emphasizes the “interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in 
individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the 
outcomes of these interactions in terms of power” (Davis, 2008, p. 68). Although recent g/t 
research seems, on the surface, to have moved forward in more responsibly in including 
race, class, disability, and so on, in reality the way these are framed within the g/t story 
remains mired in the limitations of liberal feminism. Double reading highlights some of 
these obstacles. The second dimension foregrounds ideas from feminist technoscience 
studies. Scholars I rely on most heavily are Haraway (1991a, 1997), Barad (2007), Wilson 
(1998), and Grosz (2005), for the ways in which they articulate new ways of thinking 
through the complex relationships between nature and culture and thus, essentialism, 
constructivism, time, causality, and an ethic of care. 
My project unfolds as a progressive and multi-faceted reading of the g/t story and 
its methodological conventions, as conveyed in this illustration:   
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Figure 2. Diffraction as faceting.  
My intersectional reading navigates the seven diffractions named in figure 2. This is 
not to say there are not more possible, but rather, that I found a way to end this reading—
perhaps this is what Derrida means by second. At some point, re-reading can stop; but at 
some point it would also presumably pick up again to build on what has been learned or to 
consider what has newly emerged. This is one of the challenges of intersectional or 
transdisciplinary work: there are always more exciting and important additional lenses to 
consider. I call it a problem of exponentially intriguing ideas, but it also makes apparent 
the value in a critical relationality for understanding social phenomena, one that is not 
only contextual, but also temporal.  
Over time, I have come to see that there are three different kinds of interpretive 
methodological engagements. The first is reflective, which is the approach that has most 
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grounded mainstream g/t research. Barad (2007) describes this as a strategy of “mirroring 
and sameness,” which I take to also refer to those holy grails of replicability and 
generalizability (p. 71). A second interpretive engagement is grounded in a critical 
reflexivity, which Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) define as paying serious attention “to the 
way different kinds of linguistic, social, political and theoretical elements are woven 
together in the process of knowledge development, during which empirical material is 
constructed, interpreted and written” (p. 5). Critical reflexivity makes it possible to exhume 
some of the underlying beliefs and practices that transparently frame the conduct of 
empirical research. Diffraction, according to Barad “does not take the boundaries of 
…objects or subjects…for granted but rather investigates the material-discursive boundary- 
making practices that produce 'objects' and 'subjects' and other differences out of, and in 
terms of, a changing relationality” (2007, p. 93).   
The third interpretive engagement is diffractive and interweaves multiple, 
unconventional, or newly relevant perspectives together to re-evaluate how difference, 
subjects, and objects have been conceived, located, and constituted. Diffractive readings 
build from reflexive readings and bring alternative and unconventional lenses to the table. 
They go beyond critical reflexivity because the aim is ultimately locating possibilities for 
reconstructing or alternatively conceptualizing a discourse or problem-focus so that these 
may become more effectively transformative. The conceptual provocation is quite deep. 
Rather than, for example, continuing the search for a more explanatory theory, a diffractive 
reading questions how the original problem has itself been construed. Intersectionality is in 
essence a quest to examine whether the problem as it has been laid out is the best problem 
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on which to focus attention. The goal is specifically opening up new kinds of research 
questions by reexamining the intersections between how subjects and objects and their 
relationship or significance may be theorized.  
Critical & genealogic faceting. In my reflexive reading, I examine the ways in 
which the g/t story remains grounded in liberal feminism and Gilligan’s (1982, 1993) 
psychological rendering of girls and consider why intersectional feminist approaches have 
been inaccessible. Diffractive reading allows me to bring feminist technoscience, 
philosophy, and political theory to the table and to re-examine not only the definition of 
gender in use, but also what kinds of research questions and assumptions follow the  
definition of gender. This helps in thinking about a conundrum of the g/t story where it 
aims for a universality built upon local subjectivities.  
Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy ground an aspect of how I approach reading 
the story. This lens disrupts assumptions of enduring foundations that are behind the 
concepts, theories, and accounts that ground the g/t story and that are used to justify 
claims of an objective science. Instead of certainty and reductivism, archeology and 
genealogy open up the possibility of “transformations that serve as new foundations, 
[…and] rebuilding … foundations” (Foucault, 1972, p. 5). Foucault insists that this kind of 
reading engages questions that are more basic and broader than traditional research 
questions, for example: “What is a science? What is an oeuvre? What is a theory? What is a 
concept? What is a text?” (p. 5) What is exposed is the impossibility of unities that have 
largely foregrounded the telling of certain stories by relying on “chains of inference, … 
tables of difference, … [to instead] describe systems of dispersion” (Foucault, 1972, p. 41). In 
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this spirit, my readings aim to locate, highlight, and examine the unities, concepts, and 
themes that ground the mainstream g/t story and then, to unpack these unities, concepts, 
and themes to discern what they do. 
 My methodological process and stance is at once integrative, critical, 
deconstructive, reconstructive, reflexive, and diffractive. I realize that these are also 
seemingly contradictory and paradoxical positions; however, contradiction and paradox are 
themselves useful antidotes to reductivism and certainty. The challenge of intersectional or 
diffractive reading is, in part, to locate significant contradictions and to use these to 
rethink assumptions. At the core of my approach is a social discourse analysis that is 
intersectional in its ambition and scope as it draws on a range of perspectives including 
ideas about education, philosophies of technology and computing, feminist theory, science 
and technology studies, and critical and cultural theory. I rely on Foucault’s (1972; 1975, 
1995, 1990) deconstruction of subjectivities and the subject-object relationship, Halliday 
and Martin’s (1993) examinations of the constructive nature of scientific discourse, and on 
ideas illuminating how the constituted outsider is produced (e.g. Derrida and Haraway). 
Also immensely important to my project are Taylor’s (1995) scholarship on epistemology 
and social imaginaries; Heidegger’s (1977) explication of technology through his idea of 
Gestell or enframing; and Haraway’s (1991a, 1997) work on alternative conceptions of 
objectivity that rejects both relativism and an all-knowing disengaged knower’s 
questionable objectivity.  
 Reflexivity focuses the critical, hermeneutic, and phronetic path of my interpretive 
readings within texts (see Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000) through which I examine how 
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subjects, objects, and knowledge are both derived and represented. However, diffraction is 
ultimately my intent. This is the metaphor that I borrow from Haraway and Barad to 
describe how I approach initiating conversations and analyses across texts, fields, 
disciplines, and time, in order to consider the interplay of historical, epistemological, 
theoretical, and methodological tensions that shape constructions, representations, or 
interpretations of the g/t story. These in turn become opportunities for adding new facets 
to the observational field. The observational “eye,” as Haraway and Barad suggest, cannot 
be merely a magnifying lens or mirror. Instead, my operational metaphor is that of a cut 
diamond, similar to Barad’s (2007) allusion to the multi-imaging eye of an insect, or the 
opulence and iridescence of a butterfly wing. The conceptual metaphor of this dissertation 
is then, faceting: I begin with two threads—the g/t story and its methodological 
foundations—and diffract these through a number of faceted readings.  
 Haraway identifies a common commitment in feminist science studies to be 
“avoiding what Whitehead called ‘the fallacy of misplaced concreteness’” (cited in 
Haraway, 1997, p. 269) and her suggestion is an alternative strong objectivity, which she 
describes as possible through new observational practices: “the chimeral entities emerging 
from the world-constructed-as-laboratory must be remapped and reinhabited by new 
practices of witnessing” (p. 269-270). Diffraction makes this alternative objectivity and 
witnessing possible. 
Faceting for a stronger objectivity. Building on this idea of rethinking the position 
from which we see, diffraction is a methodology best situated to re-envision objective 
perception or observation. The hurdle to navigate is how traditional views of objectivity 
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within normal science depend on a limited observational field of reference, thus, a limited 
objectivity. At the center of a diffractive practice is the intersectional scholar, who travels 
across disciplinary perspectives rather than bound to a single discipline’s (or compatriot 
disciplines) conventional ways of thinking about a problem. One of the points of 
contention in transdisciplinary work is whether sufficiently “new” knowledge is created, 
and how this knowledge is decided to be adequate or reliable. The problem is a tension 
between expectations that new knowledge dig ever deeper to produce “new” knowledge 
and aims that are more focused on questioning standing assumptions about knowledge 
and the premises behind research problems. Intersectional diffraction is a search for new 
or alternative layers to add to existing knowledge, but more significantly, it brings to the 
foreground new kinds of questions. This approach ideally strengthens disciplinary 
knowledge, but in a different way, by scrutinizing existing knowledge from often 
oppositional conceptual or methodological lenses. This is not to discredit the disciplinary 
home of such knowledge. Rather, it intends to provoke heretofore-missed opportunities for 
thinking about a specific problem in a new way. This is most useful when a problem itself 
has been seen to be intractable. The g/t story is, arguably, this kind of problem, as recent 
studies and articles have professed.12 A reflexive and diffractive intersectional methodology 
is my strategy for dissecting and reconfiguring the methodological and epistemological 
bases for thinking about the g/t story. The aim is ultimately, multiplicity rather than 
reduction, and in this sense, a stronger objective lens.  
                                                
12 Most of the more recent texts I list as the objects of my analysis take this as their starting 
premise, in some fashion: the g/t problem is a problem still in search of a solution. 
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Under consideration are conceptions of knowledge and its role in framing the 
interpretation or construction of subjects and objects and their intersection. Knowledge, as 
I understand it, is ultimately a product of the convergence of historical, political, and social 
factors that shape how we decide what is relevant to know and how social, political, and 
scientific phenomena and relationships are to be interpreted and valued (e.g. Denzin & 
Giardina, 2008; Gadamer, 1976; Hacking, 1999; Taylor, 1995). In this conception, the 
disciplines (and their stewards) not only are the intellectual locus for the creation and use 
of knowledge, they are cultural and political sites in a productive and legitimizing 
enterprise, setting the parameters of knowledge building and inquiry. The intersectional 
traveler focuses on the transparent effects of disciplinary boundaries and practices in order 
to bring these influences to the surface (Wickson, et al., 2006).  
The methodological import of intersectional thinking lies in the ways it questions, 
by illuminating previously absent lenses, assumptions that have become transparent in 
standing problem articulations. Multiple scholars, across disciplines, have argued that 
scientific knowledge—built largely through strong disciplinary conventions—reflects social 
negotiations that unfold within limited spheres of influence (e.g. Keller, 1985; Knorr-
Cetina, 1981; Latour, 2005). For these scholars, disciplinarity is only a “problem” to the 
degree that it confines our intellectual socialization within circles of disciplinary 
compatriots, and this is one of my concerns about the g/t story; its disciplinary and 
methodological lenses have been quite narrowly disciplined. This, in turn, has seriously 
narrowed both the kinds of questions opened to research and conceptions of the subjects 
and objects of that research. Intersectional thinking pursues possibilities for thinking 
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outside disciplinary and interdisciplinary practices. The aim is not merely the production 
of deeper or new knowledge about a recognized problem, but rather, new orientations to 
articulating the problem and developing new research questions. It is also a critical position 
that suggests more nuanced consideration of recent calls for greater interdisciplinarity 
alliances in educational research (AERA, 2009). At the least, greater reflexivity on the term 
interdisciplinarity and the status of critique might be useful.  
Challenging the rising fortunes of interdisciplinarity as a kind of curative, 
Greckhamer, Koro-Ljungberg, Sebnem, and Hayes (2008) deconstruct its possibility and 
impossibility. Intersectionality is a strategy that navigates the space of tension in the two 
opposing realities of interdisciplinarity that Greckhamer et al explicate: reverence for its 
sign and the negation of its possibility. What intersectionality offers is a means of opening 
up traditional expectations of how new knowledge is to be shaped, recognized, and 
stewarded.   
One challenge and responsibility facing the intersectional researcher is how to 
include and responsibly engage a broad range of disciplinary knowledge or literatures. A 
potential problem is that of being construed as an outsider by experts within those same 
disciplines. This othering may play out in how alternative interpretations are received and 
in what is considered new or useful contributions to a field. Intersectionality requires 
jumping into both an intellectual and political stew.13 This is the challenging research 
terrain—being neither wholly inside nor outside a discipline; both situated in the problem 
and yet, critically disengaged from specific disciplines and their traditions.  
                                                
13 Despite its allure, doing this kind of research presents numerous professional challenges. 
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I do not interpret intersectionality as the means of creating new disciplines (as some 
transdisciplinary scholars argue, (e.g. Nicolescu, 2008). Instead, I prefer to think about it as 
articulating alternative competencies and or practices that are at once hermeneutic and 
critical, reflexive, diffractive, deconstructive, and constructive—a kind of “interdisciplinarity 
2.0.”14 Transdisciplinary scholars (e.g. Klein, 2004; Lawrence & Després, 2004; Nowotny, 
2003; Ramadier, 2004) have argued for a re-positioning of scientific truth to create a space 
for value-rational and consequential “truths.” If there is an interventionist aspect to 
diffractive intersectionality, it lies in its aim of realigning the balance between scientific 
objectivity and an ethics of value. In some ways, this notion reflects the way that 
transdisciplinarity has been most prominent in the natural sciences and in those social 
sciences similarly aligned. The real target might be said to be objectivity itself, because once 
this is strengthened, the social-political-temporal aspects of knowing become integral and 
these are where ethics and values are situated.  
Intersectionality is also somewhat Deweyian in the ways inquiry is taken to be process 
and experience oriented. It describes particular, yet expansive, stances and methodological 
strategies of an inquirer engaged in research practices intent on revealing complexity and 
ambiguity through re-examining the premises grounding long-standing binaries of 
“subject/object, subjectivity/ objectivity, matter/consciousness, nature/divine, 
simplicity/complexity, reductionism/holism, diversity/unity” (Montuori, 2008, p. xii). This 
practice has a different emphasis than does education research that is focused on finding 
“what works” or that emphasizes replicable and generalizable knowledge. Disciplinary and 
                                                
14 Thank you to Karoliina Engstrom for this idea. 
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interdisciplinary strategies are useful in these contexts, but not well-suited to illuminating 
hidden agendas or embracing the ambiguities so important to understanding the depth 
and range of socio-political values that complicate the possibility of actually identifying 
what might work across a wide spectrum of society and shifts in this society over time.  
My argument for intersectional faceting is that it offers four opportunities. First, it 
expands the methodological lens in a way that makes it possible to rethink the kinds of 
assumptions through which the g/t story has been construed. Second, it provides a basis 
for re-evaluating long-standing problem formulations that have focused g/t researchers. 
Third, it brings questions of socio-political values and ethical commitments to the forefront 
and in so doing, expands the base of what kinds of knowledge is valued. Fourth, it becomes 
more possible to consider transparent power relations that stand to be missed through 
conventional, disengaged, scientific research methods.  
 In intersectional work, research attends to the ways in which power is negotiated in 
complex ways across and between disciplines and differently situated knowers. Klein (2004) 
suggests that transdisciplinarity is a response to an emergent shift in how expertise is 
understood to more expansively include a broader range of knowers (e.g. extra-disciplinary 
researchers or long-absent subjects of research).15 Flyvbjerg (2001) helpfully argues that 
“methodology must take account of the complex and unstable process according to which 
                                                
15 The user-expert divide is explored and deconstructed in Oudshoorn, N. and T. Pinch 
(eds.) (2003, 2005) How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users and Technology. 
(Cambridge, MA & London, MIT Press).  
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discourses can be both an instrument of power and its effect, but also an obstacle, a point 
of resistance or a starting point for a counterposing agency” (p. 124). Intersectional reading 
is a strategy for navigating this complexity.  
Witnessing. The primary aim of my reflexive-diffractive intersectional 
methodology, and my study, is to facet the g/t story from a number of angles. My aim is to 
open a space for re-imagining and re-witnessing the story and to promote a “better” 
position from which to theorize the g/t relationship and approach managing our 
technological futures. As my analytic readings unfold, I show how gender, women, and the 
g/t story have become a kind of technology used to manage a broad set of socio-techno 
anxieties. Although I do not offer a prescription for addressing whether this technology is, 
or will be, effective, I do suggest some alternative possible ways of conceptualizing gender, 
technology, and the ways these meet, through methodological lenses, in education, society, 
and politics.  
My intersectional approach queries the locations, values, and possibilities inherent 
in witnessing. Haraway’s inquiries into objectivity and the stories that science produces 
were motivated by her dissatisfaction with the gold standard of Enlightenment science’s 
“modest witness,” derived from an affectation that a standardized, disembodied, and 
generally white, European male eye was a neutral and thus, modest, observational position. 
Haraway suggests an alternative lens that includes in science, non-standard observers to 
better “interrogate critical silences, excavating the reasons questions cannot make headway 
and seem ridiculous, getting at the denied and disavowed in the heart of what seems 
neutral and rational” (Haraway, 1997, p. 269). Diffraction is also behind what Connolly 
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(2002) proposes as an intellectual modesty  “at the nodal points where the fundamental 
assumptions of contending theories differ…we should strive for reciprocal modesty” (p. 16). 
Thus, while a sufficiently faceted diamond may not bring visions of modest means, it is a 
useful metaphor for chiseling away at the standard g/t story and for beginning to imagine 
new ways of seeing not unities, but multiplicities. A faceted intellectual and interpretive 
modesty makes space for multiple perspectives to be appreciated and appreciative for what 
they, and others, bring to the table. 
 
The Significance of Faceted Readings 
Faceting the story is my organizing metaphor for the reflective, diffractive, 
intersectional analysis that I chisel at over the next eight chapters. Through multiple and 
layered readings, I unravel the ways in which assumptions and practices about the nature of 
knowledge and knowing, power relations, methodology, and conceptions or valuations of 
difference—as well as conceptions about the import of the gender and technology 
relationship itself—have been instrumental in constituting the g/t story. I conduct both a 
study of gender and technology by examining the assumptions used to understand both 
and a study of methodological assumptions, by examining how the g/t problem or 
relationship has been researched. I ultimately suggest new directions for re-imagining an 
alternative g/t story.  
Statistics (as illustrated in figure 1) suggest that the gender gap in computing 
reflects a relatively persistent trend. The question is what to make of these statistics; thus, 
one contribution of this dissertation is a re-examination of how the g/t problem itself is 
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conceived, examined, or reproduced. The methods and constructs for examining the g/t 
relationship have remained consistent over thirty years of research, often disregarding the 
often tumultuous intellectual and cultural shifts that have changed how various pieces of 
the g/t puzzle fit together (gender-women, identities, nature-culture, civil society-education, 
social theory and objectivity, minds and bodies, society and technology, and so on). In 
examining the intersection of g/t and methodology, this dissertation illustrates an 
approach for connecting how these elements may be conceptualized and diffracted to  
better think about the connections between the g/t story, education and its social 
transformative intentions.    
A significant challenge in writing has been finding a balance between the breadth 
necessary for diffraction and the depth needed for critical reflexivity. Thus, I acknowledge 
that while there is much here, so too is much left out. There are, to be sure, other examples 
of the g/t story, other possible questions, and many other significant theorists and 
perspectives that could be engaged. Thus, this thesis does not make a claim that it has 
exhausted the possibilities for comprehensiveness. It has not. However, this “lack” should 
not negate the possibilities unfolded for rethinking and re-questioning the premises or 
effects of the g/t story.  
The “official” g/t story is, in many ways, a product of transparent yet powerful ways 
of conceptualizing and investigating the social world through empirical, explanatory 
psychological-behaviorist conceived reductivist methodologies. My intersectional, reflexive-
diffractive double reading deconstructs what has been taken for granted yet is 
reconstructive in the ways it shows how a multi-faceting intersectional methodology paves 
41 
 
 
the way for re-imagining the g/t story in part, by rethinking the questions thought to be 
fundamental. The ensuing chapters articulate a seven-dimensional faceting of the g/t story, 
which I preview in the following section.   
 
Exposition: Faceted Readings 
Figure 3. Faceting the g/t story. 
This chapter (Facet 2) has outlined a primary research problem of how to 
simultaneously interrogate a dominant cultural story and the dominant methodology that 
forms the basis of this story. It has also introduced a number of other research questions 
that frame the additional faceted readings to follow. Facet 3 is a first reading of the g/t 
story; I characterize how researchers, educators, policy makers, and the media have 
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conceptualized, located, or represented the problem of girls and women’s 
underrepresentation in computing. This chapter identifies the range of problems that the 
story itself emphasizes as significant. Facet 4 chisels away at the ways the story has assumed, 
in many regards, the mantle of a modern meta-narrative.16 I consider how the instrumental 
power of this narrative is manifest through adherence to black-boxed rules of science and 
scientific discourse (e.g. nominalization, essentialisms, or binary constructions) and 
through elements presumed stable and independent (e.g. gender, technology, education, 
knowledge). One of the invisible threads woven into the g/t story is a subtle determinism 
regarding both gender and technology that persists despite a seeming acceptance of social 
constructivism in explaining both.  
In order to begin to dissect this determinism, Facet 5 introduces social imaginaries 
as an analytic lens. It identifies a set of imaginaries (gender, technology, knowledge-science-
progress, education, subjectivity-identity (framed through a dominant lens of the 
psychological-cognitive-behavioral sciences), and research) that are important in 
understanding the background practices and beliefs that shape and are shaped by how we 
live within, perceive, and represent social relations in their many forms.17 Facet 6 considers 
technology as something greater than tools and tool culture. Drawing from Heidegger’s 
thinking about technology; Taylor’s deconstruction of epistemology; Derrida, Irigaray, and 
                                                
16 Here I refer to Lyotard’s discussion but do not mean to infer that the story is such a 
narrative. 
17 C. Taylor, A. Appadurai, F. Rizvi, and D. Gaonkar are some of the scholars who use 
social imaginaries to describe the transparent background beliefs and practices that drive 
societies. I refer here to both Taylor’s view of our modern social imaginary as well as his 
genealogic analysis of this imaginary. 
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Cornell’s deconstruction of difference; and Haraway’s criticisms of mainstream science’s 
hegemonic objectivity, I draw out a thesis of a g/t story entangled within a modern four-
faceted enframing. These are our technological, epistemological, differentiated, and 
perceptual enframings and I examine how these collaborate to produce the constituted 
outsider, an essential technology of the g/t story.  
Facet 7 again delves deeper into “technology” to portray a set of subliminal 
technologies, in particular, binary thinking, that shape the social-political-cultural 
landscape in which the g/t story is situated. I describe five ways of thinking about 
technology, society, and subjects: engineering, social constructivist, philosophical-political, 
the techno-rational, and as a metaphor of mind. Discussed in depth are the political 
technologies of neoliberalism and technique as its own rationale, to show why these are 
significant technologies of the g/t story. Facet 8 examines the meta story as a disciplining 
technology of the self and gender, where objectivity is also disciplined to delineate gender 
and women outside technology. I argue that these technologies make possible the 
gendered-ethical outsider who could reshape technology and thus ameliorate a range of 
technology inspired anxieties. Facet 9 uses this expanded understanding of technology to 
discuss our modern anxieties as responses to significant ruptures in our understanding of 
the human-machine relationship; our relationship to knowledge and knowing; and 
disruptions to what had been considered stable identities in terms of gender and class. In 
this milieu and in the g/t story, desire, play, and values have been differently associated, for 
different ends. Facet 10 argues that the meta g/t story is fundamentally a story that 
responds to anxieties over our ethical relationship to technology and ourselves and that 
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this story relies on a too-limited store of resources and is thus ill-equipped to deliver on its 
various promises of transformation. To remedy this limitation, I draw on emergent work in 
feminist technoscience and new materialisms to show what posthumanist thinking infers 
regarding thinking and theorizing as techno-ethical practices. I argue that these ideas offer 
numerous opportunities for re-thinking the intersection of gender, technology, society, and 
education. I also point to some remaining challenges that stand in the way of fully re-
imagining the g/t story. The final chapter, facet 11, offers some thoughts about what might 
be done. 
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Facet 3 
Characterizing the G/T Story 
On the one hand, the meta g/t story seems quite simple: women and girls are 
underrepresented in computing and technology and the role of research is to locate and 
describe the reasons for this persistent gap and identify ways of closing it. The mainstream 
g/t story is organized around factors suspected of causing this state of affairs in order to put 
in place programmatic correctives. This is a largely instrumental lens on the problem. 
Somewhat different interests are articulated in sociological, historical, feminist 
technoscience or cultural studies of gender and technology. These studies tend to be most 
concerned with investigating intersections of feminist thought, historical conditions, and 
technoscience practices. My focus in this chapter is the first, largely instrumental story, but 
highlighting some points of divergence is useful. 
As the g/t story evolves over approximately thirty or so years, the mystery has been 
why the computing gender gap has persisted while over these same years the gap in other 
STEM fields has significantly narrowed. This mystery deepens when the fact that women 
have achieved near parity in law and medicine (at least in the practitioner domains of these 
professions) is brought to the table.18 There are at least two main facets to the g/t story: (a) 
the underrepresentation of girls and women in computing fields and (b) the perception 
                                                
18 A strong gender gap remains, however, in the more elite realms of these professions. 
Women are near parity as students in law and medical schools but as faculty or in the 
higher echelons of the professions the gap remains wide (Ward, 2008, Fall). The same is 
true in corporate upper management—a 2005 study of women’s representation on Fortune 
500 boards of directors showed a gain from 9.6 to 14.7% from 1995 to 2005, and 
Catalyst’s (2006) estimate is that while the gains are significant, achieving parity will take 
seventy years at this rate.      
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that a sufficient explanation of this gap remains on the table. The mainstream g/t story 
differs from humanities or sociological approaches in that each reflects different interests 
in describing and explaining a gendered relationship to technology. I explain this in more 
detail in a later chapter, and mention this now mainly to characterize the ways in which 
articulating a g/t story is a far more complicated endeavor than the overarching story of a 
gender gap implies.  
Despite variations in approaches or interests in g/t research, there is always a 
central commitment to some conception of equity. Facilitating social-cultural-political 
change is the glue that unifies concerns over the g/t relationship. However, as will become 
clear in my faceted reading, these commitments reflect shifting alliances and differing 
dispositions to the kinds of change sought. The two approaches have different ways of 
conceptualizing or positioning gender and technology, of thinking about the relationship 
of these to equity and social change, and draw on different methodological bases.19 One 
way to think about this these is shown in figure 4:  
                                                
19 The feminist technoscience/STS focus shows a far greater openness to alternative 
representations and theorizations of gender, technology, and their interaction. However, 
technofeminist approaches are not particularly visible in mainstream understandings of the 
g/t relationship. Its influence is largely in academia and perhaps in some policy arenas in 
Europe. Further, despite what some would argue is a greater sophistication in theorizing 
the relationship, there is seemingly little evidence that the project of technofeminism or 
STS has had any greater success in turning around the acknowledged problem of 
underrepresentation and inequity.   
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Figure 4. Locating dominant g/t meta- & micro- stories. 
Diagramed is a bifurcated gender and technology narrative. One story is largely driven by 
engineering and education concerns that feed and are fed by popular narratives. What I 
characterize as the “academic story” represents those narratives that tend to unfold in and 
remain within humanities departments and journals. The story on the left is the one I trace 
as a story concerned with three degrees of influence (reticence, utilitarianism, and women’s 
ethic of care). The top level is the meta-story, which refers to the broad literature, 
understandings, and policy aimed at describing the g/t relationship; extending out from 
this is an exponentially exploding collection of contested and shifting micro stories, each 
focused on providing ever more specific explanations or descriptions of girls and women’s 
relationship with technology. This is the culturally dominant story of gender and 
technology, in part because it sits in everyday life at least as much as it is an academic story.  
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The academic story on the right does not have the same broad-based on-the-ground 
influence. 
 
The G/T Problem as Described in the Meta Story and its Micro Stories 
The meta g/t story reflects a commitment to education and equity that in turn is 
strongly influenced by ideas about learning grounded in cognitive science and the learning 
sciences. Research, policy, everyday practices, and popular media representations both feed 
and become products of the g/t meta-story. There is a vast quantity of micro stories that 
span research and policy reports, funding agendas, institutional, government, and media 
reports, as well as largely undocumented instances enacted or told in everyday experiences 
of girls, women, boys, men, parents, and teachers. These stories not only describe and 
explain the g/t relationship and problem, they have also pursued ideas that the gender gap 
can be repaired because equity is the real issue at stake. Less obvious is the way these micro 
stories may in effect serve as a barrier to the kind of change they try to describe and 
promote. Characterizing these micro-level representations helps in laying a foundation for 
articulating the kinds of issues thought to be significant. It helps to sort out how these 
issues are positioned in the story and what interests they serve.    
“Investigating the high-tech gender gap”  was published widely in newspapers and in 
online news sites both in the US and globally on or around September 23, 2007 (Mintz). 
The article offers a glimpse into the strength and reach of the g/t story. The article begins 
by stating:  
For more than a decade, academics and technology executives have been frowning 
at the widening gender gap in computer science. Everyone has a theory, but no one 
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has managed to attract many more women. Now some computer science 
researchers say one solution may lie in the design of software itself.  (para. 1)  
 
The g/t problem is not the big news. What got this story published is that someone has 
offered a new, potential solution. Through these few opening sentences, the g/t story is 
further embedded in the social imagination as a large and lingering problem. Moreover, 
and this is a key point, this story is explicitly framed as a story in search of a solution; the 
notion that there eventually will be such a solution is the draw. Solving the problem, as 
Mintz states, is the focus of both scholarly and corporate resources and of media attention. 
Significantly, it is a story for which “everyone has a theory, but no one has managed to 
attract many more women” (para. 1) This particular instance of the g/t story was widely 
distributed by the Associated Press not because it is a new or familiar story, but because it 
promises new hope for a resolution.20   
The g/t story has, in some ways, remained surprisingly stable over the last three 
decades even as details of the story have changed significantly. In the early 1980s (the 
generally acknowledged starting point of the story), in education and engineering, 
assumptions, and beliefs about girls and women’s innate and lesser abilities in STEM fields 
provided the driving narrative (see for example, Collis, 1985; Hawkins, 1985; Kay, 1992; 
Lockheed, 1985; Morse & Daiute, 1992; Sanders, 2005; Turkle, 1988). By the 1990’s, the 
focus became more explicitly an attack on pervasive inequities as the liberal feminist 
                                                
20 In quick Google search I found that the story ran on all major and local websites – 
perhaps 190 hits on Google in one search. I read it first in a local paper and thus presume 
that the article also ran in the print versions of other papers.  I found the article online: 
Turkish Daily News, Canadian Business; salon.com; aol.com; cbs.com; yahoo.com; yahoo 
Singapore, Australia IT, and so on. 
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movement escalated the push for gender equity and parity. In this charged political climate, 
the ways in which inequities and gendered ideologies were thought to be embedded in 
software due to male biased designs, particularly in computer games, became a primary 
target (e.g. Gürer & Camp, 2002; Hawkins, 1985; Henwood, 2000). By around 2000, the 
emphasis had largely shifted to deficits and embedded inequities in the cultures where 
technology is used or created (e.g. AAUW, 2000; Henwood & Miller, 2001; Margolis & 
Fisher, 2002). In addition, race and class concerns became more prominent, but tend not 
to be significantly differentiated from gender. Generally, the idea has been that a triad of 
gender, race, and class deny or limit access to a power that is attributed to or located within 
technology and its culture.  
Statistics are generally the way that the g/t problem (or race or class) is documented 
and traced over time and between populations. For example, the AAUW (2000) report 
characterize the extent of the problem: 
Statistics on girls’ participation in the culture of computing are of increasing 
concern, from the point of view of education, economics, and culture. Girls are not 
well-represented in computer laboratories and clubs, and have taken dramatically 
fewer programming and computer science courses at the high school and 
postsecondary level. (p. x; bold in original) 
 
Similarly, statistics drive the NSF’s agenda of identifying workable interventions, as seen in 
this excerpt from its 2007-2008 funding prospectus:   
The Division of Human Resource Development (HRD) manages a portfolio of 
programs that aims to broaden the participation of traditionally underrepresented 
groups in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) learning and 
in the STEM workforce. Programs are in place to address the learning, interest and 
participation of women, underrepresented minorities (African Americans, Alaska 
Natives, American Indians Hispanics, Native Hawaiians and other Pacific  
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Islanders), and people with disabilities, at all academic and professional levels. 
(2007, sec. 1)  
 
Gender representation is the problem and the focus is always on the low numbers of 
women and girls in the field. My aim is not to question these numbers but rather, to 
highlight that it is a rare occasion indeed that any qualitative analyses of women’s influence 
on computing is discussed. Rather, foregrounded are programmatic interventions meant to 
eliminate the gender (as well as race, ethnicity, disability) divide. The NSF prospectus is an 
example of how research agendas are shaped to focus on causal factors. The factors in 
question are, broadly, specific characteristics of girls and women as these intersect with 
technology and its culture and characteristics. The NSF puts it this way: 
Research projects: investigate factors behind the underrepresentation of girls and 
women in STEM education; societal, formal and informal educational systems' 
interaction with individuals that encourage or discourage interest and persistence 
in study or careers in certain STEM fields. (2007; par. 41; bold in italics) 
 
Researchers have adopted this project of identifying causal factors and this has produced a 
vast store of micro stories—each elaborating a particular hypothesis about the relationship. 
Examining this body of literature, Cohoon and Aspray, in their 2006 review, identified ten 
factors that have served to focus g/t research and, in their view, warrant further 
investigation.    
Most extensively written about so far in the scholarly literature are experience, 
confidence, mentoring, and student-faculty interaction. Least extensively covered 
are entry barriers, role models, and culture. Somewhere in between are curriculum, 
peer support, and pedagogy. Regardless of the coverage, each of our ten categories 
includes important questions that still need investigation. (p. 171)  
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Gurër and Camp’s 2002 literature review identified a different set of factors, but showed a 
similar mindset: 
It is imperative that we encourage and retain more women in computer science 
(CS) …Why are the numbers going down? and, how can we reverse this trend?…The 
information contained in the [ACM-W] database can be divided into 12 areas: early 
in the pipeline, attitudes, computer experience, computer games, mentoring and 
role models, self-confidence, computing environments, societal influences, teacher 
and family encouragement, all-female environment, graduate school, and balancing 
work and family. (p. 121) 
 
An earlier, yet similar, framing may be seen in “Computer Fear,” published in 1983: 
The results of a study conducted at Princeton High School showed that  
gender, grade, and the type and section of math class were all related to how much 
students learned. Males, younger students, students in sophomore and junior 
precollege math, and students in advanced math courses gained relatively more 
than females, seniors, and students enrolled in other math courses and levels. In 
general, access to and experience with computers were unrelated to gain in 
computer literacy. However, asking for help from the teacher benefited female 
students, and access to a computer outside of school affected the scores of ninth- 
and tenth-grade female students. (Bakon, Nielsen, & McKenzie, 1983, p. 27)  
 
There is a consistency in these stories that spans two decades. The focus is always on 
identifying and narrowing probable causal factors of the gender gap and the ongoing aim 
has been to refine a set of predictive theories/accounts of how particular factors impact the 
g/t relationship, as Cohoon and Aspray explicitly state: 
The extent of coverage for a topic does not necessarily indicate the quality or 
adequacy of evidence. The quality or adequacy rests more on whether the study 
demonstrates a reliable link between women’s participation and some preceding 
conditions. (2006b, p. 171)  
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The factors and variables identified to date are numerous, which is perhaps not surprising 
given the sheer number of studies.21 A New York Times op-ed piece from 2000, a variation 
on Mintz’s 2007 AP article, highlights some of these: 
Why are there few women in these fields? One reason is that girls receive little 
encouragement to explore computers early in their schooling. Most computer 
games are male-oriented, and there are few female role models in technical 
industries. Women who perform well in high school math and science are often 
put off by male-dominated lecture halls in college. Women who do end up joining 
the technology work force have complained about a lack of opportunity for 
advancement and an absence of support and mentoring. (sec. A,"Technology's 
gender gap," p. 26) 
 
The overarching g/t story is built from a vast landscape of small g/t stories; the 
above examples are only a representative selection. Notably, this landscape, despite its 
reach, is rather flat. The picture is composed of a large expanse of identified factors with a 
large pile of discarded or discredited factors still clouding the view or lurking in the 
background. The many micro-level instances of this story—empirical and speculative studies 
as well as summative reviews—highlight factors and causal relations that themselves are not 
independent of beliefs now broadly held about the g/t relationship. The stated intent is to 
identify specific causes of the gender divide and develop a predictive theory of g/t that will 
facilitate designing and implementing effective remedies.   
A very recent concern is that theorizations of g/t have been insufficient or even 
missing. The argument is that better theory would produce more accurate explanations and 
                                                
21 The meta g/t story is astoundingly huge, considering it essentially emerged in the early 
1980s. Counting up the specific examples would be quite a challenge: Jo Sanders’ 2005 
review of the g/t education research literature alone listed over 700 such studies.  Her 
review was highly specific in its scope and thus, there are still more examples located in 
policy, media reports/commentary, along with those to be found in other disciplines and 
their venues. 
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thus, more effective interventions. This argument itself functions as a theory of g/t. In 
other words, the theory of g/t in use appears to be that there is a problematic g/t 
relationship due to specific characteristics in or of girls and women, technologies, or the 
environments where they meet. This argument or theory functions to both hypothesize and 
conceptualize the relationship by insisting that identifying particular, salient factors or 
relations will make it possible to change the relationship and eliminate the problem. This 
is the overarching framework of the g/t story and the theory of g/t in operation.  
Befitting its alliance with the behavioral-cognitive-psychological sciences, this use of 
theory is linked to what I suggest is another key characteristic of the meta story—its 
recursiveness.22 The story is always looking back on itself for self-verification and continues 
to circle back on itself by relying on a relatively stable set of overarching concepts and 
theoretical frameworks. The story is a continuous loop of formulating a predictive 
hypothesis, “testing” this new hypothesis, and eventually, discarding the older suspected 
factor in favor of some new, more plausible, representative, or comprehensive factor. It is 
hard to discern how the g/t problem can be other than a reiteration of previous studies 
and thus, a contributor to the continuation of the problem.   
That is, a micro-story resonates as true because it is prefaced by the long-standing 
larger story that has become a truth of everyday life. Missing from this way of telling the 
                                                
22 Hubert Blalock (1985) describes a recursive formula for explaining social phenomena or 
relationships as one that focuses on “one-way causation” and tends to “focus on a single 
dependent variable and a set of ‘predictors’…in effect it provides a set of rules for making 
causal inferences on the basis of empirical relationships…they can give us a systematic way 
of building block upon block, so that our theories can become cumulative and so that 
alternative explanations that are not consistent with the data can be rejected” (p. 3).  
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story is any possibility of questioning what its underlying truth rests upon. There is no 
entry point that would allow asking whether there is really a truth to be relied upon. I am 
not trying to suggest that there is not a gender/technology disparity, but rather, that the 
ways in which the story is approached limit what can be known about the relationship as 
well as what is available to investigate. These limitations might be understood as a set of a 
priori beliefs, concepts, expectations, or ideologies through which we view the relationship. 
It is said that seeing is believing, but often it’s the other way around. We do not 
form our beliefs on the basis of what we see; rather, what we see is determined by 
our beliefs. We see not what is there, but rather what we want to see or expect to 
see. (Morris, 2007, mid-page) 
 
 One such belief—expressed in Mintz’s AP story (2007)—is the story itself. This story 
is built from a collection of shared beliefs about a problematic relationship between gender 
and technology that presume that this pervasive, well-recognized problem is indeed a 
problem of equity and access. Mintz, using the phrase “For more than a decade…” relies on 
a cultural belief that this g/t gap is true and needs no elaboration because the problem is 
already so well known. Thus, by her third sentence she can get right to the main point—a 
new, potentially corrective solution is in the works that will address the diminishing 
participation of girls and women in computer science.   
This type of social engineering or instrumental narrative is pervasive and, despite 
the quantity of examples, remains relatively consistent across these micro examples. As an 
illustration of this way of thinking, the chapter titles and subheadings used in specific texts 
show how the story is both organized around a set of beliefs yet relies on these beliefs to 
describe and explain itself. For example, Unlocking the Clubhouse (Margolis & Fisher, 2002) 
relies on headings such as: “The Magnetic Attraction”, “Middle and High School: A Room 
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of His Own”, “Computing with a Purpose”, and “Geek Mythology.” The AAUW report, 
Tech-Savvy (2000) is organized around the following headliners: “We Can, But I Don’t 
Want To,” “In the School”, “Educational Software and Games.” Another text, From Barbie 
to Mortal Kombat (Cassell & Jenkins, 1998, 1999b) focuses specifically on the girls’ games 
movement using titles such as: “Video Game Designs by Girls and Boys: Variability and 
Consistency of Gender Differences” and “Retooling Play: Dystopia, Dysphoria, and 
Difference.” Such examples highlight the ways in which these texts’ organizational 
strategies reflect the ways in which the story is oriented to examine highly specific causal 
factors that begin with a set of existing beliefs.   
  I have suggested two levels to the g/t story. The first is a macro level story (which I 
refer to as the meta story) that acknowledges the g/t problem as one of under-
representation and inequity and tries to articulate ways of intervening in this problem. The 
micro stories are built from a vast quantity of studies or reports each describing or 
explaining some aspect of the g/t relationship. Despite the seeming clarity of the macro 
story, the wealth of micro stories suggests a complexity to the relationship and a murkiness 
that results from so much information coming from so many directions. In this stew, it is 
sometimes hard to discern the essential issues held to be at stake. The next section will sort 
through the stew to identify and characterize a set of eight meta-level concerns or problems.  
 
Meta-Level Concerns  
 Quantity. Camp’s paper, “The incredible shrinking pipeline” (1997) is highly cited 
and commonly used to describe the extent and genesis of the g/t problem. The shrinking 
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pipeline describes the specific concern over the declining numbers of women in computing 
as they move through a career trajectory of K-16, masters’ and PhD degree programs, and 
careers. Figure 5 is Camp’s graph (p. 103):   
 
Figure 5. Camp’s shrinking pipeline. 
 
The gap in women’s representation that Camp identified has deepened in the new 
millennium, as documented by the National Center for Education Statistics, illustrated in 
figure 6. (U.S. Department of Education Institute of Education Sciences; Digest of 
Education Statistics, 2005, p. 456)  
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Figure 6. Representation in baccalaureate degrees by group (2005). 
Camp’s paper stated: 
The percentage of bachelor’s degrees awarded in CS to women decreased almost 
every year over the last decade. In other words, not only does the pipeline shrink 
from high school to graduate school, but it also shrinks at the bachelor’s level). ... 
Furthermore, while the percentage of bachelor’s degrees awarded in CS to women 
decreased, corresponding percentages of other science and engineering disciplines 
increased. Since the number of women at the bachelor’s level affects the number of 
women at levels higher in the pipeline and in the job market, these facts are of 
great concern. (1997, p. 104) 
 
This description represents the g/t story as primarily a problem of the numbers or 
percentage of girls and women studying or working in the field. The emphasis is the 
quantity of women rather than other, qualitative descriptors. This focus on under-
representation thus frames the problem—at the outset— as one of quantity. This is probably 
due to the fact that primary story is intended to promote gender equity in computing fields 
and access to technology. Similarly, Margolis and Fisher have stated that while women are 
no longer a minority on the Internet, 
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In the nation’s research departments of computer science fewer than 20 percent of 
the graduates are female. Fewer still enroll in high school programming or 
advanced computer science classes.…women have lost ground in the world of 
computing. (2002, p. 2) 
 
Quantity is the overarching problem, and this emphasis on counting up the numbers now 
structures the story itself; the problem and potential solutions are always framed in 
quantitative terms. Quantity also underlies the characterization of a “leaky pipeline” that 
has been a central concern. Herman and Webster (2007) state that the problem, from a 
2007 perspective, is that there has “been very little gender analysis apart from the 
superficial number crunching, dictated by targets and quotas” (p. 280).   
 Difference. Conceptualizing the g/t story as a problem of quantity—of numbers of 
kinds of bodies—highlights a second meta-problem of difference. When Mintz (2007) states, 
“For more than a decade academics and technology executives have been frowning at the 
widening gender gap in computer science” difference is the defining quality that makes 
measuring the gap possible (para. 1).. Defining or contextualizing this difference has been 
an empirical focus of research yet is also a contested conceptual construct. For example, in 
the following, Cassell and Jenkins (1998, 1999a) want to trouble conventional assumptions 
about m-f difference and bring to the table a more nuanced notion of what it means to be 
feminine; also evident is the competing need for women to be classifiable as a cohesive 
group:   
Feminism has struggled to break down univocal conceptions of gender and open a 
space for many ways of being masculine and feminine. The development of girls’ 
games needs to be careful to reflect the diversity of women’s lives and to foster 
acceptance of a range of different feminine styles and identities. Industry insiders, 
however, note that to do so would necessitate fragmenting an already small,  
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marginalized, and developing market, insisting that such specialization of interests 
will be possible only when the girls’ game industry is more firmly established. (p. 
27) 
  
The tension over what kinds of differences are most representative and useful is palpable. 
Despite this difficulty, the g/t story largely proceeds in categorizing girls and women as a 
unified group, with recognizable and consistent characteristics. This is masked however, by 
the ways in which these differences themselves are counted, but mostly in the ways that 
race and class are framed as complicating factors to gender. One version is evident in 
Cohoon and Aspray’s (2006a) analysis:  
We have also glossed over the issue of differences among women. For example, we 
know that minority women’s representation in computing differs from white 
women’s. Likewise, students who interrupt their formal education for work or 
family reasons … often follow different career paths than those women who 
continue straight through all their schooling before entering the workforce. There 
may also be significant differences among women depending on their level of 
education, type of occupation, or employment setting planned. (p. 142)   
 
For Cohoon and Aspray, identifying and explaining difference is the aim, but this 
is not the only way difference is manifest. Turkle, in 1988, argued that there is an innate 
and symbolic difference between the computer and woman. In her view, women’s future 
relationship to computers will not be phobic but rather, reticent, as “the computer 
becomes a personal and cultural symbol of what a woman is not” (p. 41). In making this 
claim, she located a difference between the nature of woman and the nature of the 
computer, inferred that the computer is masculine, reinscribed some innate differences  
between m-f and female-computer, and thus relied on an innate and intimate male-
computer relationship. The meta-problem of difference is a constant and central concern 
in the g/t story, though the nature of that difference has never been settled. 
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 Deficits. Difference has further been used to articulate or explain some kind of 
deficit, be it biological, psychological, or a product of socialization and education. An 
ongoing tension between these kinds of deficits is evident in the Mintz (2007) article:   
Beckwith decided to investigate why women and men might interact so differently 
with the same software.…One theory grabbed her attention: High confidence 
correlates with success.…And most studies indicated that women—even ones who 
study computer science—have less confidence than men in their computer skills.… 
Beckwith wasn’t interested in changing women’s confidence levels. She was 
interested in whether changing the software could help women over this hurdle.  
(para. 5)  
 
It is hard to separate discussions of difference from those of deficits, especially as the target 
of each shifted over the decades. Beckwith sees a lack of confidence in women, but further 
locates the deficit in a human-computer interaction—it becomes a deficit embedded in 
software design, but her project also seems to infer that it will be easier to change the 
software than to change women.       
 In the late 1990s, institutional and cultural deficits took center stage. Unlocking the 
Clubhouse (Margolis & Fisher, 2002) targeted the cultures of computing and computer 
science programs: 
Despite doubts and uncertainties, women tend to persist in computer science when 
they reject and find alternatives to the dominant culture of the field. A larger 
question, though, is what institutions can and should do to eliminate the negative 
factors that lead students to leave computing programs. (p. 107)  
 
Placing the deficit within men, software, or within institutional cultures superficially 
moved the focus away from deficits within women to deficits in cultures or more subtly, in 
men, as a group either too apt to show off, try to control, or narrowly focused on 
technology for technology’s sake.   
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As early as kindergarten, girls use the computer eagerly and skillfully for writing 
their stories, but boys race to the computers for free time and play….a remarkably 
consistent picture emerges: more boys than girls experience an early passionate 
attachment to computers, whereas for most girls attachment is muted and is ‘one 
interest among many.’ (p. 15-16)  
 
Underlying all of these efforts is an implied and enduring deficit located in women’s lack 
of passion or interest in computers—an “interest deficit” caused by deficits in the dominant 
computing culture. The tension between these is explicit in the AAUW (2000) report: 
In its inquiries into gender issues in computers and education, the commission 
found that girls are concerned about the passivity of their interactions with the 
computer as a ‘tool’; they reject the violence, redundancy, and tedium of computer 
games; and they dislike narrowly and technically focused programming classes. (p. 
ix) 
 
 Identity constructions. Somewhat under the radar, but inferred in this AAUW 
passage, is that the problems are not simply those of difference or deficits. Identity 
construction is another meta level concern, and identity formation might be fostered, 
tinkered with, or challenged by the computer. Turkle (1988) positioned the computer as a 
kind of force around which identities are understood: 
This essay looks at the social construction of the computer as a male domain 
through the eyes of women who have come to see something important about 
themselves in terms of what computers are not. (p. 41) 
 
She argued that keeping one’s identity as a woman necessitated differentiating 
oneself from the computer. For women, it might be fun to play around with one’s identity 
but, because women are not like men, they could not see themselves in a merger with the 
machine.  
63 
 
 
[Women] At the extreme…see the social world of the “hacker,” a culture of 
computer virtuosos. It is a world, predominantly male, that takes the machine as a 
partner in an intimate relationship. (p. 42)  
 
Bryson and Castell’s (1996) work targeted this use of identity as part of the 
problem; it too rigidly defined woman.    
Intervening at the level of gender-identity construction troubles the illusory 
naturalness of 'differences between the sexes' - differences whose function depends 
on those differences being seen as immutable and constant. (p. 240)  
 
In their view, the problem is a normative construction of girls and women’s identity that 
plays out in classrooms in the notion that while girls should be able to use computers, they 
are not real girls if they become experts. 
The tactic of ‘queering’ gender identity by intervening in terms of access to and 
uses of technologies in school is seen by many as simply unacceptable. It is one 
thing to propose that ‘you can be a girl and still use computers’ and quite another 
to work…to make girls the experts at computers. (p. 240)  
The very idea of the identity of the computer has also been an issue. In many 
pockets of the g/t story, the computer has been socially constituted as male, and this is the 
root of at least some of girls and women’s issues with computing.  
As children see dads and brothers tinkering with the computer, being the computer 
experts in the family, playing games on the computer that obviously speaks to boys’ 
interests and not girls’, there is the likelihood that very young children will identify 
the computer as a ‘he’ object. The consequences for daughters and sons of 
identifying the computer as male and of seeing mothers as having low confidence 
and ability with technology are far-reaching. (Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 22)  
 
The computer acquires a masculine identity through children’s observations of their 
mothers’ low confidence and ability and their fathers’ normative role as the technical go-to 
person. Family practices promote the social construction of the computer as male, and 
women as outsiders.  
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 Sometimes a co-construction model of the g/t relationship is prominent. This 
model suggests that both gender and technology co-evolve and take shape through 
everyday, socio-political interaction. Computer and video games, for example, are often 
discussed in this way: 
Video games provide a prime example of the social construction of gender. Women 
rarely appear in them, except as damsels requiring rescue, or rewards for successful 
completion of the mission. Most feminist analysis of gender and video games to 
date has been concerned with the proliferation of violent, aggressive, gory, and 
often overtly misogynistic images within the video game marketplace. (Cassell & 
Jenkins, 1998, 1999a, p. 7) 
 
In these types of discourses, it is clear how the feminine is constructed but the fact that the 
computer itself is also constructed with a masculine identity is more transparent.  
 The digital divide. These problems of difference, deficits, and identity are 
constitutive elements in digital divide concerns. Inequities in various groups’ access to 
technology help sustain or create inequities in society and, thus, limit the opportunities 
and rewards available to those affected by this digital divide. This issue was at the heart of 
Turkle and Papert’s (1991) work on the epistemological frameworks that they saw 
dominating computer science programs: 
The concerns that fuel the discussion of women and computers are best served by 
talking about more than women and more than computers. Women’s access to 
science and engineering has historically been blocked by prejudice and 
discrimination. Here we address sources of exclusion determined not by rules that 
keep women out, but by ways of thinking that make them reluctant to join in. Our 
central thesis is that equal access to even the most basic elements of computation 
requires an epistemological pluralism, accepting the validity of multiple ways of 
knowing and thinking. (para. 1) 
 
The digital divide has many facets; it is manifested not only in epistemological 
terms but also refers to the realities of long-standing economic and social conventions or 
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disparities faced by individuals, groups, or countries. Margolis and Fisher (2002) 
characterize the gender divide within families: 
While upper- and middle-income children in the digital generation are being 
introduced to the computer at home, long before kindergarten or even preschool, 
home access and use are far from universal or uniform.…Many students recount a 
gender divide in their families.…The computer impaired mother is a stock character 
in many students’ stories.…Children are keen observers. They notice whether their 
mother or father gets into the driver’s seat or the passenger side, they notice who is 
called for the when the electric power goes out…and they notice who tinkers with 
the computer. (p. 20) 
 
This divide manifests on a global level as UNESCO, in its report Gender Issues in the 
Information Society (Primo, 2003) notes:  
Given the potential of ICTs in development and social transformation, it is 
essential that we address the gender digital divide. The aim is both to ensure 
women’s access to the benefits of ICTs, and to make ICTs into a central tool in 
women’s empowerment and the promotion of gender equality. (p. 15) 
 
The digital divide is a way of talking about the structural barriers that women face and 
emphasizes interventions meant to break down these long-standing inequities that women 
(and other similarly marginalized populations) face.  
 Techno-literacies and power. The digital divide is of growing importance in a 
world where technological literacy (or new literacies) is viewed as essential for individuals in 
getting and retaining good jobs and to governments as they strive to keep, or gain a 
foothold, in the global competition for resources and wealth. Notions of what constitutes 
technological literacy range from literacies around being able to use technologies and 
literacies needed to design new kinds of technologies. The AAUW (2000) report makes 
this central tension between literacies a focal point: 
A common alternative to computer science courses—and a common point of entry 
for girls into the computer world – has been courses on computer “tools,” such as 
66 
 
 
databases, page layout programs, graphics, online publishing, and other 
“productivity software.” The commission believes that while mastery of these tools 
may be useful, it is not the same thing as true technological literacy. (p. x)  
 
For the AAUW, the problem is creating a space for girls and women to achieve an 
advanced and “real” technological literacy, one that would enable them to become creators. 
The NSF’s (2007) concern is broader, in that literacies fostered on an individual level are 
the building blocks of a technologically literate society: 
One of the National Science Foundation's (NSF) key strategic goals is to cultivate a 
world-class, broadly inclusive science and engineering workforce, and expand the 
scientific literacy of all citizens. Investments are directed at programs that 
strengthen scientific and engineering (S&E) research potential and education 
programs at all levels. These outcomes are essential to the U.S. as we progress 
toward an increasingly technological job market and a scientifically complex society. 
(p. 5) 
 
  The digital divide is the barrier to full technological literacy and the digital divide 
and technological literacy are together significant because they are the gateway to 
technology’s power. In the g/t story, access to this power is both the problem and the goal. 
This plays out for individuals as well as countries, as this UNESCO (Primo, 2003) passage 
illustrates: 
Women’s capacity to exploit the potential of the new information and 
communication technologies as tools for empowerment is constrained in different 
ways in different regions…In regions with low teledensity, basic socio-structural 
obstacles mean that the vast majority of women and men are effectively excluded 
from the emerging Information Society. Yet in many cases these overall constraints 
are filtered through specific gender-based determinants that cause women to be 
particularly disadvantaged. (p. 10) 
 
Focused on computer games, Cassell and Jenkins (1998, 1999a) both highlight and merge 
the problems of literacy, access, and power: 
The problem in the differential attraction to computer games stems from the fact 
that here, as is often the case, the cultural constructions of gender are not separate 
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from those of power. It is not just that girls seem to like today’s computer games 
less than boys do, but that these differential preferences are associated with 
differential access to technological fields as the children grow older, and this 
differential access threatens to worsen as technological literacy increasingly becomes 
a general precondition for employment. (p. 11) 
 
Power, transmitted or enforced by social structures, motivated Turkle and Papert’s (1991) 
research in Epistemological Pluralism: 
With this assertion we find ourselves at the meeting point of three epistemological 
challenges to the hegemony of the abstract, formal, and logical as the privileged 
canon in scientific thought….the canonical style, abstract and rule-driven, is 
associated with power and elitism, and with the social construction of science and 
objectivity as male. (para. 2) 
 
Globalization & social change. Concerns over access, literacy, and power are 
driven by desires to keep up in a world economy seemingly ever more dependent on 
technology and technologically skilled workers. At stake are both the individual’s ability to 
sustain her/himself in this technological world and a society’s self-interest that cannot be 
separated from the ways it supports or uses its citizens and workers. Some stakeholders are 
less concerned with jobs and instead foreground the potential of technology to foster—or at 
least support—social change. This notion is also evident in Epistemological Pluralism: 
We find that, besides being a lens through which personal styles can be seen, it is 
also a privileged medium for the growth of alternative voices in dealing with the 
world of formal systems.…As a carrier for pluralistic ideas, the computer holds the 
promise of catalyzing change, not only within computation but in our culture at 
large. (1991) 
 
UNESCO’s (Primo, 2003) gender-ICT agenda is driven by this desire for social change and 
for fostering an international ethic of equity, harnessed through technological 
opportunities. 
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In regions with low teledensity, basic socio-structural obstacles mean that the vast 
majority of women and men are effectively excluded from the emerging 
Information Society. (p. 18-19) 
 
Thus, literacy and access to technologies are the means of overcoming social and structural 
barriers within particular communities and across the globe. Access to technology means 
access to information, and information means not only having power but is the resource 
for acquiring power. This meta level concern meets at the intersection of globalization and 
desires for social transformation.   
 Inadequate research or theory. Another meta concern highlighted in the 
overarching g/t story is that research methods are found lacking in scientific rigor. A 
growing concern is that inadequate research methods are themselves causal factors in girls and 
women’s continuing underrepresentation. The problem is that insufficient methods are 
thought to deliver unreliable predictions and interventions, as Cohoon and Aspray (2006a) 
argue:   
Our review of the literature on women in postsecondary computer science leads us 
to the conclusion that two conditions contribute to the persistence of women’s 
underrepresentation. The first condition is an inadequate understanding of the 
underlying and immediate causes. Much of what has been published is based on 
personal experience or observation of a single case, rather than being grounded in 
empirical evidence that can be generalized. (p. 137) 
 
Problematic methods suggest that theory-building is stymied. Cohoon and Aspray elaborate 
as follows:  
Potential influences on the gender composition of computing are seldom discussed 
in relation to any theoretical perspective.…None of the studies we located were 
designed to test a particular theory. Still, movement toward more explicit 
consideration of theory might help advance empirical investigation of this issue.  
(p. 138-139) 
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The set of meta level concerns I have identified all meet in this problem of theory. 
For example, the NSF (2007) document highlights how good theory is essential in shaping 
testable and predictive hypotheses:  
All research proposals should…include a discussion of the theory or theories 
grounding the research and outline testable hypotheses.   
Strong research designs will produce rigorous, cumulative, reproducible, and usable 
findings. (sec. C) 
 
 
Conclusion  
The g/t story, told as a progression of hunches about the factors that cause the 
gender gap in computing, is also a manifestation of what is communally believed to 
constitute a credible, researchable problem. I have identified eight meta concerns that the 
g/t story is explicitly concerned with: (a) quantity, (b) difference, (c) deficits, (d) identity 
construction, (e) digital divide issues, (f) literacies and power, (g) globalization and social 
transformation, and (h) inadequate research methods or theories. These are evident in 
policy papers, institutional reports, and the media. I have highlighted only a few examples, 
but the story derives its presence, stability, and authority from the multitudes of similarly 
grounded micro studies and reports available.   
While these eight meta-level concerns are not the only way the g/t story could be 
characterized, these do represent the overarching concerns of the story as it has evolved 
since the early 1980s and that remain active concerns today, in some form. It is however, 
hard to separate these concerns into discrete units—each seems to rely heavily on others; 
separated from these other problems, a single problem would make little sense. This alone 
suggests some limitations in a research agenda built upon isolating causal variables.  
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These problems have generated sufficient concern to spawn what might now be 
described as a g/t research industry aimed at locating promising interventions. I am not 
out to evaluate these interventions, though it is generally acknowledged that most have 
produced little, if any, change in the numbers. The general, driving assumption has been 
that more explicitly defining and characterizing the g/t relationship and the constructs of 
gender and technology will bring some resolution. In articulating and supporting this 
narrative of a gender problem and the possibility of resolution, the macro g/t story has 
come to function as a kind of narrative social truth yet this “truth” of the story is not open 
to question, because the story itself seems so solid. Recursive and reductivist approaches 
make it more so. In some very important ways, this g/t story is functioning in ways 
analogous to a modern meta-narrative.23   
The questions I pursue grapple with exactly this dilemma. That is, a meta-story of 
g/t either makes it seem like there are not other significant stories, or it effectively negates 
the possibility of other stories, voices, or lenses. This is not unlike Marco Polo’s subtractive 
exercise:  
“I have also thought of a model city from which I deduce all the others,”… “It is a city made 
only of exceptions, exclusions, incongruities, contradictions…So I have only to subtract 
exceptions from my model, and in whatever direction I proceed, I will arrive at one of the 
cities which, always as an exception, exist.” (Calvino, 1972, 1974, p. 69, quoted in 
italics in orig.)   
 
The question, in essence, is whether the mainstream g/t story warrants its narrative and 
conceptual dominance.  
                                                
23 Although I state that we ought to recognize the meta-narrative aspects of the g/t story, I 
am not also claiming that it is such a narrative. 
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Facet 4 
The G/T Story as Meta-narrative 
Over the course of this chapter, I will show how the g/t story is constituted through 
rules and practices of scientific discourse and associated research methodologies. I identify 
four sets of such rules and practices, which I describe as: (a) techniques for stabilizing 
objects, (b) discourse and a stealth technological determinism, (c) suppressing ambiguity, 
and (d) prescribing (good) knowledge. These rules and practices construct and enable the 
g/t story to function in ways analogous to a meta-narrative. The meta-narrative is in part a 
product of the way in which the story and its constructs are conceived in and through 
normalized linguistic practices of mainstream science. The question is not whether the g/t 
story is a meta-narrative—rather, of significance is how it comes to function as such a story. 
This functioning meta-narrative is the target of my third faceting.  
A meta-narrative is understood, following Lyotard (1979, 1984), to be a grand, 
cultural-political narrative that presumes a universalizing perspective about the nature of 
knowledge and knowing. Such knowledge is self-legitimizing in that it takes its validation 
from appealing to Enlightenment meta-values of universal truth and justification. A meta-
narrative, in offering a grand explanation, also tends to be durable. For example, Lyotard 
characterizes science and the stories that science self-generates about itself as such an 
Enlightenment meta-narrative: 
[Science] produces a discourse of legitimation with respect to its own 
status...making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of 
Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working 
subject, or the creation of wealth ... This is the Enlightenment narrative, in which 
the hero of knowledge works toward a good ethico-political end. (p. C-6. xii-xxiv) 
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The way in which the g/t story is represented, circulated, and examined presupposes a 
similar kind of narrative truth of a problem in need of some kind of heroic science to 
provide an ethico-cognitive-political solution.  
The g/t story has acquired the status of an Enlightenment meta-narrative in part, by 
our insistence on framing the story through universalizing ideas about the nature of 
knowledge, science, gender, women, men, technology, and equity, as well as a set of 
assumptions about the stability of the story itself. If there is even a possibility that these 
concepts have over-universalized, it is worth spending some time to consider whether these, 
as Foucault (1972) puts it, are indeed as continuous, stable, and foundational as the story 
represents them to be. That is, it is important to consider how rules and practices 
transparently embed beliefs about what constitutes good scientific knowledge or “good 
ethico-political end[s]” of this knowledge (Lyotard, 1979, 1984, p. xxiv). At stake are not 
only the warrants behind assumptions of universalizing concepts but also, their usefulness; 
to be examined is the ways in which they shape analyses and narratives about the g/t 
relationship and problem. In short, how has a discourse of science helped to constitute the 
subjects or objects of the g/t story over the past thirty years?      
 In Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault laid out a methodological position 
from which to interrogate the rules and practices of discourse and showed how ideas about 
the origin and stability of social phenomena are constituted and constituting. The g/t story 
has escaped such analysis such that assumptions, rules, and practices that construct the g/t 
story remain transparent. That is, there are a set of practices and ideas now so 
commonplace that they are invisible actors in how we think about the story and its 
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components. My aim in this chapter is first to consider how rules and practices function as 
techniques for stabilizing the objects and constructs of the g/t story. Second, I examine 
how discursive practices support a stealth technological determinism despite surface level 
dismissals of such determinist thinking. The problem of a suppressed ambiguity is my third 
concern, which leads to the fourth, an examination of how these rules and practices 
prescribe what is “good” scientific knowledge, conceived as holding an unambiguous 
clarity.  
 It has seemed as though the g/t problem is about a straightforward dilemma of 
coming to terms with a set of problems (the eight meta-level problems I discussed in 
Chapter 3). However, there is reason to consider how thinking about the story only in this 
way (e.g. through these rules and practices) masks a broader set of assumptions that mask 
how the problems and constructs thought to adequately characterize the g/t relationship 
are themselves contributing to the problem as it has been laid out. That is, on the table is 
whether “reflexive categories, principles of classification, normative rules, institutionalize[d] 
types” function as if “they are … intrinsic, autochthonous, and universally recognizable 
characteristics” (Foucault, 1972, p. 22). In order to consider this possibility, I chisel away at 
representative examples from the g/t story. 
 
Techniques for Stabilizing Objects for Scientific Investigation 
 The g/t story’s power as a meta-narrative rests in part on the way in which it 
constitutes what are in fact dynamic and processual phenomena as if they are stable objects 
available for examining. Foucault (1972) describes this, in part, as a problem of assumed 
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unities that come to refer to and encompass individuals and their situations through 
practices of examination and representation—what he terms the disciplining sciences.   
In the g/t story, there are many objects (e.g. women, girls, men, boys, masculinity, 
femininity, technology, equality, a digital divide, and knowledge) portrayed and positioned 
across statements, examples, and different kinds of sources that are used to infer a set of 
unified, stable, and durable objects and subjects. These unities are sustained by relying on 
“ready-made syntheses” and what we presume are “facts of discourse” such as Foucault’s 
aforementioned “reflexive categories, principles of classification, normative rules, 
institutionalized types.” (1972, p. 22). These rules and practices are the conventions 
(linguistic, discursive, and methodological) through which the g/t story, gender, and 
technology are rendered into concrete objects for investigation. The “gender gap” 
exemplifies this type of stabilized object, illustrated as follows:  
For more than a decade, academics and technology executives have been frowning 
at the widening gender gap in computer science. (Mintz, 2007, p. 24) 
 
The gender gap is discursively stabilized into a scientific object that is conceptually 
persistent over time. The size of the gap may fluctuate but what is significant is that the gap 
itself is construed as a stable and enduring object of analysis.     
 In another example, Camp, in The Incredible Shrinking Pipeline (1997) merges many 
kinds of women, at many different life stages, into a similarly singular and stable object:  
Since the number of women at the bachelor’s level affects the number of women at 
levels higher in the pipeline and in the job market, these facts are of great concern. 
(p. 104) 
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There are potentially very different women and interests represented here, but within this 
well-cited article, the major issue is taken to be how the numbers at one level of the 
pipeline affect the numbers in subsequent levels. Grouping women into a stable, 
identifiable object facilitates this argument. Similarly, Mintz’s Associated Press article 
depends on similarly durable objects, as follows:  
The level of confidence expressed by the participants in the questionnaire about 
debugging, however, played a much different role for the genders. (para. 15) 
 
Distinguishing between genders relies on practices of neat stabilization, essentialization, 
and classification. 
The problem to unpack is how gender becomes an “it” and how it is rendered into 
a stable and locatable object. In the following passage, from UNESCO’s Gender Issues in the 
Information Society (Primo, 2003) there are many stabilized and essentialized objects: 
Given the potential of ICTs in development and social transformation, it is 
essential that we address the gender digital divide. The aim is both to ensure 
women’s access to the benefits of ICTs, and to make ICTs into a central tool in 
women’s empowerment and the promotion of gender equality. (p. 15) 
 
Objects identified in the passage are ICTs, equality, and the gender digital divide. These 
objects are all fixed through their positioning into nouns (rather than practices) and thus 
are made available as objects of scientific investigation. Further, these objects are rendered 
easily categorizable, well suited for systems of classification that try to reduce ambiguities in 
trying to make sense of the experience of everyday life (Bowker & Star, 2000). 
Nominalization, essentialization, and classification are common techniques for stabilizing 
objects into forms suitable for scientific examination. These techniques have stabilized, for  
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example, the “problem” of g/t, underrepresentation, gender, girls’ interests, or computing 
culture. In the next sections I more fully develop these three techniques. 
Nominalization practices. Halliday and Martin (1993) go to some length in 
describing how nominalizations function in scientific writing. They argue that 
nominalization is the means by which scientific reasoning—the process of building 
knowledge—is elaborated and explained. A nominalized phrase turns a verb into a noun 
and thus serves to sum up and carry forward previously accumulated knowledge. 
Nominalization renders processes of knowledge making and the objects of knowledge static 
as well as passive. It is the way scientific argumentation has been practiced since Newton 
and facilitates the reporting and publishing of scientific research. The practice is not 
without controversy, as a 2008 debate between several critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
scholars in Discourse and Society (2008, Vol. 9:6) makes evident.24  
Billig (2008) argues that CDA scholars, in trying to unmask nominalizations, 
themselves problematically engage in this same nominalizing enterprise in their own 
critical scholarship and writing. The paradox he pursues is that CDA scholars  “investigate 
language, yet at the same time…use language in order to make our investigations. We have 
no separate tools to pursue our tasks. Discourse analysis does not, and cannot, exist outside 
of language” (p. 783). His argument is that CDA scholars need to become more self-
reflexive in their language constructions and to refine their writing styles to better serve 
their critical position. What Billig helps brings to the foreground is the pervasiveness of 
                                                
24 The prominent scholars included are: Michael Billig, Teun A. Van Dijk, Norman 
Fairclough, and J.R. Martin 
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nominalization and the difficulty of thinking outside long-standing practices and 
conventions. That is to say, nominalization is not necessarily intentionally used as a 
strategy. Nonetheless, explicating nominalizations helps to illuminate the ways in which 
discursive conventions transparently promote ideologies through everyday or scientific 
discourses. One concern is that such practices become so transparent and pervasive that 
they infuse social discourse to become a kind of ideology or narrative.  
Van Dijk (2008) disagrees with Billig’s analysis of nominalization with a counter 
argument that the contexts within which nominalization occurs are what ought to be of 
concern, not the writing practices of CDA scholars. In Van Dijk’s view the real concern is 
who does the nominalizing and with what kinds of motivation; the issue of CDA 
researchers’ writing styles is largely peripheral and only points to a need for greater 
reflexivity in writing. For Van Dijk, the import of identifying nominalization is that it 
locates “the details of discursive domination…by specific elite authors, and in specific 
contexts—that may be used to express and convey a distorted view of social events, namely 
the obfuscation of the problematic role of powerful actors in society” (p. 822). Contextual 
analysis makes evident that nominalization can be used as more than a grammatical 
convention. That is, in some contexts and practices nominalization “is especially 
problematic because it may influence the way citizens represent social events” (p. 822).  
When CDA scholars identify nominalization, their intention is “that citizens get the best 
possible information from the symbolic elites” (p. 822). 
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What this debate highlights is that nominalizations are on the one hand common 
practices and on the other hand, they indicate circles and contexts of influence by those 
doing the nominalizing. Thus, they are analytically significant. Van Dijk’s concern is quite 
specific, which he states as follows:  
A critical analysis should examine not only the syntactic structures of text or talk, 
but also its contexts, such as the relations between a right-wing newspaper and a 
political right that defends an ideology of law and order…analyses of the abuse of 
nominalizations should be based not on single examples, but should be shown to 
be a systematic practice. (p. 824) 
 
Fowler is cited by Billig (2008) as a seminal scholar who brought nominalization and its 
partner, passivization to the foreground, building upon Halliday’s earlier work. Fowler 
showed that “nominalization ‘turn[s] verbs into nouns’ (Fowler et al., 1979: 14)…[in] a 
‘process of syntactic reduction’…and ‘is a transformation which reduces a whole clause to its 
nucleus, the verb, and turns that into a noun’” (Billig, p. 785). Concerns over 
nominalization are four-fold: it eliminates agency; reifies concepts; posits reified concepts 
as agents; and sustains unequal power relations (p. 785). Ideas abound as to what 
nominalizations accomplish. Through nominalization practices, “nominalized forms 
become the subjects of active sentences, appearing as the agents who do things. This is 
reified language: things and abstract entities, not people, perform actions…. 
Nominalization is presented as the actor that transforms processes into objects” (p. 793).  
Within CDA, nominalizations are a critical target when an analyst is intent on 
showing how a political, journalistic, or media discourse promotes the passification of a 
marginalized group, in turn supporting a standing elite or hegemonic system. Nominalizing 
practices within the g/t story may not be as charged as CDA accounts of police action or 
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media distortion. Nonetheless, the ways in which groups and subjects are rendered into 
stable and passive objects—to be examined by benign yet invisible agents—is significant in 
that nominalization contributes to the g/t story’s allure as an encompassing narrative. It is 
the technique through which key constructs and relationships in the story are rendered 
static and passive (e.g. gender, technology, knowledge, and culture).  
For the purposes of my thesis, it is not necessary to become sidetracked by a finely 
tuned debate about or analysis of nominalization. Sufficient is Billig’s (2008) 
characterization of five kinds of nominalizing processes: (a) linguistic nominalization, (b) 
etymological nominalization, (c) psychological nominalization, (d) between-text 
nominalization, and (e) within-text nominalization (p. 787-88). My analysis does not draw 
such a fine distinction, as I am more interested in broadly illuminating the pervasiveness of 
nominalization practices that provide seemingly static and passive objects for the g/t meta 
story.  
In looking again at the opening quote of Mintz’s (2007) article, “For more than a 
decade, academics and technology executives have been frowning at the widening gender 
gap in computer science,” nominalization facilitates representing the gender gap as an 
object of investigation that precedes this particular article (para. 1). The grammar of the 
statement makes it possible to portray, without much explication, the idea that this gender 
gap is long-standing and ongoing. This gap is something we already know. The other 
purpose of nominalizing is to render the object of investigation stable as an object of 
scientific examination, by preparing it through the language of science, as Halliday and 
Martin (1993) explain:  
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The second reason for nominalizing has to do with the structure of scientific 
knowledge. While the argument has to be dynamic…the edifice that is constructed by 
it is a static one—or let us say that it embodies a synoptic rather than a dynamic 
representation of reality. Newtonian science has to hold the world still, to 
anaesthetize it so to speak, while dissecting it—if you are trying to understand 
something, then in the early stages of your inquiry it is helpful if it does not change 
while you are examining it. (p. 131-132) 
 
The gender gap thus becomes an object of science, in part, through its representation in 
language. Language construes our human experience and shapes how we comprehend and 
reconcile external, in the world, and internal experiences (Halliday & Martin). The gender 
gap is linguistically shaped to be the problem of the g/t story—both are nominalized 
phrases—and both are built from this linguistic convention. The NSF (2007) prospectus 
also builds from this same set of nominalizing conventions: 
Research projects: investigate factors behind the underrepresentation of girls and 
women in STEM education; societal, formal and informal educational systems' 
interaction with individuals that encourage or discourage interest and persistence 
in study or careers in certain STEM fields. (para. 41 bold in original) 
 
In this short paragraph, multiple relationships and practices have been turned into stable 
nouns: “the underrepresentation of girls and women,” “STEM education,” “societal, 
formal, and informal educational systems’ interaction,” “interest,” “persistence,” and 
“study.” Nominalizing confers a technical stability onto otherwise dynamic phenomena so 
that “they take on the semantic flavor of objects, on the model of the abstract objects of a 
technical taxonomy like radiation, equation, and mass” (Halliday & Martin, 1993, p. 15).  
 While this grammar construction has made it possible for scientific knowledge (in 
the Newtonian tradition) to proceed, this language of science has infiltrated everyday 
constructions. The problem, as Halliday puts it, is that nominalization “holds reality still, 
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to be kept under observation and experimented with; and in so doing, interprets it not as 
changing with time” (Halliday & Martin, 1993, p. 15).  
  The g/t story is not only fixed, it is also shaped into a form ready for experimental 
investigation. It can be dissected and taxonomized. The problem—this stabilized object—
acquires an authority and presence; there is no arguing with a noun so there is no arguing 
with the story (Halliday & Martin, 1993).  
Summarizing her essay, Computational Reticence, Turkle (1988) wrote: “This essay 
looks at the social construction of the computer as a male domain” (p. 41). “Social 
construction” has been nominalized, thus rendering a social process into a fixed entity 
where the computer is linguistically constituted into a stable male domain (e.g. Hacking 
(1999). Rendered into objects, neither the domain (computing), nor its construction, is 
contestable. Through such stabilizing practices, scientific, linguistic formations make 
elements of the g/t story available as objects of investigation.  
The practice is evident in the NSF funding prospectus (2007) as it articulates a 
research agenda and the dissemination of STEM research. As it lays out these goals, 
knowing is conceptualized into the stable object “research knowledge”: 
To integrate various findings about gender in science and engineering into a 
unified program of change or to facilitate the interpretation of research knowledge 
into practice. (Sec. B) 
 
Processes of knowing are nominalized as both a goal and product and the emphasis is put 
wholly on knowledge, thus fixing into a concrete form products of the act of knowing. This 
discursive practice reflects both a disposition towards empirical science and the fact that 
gender (or race, class, and disability) has long been nominalized. Both the object and what 
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is known about that object and its condition are fixed, a practice that allows knowledge of 
the object or problem to be widely disseminated. 
 Nominalization supports other discursive practices that allow linguistic biasing 
devices to embed themselves in the descriptive language of the g/t story. For example, 
computer gaming became the center of much gender-focused concern; this quote from 
Cassell and Jenkins (1998, 1999a) is a representative example: 
The problem in the differential attraction to computer games stems from the fact 
that here, as is often the case, the cultural constructions of gender are not separate 
from those of power. It is not just that girls seem to like today’s computer games 
less than boys do, but that these differential preferences are associated with 
differential access to technological fields as the children grow older, and this 
differential access threatens to worsen as technological literacy increasingly 
becomes a general precondition for employment. (p. 11) 
 
The bold-face nominalized phrases (my addition) highlight the number of practices and 
conditions that have been frozen into objects: difference, attraction, cultural constructions, 
gender, power, access, preferences, and literacy. I do not mean to infer that the authors intend 
or believe that gender, culture, and power are actually stable objects. Rather, my point is to 
show how linguistic practices confer a fixedness to concepts and practices that subverts 
these authors’ socio-political interests in challenging other conventions of the g/t story. 
Rendering practices into objects functions as a linguistic limitation on the capacity of an 
agent to counteract inferred structural limitations. As Halliday and Martin (1993) said, it is 
hard to contest a noun.   
Essentializing practices. Nominalization is also a key linguistic practice that 
facilitates the essentialization of women, girls, boys, and men. Gender, constituted as an 
object, precedes essentialized characterizations of women and girls or men and boys. The 
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problem—seemingly girls’ lesser interest in computer games—is wholly dependent on a deep 
essentialization of boys and men who are all grouped into a class that loves computers and 
video games. The g/t story is represented as a story of girls’ underrepresentation in 
computing, but it also constitutes all boys and men into an opposite position and group 
fully engaged and represented in technology. In this way, concerns over gender are largely 
framed around an essentialized male and masculinity. This idea crystallizes in Turkle’s 
Computational Reticence where “the computer becomes a personal and cultural symbol of 
what a woman is not” (1988, p. 14).  In a mere fourteen words women and men have been 
essentialized by and in relation to the computer —woman explicitly, man by holding the 
default position.  
Highlighting difference is also a means of essentializing. For example, Cohoon and 
Aspray (2006a) state: “We have also glossed over the issue of differences among women. 
For example, we know that minority women’s representation in computing differs from 
white women’s” (p. 142). While claiming to make room for multiple differences, the 
essentialization of women simply gets more specifically located, in this case as minority or 
white. This tendency towards essentialization feeds the ways that computer culture is 
described and explained. For example, in the AAUW (2000) report, researchers lay out two 
different computer cultures, one that reflects boys’ interests and a second that reflects girls’: 
Girls describe gender differences most vividly in relation to the Internet and 
computer games.…They tend to represent the Internet as a vice in the hands of 
boys, and a virtue in the hands of girls, because boys use it to play games and “fool 
around” while girls use it as a source of information. (p. 8) 
 
Girls approach the computer as a “tool” useful primarily for what it can do; boys 
more often view the computer as a “toy” and/or an extension of the self.…For boys,  
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the computer is inherently interesting. Girls are interested in its instrumental 
possibilities, which may include its use as an artistic medium. (p. 9) 
 
Just as girls and boys, men and women are classified, so too are their computing cultures.  
Classification practices. Nominalization, essentialization, and classification are 
techniques of representation that denote objects. However, there is more that 
representations accomplish. The following statement, made by Hawkins in 1985, uses 
difference, classification, and nominalization to great effect: 
It is a common concern that all children have equal opportunity and appropriate 
support for acquiring competence with the technology. These concerns derive from 
(1) the belief that, because many careers will require competence with computers, 
knowledge of information technology will be a source of power in the future; and 
(2) the fact that current differences among groups of people in their access to 
bodies of information may be exacerbated by unequal opportunities for learning 
about technology. Two important dimensions of difference are social class and sex. 
With respect to the latter—if current projections are accurate—girls are likely to 
learn less about and have less ability to control this increasingly important cultural 
tool.(p. 165-166) 
 
In this passage, somewhat vague differences in social class and sex are not only 
determinant, they are taken to be predictive. Being able to classify groups is the means of 
predicting and cataloguing difference. The AAUW (2000) also articulates girls’ perceptions 
of computing as a tool to contrast these with boys’ interests in computers as toys. Hawkins 
however, seems to have little concern with a toy conception; the real issue for her is the 
tool and the power it represents. Classifying objects is also a way of neatly locating sites of 
power or its lack, even if an injustice is not explicit or overt. As the AAUW report notes 
“Girls…almost never report overt discrimination” (p. 7). In a sense, this is true of the g/t 
story as a whole—much of what this story does is not overt. Rather, it is a story whose 
surface intentions of equity and opening up a culture are organized into a seamless story of 
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a g/t problem that is made so through practices of nominalization, essentializing, and 
classification.   
Essentialization, along with nominalization, positions actors as objects of scientific 
investigation and these practices facilitate classifying these actors or objects through a set of 
defining characteristics and attributes that may be isolated for further examination. The 
impetus to identify and separate these characteristics is quite strong. Descriptive techniques 
become increasingly sophisticated ways of organizing and classifying objects. Classification 
is such a commonplace practice that we accept premises such as those made in the 
following passage:  
Socially projected stereotypes about who should be scientists and engineers pose 
artificial limits on the participation of talented students. Gender is only one of the 
characteristics that shape personal and group identity. Other characteristics such as 
race, ethnicity, economic status, religion, and disability also bear on whether  
students are encouraged, neglected, or discouraged from developing certain skills 
and ambitions. (National Science Foundation, 2007sec. A6) 
 
On the one hand, we can find much to appreciate in this statement that wants to open 
science to a more diverse group. However, it might also be argued that this passage also 
relies quite heavily on a widely cast net of difference that inferentially includes as a kind of 
category, a quite disparate array of “identity” constructs. Because the category is so ill-
defined it remains fuzzy as to how such categorization will translate to a more diverse group 
of scientists. Perhaps it helps discern ever more ways of documenting differences. The 
passage itself accomplishes such an objective and points to two concerns. First, there is no 
such thing as “innocent” classification—the practice actively constructs boundaries that may 
be too broad and at the same time, overly circumscribed, thus becoming self-reifying. 
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Second, the line between promoting equity and standing in the way of socio-political 
transformation is gray; what one construction provides, another may take away. 
Bowker and Star (2000), discuss the ways classification is a means of excluding 
groups. One problem with essentialization and classification practices is that they create an 
assumption that categorizing is beneficial or necessary to the welfare of those being 
categorized. The taken-for-granted assumption, often, is that categories are both useful and 
benign descriptors. Glossed over are the ways in which such practices and techniques often 
become tools of exclusion. Essentialization and classification tend to infer that relying on 
some innate characteristic of an individual or group is adequate to the descriptive task at 
hand, yet these same practices are often not attentive enough to the ways in which aims of 
social justice may be sideswiped by well-intentioned projects framed around classificatory 
and essentializing narratives. Once marked as a category, it is quite difficult to be not of 
that category. For example, Cassell and Jenkins note that it is often difficult to sell a group 
on the idea that it is okay for women to be computer experts, because they are not 
commonly seen as such. Moreover, there are beliefs about sex roles and gender that often 
have strong cultural, experiential, or religious roots and merely identifying inequity or the 
characteristics of girls and women is rarely sufficient. In another example, focused on race, 
Reardon’s Race to the Finish (2005) explicates the ways in which the human genome project, 
despite lead scientists’ intentions towards social justice, was taken by others to open too 
many possibilities for extending colonializing practices or enabling new classificatory 
barriers to be put in place. Categorization has both positive and negative effects.  
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A Stealth Technological Determinism 
 There are probably few researchers, policy makers, media pundits, or even 
technologists, who believe in an uncomplicated technological determinism. However, an 
examination of the language used to tell the g/t story reveals a tendency to drift into such 
territory. The following statement is one such example: 
Along with technology’s power come responsibilities to determine what computing 
is used for and how it is used. These concerns may not be on the minds of 
adolescent boys who get turned on to computing at an early age and go on to 
become the world’s computer wizards. (Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 3) 
 
The second sentence is, by now, recognizable for its essentialization of boys into a 
predictable and narrowly conceptualized category of carefree players simply passionate 
about technology for its own sake. In the first sentence, however, technology and power 
have both been nominalized and linked as one object. There seems to be no particular 
subject or agent associated with this technological power or responsible for shaping either 
technology or its power. Moreover, the g/t story tells us that such concerns are most 
certainly not on the minds of the future wizards portrayed. This is not to say that these 
authors are making a case for technological determinism, but that the notion is embedded 
through language practices used in telling the story. These practices in effect leave out any 
responsible agent or subject, thus deferring to an agentless technology in charge. In 
another example, from TechSavvy (AAUW, 2000) a similar practice is visible: 
In this report, we use the terms “computer culture” or “e-culture” to refer not only 
to the computer that does things for us but to the computer that does things to us 
as people, to our ways of relating to others and our ways of seeing the world.25 (p. 7) 
                                                
25 (AAUW, 2000, p. 7) The authors cite Turkle’s The Second Self and Life on the Screen as the 
source of this distinction.  
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The computer does things to or for us, and thus, seems to hold a great deal of power; it is 
positioned to do this without any particular human input and agency. This may sound silly 
on the surface, but there is an implicit message about technological power embedded in 
these kinds of statements. An ominous sense of impending disaster is injected into the g/t 
story when human intentionality and agency are linguistically sidelined by a technological 
determinism. In the above quote, the computer is the agent that does things. The hardware 
and software engineers and designers are nowhere in sight; it is the “culture” of computing 
and the computer that does these things. Language practices portray an independent, 
agential computer, one that seemingly wields a great deal of power.   
The link between technology and power is solidified when written through this 
kind of determinist language, as, for example, Cockburn put it: “Technology is a medium 
of power” (cited in Wajcman, 2004, p. 10). This notion pervades the g/t story. This 
example from UNESCO’s (Primo, 2003) report is a common version: 
While ICTs and the Internet offer vast, new and unprecedented opportunities for 
human development and empowerment in areas ranging from education and the 
environment to healthcare and business, they are also one of the key contributing 
factors to social and economic disparities across different social and economic 
groups. The gender divide is one of the most significant inequalities to be amplified 
by the digital revolution, and cuts across all social and income groups. (p. 3) 
 
The power that makes change (or continued oppression) possible is linguistically held by 
technologies (ICTs, the Internet), not by people, their policies, or governments. The gender 
divide is a product of these technologies so that in the power positions articulated in this 
passage there is no human agent. This is, at the least, an artifact of a technological 
determinism that positions power wholly within technology.    
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 Turkle’s work prefaced many ideas subsequently taken up in the g/t story. Among 
these are the kinds of power and capabilities held by the computer, as she states in her 
introduction to The Second Self (1984): 
Technology catalyzes changes not only in what we do but in how we think. It 
changes people’s awareness of themselves, of one another, of their relationship with 
the world.  
 
Most considerations of the computer describe it as rational, uniform, constrained 
by logic. I look at the computer in a different light, not in terms of its nature as an 
“analytical engine,” but in terms of its “second nature” as an evocative object, an 
object that fascinates, disturbs equanimity, and precipitates thought. (p. 13) 
 
The issue I want to raise here is not (yet) about the meaning of these changes or the role of 
the computer, but that technology is represented as a catalyzing force and an object. The 
machine precipitates the changing perceptions people have of themselves, to each other, 
and to the world, but it does this as both a force and as an independent and stable object.  
Technology is given a great deal of power when it is linguistically unattached to any human 
agent.  
 
Suppressing Ambiguity 
 STEM fields are differentiated from other fields and feminist critiques of these 
fields as male sites of power and privilege are stronger to the extent that they eliminate 
ambiguity. Such constructions, along with essentializing and nominalizing, rely upon 
oppositional positions for clearly articulated arguments to take hold. The stronger the 
binary construction, the less ambiguity there is to cloud (or weaken) an argument. The  
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familiar binary is between men-women and girls-boys and this is evident in the way 
Margolis and Fisher (2002) rely on the notion of “contrast” in the following quote:  
For many male students, in contrast, the decision to major in computer science 
barely reaches the level of conscious consideration; it is a natural extension of their 
lifelong passion for computing. (p. 50) 
 
Most women take a large number of factors into account: five of the seven 
categories we tabulated were mentioned by at least 30 percent of the women. In 
contrast, the only motivation listed by at least 30 percent of the men (in fact, by 70 
percent) is the enjoyment of computing. (p. 51) 
 
Again, I am not aiming to discredit these findings, but to highlight the rhetorical emphasis 
on contrasting positions that insist on a clear m-f separation. Any ambiguity would belie 
the essentialized male at the center of the g/t story.  
 As the g/t story progresses from the 1980s to the present, increasing attention is 
paid towards de-essentializing the m-f binary when talking about girls and boys or women 
and men, as Margolis and Fisher (2002) try to do in this quote: 
It is all too easy to fall into thinking that “women are this way and men are that 
way” —to simplify the categories and underplay all the contradictions and 
differences within each individual and within each gender. (p. 9) 
 
However, they reconstitute this binary in the next sentence: “At the same time, it is 
misleading to see women as sharing no unifying experiences” (p. 9). Two things may be 
going on here: (a) a discomfort with the ambiguities that the first statement opens up and, 
(b) an overt effort to paint women as complex and yet, still maintain a coherent binary by 
not eliminating a core difference.   
 While the m-f binary is often thought to be the primary locus of concern, there are 
additional binaries in play that remain stable across the story. For example, somewhat later 
in their text, Margolis and Fisher (2002) state that the computer is “a medium that 
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supports a powerful sense of mastery” (p. 42). To support this, they turn to a statement 
made by Turkle in The Second Self (1984) as she portrays the constraints of computer games 
as “those imposed by rule systems” (cited in Margolis & Fisher, p. 42). Turkle’s support for 
her thesis, re-emphasized by Margolis and Fisher, is Chodorow’s Freudian explanation of  
boys’ needs for separation from the mother that leaves them in a tumultuous state and 
seeking structure in a rule driven world  (p. 42). 
 Importantly, there are inherent contradictions in how these arguments unfold and 
thus there is room to consider how seemingly incommensurable binaries make it quite 
difficult to conceptually navigate competing positions of difference. For example, after 
relying on Chodorow and Turkle’s rule driven binary, Margolis and Fisher (2002) 
immediately shift to Jenkins’ portrayal of computer games as “undefined open spaces” 
(albeit virtual) that support boy’s high risk, adventurous play styles that challenge (in a 
productive way) uniquely “male fears and anxieties” (1998, p. 43) Thus, although 
masculinity is at the core of their statements, I wonder if there are two somewhat 
incommensurable “accusations” made about the games and masculinity. On the one hand, 
boys are driven by a need for serious rules; yet, on the other, boys are driven by a desire for 
the high-risk adventure that games provide—“an untamed world for people who refuse to 
bow before the pressures of the civilizing process” (Jenkins, 1998, p. 279, cited in Margolis 
& Fisher, 2002, p. 43).26 
                                                
26  I see this contradiction to be – at least in part – an outcome of a methodological need to 
unfold specific, separable characteristics or variables (I discuss this more fully later in the 
chapter). The focus has been on identifying a set of qualities that could function as 
descriptors of women, men, games, and computers as ‘researchable’ qualities and 
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 Flanagan (2002) has a wholly different critique of these games, but one that is also 
dependent on a binary that eliminates ambiguity. She is an artist-scholar known for her 
criticisms of a masculinized computer gaming industry and she has made a mark by 
creating computer games meant to empower girls. In her 2002 book Reload, she states:    
The layout of most 3-D software packages and virtual world-making software 
reinforces a reading of these products as useful, practical, and unbiased or 
objective.…Through the simultaneity and variety of perspectives, however, the 
software packages used to create these virtual worlds and characters evoke complete 
omniscience rather than multiplicity, fostering instead an “old school,” white, 
masculinist epistemological model. Virtual environments are entirely 
mathematically based constructions that create the sense of a cohesive, seamless, 
scientific system, and a unified order of knowledge; 3-D graphics generation is a 
science perhaps even more than an art. (p. 427-428) 
 
The usual concern in the g/t story, and the framing concept in this passage, is the gender 
binary, but these are not the only contrasts in play. Other, taken-for-granted binaries 
ground Flanagan’s argument. Her thesis that the 3-D software environment and the virtual 
worlds these produce are beholden to an objectivist, masculinist epistemology is seemingly 
dependent on a view that mathematics and science reflect an equally objectivist, 
masculinist epistemology. She views these as “a cohesive, seamless, scientific system, and a 
unified order of knowledge” (p. 427). One problem is that the notion of mathematics and 
science that she relies on has been seriously contested. For example, Lakatos elaborated 
that such formalist, objectivist notions of mathematics are a legacy of logical positivism but 
that this methodological position has little relation to the actual work of mathematicians 
                                                
characteristics. This thinking makes it difficult to consider overlapping boundaries or 
incongruities.   
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(1976).27 Throughout her framework, Flanagan (2002) articulates strong binaries of science 
and art. As I read her essay, Flanagan is trying to counter what she sees as a masculinist, 
epistemological limitation within 3D software environments, interactions, and games while 
also aiming to show examples of women artists’ resistance to these limitations.28 The 
problem is that her reliance on these binary oppositions becomes a large limitation of her 
argument. She tries to articulate a position of resistance to a set of binaries (of 
mathematics, reason, science, and masculinity that are oppositional to intuition, art, 
contexts, and the feminine) that she also reifies in her argument. Thus, what she tries to 
promote in a visual medium, she negates in language as she reduces the possibility of 
ambiguity.  
 
 
 
                                                
27 Lakoff & Núñez, in Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings 
Mathematics into Being (New York: Basic Books, 2000) argue that mathematics is a 
product of human ideas that arise from embodied, human experience. Bertram (Chip) 
Bruce suggests these others as well: “Feyerabend’s Against Method, (that science proceeds on 
the basis of sociocultural, political, and economic factors rather than any consistent 
method (thus challenging Kuhn, whose paradigm shifting model still holds to a rationality); 
Keller’s critiques of math practice as hierarchical/patriarchical; that it is necessary to 
distinguish between math practices and various idealizations of it. After Gödel demolished 
the Russell-Whitehead program, mathematics as a “seamless, scientific system, and a 
unified order of knowledge” isn’t anything more than a straw figure. In addition, Tufte, 
Nightingale, Monmonier, and others emphasize the communicative role of math (as does 
the NCTM). Generally, there has been a shift from the early Wittgenstein view (picture  
theory of language, and consequently math) to the later Wittgenstein views (expressive, 
community-based).” (Quoted from an email communication with Bruce, 2008).  
28 As the creator of one of the 3D artworks she uses as an illustration, I also take issue with 
the premise of her thesis, but that is a topic for another paper.  
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The Means of Producing Knowledge  
Ideas about, and intersections of, theory and causality frame the way the g/t story 
can be told and in key ways, rely upon nominalization, essentialization, objective power, 
and the reduction of ambiguity to drive both the telling and the means of producing 
knowledge of the g/t relationship. This interplay is evident in the g/t story and I highlight 
a few examples over the next pages. 
The NSF 2008 Program Solicitation for Research on Gender in Science and Engineering 
clearly takes a position on what constitutes appropriate scientific research: 
Successful proposals will incorporate relevant advances in research methodologies 
and theoretical models. They should capitalize on the development of new 
instrumental, computational, or statistical methods, models, and tools of 
observation and analysis. 
 
According to the National Research Council report, Scientific Research in Education, 
educational research projects should: 
1. Pose significant questions that can be investigated empirically; 
2. Link relevant research to theory; 
3. Use methods that permit direct investigation of the questions posed; 
4. Provide a coherent and explicit chain of reasoning; 
5. Replicate and generalize across studies; and  
6. Disclose research to encourage professional scrutiny and critique. 
            (2002, p. 30, cited in National Science Foundation, 2008, p. 7-8) 
 
Clearly, in the view of the NSF, empirical research dominates because of its capacity to 
produce findings that are broadly generalizable. Such research, in turn, will add to the 
growing knowledge base of explanatory or causal theory. This model largely reflects that of 
the natural and psychological-behavioral-cognitive sciences, and to be clear, has provided 
many insights and continues to ground much of the democratic ideals behind U.S. 
educational research, policy, and pedagogies. However, reification of this model of 
knowledge production and/or of a particular kind of knowledge and thinking regarding 
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theory depends on a number of other assumptions and too easily dismisses still other ideas. 
In many ways the NSF statement reflects a naïve yet persistent separation of science from 
non-science or of the sciences from the humanities. It privileges a particular intersection of 
theory, objectivity, and methods that serve generalizability and a search for causal 
explanations that will ring true in the past, present, as well as the future. The “problem” is 
not so much with this way of doing science, but with policies or beliefs inferring that this is 
the way of doing science or producing knowledge. Such beliefs and practices preclude 
considering limitations or problems in this dominant science or the way in which, despite 
limitations, the model comes to dominate the construction and warranting of knowledge.  
Cast out in the margins are other perspectives regarding science, knowledge, and theory 
that challenge the dominance of this model in significant ways. 
 Making the limitations of normal science visible has driven much of the work of 
Barad, Wittgenstein, Foucault, Derrida, Gadamer, Harding, Haraway, and uncountable 
others. These scholars have challenged many of the underlying, transparent assumptions 
about doing science that the NSF relies on as the only means appropriate for researching 
the g/t gap. I draw on many of these alternate perspectives in subsequent chapters but here 
want to highlight an interplay between directives for doing “dominant science,” theory 
articulation, and the production of knowledge. The following excerpt from the NSF 
prospectus (2007) is worthy of some investigation, in light of these concerns. The bold type 
highlights particular phrases of interest. 
All research proposals should, therefore, present the disciplinary and conceptual 
framework for the study. They should include a discussion of the theory or 
theories grounding the research and outline testable hypotheses. The proposal 
should discuss in detail the methods used to test the hypotheses, and if a 
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population sample is used, this should be described along with the rationale for 
sample selection, and the project's access to the sample population. The proposal 
should address whether the design is premised on special needs and interests due to  
educational level, race, ethnicity, economic status, or disability, in addition to 
gender, and to what extent data will be disaggregated for multiple characteristics… 
 
The effort should provide a research foundation for educational approaches, 
curriculum, and technological tools that are already developed or can be developed 
in the future, bridging research and educational practice in settings such as 
classrooms, informal learning sites, and technological learning environments. The 
research foundation is assumed to provide a strong base of support for sustained 
improvement in STEM educational practice. Strong research designs will produce 
rigorous, cumulative, reproducible, and usable findings. (p. 8) 
 
In this passage, theory informs hypothesis formation but more significantly, grounds the 
testing of hypotheses in the quest for findings that are, as they state, “rigorous, cumulative, 
reproducible, and usable.” While these goals are laudable, they come with some 
complicating assumptions tied to the problems I have already outlined regarding the 
practices of nominalization, essentialization, and categorization that tend to solidify 
historical, dynamic, complex, and ambiguous subjects into fixed, simplified, and ahistorical 
objects. This practice makes possible the notion of predictive differences or explanatory 
theories that support broadly generalizable theory production.  
The point of methods, in the NSF’s view, is to control ambiguities that would stand 
in the path of generating predictive theory. The NSF promotes experimentalism as the gold 
standard, with no significant attention paid to significant criticisms of these models and 
the idea that experimental methods will yield more certain knowledge (e.g. Dewey, 1929; 
Hickman & Alexander, 1998). Wittgenstein (1958) sums up the problem with this 
perceptive statement: 
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The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of 
solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by. (p. xiv) 
 
Funding calls, such as the 2007 NSF example, foster an exclusivity in research and 
in the means of producing knowledge. These policies are, in effect, not particularly 
“democratic” given the ways they push aside significant scholarly criticisms of the 
dominant approach that in turn eliminate compelling alternatives for thinking about 
theory and causality (e.g. Barad, 2007; Foucault, 1972, 1975, 1995, 1990; Haraway, 1991a, 
1997; C. Taylor, 1995, 2002). These ideas focus much of the rest of this dissertation and 
thus my discussion here is quite limited.  
For the purposes of thinking more about how knowledge is produced in g/t 
research, I first want to briefly highlight the significance of the discursive (or linguistic) 
turn in the social sciences that challenged the dominance of positivism (e.g. Schwandt, 
2003). Foucault (1972, 1975, 1995, 1990) argued that empiricist science made the reflexive 
knowing subject the central agent in the production of knowledge, thereby missing the 
significant role of discursive practices in constructing not only knowledge but the subjects 
and objects of that knowledge. Empiricist models of social science have largely depended 
on factors of “resemblance” that classify and demarcate objects and their relationships. 
Foucault, in The Order of Things (1970, 1994), examined how thought itself (and thus 
discourse practices) “operate upon the entities of our world, to put them in order, to divide 
them into classes, to group them according to names that designate their similarities and 
their differences” (p. xvii). The NSF quote above is an illustration of this reliance on 
ordering and resemblances; gender constitutes an ordering practice without which a 
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reproducible and predictive theory of gender would be meaningless. Science, as promoted 
by the NSF, takes the object to be fixed and conceptually assures this through practices of 
science. In short, language, not science, prepares the research object to serve the 
production of this knowledge production practice. 
Ideas about knowledge and science are in constant flux. Recent thinking by 
feminist new materialist scholars argues that an overreliance on discursive constructions is 
itself a limitation. In this section, I briefly introduce some of the motivations for feminists’ 
new embrace of the body and materiality, but return to this idea in Facet 9 with a more in 
depth analysis. One of the core precepts of feminist thinking has been, until recently, 
separating women’s potentiality and experience from the limitations of the material body. 
Alaimo and Hekman (2008) argue that this thinking has itself become confining: 
Feminist theory is at an impasse caused by the contemporary linguistic turn in 
feminist thought.… 
 
 The turn to the linguistic and discursive has been enormously productive 
for feminism. It has fostered complex analyses of the interconnections between 
power, knowledge, subjectivity, and language….It has allowed feminists to 
understand how gender has been articulated with other volatile markings, such as 
class, race, and sexuality, within cultural systems of difference that function like a 
language….The strength of postmodern feminism is to reveal that since its 
inception, Western thought has been structured by a series of gendered 
dichotomies…argu[ing that] the male/female dichotomy informs all the 
dichotomies that ground Western thought: culture/nature, mind/body, 
subject/object, rational/emotional, and countless others. (p. 2)  
 
Feminists have long contested the determinist boxes that society and science have 
used to contain, explain, or predict women. Also, as Alaimo and Hekman (2008) argue, 
while Foucault (and Deleuze) engaged with the material world, postmodern and 
poststructuralist feminists have overemphasized the discursive aspects of this scholarship. 
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New materialist feminist thinking brings three major ideas to the foreground: (a) that 
bodies and materiality are both inescapable and meaningful sites of analysis, (b) that an 
overemphasis on “critique” is itself limiting, and (c) show a way of thinking past long-
standing binaries—e.g. material-discursive, nature-culture, and m-f. New materialist 
feminism posits that discursive and constructivist lenses are theoretically insufficient, at 
least as total explanations. Judith Butler is one example cited as a scholar who has 
depended on too great a distancing from the material body (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008, p. 
3).  
Discursive and new materialist thinking highlights two issues relevant to my 
analysis of how knowledge of g/t is produced in mainstream research and policy. First, 
gender (and objects) are radically essentialized as an outcome of categorizing practices 
meant to constitute fixed, researchable objects in a way that others argue is itself an artifice 
of power and a hegemonizing, patriarchal science. Moreover, the work of Foucault and 
new materialist scholars suggests that there are significant and consequential alternatives or 
additional ways of approaching knowledge of women and technology.  
Thus, the NSF’s (2007) view of science and of theory can be viewed as quite limited 
in some significant ways. The problem that the NSF renders invisible is the unlikelihood of 
a viable overarching and predictive theory of gender or women. Such a theory could not 
accommodate the ways in which social relations, bodies, nature, and the material world are 
always in process and in relationships that are also evolving. I will return to this idea in my 
last chapter. My point here is that the rules and practices framing the production of 
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knowledge about a g/t problem have become the limitation and I highlight one last 
example.  
Cohoon and Aspray (2006a) argue that causality and predictive theory are a central 
and pressing aim of g/t research, but that these have been lacking to date: 
Without theory, the research produces a collection of valuable observations that 
lack the context of a causal chain linking them to each other as well as to a 
meaningful outcome, such as women’s representation, retention, or progression to 
the next level …Even when theory is invoked as a foundation for empirical 
research, study outcomes may not be tested against theoretical predictions, or the 
test can be less than convincing. Too much of the research into the gender 
composition of computing includes only formative evaluations…rather than 
summative evaluations that measure whether predicted outcomes and impact were 
achieved. (p. 143-144) 
 
In emphasizing a triad of theory, testing, and prediction, Cohoon and Aspray appear to be 
relying on unities of “development and evolution” that Foucault argued, in Archaeology of 
Knowledge, falsely presume that it is “possible to group a succession of dispersed events, to 
link them to one and the same organizing principle…to discover…a principle of coherence 
and the outline of a future unity” (Foucault, 1972, pp. 21-22). If indeed these unities are 
not all that stable, why do we continue to think that reducing subjects or objects to an 
essence is so crucial?  
 
Conclusion 
 Despite the multiplicity of objects, problems, and factors swirling around in the g/t 
stew, framing the meta story are a core set of suppositions made about identifiable, 
classifiable, and stable objects and relations that are presumed to progress on a predictable 
continuum and that are discoverable by making educated predictions from what is already 
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known. This however, is not the only position from which to think about and theorize the 
g/t story/problem. Foucault’s (1972) interrogation of persistent and universalizing unities 
was a direct challenge to this kind of predictive and prescriptive model for trying to 
understand our social-political world: 
We must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we normally 
accept before examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset; 
… instead of according them unqualified, spontaneous value, we must accept, in 
the name of methodological rigour, that, in the first instance, they concern a 
population of dispersed events…We must also question those divisions or 
groupings with which we have become so familiar. (p. 22) 
 
Foucault (1972) saw that rather than persistent unities, the social and political 
narrative of history, and its portrayal, is one of discontinuities and ruptures. In his 
archaeologies he drew out the ways in which discourses are organized and the strategies 
from which they their draw authority. Subsequently, genealogic analysis moved to the 
foreground of Foucault’s work, and a new set of questions, focused around “thematiz[ing] 
the relationship between truth, theory, and values and the social institutions and practices 
in which they emerge” (p. xxv), emerged. In the next chapter, I continue on this genealogic 
path to examine further how assumptions about the g/t relationship are formed in 
discourse and practices and how these are constituted as distinct concepts that themselves 
are constitutive of—as well as constituted within—a set of social imaginaries. These 
imaginaries form the synthesizing and “pre-interpretive” foundations of knowing that, in 
many ways, directly and indirectly inform how the g/t story is researched, told, and 
interpreted.  
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Facet 5 
Social Imaginaries of the G/T Story  
In previous chapters, I examined the ways in which the g/t story is constructed and 
how it functions as a meta-narrative. In this chapter, I further deconstruct the story by 
examining a set of background social imaginaries that make it possible for the story to be 
told as it is and as well, to be readily understood as a believable representation of reality. 
The imaginaries I highlight coalesce around gender, technology, knowledge-technoscience-
progress, education, human-machine subjectivities, and research. First I explain the 
concept of the social imaginary, particularly as it as been thought about in political science. 
Following this I analyze in some depth these particular social imaginaries and explain how 
they play out in the construction of the g/t meta story and support the constitutive work of 
the story.  
Figure 7, below, is a graphic representation of the analytic model that is normally 
used to study the g/t relationship in education. It illustrates the ways in which prior 
literature and theory foreground the formulation of researchable questions that are 
investigated through a clearly articulated set of variables. A disengaged researcher-observer 
ensures an unbiased analytic field and the overarching aim is to produce a generalizable 
and provable theory that explains an aspect of the g/t relationship. In this model, 
replicating prior studies builds the credibility of a theory’s generalizability but it also 
depends on a recursivity that is both lauded and difficult to escape. That is, the ideal of 
replicability also constrains the kinds of research questions asked to within a genre of those 
already asked. At the very least, the conceptual framework behind the research questions is 
rarely itself questioned. This is the problem of this chapter: What does a social imaginary 
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analytic help to illuminate about the underlying beliefs or transparent assumptions that 
foreground the articulation of researchable questions?  
Figure 7. The dominant analytic model of g/t research.  
The dominant analytic research framework is the result of a black-boxed 
epistemological worldview that, in its transparent reach and normativity, fits the definition 
of a social imaginary. Examining the meta story through as a multi-layered social imaginary 
opens up some new possibilities for further understanding how ideas about the g/t 
relationship are built and function. The g/t story itself has become part of the conceptual  
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background of Western society and because of this, many specifics of the story seem to be—
even if not acceptable—normal.  
The g/t imaginary is a manifestation of the transparent notions we have about 
gender, tool culture, identity, and the like, as well as ideas about social science research 
conceived as empirical study of relationships among isolatable variables.29 Contained 
within this imaginary is a seemingly normal set of beliefs and practices about research and 
its use in producing knowledge of the story. Moreover, this g/t imaginary is entwined with, 
and dependent on, a number of other imaginaries and this network of imaginaries is the 
lens through which we think about the g/t relationship. The questions I consider in this 
chapter are: (a) what are these imaginaries and (b) what beliefs and ideas are functioning in 
the background that allow these imaginaries to pass unnoticed in such seemingly everyday 
practices as representation, education, education research, and policy making?30  
 
Defining the Social Imaginary 
Gaonkar describes social imaginaries as “ways of understanding the social that 
become social entities themselves, mediating collective life” (2002, p. 4). Imaginaries have 
been understood variously, in terms of ideas, theories, and philosophies, but also as  
First-person subjectivities that build upon implicit understandings that underlie 
and make possible common practices. They are embedded in the habitus of a 
population or are carried in modes of address, stories, symbols, and the like. They 
                                                
29 Here I am using ideas about the social imaginary from Gaonkar, Taylor, and Appadurai 
and will explain this more as the chapter unfolds. 
30 I cannot undertake what Taylor does, which seems to me to be in part, a genealogy of the 
modern social imaginary. For this dissertation, it will have to suffice that I identify and 
deconstruct the imaginaries rather than provide a ‘history’ of how they have evolved. 
105 
 
 
are imaginary in a double sense: they exist by virtue of representation or implicit 
understandings, even when they acquire immense institutional force; and they are 
the means by which individuals understand their identities and their place in the 
world. (p. 4) 
 
Notably, there is not one all-encompassing social imaginary, nor are social imaginaries 
fixed. Rather, there are multiple social imaginaries within which peoples live and through 
which society, social actors, and social movements are conceived and enacted. Some 
imaginaries that Gaonkar points to are “the ethnos, the mainstream, the public, and 
humanity”; some are “articulated as a we”; and others are “third-person objectifications of 
society … the market, the mainstream, and ethnic and census categories” (p. 5).31 
 Social imaginaries are also central to the way Taylor (Gaonkar, 2002) unfolds a 
collectivity of modernities through which social life is imagined and proceeds, such that, 
Within the folds of a social imaginary, we see ourselves as agents who traverse a 
social space and inhabit a temporal horizon, entertain certain beliefs and norms, 
engage in and make sense of our practices in terms of purpose, timing, and 
appropriateness, and exist among other agents. The social imaginary is something 
more than an immediate practical understanding of how to do particular things...It 
involves a form of understanding that has a wider grasp of our history and social 
existence...what some contemporary philosophers call the background. It is a 
complex, unstructured, and not fully articulated “understanding of our whole 
situation, within which particular features of our world become evident”....It gives 
us a sense of who we are, how we fit together, how we got where we are, and what 
we might expect from each other in carrying out collective practices that are 
constitutive of our way of life. (p. 10) 
 
                                                
31 The social imaginary seems to overlap with Bourdieu’s notion of habitus in the sense that 
the imaginary describes a set of transparent organizing beliefs and assumptions held by a 
society and that precede the way a society understands itself as a particular kind of society, 
whereas the habitus refers more to the beliefs and societal structures that are translated 
into transparent rules and practices that individuals subscribe to in their everyday life. 
Gaonkar sees imaginaries as embedded into a society's habitus, thus rendering rules and 
practices logical and meaningful. 
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The social imaginary is not a theory that shapes the way we comprehend the world but 
rather, an imaginary is collectively shared, confers legitimacy on practices and beliefs, and 
confers a normative aura on these collectively embraced stories and “modes of address that 
constitute a symbolic matrix that cannot be reduced to theoretical terms.…[it] carries 
within it an image of moral order, which imbues embodied practices and the 
accompanying cultural forms with meaning and legitimacy” (p. 10-11). 
 Taylor’s modern social imaginary helps us understand the modern, moral compass 
that has framed how we have come to think about how society ought to function. The ways 
a social imaginary “comes to be socially constituted and politically utilized,” is Rizvi’s 
(2006) concern as he argues that social imaginaries ground the ways policies are given 
broad legitimacy and authority (p. 195). 
 This social imaginary is the background understanding through which we envision 
the g/t relationship; it is what we transparently navigate when trying to counter or resist 
recognized social, professional, economic, intellectual, or creative inequities presented by 
perceived or real gender differences that are believed to manifest in the context or use of 
technology. Appadurai (1999, 2000) illuminates how the imaginary is a location as well as 
the means for agency. Social imaginaries are the collective workings of a communal moral 
aesthetic, and organizing rationale that envisions, frames, and models the ways in which 
social lives and social relations can be perceived and imagined.    
The first step in trying to characterize the g/t imaginary is to recognize that it 
functions at once as a holistic understanding and as a network of interconnected other 
imaginaries. The imaginaries of the g/t story that I will focus on (there may be others and I 
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do not mean to infer that my list is complete) reflect how we understand and engage with 
gender, the technological sphere, a knowledge-technoscience-progress triad, education, 
human-machine subjectivities, and research as these play out in a socio-political arena. 
These imaginaries co-exist as the moral, intellectual, perceptual, and affective facets 
through which the anchoring objects and ideas of the g/t story are articulated and 
sustained. Figure 8 is an illustration of this background: 
Figure 8. Selected social imaginaries of the g/t story. 
Over the next several pages, I describe these specific imaginaries, give some 
examples of their influence in the g/t story, and discuss what kinds of understandings have 
become taken-for-granted as a result of the strength of the imaginary. However, while these 
imaginaries are powerful, they too are constructed, and this aspect is my primary interest—
the construction of underlying beliefs and concepts that precede and shape the kind of 
imaginaries that a group comes to rely on. In the following chapters, I diffract these 
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imaginaries and the g/t story, largely by faceting technology as a concept, tool, and way of 
being and interacting in the world.  
 
A Gender Imaginary 
In 1975, in education, humans’ biology was the essential limitation to be overcome, 
but the greatest limitations seemed to be in girls and women. This limitation 
backgrounded a focus on m-f differences, as seen in this quote from the Journal of Teacher 
Education:  
Human cultures are aggregates of inventions designed to mediate between the 
constants of human nature on the one hand and the demands of human 
environment on the other. One such human constant is the biological difference 
between the sexes. (Lee, 1975, p. 135) 
 
What biology determines has gone through numerous articulations and revisions and 
eventually lost ground as a reliable predictor or explanation of women’s abilities or futures. 
Largely, one’s biologically determined sex is no longer presumed to be the natural and 
constant marker of difference, at least cognitively. For the most part, this kind of biological 
essentialism is off the table, although it rears its head every now and again (the Lawrence 
Sumner controversy at Harvard is one example (e.g. Healy & Rimer, 2005). Nonetheless, in 
the g/t story, it now appears to be de rigueur to explicitly distance oneself from any 
biologically determined essentialism, as the following two quotes suggest:   
We are reasonably sure … that most of sex role culture is open to re-invention free 
of biological constraints. (Lee, 1975, p. 339) 
 
The use of the word “gender” among feminists in the 1970s was meant to 
underline the fundamentally social or cultural quality of distinctions based on sex.  
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The word denoted a rejection of the biological determinism underlying the earlier 
term “sexual difference.” (Cassell & Jenkins, 1998, 1999b, p. 5) 
 
Over the years, biological sex difference was differentiated from gender, and both culture 
and gender were understood to be socially constructed. Nonetheless, g/t researchers 
continued and continue to rely on an essentialism that is the legacy of much of second 
wave feminism. This essentialism is evident in Gilligan’s (1982, 1993) portrayal of different 
moral inclinations of girls and boys. Girls and women are characterized as beings driven by 
a need for connection and an innate drive to care for others, whereas men, quite 
differently, have a far more independent and abstracted relationship to society. It is not our 
biologies that determine our desires and interests, but rather, our psyches. Thus, the shift 
away from biological determinism has not diminished the notion of a regulatory difference 
but seemingly, just relocated the ontology. As the g/t story distanced itself from biology 
and our psyches became more prominent, the idea that m-f difference was socially 
constructed became the standard discourse. “Sex” as a marker of innate difference was 
largely eliminated yet an idea of significant m-f difference seems to have become more 
important, as the following illustrates: 
What it means to be male or female is culturally and situationally variable; it is 
neither genetically inherent in an individual nor defined or enacted in the same 
way across all social groups.…Gender identity varies within particular contexts and 
forms, is reinforced within relationships and situations, and interacts with other 
types of identities in ways that influence beliefs about who takes on those identities. 
(Barker & Aspray, 2006, p. 9) 
 
Specific attention to conceptual nuances of gender within the g/t story are not 
always evident, but commonly a writer will stake out her or his feminist position in noting 
the importance of difference, as in the following: 
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It is misleading to see women as sharing no unifying experiences. Feminist Ruth 
Behar (1993) warns that the “opposite tendencies to see women as not all that 
different from one another or as all too different” can lead one to go to far in either 
direction and then end up indifferent…Wendy Luttrell (1997) adds that going too 
far in either direction can lead one to disconnect, to be “unconnected to the lives 
of other women”….Throughout our study, we have worked hard to capture both  
gender differences and also the wide range of often contradictory experiences 
women have. (Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 10) 
 
While the concept of gender in use here might be said to be experiential, it is important to 
understand the underlying persistence of liberal feminism in the story, on three counts. 
First is an emphasis on equity; second is the unreflexive assumption that what is relevant 
for white, middle class, Western women is relevant to all women;32 and third is the notion 
that girls, in particular, are driven, distinctly more so than boys, by an ethic of care and 
community. This idea is manifest in the ways women are said to have a different set of 
interests in computing: 
Besides having a broader set of criteria for majoring in computer science, many 
women have interests in computing that go beyond the technical aspects. 
Connecting computing to other fields and working within its human and social 
contexts make the study of computer science compelling and meaningful to them. 
(Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 52) 
 
Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982, 1993), had little to do with computers or technology 
per se, but its influence on how gender has been conceptualized in the g/t story cannot be 
overstated. Turkle’s “Computational reticence” (1988) built upon Gilligan’s concept of 
gender: 
In In a Different Voice, Carol Gilligan talks about the “hierarchy and the web” as 
metaphors to describe the different ways in which men and women see their 
worlds. Men see a hierarchy of autonomous positions. Women see a web of 
                                                
32 The nods to race and class in the g/t story, in the ways in which these are largely merged 
into the concept of gender, are a reflection of this liberal feminist bias. I examine this later. 
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interconnections between people.…Men can be with the computer and still be 
alone, separate and autonomous. When women perceive this technology as 
demanding separation, it is experienced as alien and dangerous. (p. 51) 
 
Here the gender imaginary is what makes it possible to conceptualize two different 
worldviews in regards to computers and the web. This imaginary infuses Margolis and 
Fisher’s reflection on the importance of bringing more women into technology: 
Feminist theorist Carol Gilligan foresees women’s participation this way: “To bring 
women in is not just to rectify an inequity… it means to change the whole 
conversation.” (2002, p. 143) 
 
Ten years after the publication of  “Computational reticence,” Cassell and Jenkins 
published From Barbie to Mortal Kombat (1998, 1999b) but the concept of illuminating 
gender differences by examining the relationship between girls and computers was already 
solidified: 
This study will lead us further in the understanding of what computer games can 
be, and what girls are (and are not). It also leads us to examine the hidden gendered 
assumptions that have existed in the design of computer games, which in turn leads 
us to understand better what boys are and are not. (p. 5) 
 
Also embedded in this focus on the culture of technology is a reference back to Barbara 
McClintock’s approach to science and Fox Keller’s work on the gendering of scientific 
laboratory culture (1983, 1985). These kinds of statements look something like this: 33 
According to F. Wilson (2003), “In science the masculine is associated with 
objectivist, rationalist, emotional detachment, coupled with abstract theoretical and 
reductionist approaches to problem solving” (p. 128). Whereas a feminine 
                                                
33 I am using the term ‘statement’ in the way that Foucault does in his Archaeology of 
Knowledge. In analyzing discursive statements, he bracketed both the credibility of a 
statement and its deep meaning. Thus, “statements are performances which can be taken at 
face value regardless of both the possible ambiguity of the sentences used in their 
formulation…and the causal factors involved in their utterance” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1982, 1983, p. 46). 
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approach to science is associated with a more holistic approach to problem solving, 
one in which scientists are engaged with the social world. (Singh, et al., 2007, p. 
508) 
 
All of these kinds of statements depend on reductivist or universalizing notions of 
masculinity and femininity, gender, and women’s experience. In their repetition and 
circulation, such statements come to constitute a social imaginary of gender. This gender 
imaginary has expanded in recent years to encompass race and class in a way that Chanter 
(2006) says simply adds constructs of sexuality, race, class, and gender—taken to represent 
multiple locations of difference, identity, influence—in a way that continues the dominance 
of white feminism as a dominant schema.34 Chanter suggests that this additive model 
reflects the continuing practice of creating space for race and class, but only as these fit 
within feminism’s narrow articulation of gender in an alliance with white, middle class 
women. That model keeps gender, sexuality, race, and class apart, as separable 
characteristics.  
Third wave and poststructuralist feminists’ problem with this additive model is that 
it “envisage[s] race, gender, class, and sexuality as if they were separable strands or segments 
of social life that develop independently of one another, which can be added together, or 
subtracted from one another, as if they had integrity in and of themselves” (p. 11).35 The 
                                                
34 Additionally, the digital divide has also been used to characterize inequities between first 
world and other populations and nations, which in turn cannot be separated from gender, 
race, and class. 
35 As an example of ongoing deliberation on the relationship of gender to sex, race, class, 
and so on, Linda Martin Alcoff argues that sex is significantly biological & metaphysical, 
whereas race is not. Sex (as do age, disability) represents a biological difference of the 
capacity to reproduce that is more than physical appearance subjected to cultural 
interpretation and valuations “the variable of reproductive role provides a material 
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problem, as Chanter articulates it, is that these different categories are then played off one 
another, reinforcing the drive to “ascertain which aspect of identity is more important” (p. 
11). It is just this kind of structural thinking that focuses the NSF’s approach: 
Gender is only one of the characteristics that shape personal and group identity. 
Other characteristics such as race, ethnicity, economic status, religion, and 
disability also bear on whether students are encouraged, neglected, or discouraged 
from developing certain skills and ambitions. (2007, p. 10)  
 
In Barker and Aspray’s review of girls and IT (2006), these gender-race-class 
categories seem to function a little differently:   
We recognize that gender and race/ethnicity are inextricably linked… Still, because 
relatively little research has been conducted on girls who are members of minority 
groups, or because the representation of minority girls in samples is too small to 
measure difference, we have chosen a broad focus on girls in this chapter. (p. 4) 
 
In their estimation, each category represents exclusion in some way. However, because they 
are not easily separable and not sufficiently measurable given current data, race and 
ethnicity are easily merged into the bigger category of gender. Gender is not simply a 
category of women or privileged whiteness; the category of gender is also used as a 
placeholder of difference or inequity across multiple categories. The problem is not at all 
that race and class do not matter, but that the g/t story conceptualizes gender-race-class 
through a “whitefeminist” worldview (Armour, 1999) and too easily just adds these 
together. Thus, gender, race, and class are terms fraught with contested meaning, yet they 
function as the primary means of measuring the rate at which members of these categories 
participate in the dominant techno-culture. Because computing is culturally male and 
                                                
infrastructure for sexual difference that is qualitatively different from the surface 
differences of racial categories” (2006, p.165). 
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white, a sweeping gender imaginary makes it possible to include within this culture—in the 
g/t story—what is in fact, a large diversity of male computer scientists (or geeks, hackers, 
gamers), that includes Americans, Chinese, Russians, Koreans, Indians, and so on. The 
gender imaginary itself is so strong that it supersedes ethnic, race, or class concerns (except 
in immigration debates) and thus is used to describe and mark a set of outsiders to a 
dominant and seemingly “pure” masculine computing culture.   
  Chanter (2006) characterizes a growing feminist unease with relying on category 
distinctions. She argues that poststructuralist feminists understand that the project is not 
to “simply get rid of these categories” but instead to recognize that each attempt at 
universal categorization “tends to oversimplify a complex field of phenomena” (p. 11). 
However, in the g/t story, the categories of gender, race, class, disability, and so on are 
glossed into a broadly encompassing category. Discursively, because of insufficient data 
measuring how these various categories have fared in the project of achieving technological 
parity or competency, gender has become a broadly useful construct for addressing 
problems in computing’s culture. While there is a growing interest in research that more 
explicitly attends to these categorizations, one idea remains coherent and durable: the 
imaginary of gender, in the g/t story, is strong enough to include difference and inequity 
across multiple categories such that differences of gender are taken to be useful in 
attending to differences more specifically or comprehensively. In addition, difference itself 
is conceived as something that can be isolated, measured, and catalogued.  
Through the strength of the gender imaginary, gender functions not merely as an 
analytic construct. The notion of gender as a key signifier of difference is one of the 
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primary lenses through which we understand and conceive of how girls, women, boys, and 
men act or understand themselves and others in the world. The specific ways in which 
ideas of gender, sex, men, and women are approached and conceptualized have shifted 
over the years, particularly in feminist thinking. However, the dominant model of the g/t 
story reflects an imaginary wherein locating precise difference and categorization is 
assumed possible and desirable. This extends from beliefs that generalizable theoretical 
models and interventions are the Holy Grail to pursue. This pursuit however, relies on a 
belief that gender is a static category, meaning that, even as race and class intermingle with 
gender, there remains a desire to predict based on these classifications. This thinking in 
turn depends on these categories remaining stable. The g/t story reflects the holding power 
of a gender imaginary that has been grounded in notions built from second wave feminism 
and psychology. This imaginary is taken to be fluid enough to be useful across gender, race, 
class, and other markers of difference while at the same time the gender imaginary holds 
together as a central, internally stable, organizing strategy of Western society.36  
 
 
 
                                                
36 Here I have indeed alluded quite broadly, and without due detail to several important 
ideas: the progression in feminist theory (often referred to as first, second, third wave 
feminisms, now moving towards post-feminism); what some view as paradigm shift as 
Hillary Clinton became a serious contender for the US presidency, even as others claim 
that hers was an opportunity available through a particularly and politically convenient 
marriage; and the fact that feminism, if not the g/t literature, is particularly sensitive to 
global feminisms and tries to steer clear of what might be described as a persistent colonial 
notion of global gender.  
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A Technological Imaginary  
As the gender imaginary percolates behind the scenes, so to speak, the g/t story also 
depends on a specific imaginary of technology. In this section I unpack some of the 
ideologies and beliefs about technology commonly circulated and that function as our 
technological imaginary. In the two quotes below, UNESCO articulates how access to ICTs 
is connected with social and economic power: 
While ICTs and the Internet offer vast, new and unprecedented opportunities for 
human development and empowerment in areas ranging from education and the 
environment to healthcare and business, they are also one of the key contributing 
factors to social and economic disparities across different social and economic 
groups. The gender divide is one of the most significant inequalities to be amplified 
by the digital revolution, and cuts across all social and income groups. Throughout 
the world, women face serious challenges that are not only economic but social as 
well as cultural—obstacles that limit or prevent their access to, use of, and benefits 
from ICTs. (Primo, 2003, p. 5) 
 
The Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 is generally regarded 
as a watershed in understanding of information technology as a powerful tool that 
women could use for mobilization, information exchange, and empowerment. (p. 
11) 
 
In the following example, the National Research Council (2007) similarly connects 
technology tools with social and economic progress:  
Since the Industrial Revolution, the growth of economies throughout the world has 
been driven largely by the pursuit of scientific understanding, the application of 
engineering solutions, and continual technological innovation. … 
… To many of us, that universe of products and services defines modern life, 
freeing most of us from the harsh manual labor, infectious diseases, and threats to 
life and property that our forebears routinely faced. …  
… Maintaining that vast and complex enterprise during an age of competition and 
globalization is challenging, but it is essential to the future of the United States.37 
(p. 41-43) 
                                                
37 The Research Council, in this chapter, also nods to an alternative point of view on 
technology by including a short, boxed statement: “For all the practical devices and 
117 
 
 
In these various descriptions of technology—whether referring to computers or technology 
more broadly—we see technology at its best, positioned as a tool and means of improving 
human life in general; and, in particular, as the means through which marginalized groups 
will achieve equity. Technology, in these kinds of statements, is a tool of democracy and 
brings progress. This belief relies upon what is commonly called the technological fix thesis. 
This notion is also evident in the following excerpt from the AAUW (2000) report: 
In contemporary culture, the computer is no longer an isolated machine: It is a 
centerpiece of science, the arts, media, industry, commerce, and civic life. 
Information technology is transforming every field, and few citizens are unaffected 
by it.…The question is no longer whether computers will be in the classroom, but 
how computers can be used to enhance teaching and learning—ideally, in ways that 
promote the full involvement by girls and other groups currently underrepresented 
in many computer-related endeavors. The commission’s themes and 
recommendations, while focused on girls in schools, would, if addressed, improve 
the quality of the computer culture for all students. (p. ix) 
 
Burbules (2007) articulates rather concisely, what an idea of a transformative role of 
technology—in education—might look like:     
Questions of teacher authority, “coverage” of material, and the isolation of school 
activities from learning that takes place in other contexts (and vice versa) are all 
impediments to realizing the transformative potential presented by new learning 
technologies. (p. 207) 
 
He sees a set of new tools that themselves hold the power to transform schools. 
                                                
wonders that science and technology have brought to society, it has also created its share of 
problems. Researchers have had to reapply their skills to create solutions to unintended 
consequences of many innovations” (National Research Council, 2007, p. 42). The 
interesting thing here is how strong is the technological determinist language—technology 
has not only brought wonders, but also created problems. Researchers, in this kind of 
statement, are seemingly the discursive white knights to save us, but responsibility for the 
bad technology remains within the technology itself.  
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The dominant idea throughout is that technological tools represent the possibility 
of progress; they open the door to new, more democratic practices and outcomes, 
particularly in education. The “question regarding technology” here is not concerned with 
technology in any cultural, ontological, or practice-based sense.38 Instead, the question is 
reduced to how everyone can be brought into technology’s fold so that the benefits 
promised by these new tools will be equitably distributed. This is the dominant and visible 
social imaginary of technology in education and the imaginary central to the meta g/t 
story.39 Cassell and Jenkins (1998, 1999a), for example, rely on the pervasiveness of this 
imaginary to explain why computer games are an important site for feminist activism:   
The second sense in which we are feminist researchers comes from our belief that 
equity between boys and girls, men and women, is a laudable goal.…In this context 
we examine the different ways in which we might strive for equity: equity through 
separate but equal computer games, equity through equal access to the same 
computer games, equity through games that encourage new visions of equity itself.” 
(p. 4-5) 
 
Similarly, Barker and Aspray (2006) explain why it is important to expand the number of 
women in IT by offering, as one of several reasons, “applying computing as a tool for 
solving big problems is considered critical to the U.S. future and economy” (p. 14). 
                                                
38 The phrase is a play on Heidegger’s essay “The Question Concerning Technology” 
(1977). One article that delves into this project of theorizing technology in relation to 
education is Barnhardt, Carol, Bertram C. Bruce, and Andee Rubin. “Conclusion: What 
We Have Learned.” In Electronic Quills: A Situated Evaluation of Using Computers for Writing 
in Classrooms, 234. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993; Bowers, C.A. The 
Cultural Dimensions of Educational Computing: Understanding the Non-Neutrality of Technology. 
New York: Teachers College Press, 1988; Illich. Tools for Conviviality, World Perspectives, 
V. 47. New York: Harper & Row, 1973. 
39 Here is one place where the education g/t story is quite different from that told in 
feminist technoscience or Science & Technology Studies (STS), fields where technology 
itself is more critically examined.  
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 Dede (2007), at Harvard’s Graduate School of Education, also relies on this 
instrumental technological imaginary to advocate for the role of computing technologies as 
the means of transforming education:  
To prepare students for 21st-century work and citizenship, the usage of sophisticated 
ICT based on a complementary pedagogical theory, situated learning, is a vital 
supplement to current educational technologies. (p. 22)  
 
Fortunately, emerging ICT that enable immersive, collaborative simulation now 
offer the capability to implement situated learning environments in classroom 
settings. (p. 23) 
 
Similarly, in the following UNESCO statement (Primo, 2003), the technological 
imaginary of “tools for transformation” foregrounds concerns over gender equity:  
Information and communication technologies could give a major boost to the 
economic, political and social empowerment of women, and the promotion of 
gender equality. But that potential will only be realized if the gender dimensions of 
the Information Society—in terms of users’ needs, conditions of access, policies, 
applications and regulatory frameworks—are properly understood and adequately 
addressed by all stakeholders.  
 
UNESCO believes that unless gender issues are fully integrated into technology 
analyses, policy development and programme design, women and men will not 
benefit equally from ICTs and their applications. (p. 9) 
 
Gender matters, in the technological imaginary, but the locus of transformation is 
centered in technology itself; women have needs, but technology has the power. Thus, the 
technological imaginary includes technology’s power to transform society (or conversely, its 
power to thwart transformation). In this imaginary, technology is an enormously powerful 
tool for social transformation. Lost is the way in which responsibility for the inequities 
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wrought by technology are ascribed to tools—not the creators or handlers of these tools or 
the socio-economic-political milieus within which technologies are conceived.40  
 Sometimes this imaginary expands to include the culture of computing. In the 
following quote from Unlocking the Clubhouse (Margolis & Fisher, 2002) the power to limit 
social change is located in an inventing that is determined by culture; thus, the masculine 
culture of technology is the target factor that determines what kinds of technologies we get: 
If boys invent things, and girls use things boys invent, a cyberspace culture will inevitably 
reflect the desires and sensibilities of males to the exclusion and often denigration 
of females. (p. 12) 
 
It is in these kinds of statements that a radical technological determinism is 
embedded into the technological imaginary. In conceiving of technology through its 
instrumental aspects, tools, or the culture that contains them, two ideologies persist. One is 
that it is sufficient to talk merely about tools and the second, that tools and their culture 
hold a power that determines social relations. Politics, agendas, and other human 
involvements are not particularly visible, except as they are to be manipulated by 
technology.  
 
A Knowledge-Technoscience-Progress Imaginary  
 The dominant technological imaginary of Western society is that technology itself 
will fix—or provide the means of fixing—many ills of society and the imperfections of 
humans. This imaginary acquires its cache through another that extols expert, abstract, 
                                                
40 This is an idea that Langdon Winner takes up at great length in his essay Do artifacts have 
politics (1986). 
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scientific, and rationally acquired knowledge. In 1993, an NSF solicitation stated the 
following:  
The amount of information generated by science and engineering has grown 
dramatically. The increased use of technologies has enabled us to expand our 
capacity to solve certain problems that were thought intractable only a short time 
ago… If society is to continue to benefit from the rapid production of new 
knowledge, new and better ways must be devised to expand human capacity to deal 
with the increased information, multiply the power of human reasoning to deal 
with the increasing complexity of science, develop ways to compensate for human 
limitations, and expand the power of human skills through collaboration to convert 
data into information, information into knowledge, and knowledge into practice. If 
these innovations are to affect education, new institutional innovations and 
infrastructures may be needed to cope with and speed their adoption in a timely 
manner….  
… The program urges proposers to anticipate what new knowledge will be available 
in 5 to 10 years and to show how best to articulate and represent it through the use 
of advanced technologies--in the laboratory and classrooms as well as to decision 
makers. (Section: Basic and applied research) 
 
The technological imaginary is again evident, particularly in the intertwining of 
technological determinism and the exponential growth of knowledge. Implicit is the 
connection between knowledge and progress, and the idea that humans are limited in their 
capacities to produce and sort through this knowledge, as well as seemingly powerless in 
any attempt to contain it, whether or not such containment might be warranted. In fact, 
humans themselves are to be “improved” by techno-science, to become better equipped to 
use and produce ever more knowledge, in turn made possible through technological 
progress.41 
                                                
41 Another distinction lost in these kinds of documents is the difference between science, 
technology, and engineering. In this NSF passage, these seem to be rather interchangeable, 
but this strategy ignores the important distinctions as well as the debates over what each of 
these fields represents. One of these debates is over whether technology is the tool of 
science or conversely, is something bigger that contains science. I will not attempt to 
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The new knowledge of technoscience—and the “progress” it promises—is the 
background good by which humans and their activities and abilities are to be evaluated and 
modified. The pre-eminence of this technoscience-knowledge-progress imaginary frames 
how literacy itself is now conceived and measured. For example, the 2002 National Science 
Foundation Reauthorization Act frames technology and engineering as the primary literacy 
needed by citizens: 
A literate citizen is one that understands the world around her. Engineering offers 
an excellent platform for project problem-based engineering and helps children 
integrate knowledge from all disciplines including math, science, social science, 
language art and art. (Statement of Dr. Ioannis (Yannis) Miaoulis, page 58) 
 
Margolis and Fisher (2002) also foreground this scientific and technical literacy as they 
argue for a broader relevance for computer science in education:   
Many computer science teachers argue that computer science involves developing 
higher-order critical thinking skills and problem-solving skills important for all 
students, not just those who intend to make a career of computing. (p. 37) 
 
Foreshadowing these ideas was Turkle and Papert’s (1990) work on epistemological 
styles and a rigidity they perceived in programming classes that negated what they argued 
were alternative, stylistic differences in approaches rather than differences in student 
abilities or programming outcomes. In the passage below, Turkle and Papert argue that a 
top-down, formal, and rule driven process was not the only way that programming could 
proceed or be taught:  
                                                
resolve, nor even enter this debate (Dewey and Heidegger would be good places to begin to 
understand this complex issue.) While I think technology is more than the tools of science 
(or learning), my analyses of particular statements only reflect the language or ideas 
embedded in a particular text. Here the term techno-science reflects the general blurred 
boundary I observe in these texts. 
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The computer has emerged as an important actor in the revaluation of the 
concrete, a privileged medium for the growth of alternative voices in dealing with 
the world of formal systems. The conventional route into formal systems, through 
the manipulation of abstract symbols, closes doors that the computer can open. 
The computer…can provide a port of entry for people whose chief ways of relating 
to the world are through movement, intuition, and visual impression. At the heart 
of the new possibilities for the appropriation of formal systems is the 
computational object, on the border between an abstract idea and concrete physical 
object….The computer has a theoretical vocation: it can make the abstract concrete; 
it can bring formality down-to-earth. (p. 131) 
 
In this excerpt, the technological imaginary is in full view, as the computer will “fix” 
problems in how formal systems and abstract knowledge are understood and acquired. 
More importantly, the acquisition of concrete, formal, and abstract knowledge is the 
ultimate goal. The “tweak in the system” that Turkle and Papert propose concerns only the 
styles of interacting with knowledge and artifacts, not the kind of knowledge produced, nor  
what is to be done with it. We might say that their major interest lies in the methods of 
production, as the following suggests: 
For some people in our study, what is exciting about computers is working within a 
rule-driven system that can be mastered in a top-down, divide and conquer way. (p. 
136) 
 
Formal reasoning is not a stage, but a style.…Thus, observation of programmers at 
work calls into question deeply entrenched assumptions about the classification 
and value of different ways of knowing.…It supports a perspective that encourages 
looking for psychological and intellectual development within rather than beyond 
the concrete and suggests the need for closer investigation of the diversity of ways 
in which the mind can think with objects rather than the rules of logic. (p. 143) 
 
Linking the technological and the knowledge-progress imaginary is this idea of 
“thinking with objects” and something that Dede (2007) builds on to position expert 
thinking in the 21st century as requiring different knowledges and problem solving skills 
than those needed in an earlier, less technological time. As he articulates it, what is needed 
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is a new kind of knowing, problem solving ability, and cognitive disposition. Globalization 
and the emerging knowledge economy require new kinds of thinking and these rely heavily 
on information and communication technologies (ICTs). Expertise is not within 
individuals, but is a product of the ways individuals, groups, and communication 
technologies are brought together. In short, 21st century expertise—which he portrays as a 
particularly (and new) complex approach to thinking and problem solving—is not possible 
without a strong ICT presence and capacity.  
In the new world that Dede (2007) locates, expertise is grounded in a fundamental 
fluency in cognitive processing skills but this is no longer the end goal or final expert 
knowledge. The new expertise supports knowledge building that is distributed and 
mediated across groups of people and through technologies. However, achieving this 
distributed expertise is dependent upon individuals’ expertise with ICTs. This is made 
clear in the following: 
Education should prepare students for a world in which computers do almost all 
types of routine cognitive tasks and in which expert thinking and complex 
communications are based on fundamental knowledge about how to do simpler 
tasks, so the shift needed is not about removing the learning of routine cognitive 
performances from the curriculum. Rather, the fundamental change involves 
deemphasizing fluency in simple procedures as an endgoal of preparation for work 
and life, instead using these routine skills as a substrate for mastering complex 
mental performances. (p. 13) 
 
The vision of 21st century expertise envisioned by Dede is impossible to visualize outside 
the technological imaginary; technologies are not only called upon to repair a lack in  
human processing capacity, computers (and insufficient pedagogies) apparently create this 
new cognitive disability.  
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Unfortunately, the interrelated 21st-century skills delineated earlier are largely 
absent in current pedagogical assessment practices.…The following section then 
delineates how emerging technologies such as multiuser virtual environments 
(MUVEs) and augmented realities enable new types of pedagogical strategies that 
meet a broader spectrum of learning styles and enable mastery of more 
sophisticated kinds of skills, complementing current teaching methods to more 
effectively prepare students for the 21st century. (p. 17) 
   
 Expertise, and what or who counts as an expert, is given a great deal of significance 
in differentiating users from experts, the technologically literate from the non-literate, and 
within these demarcations, men from women.42 This plays out in not only what kinds of 
programming strategies are deemed acceptable or who is given access to technology, but 
also delineates a boundary that promotes self-exclusion, as this quote from Margolis and 
Fisher (2002) shows: 
School computers and computing centers have been claimed as the territory of a 
subset of male students who are the school’s computing experts. And girls, as 
“outsiders,” do not see how they and what they value can fit into the computer 
culture and curriculum. (p. 33) 
 
Central is an idea that knowledge and power are intimately connected and that technology 
plays a central role in this power hierarchy:  
The domination of communication by a small powerful elite, mostly males, who 
use the existing communication technologies to coordinate and reinforce 
social/cultural dominance, is a very real threat for women. (Primo, 2003, p. 21) 
 
In this technological-knowledge imaginary, even when technology is a hegemonic tool or 
force, certain kinds of knowledge and information are given greater social capital. In the 
                                                
42 An extensive consideration of the expert-user connection is discussed in Gibbons, M., 
Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). The new 
production of knowledge: The dynamics of science and research in contemporary societies. London, 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. Also see Oudshoorn and Pinch (2003, 2005 ) for an excellent 
examination of the complexities of the user-designer relationship and the importance of 
each in how technologies evolve, live, and die. 
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following passage, UNESCO (Primo, 2003) argues that indigenous knowledge has been 
undervalued, yet must be protected from exploitation. Largely Western notions about 
intellectual property become the driving concepts through which to understand 
knowledge, ownership, and the distribution rights to this knowledge: 
The critical issue for women in indigenous communities…involves their control 
over, access to, and potential compensation for the knowledge they have acquired. 
The fact that most of their knowledge is considered “old” places it outside the 
scope of protection by industrial property laws. Under current international legal 
mechanisms, local and indigenous women’s knowledge are at increasing risk of 
exploitation in the race for genetic resources...In the information or knowledge 
society, a new legal instrument is needed that would recognize and protect 
knowledge created, developed and enhanced by communities of people, and which 
acknowledges that men and women have differential access to the structures that 
shape knowledge systems. Such an instrument needs to be developed with the full 
participation of all parties who hold such knowledge, including men and women. 
(p. 51-52) 
 
While this recognition of indigenous and women’s knowledge is important, the stated goal 
is to find an appropriate legal instrument that protects and accommodates these 
indigenous rights and needs. Not on the table is the possibility that the knowledge-science-
progress triad might be re-envisioned or contained. Knowledge still acquires its social 
capital to the extent it can be framed within a Western model of expertise and progress. 
 
An Education Imaginary  
 It is difficult to separate characterizations of the gender/technology problem from 
(a) concerns over a nation’s need for skilled and technically literate workers; (b) educational 
policies charged with ensuring measurable outcomes (intellectual, economic, attitudinal) so 
that its products (students) may become productive workers; or, (c) the competitive realities 
of an increasingly globalized marketplace that both requires newly skilled workers and 
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simultaneously socially and economically devalues them. Aspects of this state of affairs are 
both evident and invisible in the following excerpt from the 2007 NSF Program 
Solicitation for Research on Gender in Science and Engineering: 
One of the National Science Foundation's (NSF) key strategic goals is to cultivate a 
world-class, broadly inclusive science and engineering workforce, and expand the 
scientific literacy of all citizens. Investments are directed at programs that 
strengthen scientific and engineering (S&E) research potential and education 
programs at all levels. These outcomes are essential to the U.S. as we progress 
toward an increasingly technological job market and a scientifically complex society. 
(p. 5) 
It is largely in this socio-economic-political intersection that national educational policies 
are shaped and enacted. Prefacing these policies, education is understood as a central, 
mediating factor in developing workers’ technological competencies. However, taken-for-
granted in all this is the working definition of education itself. What is meant by education 
and who will be educated in these various sectors? What we need to be clearer on is how 
the social imaginary of education is construed and enacted, and further, why this matters. 
Dede (2007) provides an answer: 
A crucial challenge for U.S. education is to align curriculum and learning to a 
whole new economic model based on an emerging global, knowledge-based  
workplace.… Linking economic development, educational evolution, workforce 
development, and strengthened social services is essential to meeting this challenge. 
(p. 15) 
 
In a footnote Dede explains that he is not dismissing those who believe education should 
include other objectives, “e.g., equity, moral citizenship, self-realization” (p. 35). He does, 
however, position the economic model as the primary model. Similar emphases are evident 
in the 2007 NSF prospectus:  
The program for Research on Gender in Science and Engineering (GSE) seeks to 
build resources - developing the nation's knowledge capital, social capital, and  
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human capital -- toward the goal of broadening the participation of girls and young 
women in STEM education from kindergarten through undergraduate education. 
(p. 5) 
 
 In the g/t story, constructs of gender and technology tend to be defined or 
explicated in at least some minimal way. Often one is more defined than the other, and the 
understandings reflect transparent assumptions of the imaginaries already described. The 
education imaginary is perhaps the most black-boxed of all simply because education tends 
to be one of the generally agreed upon values of society. Specific goals and practices may be 
debated but few oppose the idea of education as a social good. However, the ideals driving 
societal beliefs in education have themselves shifted, increasingly driven by market and 
technocratic values. Education has become more of a market good rather than a citizen 
good.    
Education and human capital theory. In the passages quoted above, the generally 
agreed upon understanding that makes these statements both plausible and expected is a 
human capital theory of education. Livingstone (1997) explains how this theory framed 
mainstream thinking about education during the post WWII years. It equated “workers’ 
knowledge levels with their levels of schooling” where these would reliably insure “higher 
productivity and macroeconomic growth” and both individuals and society would gain, 
economically, from higher levels of schooling (p. 9). In the 1970s, the theory was found 
lacking, given that people’s salaries and employment levels were falling despite their 
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increasing educational credentials.43 The theory was then revamped in two ways: First, it 
made the quality of education the problem and the focus turned to raising standards, 
starting children in school earlier, making schooling more relevant or specialized; second, it 
shifted the focus from schooling to life-long learning (p. 9). 
 Evidence of a reliance on human capital theory is strong in the g/t story as this 
example from TechSavvy (AAUW, 2000) illustrates:  
Girls were less likely to take high level computing classes in high school, and 
comprised just 17 percent of those taking Advanced Placement computer science 
exams. Girls outnumbered boys only in their enrollment in word processing classes, 
arguably the 1990s version of typing. In 1995, at the postsecondary level, women 
received one in four of the computer/information science bachelor’s degrees and 
only 11 percent of the doctorates in engineering-related technologies. These 
educational gaps reverberate in the workplace, where by most estimates women 
today occupy only 20 percent of the jobs in information technology. (p. 3) 
 
The instrumentality is palpable. Girls, women, and society will gain if they can be 
convinced to stick with technology in their education careers thus plugging the “leaky 
pipeline.” This leaky pipeline is one of the driving story lines of the g/t narrative, but it is 
important to recognize how this metaphor relies on thinking about education through 
human capital theory. Camp’s 1997 article, “The incredible shrinking pipeline” not only 
makes this connection clear, but also positions it as a fundamental, human capital 
concern:44 
                                                
43 For example, the recent economic downturn has hit the well-educated. In addition, a 
particularly well-educated and undervalued group is the ever increasing adjunct faculty of 
higher education, most with expensive PhDs. 
44 It might be useful to consider this pipeline concern in the context of a proportionally 
miniscule discourse of concern over a long-standing low percentage of men studying to be 
K-12 teachers.  
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The percentage of bachelor’s degrees awarded in CS to women decreased almost 
every year over the last decade. In other words, not only does the pipeline shrink 
from high school to graduate school, but it also shrinks at the bachelor’s level. 
Furthermore, while the percentage of bachelor’s degrees awarded in CS to women 
decreased, corresponding percentages of other science and engineering disciplines 
increased.…In short, there is a critical labor shortage in CS and, although women 
are more than half the population, they are a significantly underrepresented 
percentage of the population earning CS degrees. (p. 104) 
 
Human capital theory is also a foundational concept in Unlocking the Clubhouse, as seen in 
the following: 
Girls and women who have the necessary talent and inclination but do not become 
engaged in the technology are missing the educational and economic opportunities 
that are falling into the laps of computer-savvy young men. Computing salaries are 
high, jobs plentiful, and entrepreneurship opportunities unbounded. Furthermore, 
a command of information technology is an asset in many contexts outside the 
field itself. (Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 2) 
 
The technocratization of education. Thorndike’s behaviorist theories of education 
have also been enormously influential in how technology has been brought to education. 
Tomlinson (1997) describes Thorndike’s educational position as reflecting a notion of 
education that relies exclusively on the “tools of behavioral psychology, mental testing, and 
scientific management” (p. 366). He explains that Thorndike also advocated a technocratic 
and scientific role for education that became a “most effective argument for undermining 
the traditional humanist curriculum” (p. 372). Thorndike also insisted that there is little or 
no transfer of learning between domain specific tasks and that no subject is more effective 
than any other in developing a child’s intelligence. One outcome of Thorndike’s ideas is 
the notion that education and teaching should focus on the acquisition of skills and that 
these skills should be tested, measured, and tracked. The technocratic shift in education is 
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not merely about bringing computers to the classroom, it reflects an overall theory of 
education that the computer facilitates. 
 Gibboney (2006, October) also returns to the tensions between Deweyian and 
Thorndikian conceptions of education to understand current debates in education over 
testing and what kinds of learning matter. As he illuminates, Thorndike’s view of transfer 
promoted the idea that learning can (and must) be measured and it conjoined transfer and 
testing so that the only relevant learning is that which can be measured, visibly and 
quantitatively. Gibboney explains that Dewey argued a wholly different notion of 
education:45 
Dewey's ideas on the transfer of learning were fundamentally more humanistic than 
Thorndike's. Dewey believed subject matter in schools exists to make the quality of 
democratic life as good as it can be under given conditions.…In other words, what 
is transferred when a student learns something that is truly important is intangible 
and immeasurable by tests. It is an attitude, the desire to learn. Subject matter is 
but one among many means used to attain this central objective, which is sadly 
overlooked in today's race for higher test scores. (p. 170) 
 
In the early 1980s, education started to view the computer as a new tool for 
learning that would transform schooling. The debates on this are extensive and I will not 
delve into them.46 Of greater significance here is that the g/t problem has historically been 
linked, at least since Hawkins’s 1985 article, “Computers and Girls: Rethinking the 
Issues,” to how education conceives of and deals with both girls and technology. Early on it 
was understood that girls do not receive the same educational support that boys do, from 
                                                
45 Dewey’s oeuvre also reflects a substantively different, and experiential, view of technology 
that I do not have space to fully acknowledge. 
46 Some key scholars who have weighed in this are Bertram (Chip) Bruce, Larry Cuban, 
Robert Taylor, and Robert McClintock. 
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teachers or parents, and that technology is but the latest manifestation of this gender (and 
later, race and class) inequity. From this base, Margolis and Fisher (2002) viewed the 
educational cultures wherein computing is taught and view these as much of the problem.  
In this book, we lay out the blueprints—the doors, walls, and windows—of the “boys’ 
clubhouse” of computing education. We show how rarely girls’ interest in 
computing is kindled and how women who do develop and interest in computing 
often have it extinguished in school. We discuss what is necessary to remodel 
education so that girls and women who are or could be interested in computing 
can find a home in the discipline. 
 
Curriculum, teacher’s expectations, and culture reflect boys’ pathways into 
computing, accepting assumptions of male excellence and women’s deficiencies in 
the field. (p. 3-4) 
 
 Across the g/t story, inadequate and male-centric pedagogies are quite often 
isolated as the problem. An example of this is evident in the AAUW (2000) report: 
The AAUW Technology Commission also found computer science classes often to 
be “bastions of poor pedagogy” (p. 41). Assignments and teaching examples often 
embed male-dominated interests and activities, such as sports statistics and card 
and number tricks. There is often little in computer science instructional materials 
to draw in girls…Although computing is integrally linked to critical investigations 
in medicine, environmental science, famine control, art, and music, computer 
science textbooks focus primarily on technical detail, with little attention paid to 
the application and impact of the technology in meaningful interdisciplinary 
problem-solving assignments. (p. 37) 
 
Besides the broad inference that girls and techné do not mix well, this way of thinking 
about computing education seems to be an extension of Turkle and Papert’s 
“Epistemological pluralism” (1990; 1991) in which they focused attention on boys 
preferences for formal, abstract, and rule-driven logic and girls’, for the intuitive and 
contextual. A similar idea is found in Kay’s 1992 essay concerned with associating cognitive 
abilities with technological skills. 
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By assuming that all knowledge is acquired in a similar fashion, researchers ignore 
potentially important differences that are illuminated by investigating specific 
cognitive tasks such as programming, word processing, spreadsheet software, or 
computer terminology….Yet even in these studies, we are still at the general 
learning level. By testing general programming skills, for example, we obscure 
factors such as language features or syntax, design skills, program reading, and 
procedural skills. (p. 165) 
 
 The attention, in these kinds of statements, has been on the cognitive and 
psychological abilities of girls and boys. However, is this all that is going on? In thinking 
that these abilities can be tested and measured, they become the most important factors 
and abilities and other approaches and ways of thinking about education move to the 
margins. Transparent in this kind of education climate is the dominant imaginary of a 
Thorndikian inspired technocratic view of learning and education.   
 My aim here is not to get embroiled in the Dewey versus Thorndike debates over 
education; however, the technocratic turn in education is of great significance. I want to 
suggest that the g/t story—in statements like those made in Margolis and Fisher and in the 
AAUW report—frames preferences for humanistic, experiential, or holistic pedagogies or 
motivations to be an outcome of one’s gender. That is, the battleground laid out is a 
curriculum that privileges boys’ ways of learning and ignores what and how girls want to 
learn. Invisible is the ways in which skill-driven and task-based pedagogies and assessments 
have come to dominate in schooling. This reality can be black-boxed to the extent that the 
gender imaginary is available to act as a counter-balance even if its surface use is to 
articulate difference.  
 The underlying analytic framework is a response to a dominant, yet transparent, 
Thorndikian conception of education. That is, the g/t story construes contextual and 
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experiential preferences in education to be gendered preferences, yet doing this masks a 
longer-standing debate over what education is to be and how it should be conceived and 
practiced. This suggests the import of recognizing how technocratic and human capital 
ideals of education have merged and together have become the transparent beliefs 
underpinning the education imaginary. 
 
 A Human and Machine Subjectivity-Identity Imaginary 
 Another legacy of Thorndike’s influence on education is the overarching influence 
of the psychological, cognitive, and behavioral sciences as the primary model for 
conceptualizing students in terms of their subjectivities and identities. This tendency can 
be traced within the g/t story and because this practice seems so normal, it functions as 
another layer in the g/t social imaginary. It might not be a stretch to state that the 
subjectivity-identity imaginary is the primary means through which we understand and try 
to make sense of the g/t relationship. It denotes a picture of persons wherein psychological-
behavioral-cognitive traits are taken to be either innate or socially ingrained and taken to 
be determinant, in some fashion, of a person’s identity or capacities. Moreover, these traits 
may be catalogued and measured. This social sciences tradition grounds the g/t meta story; 
for example, girls’ and women’s subjectivities or identities tend to be viewed as fixed rather 
than in flux. Arguably, studies on online identities query this very question, but within 
education’s g/t story, identity research remains within the psychological-behavioral-
cognitivist conceptions that depend on enduring notions that subjectivities can be 
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objectively observed and thus, catalogued. This subjectivity-identity imaginary is evident in 
statements such as the following:  
At each step from early childhood through college, computing is both actively 
claimed as “guy stuff” by boys and men and passively ceded by girls and women…. 
Curriculum, teachers’ expectations, and culture reflect boys’ pathways into 
computing, accepting assumptions of male excellence and women’s deficiencies in 
the field. There is also a subset of boys and men who burn with a passion for 
computers and computing. Through the intensity of their interest, they both mark 
the field as male and enshrine in its culture their preferences for single-minded 
intensity and a focus on technology. (Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 4) 
 
In this passage, boys and men’s subjectivity is described as active and girls and women’s is 
one of passivity. Margolis and Fisher’s concern seems to be focused on how boys’ 
excellence in computing is misconstrued because girls’ competencies go unnoticed, masked 
by their passive natures. The subjectivity-identity imaginary transparently enables these 
assumptions. Thus, boys and men’s passion and intensity for computing becomes a 
subjectivity ready to be measured and investigated in contrast to girls and women’s 
dispassion. The underlying assumptions that assign these subjectivities and identities 
however, pass as norms.  
In many ways, the g/t imaginary is built upon two beliefs: (a) identifying and 
understanding psychological, cognitive, and behavioral subjectivities will provide a 
substantive and sufficient explanation of girls and women’s experiences with technology 
and (b) we can observe, measure, and compare subjectivities or identities. Framing the 
subjectivity-identity imaginary is the dominant lenses of the psychological-cognitive-
behavioral sciences. Some readers may be skeptical that a set of ideas so infused and 
evident in the story are “transparent.” However, the very fact that the g/t story-imaginary is 
so heavily and unreflexively dependent on the exposition and examination of subjectivities-
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identities is sufficient reason to further investigate the black-boxed nature of these 
assumptions.  
While Thorndike’s influence cannot be underestimated, Turkle’s The Second Self 
(1984) has also been influential. Using a psycho-anthropological analytic lens, she 
described human subjectivities and psychologies as they intersected with the computer—an 
object with its own subjectivities and psychologies. In the following two passages, she deftly 
connects human psychology with the computer in a way that makes subjective 
understandings of both central and formative: 
Most considerations of the computer concentrate on the “instrumental computer,” 
on what work the computer will do. But my focus here is on something different, 
on the “subjective computer.” This is the machine as it enters into social life and 
psychological development, the computer as it affects the way that we think, 
especially the way that we think about ourselves. (p. 13)  
 
People are thinking of themselves in computational terms.…Their language carries 
an implicit psychology that equates the processes that take place in people to those 
that take place in machines. It suggests that we are information systems. (p. 17) 
 
Turkle takes subjectivity in a new direction and extends it to the machine. The computer 
here is not simply a tool; it offers a new kind of subjective experience through which to 
understand human identity.  
Turkle’s (1984, 1988, 1995; Turkle & Papert, 1990) analyses of computer culture 
have been immeasurably influential in describing the ways identity formation and 
computers may be linked. This conception followed in the wake of Turing’s (1950) 
infamous tests of whether a machine was capable of thinking or learning. Turkle’s 
narratives depend on psychological-behaviorist-cognitivist lenses that in turn both support 
and are supported by a model of artificial intelligence that understands the mind as a 
137 
 
 
processing machine (e.g. Minsky, 1985; Moravec, 1988).  Significant is that an idea of mind 
as information processor was the dominant model of AI and learning in the early 1980s 
when education began its relationship with computing. Therefore, it seems important to 
consider the import of linking human psychology, machine psychology, and human 
thinking to computational processing. Reflecting the ongoing strength of a link between 
these, Dede (2007) has stated:  
[Observing] the impact of ICT on society…cognition is now distributed across 
human minds, tools/media, groups of people, and space/time.…Because of 
sophisticated computers and telecommunications, the process of individual and 
collective thought in civilization is increasingly dispersed symbolically, socially, and 
physically. (p. 12) 
 
More so than human ingenuity or agency, ICTs are seen to be the articulation points in a 
triad of communication, thinking, and information processing. Turkle’s ideas, along with 
those of Papert (1980), were somewhat revolutionary during this time when computers 
were emerging as a new force in society. For Turkle and Papert, the bond between human 
and machine was significant, but Dede’s statement reveals how widely much of this human-
machine subjectivity has been embraced and the ways in which human cognition is now 
nearly inseparable from the computer, particularly in STEM education circles. 
 The ideas promoted by Turkle and Papert were probably not attributable to 
Thorndike specifically but to the close professional association at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) between Turkle, Papert, and Minsky, where artificial 
intelligence was the driving paradigm.47 This paradigm had a major influence on how the 
                                                
47 Quoted from Minsky’s website at M.I.T.: “Marvin Minsky has made many contributions 
to AI, cognitive psychology, mathematics, computational linguistics, robotics, and optics. 
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computer, from within education, would be understood.48 For example, Hawkins’ (1985) 
research explicitly reflected Thorndike’s influence, as seen when she describes a tight 
interplay of psychological-behavioral-cognitive factors: 
Some studies indicate that particular characteristics of children's learning tasks may 
be an important factor in the development of sex differences. For example, Licht 
and Dweck (1982) suggest that achievement orientations may be different for the 
two sexes in various subject areas. Girls and boys interpret failure feedback 
differently: Girls are more likely to attribute difficulty in solving problems to their 
own lack of ability; boys are more likely to attribute failure to other situational 
factors. (p. 169) 
 
This psychological-behaviorist-cognitive lens is the basis upon which attributions of 
particular and identifiable traits, dispositions, abilities, and so on, become claims for 
objectively understanding and explaining individual and gender-dependent factors that 
influence STEM outcomes.  
Gender biases are still evident in gender gaps at many stages of the STEM 
educational continuum. While both boys and girls now enroll in elective and 
advanced high school courses to prepare for college at about the same frequency, 
girls are less likely to report liking math or science. (National Science Foundation, 
2007, p. 6) 
 
A Thorndikian subjectivity is behind the experiential, explanatory narratives of who 
can or cannot, wants or does not want, to engage with the computers or its culture. In 
1985, this narrative took the form of “we can, but I can’t,” framed as a “paradox” (Collis, 
                                                
In recent years, he has worked chiefly on imparting to machines the human capacity for 
commonsense reasoning. His conception of human intellectual structure and function is 
presented in The Society of Mind (CDROM, book) which is also the title of the course he 
teaches at MIT.” http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/  
48 A case could be made (though I do not have space here to make that argument) that 
Thorndike’s influence reaches to the way in which cognitive science and AI now permeate 
educational models of learning. For example, the dominant approaches of the learning 
sciences and IES projects on educational technology. 
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1985, cited in Kay 1992, p. 167). By 2000 the narrative had morphed into “we can, but 
don’t want to” (AAUW, 2000, p. 6). Another recurring theme around subjectivities in the 
g/t story is that of a tool-toy divide that is repeatedly used to distinguish girls and boys 
interests in computing. The contrast derives its authority from a reliance on Thorndikian 
behavioral psychology: 
The focus groups support a recurrent theme in research on gender and technology: 
Girls approach the computer as a “tool” useful primarily for what it can do; boys 
more often view the computer as a “toy” and/or an extension of the self (what 
Turkle has called the projective qualities of the computer, the computer as 
“Rorschach” or “second self”). For boys, the computer is inherently interesting. 
Girls are interested in its instrumental possibilities, which may include its use as an 
artistic medium. They express scorn toward boys who confuse “real” power and 
power on a screen. “I see a computer as a tool,” a high school girl declares. (p. 9) 
 
 Although I do not want to dismiss out-of-hand the importance of people’s 
experience and perceptions in learning and interacting with computers or other 
technologies, the degree to which this subjectivity frames the g/t conversation is striking, so 
much so that it might be hard to separate the story from this way of understanding. The 
question is whether this perspective warrants the ways in which it has become a totalizing 
lens and whether it has the explanatory reach that it has been given. The list of 
psychological, cognitive, and behavioral characteristics that have been used as explanatory 
traits in the g/t story is quite extensive. For example, girls and women’s confidence levels  
or various fears of computing are repeatedly discussed in the literature, and the following 
are but two highlights.49  
                                                
49 A useful alternative examination of women and competition is Miner, V., & Longino, 
H. (Eds.). (1987). Competition: A feminist taboo? New York: The Feminist Press, CUNY. 
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Most studies indicated that women—even ones who study computer science—have 
less confidence than men in their computer skills. (Margolis & Fisher, 2002, pp. 
38-39) 
 
One of the more pervasive but intractable problems is “technophobia,” or fear of 
technology. Women often have complex relationships with technology and 
machines as a result of being socialized over time to believe that machines and 
technology are a man’s domain and not for women and girls, thus generating a 
gender bias in attitudes towards studying or using information technology. (Primo, 
2003, p. 38) 
 
Often, ideas about women’s relationship with computers refers back to Turkle’s work on 
women’s fears of the intimate machine.  
The central issue for these competent and talented women is not phobia or lack of 
ability, but a reticence to become more deeply involved with an object experienced 
as threatening. (Turkle, 1988, p. 42) 
 
Building from these ideas of essential psychological-cognitive-behavioral differences, the 
NSF 2007 prospectus highlights these as key factors worthy of investigation and funding: 
Proposals in the research area may seek to enhance the multidisciplinary 
understanding of STEM learning to the extent that differences are evident based on 
gender. Behavioral, cognitive, affective, and social differences may be investigated 
using methods of sociology, psychology, anthropology, economics, statistics, and 
other social and behavioral science and education disciplines. (p. 7) 
 
There is also evidence that differences in m-f subjectivities do not only reflect “objective” 
measures of perceived difference; they are also rhetorically enforced.  
“Dreaming in code” has become one of our working metaphors, emblematic of a 
male standard of behavior in this computer-oriented world. (Margolis & Fisher, 
2002, p. 5) 
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The role of computers and computing culture in identity formation is another way that 
subjectivity is approached and dissected in the g/t story:50  
Computers become particularly seductive at a certain moment in psychological 
development: the moment of adolescence. (Turkle, 1988, p. 43) 
 
There is not room here to show how extensively this notion of identity formation 
permeates the gender and computing story. However, the following quote from Wajcman 
(2007), one of the most prominent feminist scholars of gender and technology, illustrates 
the pervasiveness of this idea across various sectors of the g/t story: 
The literature on gender and technology has grown to become a broad and diverse 
field. It foregrounds the need to investigate the ways in which women’s identities, 
needs, and priorities are being reconfigured together with digital technologies. (p. 
295) 
 
 The subjectivity-objectivity imaginary, framed as it is through the psychological-
cognitive-behaviorist triad, supports a quite narrow and exclusionary conceptual framework 
for understanding the modern social-technological world or girls and women’s interactions 
with technology. This imaginary has become, through many intersecting facets, normative 
yet transparent as an explanatory lens—dominant, and itself constitutive. 
 
A Research Imaginary  
According to many scholars, mainstream educational research remains too 
dependent on positivism, experimentalism, and measurement (Rizvi, 2006; St. Pierre, 
2006). Appadurai (1999) describes this dominant model as the modern research imaginary 
                                                
50 Some others who emphasize identity are Cassell & Jenkins, 1998, 1999b; Phipps, 2006, 
Turkle, 1995.    
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and argues that it is marked by a valorization of method. In the following passage, he 
highlights some of the beliefs driving this imaginary: 
The most serious problems are not those to be found at the level of theories or 
models but those involving method: data-gathering, sampling bias, reliability of 
large numerical data-sets…method, translated into research design, is taken to be a 
reliable machine for producing ideas with the appropriate shelf-life. (p. 236) 
 
Appadurai’s concern is a dominant research ethic that supports or reflects the tendency of 
Western ideologies to dominate in knowledge building. It also refers to the “ubiquitous, 
taken-for-granted and axiomatic quality of research” (p. 233). That is, there is a 
transparently accepted way of thinking about research that on the one hand has become 
normal and expected, yet on the other, brings with it an ethical orientation towards 
knowledge and inquiry that is imbued with its own set of ideologies. This “modern 
research ethic” emphasizes “systematicity, prior citational contexts and specialized modes of 
inquiry” and “the issue of replicability…not search but re-search” is foremost. At the heart of 
this dominant research imaginary is replicability, which Appadurai argues has become a 
kind of moral authority that most worships a values-independent rationality (p. 199). 
The belief in replicability sustains the idea of value-free research and notions that 
only professionals connected through “a professionally defined field of prior knowledge…a 
specialized, usually technical, body of readers and judges” are warranted to do this research 
(Appadurai, 1999, p. 236). There are many scholars and researchers working to reign in the 
dominance of this research imaginary (e.g. Helga Nowotny, 2003; Schwandt, 1996, 2004; 
Wallerstein, 1997; Wallerstein & Gulbenkian Commission, 1996) but nonetheless, in g/t 
research in education, this imaginary remains quite strong. Driving criticisms of this 
imaginary is a concern that its ideologies are so pervasive and transparent that the notion 
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of “research” not only carries the weight of authority, it claims a flawed assumption of 
neutrality and at the same time a kind of omniscience. Examples of the strength of this 
imaginary are pervasive in the g/t meta story. In Cohoon and Aspray’s 2006 literature 
review the gender gap in computing is attributed, at least in part, to flawed research 
methods—research that does not meet the criteria of the dominant research imaginary. This 
is explicit in the following statements:  
Our review of the literature on women in postsecondary computer science leads us 
to the conclusion that two conditions contribute to the persistence of women’s 
underrepresentation. The first condition is an inadequate understanding of the 
underlying and immediate causes. (Cohoon & Aspray, 2006a, p. 137)  
 
Too much of the research into the gender composition of computing includes only 
formative evaluations (participant satisfaction with aspects of the program) rather 
than summative evaluations that measure whether predicted outcomes and impact 
were achieved. When summative evaluation is attempted, it must still meet several 
criteria if it is to be credible. (Cohoon & Aspray, 2006a, p. 144)   
 
This same research imaginary and ethic dominates the NSF calls for g/t research funding 
proposals—perhaps the primary funder of STEM education research in the U.S.: 
Successful proposals will incorporate relevant advances in research methodologies 
and theoretical models. They should capitalize on the development of new 
instrumental, computational, or statistical methods, models, and tools of 
observation and analysis. (National Science Foundation, 2007, p. 7) 
 
The NSF is not merely setting a standard of research; it is wholly engulfed within a kind of 
value system where the research imaginary functions as a kind of gatekeeper to the kinds of 
knowledge that may be pursued.  
 Sometimes this research imaginary that is built around a strong belief in 
replicability is dressed in less explicit language. When Cohoon and Aspray (2006a) focus 
attention on the lack of causal theory, their underlying concern is the gap in replicable 
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studies that would produce such theory. They state: “Without theory, the research 
produces a collection of valuable observations that lack the context of a causal chain 
linking them to each other as well as to a meaningful outcome” (p. 144).  
Concerns about methods are, ultimately, meant to bring research more in line with 
the research imaginary. That is, the reason that solid methods are thought to be so crucial 
is that they are the means to producing first, good results and second, replicable studies 
that move findings up the ladder towards becoming proven theory. This ladder is evident  
in how Cohoon and Aspray (2006a) draw on the NSF position on methods (highlighted 
below) to pinpoint a perceived flaw in g/t research that limits this kind of theory building:  
The criteria considered most important by an NSF evaluation of research on 
programs for women and girls in STEM were: 
A cogent means of measuring outcomes; 
Data from a sample set larger than ten; 
Appropriate measures of outcomes; 
A study design employing pre- and postassessments, a control group, or 
comparison; 
one or more data points; 
… 
We found few examples of published research on computing’s gender composition 
that was tied to theory and met these criteria. (Cohoon & Aspray, 2006a, pp. 144-
145) 
 
The NSF program solicitation however derives its criteria from the National Research 
Council report, “Scientific Research in Education” (2002) which argues that educational 
research projects should reflect scientific principles based on the following standards and 
ideals: 
Pose significant questions that can be investigated empirically… 
Link relevant research to theory… 
Use methods that permit direct investigation of the questions posed… 
Provide a coherent and explicit chain of reasoning… 
Replicate and generalize across studies… (p. 3-4) 
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The explicitly stated belief amongst g/t researchers is that methods lacking in “scientific” 
rigor are a primary contributing factor to the persistence of the g/t problem. This idea, that 
methods are the root problem, emanates from the research imaginary that Appadurai 
identifies. Research, in the g/t meta story, means exactly what Appadurai refers to when he 
characterizes contemporary educational research as holding an ethical stand towards 
knowledge as “re-search.” The “re” in research confers a moral authority to “redoing” in the 
search for causal relations. Replicability both validates knowledge and moves it up the 
chain of authority but it also both depends on and confers a stasis of phenomena, 
subjectivities, or relationships that is blind to cultures, geographies, politics, and to any 
shifts in or between these.      
 The problem with the research imaginary is both its transparency and its 
grandiosity, by which I mean the moral authority it claims, through methods that are 
marketed as passive and neutral, but in actuality, carry the ethos of a very specific Western 
epistemological orientation to the world. The belief is that knowledge produced according 
the norms of the imaginary is promotable to become generalizable theory. Appadurai’s 
argument is that this research imaginary is a barrier to understanding in a globalized world. 
The research ethic is so circumscribed that it has become a major constraint for researchers 
and policy makers.   
 Wittgenstein’s (1958) criticisms of the experimental method, the model behind this 
dominant research imaginary, takes the argument a bit further: “The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which 
trouble us –the problem and method pass one another by” (p. 232). 
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 It is crucial to understand the strength of the research imaginary across the g/t story 
in order to understand the moral authority attributed to a triad of method, replicability, 
and the value neutrality of re-search. Researchers functioning within this research 
imaginary tend to negate criticisms of its ethical authority, positing such criticisms as non-
science (the extreme example is Sokal’s hoax (Ross, 1996, Spring-Summer), which I discuss 
in chapter 9. Debates over the efficacy or ethic of this imaginary continue. The problem of 
the g/t meta story however, is that it so wholly embraces the research imaginary and rarely 
considers what is being constituted in the process. 
 
Conclusion 
 By now it might be evident that it is difficult to talk about these multiple 
imaginaries independently—each is connected to a larger set of ideas and practices and is 
dependent on a set of long-standing beliefs, even if the source of these beliefs or practices 
have been forgotten. These imaginaries both constitute and continually promote the 
understandings we have of the g/t relationship. They inform the ways in which we 
normatively imagine how gender sits and is studied in relation to technology. Moreover, 
the ways that we imagine this relationship are also constitutive. Taylor, in Modern Social 
Imaginaries (2004), illuminates the intimate interplay between background social practices, 
the social imaginary, and a social theory. “What is originally just an idealization grows into 
a complex imaginary through being taken up and associated with social practices” (p. 29). 
Our sense of the social order, of our place within this order, and the explanations we 
construe of this order evolve as they come in contact. However, Taylor suggests that theory 
147 
 
 
is quite influential in the ways it “penetrates and transforms the social imaginary” (p. 29). 
This is the process, as he describes it: 
For the most part, people take up, improvise, or are inducted into new practices. 
These are made sense of by the new outlook, the one first articulated in the theory; 
this outlook is the context that gives sense to the practices. Hence the new 
understanding comes to be accessible to the participants in a way it wasn’t before. It 
begins to define the contours of their world and can eventually come to count as 
the taken-for-granted shape of things, too obvious to mention. 
 
 But this process isn’t just one sided, a theory making over a social 
imaginary. In coming to make sense of the action the theory is glossed, as it were, 
given a particular shape as the context of these practices…the theory is schematized 
in the dense sphere of common practice. (p. 29-30) 
 
This interplay of practices, background understandings, and theory building is a 
hermeneutic one—each processually transformed in the interaction. This suggests that, 
contrary to how the g/t meta story views theory as an explanatory scheme to be discovered, 
the interplay between theory and practices is far more complex, each mutually constitutive 
of the other.  
 Moreover, an imaginary holds within it a particular set of concepts that give it a 
normative authority. These concepts promote or reflect a particular worldview or 
orientation to the empirical world. In the imaginaries I described, some of the most 
instrumental concepts are determinist thinking, an instrumental orientation to the world, 
the primacy of essentializing and cataloguing difference, and reductivist thinking that make 
our imaginaries seem as if they are our ontological condition. It is through the exclusive, 
wholehearted, or unreflexive embrace of these concepts, and the near exclusion of others, 
that these imaginaries function transparently and with such influence. The flawed notion is 
that a theory is descriptive of an observed phenomenon (for example, that gendered 
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experiences shape an interest in computers) rather than a constitutive element in 
producing the practices, beliefs, or relationships that are taken to be causal or most 
significant. In the following chapter, I explore this notion further by reading the g/t story 
as a reflection of a four-faceted enframing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
149 
 
 
Facet 6 
A Story Enframed 
Despite the rapid changes in technology and some fifteen years of literature 
covering the era of the ubiquitous personal computer, a remarkably consistent 
picture emerges: more boys than girls experience an early passionate attachment to 
computers. (Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 16) 
 
The question is twofold: How should we read the g/t story and how can we read it, 
given the imaginaries, traditions, or lenses through which we have been conditioned to 
read and interpret? There is an assumption embedded in the g/t story that we will—
eventually, once the right causes are identified—be able to intervene in and “finally” redress 
the underrepresentation of women in computer science. Sometimes the idea promoted is a  
“fix” of either women or the cultures of computing technology. In this chapter I argue that 
the “should” or “can” aspect of reading and interpreting is inextricably tied to four ways of 
being in and reading the world: (a) a representational and radically reflexive epistemology 
(e.g. Taylor), (b) a technological understanding of being (e.g. Heidegger), (c) a far-reaching 
set of rules over what denotes gender difference (e.g. Cornell), and (d) a limited yet 
powerfully exclusionary organizing perception of subjects and objects (e.g. Haraway). This 
four-faceted enframing grounds the g/t story’s aura of a meta-narrative that gains its 
credibility through an accumulation of similarly conceptualized micro stories all bent on 
describing and explaining girls and women’s experiences, interests, and abilities as these 
intersect with “technology.”   
A story is regarded as “true” because it is recognized to be an appropriate and 
familiar kind of narrative that is at once descriptive, encompassing, and objective in 
explicating a subjectively experienced empirical world that seems natural in the way it has 
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been represented. In their various ways, Heidegger, Gadamer, Foucault, Taylor, Bowker 
and Star, Haraway, and Barad (to list but a few) have taken issue with presumptions made 
about the innate authority or necessity of this epistemology. In earlier chapters I unpacked 
the ways the g/t story is put together and characterized some of the transparent ideas or 
practices that have made this story plausible in its current forms. Beyond these 
constructions and imaginaries however, are concepts and beliefs about epistemology, 
technology, difference, and perception that act as a foundational glue in the story. Viewing 
the world through ideals filtered through a pervasive instrumentalism, reductivist 
epistemology, a limited conceptual framework of difference, and an objectivity located 
outside the knower, the constitutive outsider (CO) is delineated. This outsider foregrounds 
the scientific basis and descriptive power of the g/t story and makes it possible to see 
women and girls as the outsiders to technology. The problem lies in how women are 
construed as outsiders and that the category of women is essentialized to all women, in part 
by not recognizing those women who sit outside the norms of our enframing.  
Enframing, as explained by Heidegger is  
The mind-set that underlies the rise of technology and that permeates our daily 
habits of speech and thought…a way of objectifying our world and our experience 
(including our experience of ourselves) in such a way as to make what is enframed 
available for our use, manipulable and transformable in the service of designated 
goals and purposes.” (Pattison, 2000, p. 2)  
 
Enframing is not merely a way of describing the human drive towards mastery over nature. 
Rather, it reflects how we understand ourselves to be in the world. It is a kind of narrowed 
perceptual disposition wherein the beliefs-lenses-dispositions that we rely on to navigate, 
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understand, and attempt to control the world are themselves already constrained by our 
technological disposition to, and understanding of being in the world.51 
I facet enframing through the following four lenses: First is our epistemological 
enframing: Taylor’s (1995) tracing of our modern epistemology illuminates the ways that, 
for example, reductivist and representational practices have come to shape how we are in 
and understand the social world through knowledge formulations. Second is our 
technological enframing: Heidegger’s (1977) discussion of technology as our modern 
enframing (Gestell) characterizes our self-understanding and ways of being in the world in a 
modern mindset where humans, nature, and society are normatively thought about in 
wholly instrumental terms. Third is an enframing in difference: By articulating an ethically 
drawn re-visioning of sex difference and gendered identity, Cornell (1999) challenges us to 
consider the possibilities of différance that Derrida (1978; Wood & Bernasconi, 1988) 
introduced. Along with Irigaray’s (1985) re-imagining of sex difference as something other 
than opposition, a re-imagining of difference opens the possibility of moving beyond taking 
the masculine position as the norm. Fourth is a perceptual enframing: Focused on how an 
observer’s perceptual position shapes the production of scientific knowledge and subject-
                                                
51 Heidegger’s concept of Being is quite complicated but Hubert Dreyfus’s explanation is 
both useful and illuminating: Briefly, the shared practices into which we are socialized 
provide a background understanding of what counts as things, what counts as human 
beings and what it makes sense to do, on the basis of which we can direct our actions 
towards particular things and people. Thus the understanding of being creates what 
Heidegger calls a clearing (Lichtung). Heidegger calls the unnoticed way that the clearing 
both limits and opens up what can show up and what can be done, its "unobtrusive 
governance (Waltens)." (Dreyfus, Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault; 
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper_being.html) Thus, Being is tied in 
with Heidegger’s concept of technology.  
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object relations, Haraway (1991a, 1997) takes on the problem of a disembodied objectivity, 
for the ways it produces not only an exclusionary field of observation and objects, but it is 
also improbable. I bring these four positions together to portray a four-faceted enframing 
through which the observational field of the g/t story, as well as its interpretation, are 
shaped and regulated. Faceting (as a process of diffracting) is one step in re-imagining some 
of the assumptions embedded within this widely disseminated story. As part of a 
deconstructive re-imagining, I consider how our enframing designates the constituted 
outsider and from this, show how the g/t story functions as a kind of socio-political 
technology.  
On the one hand, highlighting a four-faceted enframing as epistemological and 
technological and that is driven by a specific orientation to difference, and perception 
helps to make evident an underlying and dominant conceptual framework through which 
we are conditioned to see and make sense of the social-scientific world and the g/t story. On 
the other hand, faceting also brings new theories, realities, networks, and perspectives into 
the mainstream circle of knowledge and understanding that has heretofore shaped the g/t 
story. This makes it easier to see how, through a complex and largely invisible enframing, 
the g/t imaginary is functioning as another technology of contemporary society.  
 
Epistemological Enframing 
The g/t story is a product of modern science and our modernist epistemology. As 
Taylor  (1995) showed, this epistemology is not itself “natural.” Instead, it reflects and 
shapes how we are in and understand the world and in turn, proscribes the norms for 
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producing and validating knowledge claims and interpretations. An ongoing dispute is 
whether social scientific knowledge can, in effect, be disembodied or value-neutral given 
that it reflects and shapes understandings of social phenomena that themselves are fully 
immersed within the messy contexts of being, politics, history, or intersubjective 
interpretation. Taylor (and Heidegger, Gadamer, Castoriadis, among others) argues that 
our modernist epistemology, which claims to be neutral and disengaged, in reality depends 
on deeply embedded beliefs that perceive social contexts or human subjects as reducible 
and independent units that can be instrumentally prepared for scientific investigation. 
Contrary to its aura of neutrality and disengagement, beliefs about knowledge building 
construe and situate agents in relation to other agents, contexts, and knowledge. Taylor 
suggests that a scientifically drawn epistemology is not a problem when trying to 
understand the natural world but that it leads us wholly astray in trying to conceptualize, 
document, and interpret humans in what are actually highly contextual social-political 
actions, interpretations, and relations.52 There are multiple facets to Taylor’s explication of 
epistemology and I focus on these: representationalism, reflexivity, atomism, and the 
punctual self. The following passages from an NSF prospectus (2007) soliciting research 
proposals that investigate the causes of the g/t gap are useful to consider. 
The GSE program supports activities that address the following types of objectives.  
…To discover and describe gender-based differences and preferences in learning 
science, engineering, technology and mathematics in K-16 and factors that affect 
interest, performance, and choice of STEM study and careers in fields where there 
are significant gender gaps. (p. 6) 
                                                
52 Others, including Haraway, Nowotny & Gibbons, and Barad also question whether 
knowledge of the natural world should be opened up, but this controversy is beyond the 
scope of my project.  
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There is a familiarity in this NSF statement, itself based on a notion that differences 
between subjects and objects can be scientifically documented and investigated; we are so 
comfortable with this idea that it seems wholly normal.  
Through modern epistemology, the scientific basis of knowledge, subjects, or even 
science are not themselves viewed as problematic; instead, schools, teachers, parents, game 
cultures, and so on become analytic targets wherein behaviors and beliefs can be examined 
and perhaps corrected. This model is inferred in the NSF’s prospectus. 
Our society as experienced in education through parents, the media, K-12 
educators, post-secondary faculty and others tends to reinforce traditional 
assumptions about the capabilities, interests, and career options for girls and 
women, steering them away from STEM classes, majors and careers. (p. 5) 
 
On the one hand, the notion that research and policy can facilitate social and educational 
change is both necessary and somewhat unremarkable (yet also quite extraordinary when 
accomplished). On the other, there is reason for caution because of the ways in which the 
locus of and responsibility for knowledge is located and dispersed (notably, away from 
science and scientists and onto their research objects or products) and for what this 
knowledge sets out to accomplish. The instrumentalism embedded in the following quote 
makes it seem laudable and natural that citizens can be repurposed to fit the needs of a 
domestic workforce in need of more human capital.  
At the same time, the demand for science and technology literacy on the part of all 
citizens has never been higher, and the demand for domestic workforce capacity in 
engineering and computer fields is projected to exceed supply. (p. 5) 
 
This example broadly illustrates aspects of our modern epistemological enframing, a 
technological understanding of humans and society, and the ways in which this is 
facilitated by bounding the perceptual field in the name of objective science. The normalcy, 
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neutrality, and necessity of these beliefs and practices is a kind of black-boxed conceptions 
of knowing that transparently surrounds the g/t story.  
Representationalism & reflexivity. A created—not innate—understanding of both 
knowledge and being is at the heart of our epistemological enframing. That is, our view of 
knowledge reflects a modern, Western orientation toward both self and the world. In 
“Overcoming Epistemology,” Taylor (1995) traces the underlying principles that evolved 
from Enlightenment natural science to become the dominant model of knowledge in 
modern social science. He identifies several characteristics of this epistemological model 
and the most significant aspect in his estimation is the dominance of the representational 
view of knowledge, as he states here:  
If I had to sum up this understanding in a single formula, it would be that 
knowledge is to be seen as a correct representation of an independent reality. In its 
original form, it saw knowledge as the inner depiction of an outer reality. (p. 3) 
 
One of the features of representationalism is that external observations and interpretations 
of others’ (e.g. their experiences, actions, or accounts of these) are deemed to be accurate 
and objective portrayals of empirical reality, as long as correct procedures are followed. 
Moreover, in producing representations, we take on two roles. As disengaged observers 
(researchers) we receive impressions emanating from the external world but “fix experience 
in order to deprive it of its power” (C. Taylor, 1989, p. 163). As objects of knowledge, we 
are ready and available not merely to be examined but also, to be instrumentally altered. 
Social research is a form of self-disciplining where we cooperate in the quest to improve 
ourselves to better fit various social, political, or economic roles (Foucault, 1975, 1995; C. 
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Taylor, 1989). The following passages highlight Taylor’s understanding of our modern, 
disengaged and instrumentally driven epistemology:  
Knowledge then hangs on a certain relation holding between what is “out there’’ 
and certain inner states that this external reality causes in us.…The epistemological 
construal is…an understanding of knowledge that fits well with modern 
mechanistic science. (1995, p. 4) 
 
What one finds running through all the aspects of this constellation…is the 
growing ideal of a human agent who is able to remake himself by methodological 
and disciplined action. What this calls for is the ability to take an instrumental 
stance to one’s given properties, desires, inclinations, tendencies, habits of thought 
and feeling, so that they can be worked on, doing away with some and strengthening 
others, until one meets the desired specifications. (1989 p. 159-160)  
 
This epistemology is the invisible glue of the g/t story. The belief in representationalism is 
expressed through statements such as the following, where representing sets the stage for a 
subsequent re-imagining. 
We have worked to listen carefully to students’ accounts of their experiences and 
translate them in ways that are both accurate and useful for conveying how the 
gender gap in computer science perpetuates itself. (Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 9)  
 
The interplay between representationalism and the disciplining intention of g/t research is 
evident in the following two excerpts concerned with the problem of girls’ instrumental 
attitudes towards computers. 
The focus groups support a recurrent theme in research on gender and technology: 
Girls approach the computer as a “tool” useful primarily for what it can do; boys 
more often view the computer as a “toy” and/or an extension of the self....For boys, 
the computer is inherently interesting. Girls are interested in its instrumental 
possibilities.   
 
These girls’ descriptions of what boys are doing with technology are missing some 
very important elements. There is strong value in boys’ activities that girls are quick 
to denigrate….But it is also clear that getting girls involved with computing will 
require overcoming resistance based on their negative feelings about getting 
involved with the machine “for itself.” (AAUW, 2000, pp. 9-10) 
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A neutral observer registers what is going on but the assumption carried along is that girl’s 
interests and motivations are available to be modified both for their own benefit and to 
benefit society.  
 Representationalist epistemology equates real (i.e. “objective”) knowledge to 
scientific knowledge, i.e. knowledge obtained through the judicious application of method 
(whether that is the method of reason or the method of empiricist investigation). 
Objectivity depends on a radical reflexivity whereby the researcher “rids” his observational 
perspective of unwanted subjectivities, “ordering … thoughts correctly” to observe reality 
without bias or prejudice (C. Taylor, 1995, p. 5). Taylor calls this a stance of 
“disengagement.”  
It is essential to our scientific practice, to what we understand as the correct search 
for knowledge, that we set ourselves the goal of making an accurate representation 
of things. And this has meant shaking ourselves free from earlier view in which the  
demands of connection, communion, or attunement with the cosmos were still 
intricated with those of attaining an adequate picture of the true state of affairs. 
(cited in Abbey, 2000, p. 176) 
 
 When representationalism drives the rules for producing objective knowledge, 
rational disengagement is the only stance allowed in producing scientific knowledge. In the 
following excerpts, Margolis and Fisher explain that subjects’ accounts of their experience 
shift over time.  
Our subjects—being the live creatures they are—change and transform in response to 
their own inner workings and to their environment.…By the fourth interview she 
may announce to us that she is leaving the program, having concluded that she just 
isn’t interested in computer science. At any point along the way, had we drawn 
conclusions prematurely about this student, we would have an incomplete and 
possibly a misleading story. (2002, pp. 7-8)  
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This passage highlights that although these researchers explicitly acknowledge the shifting 
nature of their subjects’ accounts as something fundamental to the analysis, the researchers 
themselves are so outside the analytic field they get no mention. There is no account of the 
researchers’ understandings evolving in tune with their subjects’. Moreover, there is 
nothing else complicating the field.  
 Representationalism relies on a specific form of reflexivity for its validation. For 
example, in illustrating how systematic analysis is used to disengage the researcher, 
Margolis and Fisher justify that interview narratives are not merely “anecdotal” but qualify 
as external, scientific data. 
Accounts which are gathered and analyzed in a systematic manner allow the 
investigator to discover things that cannot easily be discovered by any other means. 
In complex human affairs, noticing the patterns in the independent accounts of 
expert witnesses plays the same role as laboratory observations in the formation of 
hypotheses. (p. 8) 
 
These “accounts” are discovered independent of the discoverer. Discovery is made possible 
by a radical reflexivity that may be described as a kind of distancing and disengaging built 
on the notion that socially situated “data” are independent and available to be discovered.  
Radical reflexivity accomplishes this separation of the researcher’s perspective from the 
analytic field, as the following example highlights: 
Completed by 76% of the females and 88% of the males, the questionnaires were 
first analyzed for (a) word counts, (b) average-length responses, and (c) evidence of 
personalization…We then studied the responses and developed descriptive 
categories…which emerged from the data. (Morse & Daiute, 1992, p. 13; italics added)  
 
The belief that categories emerge from the data themselves, rather than from a researcher’s 
input or interpretation, depends on this radical reflexivity. Reflexivity in this sense refers to 
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a process whereby a scientist’s biases or a priori beliefs are procedurally eliminated from the 
scientific field.  
The problem with this epistemology, in Taylor’s estimation, is that it has become 
the dominant model of knowledge yet it is not a particularly suitable model for developing 
knowledge of humans or the social world. It discounts the self-interpreting nature of being 
human as well as the dynamic contextual backgrounds within which selves and self-
interpretation unfold (e.g. H.-G. Gadamer, 1976; C. Taylor, 1989).    
Atomism, disengagement, & the punctual self. An atomized society is one where 
“the ideal of self-responsibility is foundational… and linked to the modern ideal of freedom 
as self-autonomy” (C. Taylor, 1995, p. 7); objectified, punctual selves become the 
instruments of this society. The punctual self describes the individual tuned to treat self 
and the world instrumentally as a “subject [ready] to change and reorganize…the better to 
secure the welfare of himself and others” (p. 7). It reflects a modern “radical stance of 
disengagement to himself or herself with a view to remaking” that self and contributes to 
what Foucault characterizes as the disciplining technologies of the self (C. Taylor, 1989, p. 
171).    
 The g/t story may be read as an instance where this atomizing and disciplining is 
carried out. The scenario, broadly, looks like this. The disengaged researcher reflexively 
locates, without biases of experience, beliefs, or instincts, a set of atomistic objects (in this 
case, girls and women) with the full intention (and presumed cooperation of these objects) 
of reshaping and reconstituting individuals to fit a desired result. This model is reflected in 
the AAUW report: 
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One of the values in getting more girls and women interested in the computer 
pipeline is that their greater presence may transform the computer culture overall; 
by the same token, changes in the e-culture itself—the ways technology is discussed, 
valued, and applied—would invite more girls and women to participate fully in that 
culture. (2000, p. 3)  
 
Behind this passage is an explicitly stated instrumental train of reasoning. Transforming 
the culture is the rationale for bringing more women (re-engineered to become more 
interested) into computing fields. At the root is the modern subject available to be 
remolded to fit external circumstances and purposes. However, this process of disciplining 
depends on a black-boxed and “external” observer—the disengaged, neutral researcher.  
In the following statement, the researcher remains outside the field, a disengaged, 
radically reflexive observer. Disentanglement ensures that the researcher and any values or 
ideologies are not influencing the field of observation. This interplay depends on a group 
of punctual selves (girls and women) who even when they do not have the right self-
descriptions, are willing to search for an appropriate language to help facilitate both 
research and societal aims.  
In focus groups, most girls took offense at any suggestion that there may be 
differences in how boys and girls interact with computers….we found that girls 
observe and describe strong gender differences but do not have a language with 
which to talk about them. The result is that girls are likely to express bewilderment 
and confusion about how they are different in their attitudes and abilities than 
boys. In girls’ efforts to find a perspective from which to talk about gender 
differences, they often position themselves as morally or socially more evolved than 
boys who, they tell us, enjoy “taking things apart” and interacting with “machines.” 
(AAUW, 2000, pp. 7-8)  
   
Girls and women are examined by researchers operating within a set of transparent, 
instrumental technologies that depend on and promote a particular strain of 
disengagement that construes selves as separable from others, from their own experience 
and bodies, and malleable so as to be self-disciplining. Thus, the self sees itself, so to speak, 
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through an instrumental understanding of the social world that articulates the normal in 
institutions, social science research, and individuals or groups of people. Foucault’s project 
in such texts as Discipline and Punish (1975, 1995), Birth of the Clinic (1963, 1989), and The 
History of Sexuality (1990) was examining how this normalizing process unfolds. 
Framed within a Cartesian mind-body separation, the knower is disengaged from 
corporeal messiness or affective biases. Scientific knowledge maintains an abstract distance 
from responsibility for the outcomes of knowing or its procedures, as long as these follow 
epistemological conventions. Taylor’s characterization of an atomistic society, disengaged 
knowledge, and the punctual self would be difficult to conceptualize without Heidegger’s 
explication of our technological enframing. Epistemology is itself a kind of instrumental 
technology, another way of characterizing our technological enframing. With a nod to 
Heidegger, Taylor explains that he “notoriously treats the rise of the modern 
epistemological standpoint as a stage in the development of a stance of domination to the 
world, which culminates in contemporary technological society” (1995, p. 8).  
  One reason that the instrumental project appears to be logical, appropriate, and 
wholly democratic is that it is carried along with conceptions of an atomistic society. For 
Taylor, this society is infused with a particular ethical disposition to being in the world 
wherein not only is knowing disengaged, freedom is similarly decontextualized and 
disassociated. This promotes a radical individualism that negates ideals of collectivity and 
promotes “the belief that humans...are free to develop their own goals and purposes rather 
than having to bend to preordained ones” (Abbey, 2000, p. 177). Self-regulation and self-
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autonomy are key markers of successful and responsible personhood in the atomized 
society.  
Within this worldview, it seems epistemologically logical to scientifically ferret out 
factors that get in the way of girls and women’s participation in computing. Factors within 
girls and women—such as their beliefs or interests—will no longer stand in the way of their 
pursuit of individual freedom to achieve a self-determination that serves society’s needs. 
Computing is conceived as one such path to economic (and thus social and political) 
freedom for both the individual and for society. Thus, the instrumentalism that frames the 
g/t story reflects more than an agenda of helping women to achieve parity. There is also an 
instrumentality driving this gender equity project that is “democratized” through the ways 
in which selves are disengaged from their experience and disciplined, as malleable selves, to 
better fit the social norms and needs of a technocratic society.53  
 
Technological Enframing 
I resisted articulating, at the outset, a specific definition of technology, instead 
suggesting that how technology will be defined remains an important and open question in 
reading the g/t story. How we think about technology has a great deal to do with how we 
think about the processes and products of knowing, about our relation to tools and their 
culture, and not so visibly, our relation to ourselves and to each other. The g/t story largely 
relies on a tools-culture definition of technology (largely focused on computers), but this 
                                                
53 Brown (2005) develops these ideas and I return to her work later. 
163 
 
 
definition does not adequately describe the interweavings of ideas about technology, 
knowledge, or being within the g/t story. Common understandings of technology, in the 
g/t story, have emphasized (a) applied definitions (e.g. Dede, 2007; Papert, 1980) rather 
than the philosophical or ontological (e.g.Heidegger, 1977; Hickman, 1990; Mitcham, 
1994); (b) a natural and self-determining view of knowledge rather than the ways 
knowledge (and tools) are socially constructed (e.g. Law, 2000; Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003, 
2005; Wajcman, 2004), and (c) an enforced separation of scientific knowledge from 
politics and values (contested by scholars such as Pacey (1983, 1989), Franklin (1990, 
1999), Winner (1986), or Bruce (1996; Bruce & Hogan, 1998)). Overwhelmingly, the g/t 
story has been framed through an engineering, determinist, and epistemological definition 
of technology, whether talking about technology in a broad sense, more specifically about 
computers, or in characterizing the cultures and environments within which technologies 
are produced and used. Following Heidegger, it is easier to see that our technological 
enframing is dual: first is the enframing that he describes, and second, more specific to the 
g/t story, are the conceptual boundaries that function as a technology to frame a working 
definition of technology.  
Heidegger’s explication of a far more comprehensive notion of technology was 
meant to move us away from a dominant and highly essentializing and determinist view of 
technology. A flawed definition of technology, in his estimation, was perhaps more 
problematic than technology itself. A misdirected view of technology interferes with our 
ability to think better about the intersection between technology, nature, and culture. The 
character of modern technology that he unfolds resonates with Taylor’s work on 
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epistemology.54 Briefly, Heidegger’s thesis is that our modern relation to technology is 
wholly instrumental, but he means this in a much larger way than an overreliance on 
machines. The core problem is that humans are (as wholly part of the natural world that 
technologies are increasingly used to control) in danger of being subsumed by technology 
in part because we misunderstand what technology is as well as our own ontological 
relationship to technology.  
Using Heidegger’s notion of technology, I recast the g/t story as a functioning 
technology rather than simply a descriptive or explanatory narrative. That is, in significant 
ways, the g/t story is wholly bound up in, as well as promotes, an instrumentalization that 
is technologically and epistemologically facilitated.55 Conceptualizing the g/t story as a 
social imaginary in chapter four made it possible to illuminate a set of background 
imaginaries upon which the g/t story depends. Drawing on enframing as the essence of 
modern technology, as well as Taylor’s deconstruction of our epistemological enframing it 
becomes easier to see that the g/t story mirrors a contemporary epistemological and 
technological enframing. Thus, this g/t story is more than a descriptive narrative of 
women, technology, and equity. The story both depends upon and builds the subjects, 
objects, and beliefs through which we are able to perceive the techno-social world, and it 
                                                
54 It is not possible for me, in this dissertation, to characterize the ways in which 
Heidegger’s ideas are foundational to the range of scholars that I draw on, but his work is 
at the core of most of this work that steps outside the dominant Western notions of 
knowing and understanding. Some feminist scholarship may situate itself outside this 
framework, but this is not an argument that I will pursue or defend in this dissertation.  
55 This analysis has some connection as well to Foucault’s work on disciplines and 
technologies of the self and I will discuss this further in a subsequent chapter. 
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does this in part, through an instrumentalizing conception of technology, of which we are a 
part.  
Throughout the story are statements that distinguish between gendered, tool, and 
play orientations to technology and the tool-toy divide is a common focus. The AAUW 
(2000) states: “Girls approach the computer as a ‘tool’ useful primarily for what it can do; 
boys more often view the computer as a ‘toy’” (p. 9). This tool-toy orientation is taken to 
reflect how boys and girls relate differently to computers such that girls are described as 
having a more instrumental, and thus limited, relationship to technology.56 This 
attribution has two features. First is a framework that defines technology quite narrowly as 
tools and second, a failure to recognize the ways in which an instrumental epistemology 
reflects our broad enframing within a technological understanding of being that allows the 
tool-toy description to function, credibly, in the story.  
The underlying instrumentality of the g/t story itself remains below the surface, as 
when the AAUW uses this tool-toy framework to distinguish between girls and boys and 
their interests and abilities.  
These girls’ descriptions of what boys are doing with technology are missing some 
very important elements. There is strong value in boys’ activities that girls are quick 
to denigrate. For example, there is intellectual importance to getting to understand 
computers from the “inside out” and developing skills and an intuitive feel for 
programming. There is intellectual value in tinkering with technology… it is also 
clear that getting girls involved with computing will require overcoming resistance 
based on their negative feelings about getting involved with the machine “for 
itself.” (2000, p. 9) 
 
                                                
56 This is in part, Turkle’s conception in ”Computer Reticence” and is an idea expanded 
on in various g/t micro stories.  
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This toy-tinkering orientation is taken to reflect a condition of clearly delineated gendered 
differences in development or dispositions, but this misses the ways that such beliefs act as 
a functioning technology to reflect an underlying, instrumentalizing human capital model. 
These kinds of narratives reveal how means-ends rationality permeates how we think about 
not only technology, but also each other. The idea promoted in the above passage is that 
even if girls have different interests, there is reason to reshape these interests to facilitate 
the greater project of getting girls interested in computing. Preceding this argument is the 
punctual self, available to be re-molded.  
The problem of the underrepresentation of girls and women in computing is 
constructed to be a problem of human capital development; the idea that passes as normal 
is that persons can be revised to better serve national interests—as capital rather than as a 
community of citizens. Girls and women are one of the available resources to be harnessed 
for a particular purpose. Once the “technology” is found that will more predictably engage 
girls in computing, these human “resources” can be placed into service. This is one way the 
g/t story functions as a technology. It is one expression of the ways in which we are all 
resources in a larger instrumental project.57 Within the story, this relationship is also taken 
to be normal. 
Nationwide movements…seek to identify, pilot, and spread promising and effective 
practices. This new approach asks what works, rather than why it works. Mirroring 
the distinction between scientific efforts to know or understand, and engineering 
efforts to make or do, we see a shift away from the science and toward the 
engineering of computing’s gender balance. (Cohoon & Aspray, 2006b, p. 471)   
                                                
57 Scholars in various ways describe this “project.” Some, such as Wendy Brown (2005, 
2006) hone in on neoliberalism whereas Ulrich Beck (1992; Beck, Gibbons, & Lash, 1994) 
characterizes a risk society and I discuss both in chapter 8.    
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When humans are conceived as resources—capital—this reflects the kind of relationship 
that Heidegger was concerned with. This was his way of characterizing the dominance of a 
means-end and value-neutral understanding of technology (and of humanity) as our 
modern, primary relation to technology (and again, humanity). Our self-understanding is, 
in essence, technological.  
Presented in this way, the instrumental use of humans may seem a bit 
disconcerting; why do we not protest? The following passage suggests how the relationship 
is blurred to intimately connect technological and social progress: 
Information and communication technologies could give a major boost to the 
economic, political and social empowerment of women, and the promotion of 
gender equality.…Socially and culturally constructed gender roles and relationships 
remain a cross-cutting element in shaping (and in this case, limiting) the capacity of 
women and men to participate on equal terms in the Information Society. (Primo, 
2003, p. 9)  
 
There is a conflation of technologies and social liberation and empowerment, as if this 
connection is itself going to reshape society. Technology is promoted as the new hope for 
achieving equality in the Age of Information. However, this democratic optimism is only a 
partial view. A somewhat different picture is evident in the NSF 2007 funding prospectus: 
The program seeks to broaden the participation of girls and women in all fields of 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education…that will 
lead to a larger and more diverse domestic science and engineering workforce.  
(p. 2)  
 
This passage has a different tone and emphasis. Increasing the numbers of women in 
STEM fields is not simply about bettering some women’s opportunities, it must also be 
read more specifically as fulfilling a national need. Much of the engineering forecasted is of 
women rather than technological tools and this is rather explicit in the NSF’s narrative: 
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“The program for Research on Gender in Science and Engineering (GSE) seeks to build 
resources —developing the nation's knowledge capital, social capital, and human capital” (p. 
8). Here, women are explicitly described as capital and resources, illustrating the ways in 
which humans become “normally” constituted in the same instrumental terms as oil and 
other tradable or usable resources. This thinking is also evident in The National Academy 
of Sciences report Rising Above the Gathering Storm (National Research Council, 2007): 
An educated, innovative, motivated workforce—human capital—is the most precious 
resource of any country in this new, flat world. Yet there is widespread concern 
about our K-12 science and mathematics education system, the foundation of that 
human capital in today’s global economy. (p. 30) 
 
This idea, that girls and women are available as resources to be controlled and reshaped is 
but an instance of our larger technological enframing. Yet, it is through such “discursive” 
technologies that a technological relationship to the world and to each other has become 
our “truth of the world.”58 We are bound up in this technological story (itself a kind of 
imaginary) and this is the relationship that Heidegger calls our enframing (1977).  
 
Enframed in Difference 
Without some significance attached to differences between genders, there would be 
little reason to worry about the g/t relationship. Difference is a key lens through which we 
see the world around us—men from women, black from white, western from eastern, geek 
from jock, and so on. The question is what to make of these differences. Within the g/t 
                                                
58 Dewey (and Bruce, Pacey, Franklin, among others) has a different ontological perspective 
on technology that I will reserve for a later chapter. These views are not incompatible with 
what Heidegger lays out, but they do seem to head in a different direction that is not 
particularly useful here. 
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story, differences denote well-bounded categories such as girls-women, boys-men, tools-toys, 
and gender-race-class and a somewhat more transparent and ambiguous us-them when 
global competitiveness is factored in women’s underrepresentation. The problem normally 
of concern is how to better identify, articulate, qualify, and quantify these differences. 
What is it about this notion of difference that has us thinking that sifting and 
sorting based on oppositions is the appropriate path of inquiry? Moreover, what challenges 
follow this way of thinking, given that one of the great debates of late modernism has been 
over this question of difference? Despite such long-present concerns, g/t researchers tend 
to stay clear of the kinds of ambiguities that such questions provoke and instead view the 
problem of locating and explaining differences as a methods problem—it is a conception 
enframed by a singular, dominant notion of difference. What follows is a simplified 
exposition of the kinds of questions that Derrida, Irigaray, and Cornell have grappled with, 
the latter two more specifically concerned with sex and gender. Interpreting Derrida (and 
somewhat less so, Irigaray) is a path fraught with controversy and uncertainty; my 
interpretation borrows from Cornell’s Beyond Accommodation (1999). Culling from Derrida 
and Irigaray, she states “Woman, the feminine, is what cannot be captured” (p. 141). Her 
argument is with both MacKinnon and Gilligan, but my concern is the latter because 
Gilligan’s book, In a Different Voice (1982, 1993) has been so central to the meta g/t story. 
Gilligan’s thesis was that women have a different moral compass than do men. 
Importantly, she argued that it is not inferior, merely (but significantly) different. Equal 
status for this different view of justice and ethics was Gilligan’s aim.  
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The g/t story has always been about difference and—on the surface—it appears that 
the story has been theoretically sensitive in articulating differences by shifting over the 
years from a focus on biological sex to refocus on gender, and more recently, open to 
adding to the mix race, class, ethnicity, and disability (to name the most prominent 
categories). Gilligan’s work has grounded these conceptions and thus, the g/t story is 
ultimately modeled on an understanding of difference as an essential and largely static 
subjectivity or identity trait. While not always explicitly cited, Gilligan’s influence is evident 
in the ways researchers pursue, use, and interpret girls and women’s perspectives on 
computing.   
We found that girls observe and describe strong gender differences but do not have 
a language with which to talk about them. The result is that girls are likely to 
express bewilderment and confusion about how they are different in their attitudes 
and abilities than boys. In girls’ efforts to find a perspective from which to talk 
about gender differences, they often position themselves as morally or socially more 
evolved than boys who, they tell us, enjoy “taking things apart” and interacting with 
“machines.” (AAUW, 2000, pp. 7-8)  
 
If there is a background assumption driving this statement, it is descended from Gilligan. 
The problem is not difference per se, it is finding the right way of describing that difference.  
According to Cornell (1999), Derrida’s understanding of différance is that of “a 
‘general economy’ [that] can only be demonstrated within the particular context” (p. 140). 
This primacy of context situates and problematizes any idea of “the male and the female as 
unshakable biological entities” that can be used to systematize a universality of difference 
(p. 140).59 The problem of sex and gender difference is manifest in the way either is used to 
                                                
59 Cornell’s concern was MacKinnon’s framing of a legal argument and how she defines the 
terms of debate by focusing on the problem of a masculinized norm. 
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paint a reality of women’s experience and identity quite broadly, without regard to 
individual women. Irigaray (Cornell, 1999; Irigaray, 1985), drawing from Derrida, made 
this problem her target, arguing that articulations of these kinds of sex or gender 
differences become just another way of setting up the rules of belonging or not belonging—
in essence fostering new hierarchies by conceiving difference as a fixed condition.   
Cornell (1999) explains Derrida’s contribution as follows: “Différance…is not 
reducible to either an empirical or a normative concept of relational difference. Nor is a 
différance meant to indicate the empirical difference between the sexes as they are now 
defined by the gender divide” (p. 139). Cornell’s interest is whether, and in what form, 
difference matters. For MacKinnon, Gilligan, and the g/t story, difference describes a fixed 
set of differences between sexes and genders where equalizing the values ascribed to 
differences is the aim.  
This is what Cornell and Irigaray resist. In returning to a kind of biological 
essentialism that had been superseded by cultural feminisms’ focus on gender, Cornell and 
Irigaray want to recognize relationality, where neither the masculine nor the feminine can 
signify an independent essence or lack. Any lack is only in relation to the other.  
The intertwinement of the masculine and the feminine belies the very structure 
that would define one apart from the other as an ontological truth or one against 
the other, so that the masculine is privileged as the self-determining term that 
unites the pair. The feminine as Other remains. (Cornell, 1999, p. 143)  
 
Differences, yes, but in Irigaray’s re-imagining this does not end in oppositions that always 
seem to reduce the woman to an inferior position. Irigaray imagines the feminine as 
significant but in an “alliance beyond the master/slave dichotomy…as the threshold located 
in the specificity of our desire for peace” (p. 145). The meta g/t story relies on women as 
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the other who will bring a more humanizing set of values to technology. In the g/t story, 
women’s value orientation is what sets them apart.  
The drive to identify and accommodate a clear m-f difference becomes a hurdle 
within the g/t story. For example, as the AAUW (2000) tries to come to terms with 
gendered approaches to software or computer games, they trace a number of conflicting 
positions. Should more games be like Barbie Fashion Designer, be more gender neutral, or 
model particular gendered characteristics?60 Each option builds on a deep belief that 
difference itself is of great significance, and thus, none of these stances towards gendered 
games is significantly different from the others. Interviews conducted by the AAUW 
commissioners also yielded some differing opinions from teachers.  
It is not enough to make “token gestures” in software—as one teacher surveyed put 
it, “tossing a token female or black” into science software. As a solution to the 
problem, some teachers advocate the use of “neuter” characters…What’s wrong 
with making the main character in these software packages be neuter?” (p. 31) 
 
Another teacher has a different take on difference: 
The problem with most gender issues within educational software is that they are gender-
neutral. I teach eighth grade. [My students] are at an age when gender is something they are 
thinking about and confused about. The software should be addressing their needs instead of 
utilizing non-gendered beings such as animals and other animated creatures. Gender 
differences are not being given their just due. The students appreciate discussing the 
differences and negotiating roles. Even math programs can address differences. teacher 
survey, on gender and software.  
(p. 31; italics in original) 
  
 It is less important how the AAUW commissioners use these reports (to argue that 
software selections in schools should serve multiple learning styles and promote learners as 
                                                
60 Mattel published this software “game” in 1996. It was the first entertainment software to 
be widely successful with girls. It was however, controversial amongst women and 
educators. 
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designers). More significant is the way these interviews with teachers (and the AAUW 
commissioners) display a deep belief that gender difference is on the one hand 
phenomenally important and on the other hand, is connected with software in often 
incommensurable ways. However, in all these configurations, computing software is 
expected to fix a problem with gender.  
Is the difference that Irigaray and Cornell imagine the same as that promoted by 
the g/t story? In the latter, difference reflects a view wherein women can be reduced to an 
idea or a set of attitudes and dispositions. The g/t story has, since Gilligan, fully separated 
itself from a dependence on biological sex difference yet has instead wholly embraced an 
idea of gender difference that is often grounded in social constructivism. However, there 
remains an embedded psychological and behavioral essentialism so that even what is 
socially constructed is given a determinist character. In part, this is because gendered 
subjectivities socially constructed in girlhood tend to be portrayed as endpoints in a 
woman’s trajectory. On the one hand, gender is argued to be socially constructed and on 
the other, girls and women are broadly differentiated from boys and men by explicating 
psychologies and behaviors that are characterized as static and innately different. Moreover, 
the aim of the g/t story is really to make the girls more like the boys, even if the specifics of 
what is to be realigned shifts. Across the meta story there is an “appeal to what women are 
as the basis for feminine difference” that derives from Gilligan (Cornell, 1999, p. 146) ). 
Irigaray and Cornell have a completely different vision where “What the feminine ‘is,’ is 
not the question” (p. 146). For both, the feminine is evoked in writing that itself must not 
be determining or merely delineating a fixed reality. However, this is just what the g/t story 
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does. The significant limitation of the g/t story is that it continues our enframing through 
thinking and writing within a prescriptive and fixed idea of difference.  
 
Perceptual Enframing 
Haraway (1991b) argues that women put themselves at risk, and misconstrue 
science and technology, distancing themselves from either, by believing that they do not 
belong because science is for men.61 The predominance of Western, white, masculine 
epistemology and technoscience is due to the ways in which Enlightenment derived science 
has constituted “non-scientists” so far outside the field of relevance that they became 
invisible. The problem as Haraway sees it is an ideal of objectivity promoted by 
Enlightenment science. She does however remain in favor of a strong objectivity, conceived 
from a different perspective. While she believes in science, she argues that the kinds of 
knowledge that mainstream science’s objectivity has promoted are faulty. The problem is 
not technoscience or objectivity per se, but the hegemonic, masculinist, objectivist, and 
disengaged lens through which mainstream science has privileged a god-like position of the 
knower.62 Moreover, this knower has been ordained through privileging practices and 
positions that render other knowers as not possibly reliable or relevant (Haraway, 1997).  
The epistemological problem of objectivity that Haraway (1991a, 1997) takes to 
task suggests another facet relevant to understanding the depth of our enframing. Through 
                                                
61 She does not seem to make a clear distinction between science and technology, as do 
others, and I am not going to make that distinction for her, nor is it particularly relevant to 
my thesis. 
62 Some other scholars who have written, variously, on these kinds of ideas include Sandra 
Harding, Evelyn Fox-Keller, Knorr-Cetina, Dorothy Smith, and Bruno Latour. 
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her articulation of situated knowledges, Haraway identifies a perspective that reconnects 
knowledge and the knower and posits a more objective objectivity. Situated knowledge 
(1991a) was in part an argument with feminist thinking that wanted to debunk objectivity 
by arguing for a highly relativist social constructivism. Instead, she relocated objectivity in 
an alternative epistemological position, within the feminine and more aligned with the 
body, concern for community, and respectful of the localized contexts of meaning and 
experience.63 I do not want to get caught up here in the debates over what technoscience 
knowledge should or could look like. My interest is much more contained—to identify 
some theoretical lenses useful for understanding something about the ways the g/t story 
itself is framed and what sneaks in under the radar (or is left out) because of 
epistemological assumptions made by various stakeholders about what we observe. 
Situated knowledge (Haraway, 1991a) repositions scientific knowledge and 
objectivity, as well as feminist critiques of science, to challenge beliefs that women should 
stand aloof from technoscience. Rethinking objectivity itself and the positions from which 
we can objectively know the world, Haraway challenged feminist technoscience scholars’ 
reticence and their notions of a highly localized objectivity by arguing that objectivity and 
the knower’s position are intimately interconnected and inseparable. Notably, Haraway’s 
                                                
63 See Sandra Harding or Nancy Hartsock (for example) for some of the work that Haraway 
was challenging. Maria Mies insisted that women—to ensure their own well-being and the 
feminine itself—should stay clear of an always exploitive and domineering technology, and 
eco-feminism views technology as violent and patriarchal. Arguing a polar opposite, Sadie 
Plant’s 1998 essay, Zeros and Ones: Digital Women and the New Technoculture, proposed that 
the new digital technologies were far more aligned with women’s innate abilities, and 
therefore, women could (and should) take these over as their own; the computer offered a 
way out of patriarchal domination. 
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portrayal of what falls under the domain of “science” is more expansive than is Taylor’s 
(1995), in that she explicitly includes the social sciences. Whereas Taylor’s project was, in 
part, to distinguish the social sciences from the natural, Haraway’s call for “some 
enforceable, reliable accounts of things not reducible to power moves and agonistic [sic], 
high status games of rhetoric or to scientistic, positivist arrogance” was intended as a 
criticism of how normalized, scientific ways of knowledge building about “genes, social 
classes, elementary particles, genders, races, or texts” have given us a misconceived 
construal of objectivity (1991a, p. 188), even in the natural sciences. 
Haraway’s criticisms of feminist anti-epistemology and anti-science or technology 
discourses highlighted the ways these aimed to have it both ways: a radical constructivist 
notion of reality and a feminist version of objectivity. I am not going to attempt to sort 
through her “unifying” the social and human sciences and the natural sciences. Instead, 
her ideas about what constitutes objective knowledge and the ontological positions from 
whence we know are sufficiently interesting to be of use here without getting diverted by 
these other debates. Haraway’s argument is that the originating locus of the knower’s 
perception must be integral to any scientifically useful notion of objectivity. In her words, 
“feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges” (1991a, p. 188). The core idea 
is that what we know is dependent upon what we “see,” which in turn frames what we can 
know. Hence, vision is always partial and “only partial perspective promises objective 
vision” (p. 190).  Normal science’s god-like, all-seeing and all-knowing perceptual position 
that insists on disengagement is a false epistemological position, producing a flawed 
objectivity.   
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One of the emerging notions in the g/t story, particularly in recent literature 
reviews is that the relationship between gender and technology is “under theorized.”64 One 
of the things that slips by, however, is a notion of theory that itself is heavily bound to our 
epistemological, instrumental, differentiated, and perceptual enframing. Heidegger (1977), 
Taylor (1995, 2004), Cornell (1999), and Haraway (1991a, 1997) each articulate an aspect 
of enframing that is bound to a technocratic disposition fed by representationalism and a 
value-neutral objectivity. Taylor and Heidegger’s analyses remain in many ways cerebral, 
abstracted arguments, largely framed around the centrality of language as the locus of 
human experience and knowing. Irigaray and Cornell take issue with a fixed and 
oppositional difference. Taking a different angle, Haraway draws out a metaphor of human 
vision (particularly as it is enhanced by technological extensions to our human sensory 
faculties) to show how knowledge is always partial and linked to a particular sensory lens, 
and in this way, the knower—as the objective lens—is responsible for the production of 
knowledge; this knowledge can only be situated and thus, partial. Continuing a myth that 
the knower is independent of perceptions and knowledge produces knowledge that is more 
than limited. As she explains it, this vision is destructively aggressive in its reach and 
power. 
Vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all perspective 
gives way to infinitely mobile vision, which no longer seems just mythically about 
the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into 
ordinary practice. And like the god-trick, this eye fucks the world to make techno-
monsters. (Haraway, 1991a, p. 189)   
 
                                                
64 This is an explicit argument made by Cohoon & Aspray (2006) and Singh, Allen, 
Scheckler, & Darlington  (2007).  
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Concerns over representationalism, atomism, and morally neutral objectivity focus both 
Haraway and Taylor’s work, although Haraway’s critique is less measured and more far-
reaching in the ways she explicitly moves beyond the mind and language as a center of 
knowledge production to highlight the significance of localized sight for the construction 
of knowledge. As she states, “Objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific 
embodiment, and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits 
and responsibility” (p. 189-190).  
Disembodied vision is a view from nowhere that claims an “infinite vision” to 
transcend any limits or responsibility for the knowledge it produces or disseminates 
(Haraway, 1991a, p. 189). Some might argue that the g/t story does something different 
when it attends to the personal experiences of girls and women as they navigate computer 
cultures. The question is whether these subjective, experiential accounts are a kind of 
situated knowledge or just another incarnation of a god’s eye view and its false 
(insufficient, limiting) objectivity. The problem in these kinds of g/t stories is that 
subjective reports are an aspect of representationalism. However, these subjective accounts 
are not at all what Haraway is getting at with her situated knowledge. On the contrary, I 
think she is focused on the researcher’s lens and the knower as producer of scientific 
knowledge. Taking a situated perspective exposes empirical, subjective accounts to be 
problematically logged and analyzed by a disengaged and far too distant observer; this is 
what yields a false objectivity.  
The extent of the g/t story’s perceptual enframing is evident in Cohoon and 
Aspray’s (2006a) claim that “much of what has been published is based on personal 
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experience or observation of a single case, rather than being grounded in empirical 
evidence that can be generalized” (p. 137). This statement illustrates a common tension. 
On the one hand is a belief in empirical evidence, but this evidence, to be useful and true, 
must be bigger than it is. Local knowledge and experience must be filtered through the 
disengaged-disembodied-diffuse observer to be promotable to a god’s eye, scientific  
objectivity, a move that both reflects and molds knowledge through a wide-ranging belief in 
representationalism and instrumentalized knowledge. 
 
The Constituted Outsider 
Haraway’s (1991a, 1997) claim is that certain subjects are set outside the visual 
range of mainstream scientific epistemologies. Some knowledges or bodies remain outside 
these privileged spaces, and Haraway argues that this alterity is an outcome of the ways that 
the observational field is populated with objects that are seen and counted—or not seen 
and not counted—through a limiting and biased gaze. An Enlightenment derived modest 
witness is the idealized scientist-observer that promotes an idealizing objectivity and 
hegemonic epistemology. Modest witnessing in turn delineates the constituted outsider 
(CO).65  
                                                
65 Judith Butler describes the CO in Bodies that Matter (1993). For her, any meanings 
ascribed to bodies are constructions. However, constructions are not benign and within a 
construction are other “domain[s] of unthinkable, abject, unlivable bodies” that are the 
“excluded and illegible domain”(p. xi). The constitutive outside is unintelligible because it 
exists outside what has been constituted the legible terms within which to read or see 
subjects and their domains. Derrida also develops this idea, which Bowker & Star (2000) 
use to explain the way in which an “’other’ category”—while invisible—is what makes 
possible the “whole social architecture”(p. 301). Thus, the very category of gender and 
180 
 
 
The gaze that mythically inscribes all the marked bodies, that makes the unmarked 
category claim the power to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping 
representation. This gaze signifies the unmarked positions of Man and White, one 
of the many nasty tones of the world [sic] objectivity to feminist ears in scientific and 
technological, late industrial, militarized, racist and male dominant societies. 
(Haraway, 1991a, p. 188) 
 
This powerful gaze has long staked a claim as apolitical and non-judgmental: the 
foundation of independent science. The Enlightenment witness is modest in its stance as 
outside the scientific field; it is, however, immodest in its claims made for objectivity, 
representational knowledge, and the reach of this science and knowledge. By now this 
“neutral” position has faced significant challenges from a host of prominent scholars across 
the social sciences and humanities. Why is it then that this gaze persists so strongly in the 
g/t story? As an example, the following passage describes a common focus in the literature: 
By middle and high school years, many boys have spent endless hours, alone or 
with their friends, playing games, manipulating the games so that they do what they 
want them to do, and in some cases delving into the programming behind the 
games. Many girls are also interested in games but not generally with the same 
focus. (Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 40)  
 
On the surface, this example relates a particular case of girls having a different experience 
with computer gaming, and this seems to make sense within the larger, encompassing meta 
g/t story. Not explicitly evident, but ultimately essential, is the gaze that recognizes 
appropriate objects of study. Where does this gaze emanate from? The third person voice 
suggests that it relies on a culling of some girls’ statements, but it is not readily apparent 
which girls are under the lens. We also do not know which boys, but there is a lot of detail 
about what, where, and with whom the boys’ game play unfolds. A description of the girls’ 
                                                
technology reflects the way that we normatively segment society into classifications rather 
than a wealth of intersectional and constantly moving plurality.  
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playing lacks a similar richness. Who decides that the boys get good details whereas the 
girls are merely noted as outside this male norm? It does not really matter for the moment 
whether the boys or the girls might have promoted either description, in subjective 
accounts or even, whether the researchers are male or female. More significant is that what 
is represented has been filtered by an independent observer who lays claim on the one 
hand to a “modesty” and on the other, acts as the sole, thus immodest, filtering agent. 
What is assumed is that this observer is appropriately distant and disengaged (apart from 
an interest in getting girls into computing). However, despite a presumption of modesty, 
this is not a weak gaze; it quite clearly lays out some parameters for measuring and 
positioning subjects. An individual or groups’ degree of focus (which may also infer 
passion) is one, but being part of the norm is the important signifier and the gaze 
articulates this norm. In the above quote, “many girls” are located outside the normal field. 
What happened to the other girls?66 The CO refers to those objects that remain outside the 
observational field, not of their own accord, but as an outcome of exclusionary knowledge 
building practices.  
 The CO is an important position and production of the g/t story, and thus bears 
some elaboration. Beauvoir’s argument that women are always cast as an other to the male 
norm brought the “woman as outsider” problem to the table. Haraway (1997), building on 
her own earlier criticisms of disengaged objectivity, uses the notion of “modest witnessing” 
to illuminate two differently valued and positioned modest witnesses in Enlightenment 
                                                
66 Google is less of a modest witness: A search for girl gamers gives a different story. One I 
particularly liked describes “The top 10 myths about girl gamers” at 
(http://www.geocities.com/blackhatmatt/girlgamers.htm.   
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science practices. At the top were the scientists: “transparent, self-invisible, legitimate 
witnesses to matters of fact” and below, the rest of us—men and women who are “made 
simply invisible, removed from the scene of action” (p. 29). Modest witnessing, as a core 
practice of Enlightenment technoscience, eliminates from the scientific arena any potential 
other or complicating witnesses, especially common knowledge. In particular, gender and 
race were easy to exclude from the field because women and non-whites were not scientists 
and thus, had no right to witness; in being absent, these also were fixed into categories and 
identities: 
The effect of the missing analysis is to treat race and gender, at best, as a question 
of empirical, preformed beings who are present or absent at the scene of action but 
are not generically constituted in the practices choreographed in the new theaters 
of persuasion." (p. 29) 
 
Within the boundaries of official technoscience practices and spaces: “modest men were to 
be self-invisible, transparent, so that their reports would not be polluted by the body” thus 
providing “credibility to their descriptions of other bodies and minimiz[ing] critical 
attention to their own. This is a crucial epistemological move in the grounding of several 
centuries of race, sex, and class discourses as objective scientific reports” (p. 32).. 
 Of what significance is this constituted outsider in reading the g/t story? Thirty years 
of research and stories have relied on a vast array of constructions wherein women have 
been described outside a male norm. First, it was that women were thought to be 
differently constituted in math and science abilities, in their competitive drive, and so on. 
A version of this persists, as seen in this quote: 
Almost every woman in our study was enthusiastic about learning computer 
science. … Yet most came to computer science later, in high school, through being 
“math and science” students who enjoyed problem solving, doing puzzles, 
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exercising logical thinking skills, or taking a high school programming class. Most 
did not have the same experience of falling in love at an early age that many boys 
did. Early exploration into the computer is the exception among the women. 
(Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 18). 
 
More recently, a schema built around ontologically different m-f values orientations frames 
conceptions of women and men’s relationships to computing and to society, and this is 
articulated in ways such as the following: 
Yet even among these computing-oriented women, we heard about values and 
preferences that were distinct from those of most male computer science students. 
(p. 49)  
 
Often, boys and men are described as ruling a computing culture that makes it 
uncomfortable for women to participate. 
The study of computer science education can be seen as a microcosm of how a 
realm of power can be claimed by one group of people, relegating others to 
outsiders. (p. 6)  
 
    Beginning around 2007, researchers started to argue that the category of woman has 
overly generalized women. Singh, Allen, Scheckler, and Darlington (2007) make this 
argument in the following: 
The literature on women’s enrollment and retention in computer science majors 
begs the question of ‘which women?’…Thus, women in computer-related fields are 
not a monolithic group, do not bring the same kinds of economic and social 
resources to the academic arena, and do not face the same kinds of pressures to 
succeed. (p. 517)  
 
On the one hand, there is opportunity in this intent to open up the group of women by 
opening up the gaze, but even Singh et al. shoot themselves in the proverbial foot when 
they later argue that “small, nonrandom samples and single-site case studies…do not yet 
present in-depth analyses of the complex interplay of forces that affect women’s decisions.” 
(p. 518) The contradiction escalates when they argue for methodologies that ultimately rely  
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on long-standing methods of the modest witness, which, as I have argued, can only reify 
some version of the CO.  
Methodological triangulation of data allows for in-depth theorizing and the 
generation of new concepts…  
…Quantitative research that is explanatory and tests a priori hypotheses will allow 
for theory development and greater generalizability of results. (p. 518)  
 
Another conflict is evident in terms of which women and which fields are considered 
significant and in debates over whether progress has been made in bridging the gender gap. 
A 2008 column in the New York Times (Stross) suggests some dilemmas. Citing a 
conversation with Justine Cassell (a professor of computer science and communications at 
Northwestern and a prominent thinker on g/t), Stross explains competing conceptions of 
the state of g/t research. 
Some people in the field still believed that the answer to reversing declining 
enrollment was building the right game. Another school of thought is what she 
calls the “we won” claim because women have entered computer-related fields like 
Web site design that are not traditional computer science. Ms. Cassell points out 
that it’s not much of a victory, however. The pay is considerably less than in 
software engineering and the work has less influence on how computers are used, 
and whether this actually accounts for the diminishing numbers of female 
computer science majors remains unproved. (para. 9) 
 
The first idea, focused around games as an intervention, holds on to the notion that the 
gap is an artifact of computing experiences that have kept women out of the game, so to 
speak. Cassell’s second, alternative thesis recognizes that Web designers and other applied 
computing professionals have made significant inroads, but she clearly dismisses these as  
less significant activities than computer science careers. Hers is a position not unlike the  
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exclusionary modest witness who discounts not only certain types of subjects, but also their 
meaning and significance.67 
 What makes telling the g/t story possible is a pervasive and black-boxed constituted 
outsider. Certainly there is some value in highlighting the various inequities that different 
groups or individuals face, but it is also true that the CO position just as easily makes it 
possible to discount and displace objects who have been marginalized through scientific 
methods and lenses that make broad claims based on a highly constructed form of 
objectivity and knowing. An exclusionary objectivity and epistemology enhance the 
technological character of the g/t story, for both good and less desirable outcomes and 
understandings. That is, the lenses of our enframing(s) are also the tools of constituting 
subjects and objects in ways that do not merely mirror reality; they allow and disallow 
selected subjects, objects, lenses, or knowledges. 
On the one hand is an epistemology and perceptual lens that claims to depend on a 
neutral and broadly encompassing objectivity; on the other, this objectivity is instrumental 
and marks some subjects as outsiders. In this way, the epistemological tradition of modest 
witnessing casts not only the objects of research but also, non-standard observers, so far 
outside the scientific field that they and their knowledge, experiences, and perceptual 
lenses are not only considered second tier, they are negated through a lack of presence.   
                                                
67 Arguments that users are more central than has been recognized are found in, for 
example Oudshoorn, N., & Pinch, T. (Eds.). (2003, 2005). How users matter: The co-
construction of users and technology. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press; Oldenziel, R. 
(2001). Man the maker, woman the consumer: The consumption junction revisited. In A. 
N. H. Creager, E. Lunbeck & L. Schiebinger (Eds.), Feminism in twentieth century science, 
technology, and medicine. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
186 
 
 
Conclusion (A Technological Story) 
 Heidegger, Taylor, Derrida, Cornell, Irigaray, and Haraway, in their various 
arguments, each provide a lens useful for illuminating the ways in which our theoretical 
and conceptual enframing precedes and infuses the g/t story. If the g/t story is a descriptive 
story, what it describes is filtered through a four-faceted enframing wherein our 
technological, epistemological, differentiating, and perceptual orientation to the world 
both shapes how the g/t story is constructed and why it takes this particular form. A 
technocratic understanding of being and knowing promotes an epistemology reliant on a 
separation of mind and body where knowledge and knowing have a bi-directional 
instrumentality (that is, they are meant to shape and mirror an objective reality).  
 Gender-technology researchers and scholars argue that a more robust objectivity, 
better theory, and better adherence to experimental and rigorous scientific methods will 
help solve the gender gap in computing. However, upon closer examination it becomes 
increasingly apparent that the problem is instead the extent of our epistemological and 
technological enframing. The meta g/t story is limited in and through its epistemological 
and technological foundations. There is then, a kind of paradox that unfolds in the way 
the g/t story—meant to describe and overcome perceived problems of subjects, objects, or 
opportunities—is itself trapped within a more transparent set of technical, epistemological, 
differentiating, and perceptual boundaries.  
I have belabored these points of methodology, epistemology, and conceptualization 
schemas, for which there is no easy solution (which is the point of attending to them) to 
ultimately question the prudence and value of reductivism. The reason to pursue more 
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complexity is to see what else is going on in the g/t story, beyond what appears in 
conventional readings. When read as more than a story about inequity and access to 
opportunity, what “value” does this so-called objective story offer to girls, women, and 
society? Is objectivity as an end in itself, or are there additional implications in telling—and 
retelling—the g/t story as one of underrepresentation and its effects?  
Objectivity, in the g/t story, has an instrumental function such that the meta story, 
constructed within the limitations of our epistemological and technological enframing is, 
ultimately, a technology that both reflects and promotes an instrumental understanding of 
technology as well as of girls and women as technological resources. Epistemology and the 
constituted outsider are transparent technologies of a four-faceted enframing.   
This g/t story reflects the underlying conceptual frameworks through which we 
imagine our world and our subjective positions within this world or our experiences. In 
this enframing, an embodied imagination is stifled; it is “disabled” in attempts to 
transform social inequities that have been shaped by deeply held and black-boxed beliefs 
about scientific truth, progress, the workings of social and intellectual hierarchies, and by 
subscribing to a reductivist epistemology and exclusionary witnessing in producing 
knowledge and thus bounding possibilities. In the next chapter, I delve into some 
additional subliminal technologies that feed a contemporary state of anxiety and examine 
how the g/t story is positioned to manage these anxieties.  
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Facet 7 
Subliminal Social-Political Technologies 
No social, human, or spiritual fact is so important as the fact of technique in the 
modern world. (The Technological Society, Ellul, 1964, p. 3) 
 
The g/t story is strategically positioned and unreflexively used to manage a set of 
modern anxieties such that gender or women are co-opted to stand between traditions and 
values and a generalized societal malaise prompted by a seemingly unfettered, and 
oftentimes frightening, technological progress. Mediating both a fear and fascination with 
technological innovation, the meta g/t story functions as a technology that reinforces a 
number of expected norms regarding societal expectations of women or men, the use and 
value of education and disciplines, of research, and what scientific, educational research 
should look like and accomplish. To see how the story functions in this way requires 
bringing to the surface several social-political-intellectual practices that themselves function 
as “technologies” that both consciously and subliminally define, construct, and constrain 
objects, subjects, knowledge, and relationships.68  
These subliminal technologies are largely taken-for-granted, yet they ground the 
central conceptual, organizing, and representational premises of the meta g/t story. 
Through these hidden technologies, the constructs of gender, technology, knowledge, 
research, and education are normalized and embedded as themselves a kind of technology 
that educational research and related policy agendas have come to rely on. In addition, 
these fundamental technologies and organizing constructs serve a number of competing 
                                                
68 Although I will deconstruct ‘technology’ in depth as the chapter unfolds, I am using it 
here to refer both to tools (particularly the computer) and to a cultural practice and system 
that reflects the dominant, modern, Western, mindset.  
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interests regarding the role of women and technology in education and in society more 
broadly. The transparency, ubiquity, and taken-for-granted character of these transparent 
technologies subliminally grounds and amplifies our contemporary culture of anxiety. 
While the g/t story is a technology used to mediate anxieties over the encroaching techno-
rationality of society and its social institutions, these anxieties derive from the very 
technologies we have idealized and promoted as the best ways to think about our situations 
in the world.   
Reflecting more than simply concerns over equity or a diverse workforce, a 
(post)modern anxiety drives much of the g/t story, such that this story may be understood 
as a particular response to the uniquely disruptive emergence of the personal computer in 
the latter quarter of the 20th century. This was the computer—a new and wholly different 
kind of machine—as it has been articulated in and bound to multiple agendas and 
discourses that became increasingly important to education, markets, states, and 
individuals beginning in the early 1980s (e.g. Beck, 1992; Bowers, 1988; Brown, 2005; 
Sennett, 2004, October 23; Turkle, 1984, 1995).    
Conventional approaches to studying the intersection of the computer, society, 
women, and education have largely focused on specific tools to understand their influence 
on social interactions, individual or group identities, learning, and so on. While these 
approaches have given us new and helpful insights, exclusively focusing on tools offers only 
a partial picture. In what follows, I largely leave aside material tools to instead examine a 
set of abstract subliminal technologies manifest as common, conceptual, discursive 
practices that in turn have shaped Western social-political-intellectual life through their 
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transparency. They frame the expected parameters of what is normal across a range of 
practices and beliefs. These “non-tool” technologies preface notions of how we think about 
and interact with our tangible tools.  
Given the ways that the g/t story has been built via these subliminal socio-political-
intellectual technologies over the last thirty years or so, the story may be seen as a product 
of and response to a set of anxieties, seemingly specific to computing, but that in reality 
mirror a greater and more profound anxiety that emanates from an unease with the 
increasingly techno-rational character of modern society. These anxieties reflect our 
extensive yet conflicted cultural relationship with the computer and technology that carries 
over into education and weaves back into society (e.g. Bromley & Apple, 1998; Franklin, 
1990, 1999; Hickman, 2001; Illich, 1973; Pacey, 1983, 1989). I situate the g/t story within 
this socio-technological-policy-education complex and in this chapter examine three 
primary technologies: (a) a conceptual technology of binary thinking, (b) reductive 
conceptualizations of technology, and (c) the political technologies of neoliberalism and 
techno-rationality.69  
 
A Conceptual Technology of Binary Thinking  
Western epistemology is a technology for thinking in and through binary 
constructions (e.g. Derrida, 1978, 1997; Foucault, 1970, 1994, 1972, 1975, 1995; C. 
                                                
69 In the next chapter I tackle disciplining technologies; constructing gendered objects; 
objectively constituting outsiders to technology; constituting objectivity as a technology; 
and uncovering a better objectivity. There may be others that are significant and I do not 
mean my list to be comprehensive. 
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Taylor, 1995; Wood & Bernasconi, 1988). This epistemology insists that we think through 
oppositions, reductions, representationalism, and a radical reflexivity. It is also a 
technology that insists on and provides the means for scientific objectivity, by keeping 
biases and beliefs of the observer out of knowledge constructions. In essence, Western 
epistemology is a technology that presumes disengagement is a normal state and that a 
thinker is independent of the knowledge she/he thinks. Fundamental to this technology of 
thinking is a conceptual separation of mind and body (understood as the legacy of 
Descartes).     
The conceptual technology of binary thinking has sustained such primary 
oppositions as nature-culture, male-female, reason-affect, and more recently, sex-gender. 
Even as the possibility of such dichotomization has been hotly debated and deconstructed 
(Barad, Bowker & Star, Cornell, Colebrook, Derrida, Dewey, Foucault, etc.), these 
dichotomizing practices retain a broad intellectual and cultural cache. Standard thinking 
about g/t is transparently caught up in the web of this binary thinking. It seeds the 
dominant social imaginaries through which the g/t story is understood and circulated, yet 
mainstream epistemology offers little help for understanding how this happens or the 
significance of these formations, because the epistemology itself seems so normal and 
necessary.  
Examining binarism to question this normal epistemology in turn makes it possible 
to re-examine essentializing classification practices that foreground the g/t story. These 
practices produce what have become, even if not intentionally so, reliable and stable 
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constructs of gender and technology.70 Deconstructing the binary layer illuminates how 
gender and technology tend to be conceptualized as if they are independent constructs, 
easily traced or measured (even if they are argued to be co-constructed). Moreover, 
reduction and opposition prepare gender and technology to be used in the intersections of 
knowledge and power. Binary reductions found across the g/t story are women-men; 
women-computing; rationality-interpretation; STEM-humanities; affect-reason; and so on.  
Binary thinking is the dominant social-intellectual technology of the modern West. 
It is one of the transparent technologies through which the g/t story acquires the stature of 
a modern meta-narrative, as I suggested in Chapter 3.71 To reiterate, Lyotard (1979, 1984) 
argued that a narrative gains the aura of a meta-narrative when it is accepted as the carrier 
of important and universal perspectives regarding knowledge, truth, and social relations. A 
meta-narrative, taken to represent a significant and enduring truth, is embedded into the 
social-scientific library of explanations and understandings of the world.  
The g/t story has taken on the character of a meta-narrative in the ways that it 
draws upon and promotes a set of conceptual unities around knowledge, science, 
difference, gender, technology, equity, and related concepts and constructs that have been 
essential in characterizing the persistence and import of the g/t relationship. In what 
follows, I extend and refine my analysis of this meta story by highlighting a number of 
other transparent and pervasive technologies that function to normalize practices and 
                                                
70 I do not mean to dismiss other studies or papers that have considered alternative and 
complicating ideas or positions (Lockheed, 1985). However, these do not reflect the 
thinking that drives the mainstream story and in fact, these alternatives seem to remain 
marginal in the larger dominant g/t story, an idea I return to later.  
71 Other technologies will be explained later in the chapter. 
193 
 
 
beliefs and that in turn function as a kind of discursive or conceptual glue in making the 
g/t story appear coherent. These other technologies manifest as thinking or practices built 
from our social imaginaries and enframings.  
 
Explicating Technology  
 Articulating “concepts” as social or intellectual technologies suggests that a more 
expansive yet precise consideration of technology is needed than the reductivist tool 
construct relied upon in the g/t story. Heidegger’s (1977) articulation of our modern 
technological enframing is a useful starting point for the ways that it characterizes our 
background understanding of being, but this too is only one lens onto how technology 
might be more thoroughly understood and situated as a complex social-cultural-political-
cognitive-affective practice. Over the next pages, I discuss the problem of reducing 
technology to its instrumental nature and pursue other ideas for thinking about technology 
that better reflect the multiple and often conflicted ways in which we think about and are 
situated in relation to “technology.”  
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Conceptual reductions of technology. Reducing technology to only its tool and 
tool culture aspects is epistemologically useful—it provides something tangible to analyze 
and measure. This conceptual pruning makes it possible, for example, to quantify the 
underrepresentation of women in computing fields, thereby avoiding the messiness that a 
more complex rendering of technology would inflict. By confining technology to its 
instrumental essence, an illusion of control is maintained so that in a given g/t study, the 
variables of technology and gender are seemingly contained and constructs are neatly 
defined, making it possible to easily locate the technology. Expectations are for something 
akin to “the PC, the I-pod, mainframe computers, computer games,” and so on. However, 
in accommodating such demands for neat and precise definitions, much is lost—
specifically, the highly nuanced character and reach of technology as well as a richness of 
concepts otherwise available for understanding how technology is implicated within the g/t 
story and infused in society on a grand social-political-experiential-existential scale. 
More complex explication of the essence and workings of technology are essential if 
we are to move beyond the instrumental or constructivist explanations that have helped to 
sustain the working assumptions and frameworks of the g/t story. Bruce (1996; 1998), 
Foucault (1975, 1995, 1990), Franklin (1990, 1999), Heidegger (1977), Pacey (1983, 1989) 
and others have already done this, yet this kind of exposition is excluded from the meta g/t 
story. Expanding the “definition” of technology necessitates expanding the disciplinary 
bases from which we theorize or classify our interactions with technology. Needed is a way 
to think beyond technology as an isolatable construct with its own culture and mores. One 
way to do this is through philosophical and critical theory lenses that counter or 
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complicate the dominant psychological-behavioral-cognitive approaches taken by g/t 
researchers.  
Expanding notions of how to think about technology opens up new kinds of 
questions. For example, it becomes more pressing to understand why is it that technology, 
in the g/t story, has been reduced to tools and tool culture. From this it becomes more 
evident that thinking about technology as something separate and distinct from our shared 
human experience and being-in-the-world is quite pervasive, yet also a flawed notion. There 
are multiple influences that serve to delimit conceptions of technology to its instrumental 
aspects, but once this is recognized, we more easily notice that other philosophical or 
cultural-sociological conceptions of technology have been rendered invisible (or 
marginalized).  
The instrumental understanding of technology is the product of three phenomena: 
(a) a separation of science and technology from the humanities (e.g. Heidegger, 1977; 
Kuhn, 1962, 1996; Mitcham, 1994; Snow, 1965); (b) a reliance on an epistemological 
model of knowing that overly values reductivist practices and the expert knower (e.g. 
Appadurai, 1999, 2000; Klein, 2004; Helga Nowotny, 2003; C. Taylor, 1995; Wallerstein, 
1997; Wallerstein & Gulbenkian Commission, 1996); and (c) a totalizing tool-focused 
notion of technology that mirrors the inherently instrumental nature and intentions of the 
g/t story. The construct of gender and this instrumentalized notion of technology intersect 
as the g/t story takes on an aura of a meta-narrative that aims to be broadly descriptive and 
explanatory. Instrumental conceptualizations of technology easily accommodate arguments 
that the descriptive and explanatory methods of g/t research have been insufficiently 
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rigorous. Tools, their culture, and procedural concerns over methods—rather than self-
limiting conceptions of technology or methodology as technique—are argued to be the 
problems to fix.  
When technology is articulated only as tools, this makes it seem as if the g/t story is 
a neutral and merely descriptive or explanatory narrative. Black-boxed is the way the meta 
story is constructed by promoting some beliefs or practices about technology while 
rendering others invisible, unwarrantable, or more emphatically, absent. One reason the 
workings of the meta story seem so natural is its conceptual blindness. We have become so 
comfortable with engineering, psychological, cognitive, and behaviorist driven conceptions 
of technology that this has made it seem most appropriate to similarly reduce other 
concepts and constructs that play out in the g/t story.   
Reductivist definitions and concepts mask the ways in which technology could be 
better understood as something both concrete and quite mysterious, more cultural-
intellectual-existential practice than artifact. For many scholars, technology is a difficult 
term to pin down and any agreement on how to do so remains elusive. Philosophers and 
cultural theorists of technology have been pursuing such questions for quite some time, 
producing a vast store of scholarship that this study cannot do justice to in more than a 
cursory way. That said, in the following paragraphs I draw upon some key ideas, fully 
recognizing that this, too, is a bit reductivist and a simplification of a complex body of 
thinking that considers technology as it intersects with humans and their practices. 
Engineering views of technology. 
An individual relates himself in action to his society through the use of tools that 
he actively masters, or by which he is passively acted upon. To the degree that he 
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masters his tools, he can invest the world with his meaning; to the degree that he is 
mastered by his tools, the shape of the tool determines his own self-image. (Illich, 
1973, p. 17) 
 
 Although quite critical of our technology driven, capitalist society, Illich’s criticisms 
of technology remain tied to a tool-based definition of technology. Mitcham (1994) tells us 
that engineering grounded the first philosophy of technology. This view frames technology 
within a mechanist model but it also extends this technological model as an emancipatory 
model for human thinking and society, for moving beyond the distractions and biases 
attached to bodies, emotions, and other non-technological processes. The engineering 
definition of technology is not limited to machines but extends to theories of knowledge 
and mind and is far too complex to elaborate here. For the purposes of my thesis, it 
suffices to note that within the fields of philosophy of technology, one of the ongoing 
controversies is whether, or to what degree, the mechanistic model should extend to 
humans, their activities and production, society, and nature. Technology is argued to be 
both the key to a humanizing, democratic society (Bacca cited in Mitcham, 1994, p. 34) or 
the antithesis of humanism and democracy. Advocating the former, Bunge’s definition is 
that “‘technophilosophy’ is only an aspect of a larger effort to explain reality in scientific-
technological terms and to reformulate the humanities (philosophy and ethics) along 
scientific and technical lines” (cited in Mitcham, 1994, p. 37).  
Conversely, Ellul (1964) argued that a dominance of mechanistic technique has 
expanded to become the driving conception of society across political, social, economic, 
and cognitive activities. Dewey’s thinking was more experiential and pragmatic and held 
that tools and instruments are “are the methods and means by which technological inquiry 
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takes place” (Dewey, cited in Hickman, 1990, p. 4). Perhaps the primary controversy is to 
what degree, and in what form, technology functions as an appropriate metaphor for 
human social, political, and economic relations or as a viable model of the human mind.  
Social constructivist & actor-network views of technology. 
“Technology [is] a culture that expresses and consolidates relations amongst men.” 
 (Wajcman, 1991, p. 22) 
 
Scholars across the humanities and sciences have argued two positions on how 
technologies unfold: (a) technologies and persons are social constructions and co-
constructed or (b) humans and non-human organic actors, as well as non-organic actors 
(e.g. tools, artifacts in the physical world, and concepts), evolve in concert in a networked 
relationship that is both material and semiotic. Without getting deep into either position, 
the idea is that technologies do not blossom independently from a technological ether, but 
are an outcome of human input, thinking, and social-political-cultural relations that both 
frame and are changed through specific technologies (e.g. Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1989; 
Latour, 2005; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Suchman, 1999; Wajcman, 1991, 2004, 2007).  
Social constructivists argue that the practices through which technologies are 
conceived and used are inseparable from these technologies. Although the social 
constructivist model is vastly influential (and underlies much of the scholarship of science 
and technology studies) it tends to focus attention on specific technologies and the 
formation of technology cultures as sites of inclusion, exclusion, identity formation, and so 
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on.72 Social constructivist views have also been criticized for their tendency to leave aside 
the possibility of a social agent’s responsibility within the interaction. More problematic is 
the turn to a radical social constructivism that claims a totalitarian explanatory position 
(Haraway, 1991a) or the tendency to focus on language and culture to the exclusion of 
materiality. For example, Barad’s (2007) criticism is that social constructivist approaches 
depend on a belief in representationalism and “the power of words to mirror preexisting 
phenomena…perpetuating the endless recycling of untenable options” (p. 133).  
Philosophical & political perspectives of technology. 
Technology, like democracy, includes ideas and practices; it includes myths and 
various models of reality. And like democracy, technology changes the social and 
individual relationships between us. It has forced us to examine and redefine our 
notions of power and of accountability. (Franklin, 1990, 1999, p. 2)  
 
Philosophical examinations of technology often have followed two distinct paths in 
considering values and ethics: engineering or humanities perspectives.73 The broad aim, 
amongst humanities-focused philosophers of technology has been to articulate how 
technology might be conceptualized as a complex social, cultural, and political practice.74  
                                                
72 Both social constructivist and actor-network-theory are more complex than my discussion 
suggests. My intention is to briefly note some of the ways technology is discussed.  
73 Carl Mitcham (1994) and more recent works on the ethical and philosophical aspects of 
technology are explored at such conferences as the International Association for 
Computing and Philosophy (IACAP). Some prominent scholars are Luciano Floridi, 
Charles Ess, Philip Brey, and Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic.  
74 See Mitcham, Pacey, or Franklin, for example. This aspect of technology has been used 
by Bruce, etc to redirect the focus on technology in education and learning from an 
overreliance on technology as fix. The intent is to refocus attention on the fact that 
technologies and social relations are co-constructed and moreover, that technology has 
always been part of education (even as the specific types of tools have evolved). (Bruce, 
1996) 
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Driving these inquiries is often a broad interest in the ethical or political 
dimensions of technology (e.g. Castell & Bryson, 1998; Foucault, 1975, 1995, 1990; 
Franklin, 1990, 1999; Winner, 1995). Concerns also frequently focus around the 
consequences of the Enlightenment project that idealized technological progress (e.g. 
Balsamo, 1995; Haraway, 1997; Heidegger, 1977; Postman, 1993). The argument often 
made is that the modernist project, in the ways that it dichotomizes science and art, reason 
and affect, mind and body, also reflects a stratified society that promotes and distinguishes 
experts and the technical sphere as the privileged domains of society while casting users or 
non-experts as relatively insignificant (e.g. Helga Nowotny, 2003; H. Nowotny, Scott, & 
Gibbons, 2001; Oldenziel, 2001). Similarly, the primacy of a tools and tool culture 
conception of technology is, according to Pacey (1983, 1989), a reflection of the 
dominance of the expert-technical sphere of technology. In humanistic philosophical and 
cultural analyses, the significant issues are said to revolve around values (e.g. political, 
moral, ethical, social, or user-centered) especially as these are deemed to have been 
artificially separated from the technical realm. Criticisms of the expert-nonexpert hierarchy 
highlight how privileging the expert domain has diminished the cultural and organizational 
spheres of influence regarding technology, and in doing so, promoted a false sense of a 
structural divide between technological progress and the politics, values, and human 
agency driving this progress.75   
                                                
75 Arnold Pacey portrayed somewhat distinct spheres, each weighted heavily towards either 
users or experts’ interests and positions, and noted that co-constructivist models blur these 
boundaries. However, what persists is that the technical aspects lie wholly in the 
technical/expert sphere, while the cultural and organizational aspects (including values, 
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 Definitions of technology tend to reflect their context of use. It makes some sense 
then, that philosophers pursue fine-tuning how we might conceive of technology, and 
educational researchers pursue how technologies are used in learning.76 In this separation, 
however, something essential is lost. Specifically, when g/t researchers focus only the 
computer’s instrumental aspects, it becomes quite difficult to see what the conceptual 
reduction of technology supports or masks. 
  That is, opening up technology so that it is not merely understood as tools that we 
manipulate, or as a hegemonic culture where tools are conceived and developed, also 
supports more nuanced thinking about the g/t relationship. For example, it complicates 
epistemological assumptions about a totalizing objectivity; because the g/t story has relied 
only on a singular notion of technology it must be understood as only a partial story and 
thus, its objectivity can also be questioned. The key point is that objectivity can never be 
totalizing nor wholly impartial in its perspective. As Haraway (1991a) frames it, knowing is 
                                                
goals) are more dispersed. Because of this cultural hierarchy, experts are able to ignore 
much of the cultural and organizational effects of their technologies or the ways they 
negatively influence the user sphere. Similarly, Franklin (1990, 1999), a noted 
experimental physicist, characterizes technology as a practice, but she also describes a 
system of activities and a body of knowledge that is both structured and structuring (p. 2 & 
5). This act of structuring is particularly significant and refers to how technology initiates 
“a different way of doing something, a different tool for the same task, [that] separates the 
outsider from the insider” (p. 6-7). Thus, the structuring nature of technology functionally 
categorizes groups according to their practices, knowledge, skills, and tools. Moreover, 
technology alters or even eliminates reciprocity in human activities and relationships by 
constructing physical distances between parties and because of this, she argued, the 
fundamental quality of reciprocity—is distorted, reduced, or even eliminated and this 
enacts a “form of technologically executed inequality” (p. 42-43).  
76 Some, such as Burbules and Bruce do try to bridge this gap; still, these crossovers are not 
much in evidence in the g/t story 
202 
 
 
inevitably situated, necessitating a more limited, yet also more robust, notion of objectivity. 
How we think about objectivity impacts how we understand the g/t story.  
In addition, given the prominence of the psychological, cognitive, and behavioral 
sciences in grounding the g/t story, it is crucial to understand how a limited disciplinary 
range delineates the dominant and instrumental construct of technology in use. The meta 
g/t story is conceptually disciplined as an instrumental story in part because other 
perspectives are absent. Rethinking the concept of technology makes it possible to more 
fully consider how the g/t story reflects, explains, and creates our technological and 
epistemological enframing. The problem is in recognizing how we are disciplined in how to 
think about gender and technology and to cooperate with the meta story as its disciplining 
unfolds. Reconceptualizing technology is, therefore, a first step out of what has been a No 
Exit endeavor of recursively describing and explaining inequities.77 There is much more to 
the meta g/t story. 
 Thinking through the “question concerning technology” creates a space for ideas 
heretofore missing from the g/t story to be re-engaged. The goal is a more encompassing 
understanding of technology as a complex cultural-political-intellectual-affective system 
through which humans normally live, learn, and relate (e.g. Pacey, Franklin, Dewey, 
Heidegger). In the next section, I look at the separation of technology from its values, 
which prefaces a discussion later in the chapter of two political technologies—neoliberalism 
and the techno-rationality that increasingly drives society, fueled by technoscience.    
                                                
77 This is the title of Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1944 existentialist play. 
203 
 
 
Separating technology from its values.  When it became less possible to argue that 
women are ontologically less capable than men as mathematicians, logical thinkers, or 
scientists; the focus of g/t research was re-directed. This shift simply brought to the table a 
new version of the deficit model—it changed the problem to a lack of social or humanistic 
values in the dominant computing culture, specifically in computer science programs and 
in their main cohort of boys and men. Women were no longer lacking; instead the culture 
and boys-men show a deficit in their ethical connection to technology. Despite this shift, 
concerns over equity did not go away, thus putting two desires in play. First, is an ongoing 
desire to increase the technological labor pool by bringing in more women that expanded 
to include a desire to diversify the ethnic, racial, and class representation in technology.78 
These diversity and equity concerns coexist with the idea that more women are needed in 
computing because women, specifically, will bring a wholly different values orientation and 
reshape computing as a discipline and in ways that will better serve society’s interests. Two 
additional ideas are carried along. One is that the impact of women’s values is itself 
conceived in the singular, reflecting the ways in which the gendered position is framed as a 
                                                
78 There has been such a large focus on women’s different subjective experiences to explain 
underrepresentation that this has masked possibilities of seeing that some studies are 
focused on women working as “line programmers,” technical laborers, or K-12 teachers 
(needing to be made more technologically literate), while other studies focus on women at 
the creative center (e.g. Carnegie Mellon computer science majors). Because these studies 
blend together to seemingly focus on representation statistics, somewhat lost in the ether is 
that often these studies are examining fundamentally different positions that are about 
class, race, mentoring, opportunity, and a host of other factors more related to a universal 
glass ceiling and other social or economic class disparities than to any specialness of 
computing. Moreover, there just is not as much financial or social capital expended in 
trying to increase women’s representations in the creative fields or in the higher echelons 
of business, politics, academe, medicine, or law, as there is in STEM fields and most 
particularly, computing. 
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universal, not local, subjectivity of women rather than of any particular woman. Women, 
essentially, become a unitary construct in terms of their techno-social values and 
dispositions. The other embedded feature is that this values reorientation is predominantly 
expressed in the future tense—it is hard to find an example in the meta story that discusses 
how women have changed computing. The examples used tend to be from medical fields, 
where women have brought new insights and respect for women’s bodies or from the legal 
profession, where women have altered the law, particularly in thinking about women’s 
rights and bodies. 
In short, g/t research and policy agendas have been too willing to blend three 
notions: (a) increasing women’s representation in computing will increase women’s 
economic well-being, (b) doing so will also enhance the country’s technological workforce 
and competitiveness, and (c) women’s greater presence will make computing cultures and 
society more humanistic and values-driven. There is a black-boxed assumption that these 
are easily compatible desires or outcomes. One way that such assumptions pass is that 
technology itself has been separated from its values, which in turn have been relocated in 
women, seemingly exclusively. In essence, over the life of the meta g/t story, as computers 
facilitated a growing instrumentalization of humans and society, gender and women 
became increasingly useful constructs as political ideologies increasingly construe humans 
(and non-humans) in terms of their production-consumption value.  
This shift is evident in the ways that the NSF language changed from 1993 to 2008 
in publications of the Division of Research, Evaluation, and Dissemination. In 1993, the 
following language is found: 
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This agenda recognizes that our greatest assets are students of all ages…and citizens 
who want to know more about the world we live in—and who want to be 
knowledgeably involved in the many critical, scientific choices we make each day. 
… 
Our ultimate goal is to create and sustain a national atmosphere that values and 
encourages scientific thinking and scientific endeavors by all of our citizens. When 
we succeed, every student will be able to study mathematics and science and 
become knowledgeable in these vital areas. (1993, Luther S. Williams, Assistant 
Director for Education and Human Resources, introductory letter)  
 
Contrast this with the 2008 language in the same directorate: 
One of the National Science Foundation's (NSF) key strategic goals is to cultivate a 
world-class, broadly inclusive science and engineering workforce, and expand the 
scientific literacy of all citizens.  
… 
The program for Research on Gender in Science and Engineering (GSE) seeks to 
build resources—developing the nation's knowledge capital, social capital, and 
human capital—toward the goal of broadening the participation of girls and young 
women in STEM education from kindergarten through undergraduate education. 
… 
The demand for science and technology literacy on the part of all citizens has never 
been higher, and the demand for domestic workforce capacity in engineering and 
computer fields is projected to exceed supply. (National Science Foundation, 2007, 
pp. 5-6)  
 
The NSF started its Program for Women and Girls in 1993, and the first example above 
emphasizes engaged, citizen-centered knowing. Its language is of helping a broad range of 
students and citizens become more knowledgeable about science, because these learners are 
themselves interested and moreover, are valued as citizens. By 2007, the NSF shifts to 
rather explicit language that talks in terms of human capital development rather than of a 
citizenry broadly knowledgeable and critically literate. We are described not as citizens but 
as resources. Arguably, the reasons for increasing women’s participation in computing 
shifted on a national, visionary, and policy level.  
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Once we recognize this shift of vision, our understanding of g/t research and the 
meta story requires reevaluation. For example, the AAUW (2000) report appears to be 
reporting girls’ disinterest in computing noting that girls feel they are not incapable, they 
just are not that interested.   
Most […girls] do not predict that they will want to learn more about or become 
more involved with computers in the future. In Turkle’s terms, these girls are not 
computer-phobic; they are “computer reticent.” They say that they are not afraid 
but simply do not want to get involved. They express a “we can, but I don’t want 
to” philosophy. (p. 7) 
 
We can read this, first, through a national policy agenda that has become more explicitly 
interested in humans as capital rather than as participatory citizens. The problem becomes 
how to get girls interested because they are untapped resources. Moreover, since girls and 
women’s intellectual deficits are no longer viable as an explanation for the computing 
gender gap, the focus easily shifts to girls’ subjectivities. In both narratives, subjectivities are 
made available for re-engineering. Through these shifts, the g/t story steers attention to the 
notion that reducing the gap is both the best way to increase the labor pool and to bring a 
greater sense of values into computing. Largely glossed over is how these two quite 
different notions fit together. 
 This thinking is bound to approaches that view proper methods as the arbiter of 
quality research findings. A tight focus on the gender gap keeps our attention from other 
more problematic gaps, such as those between, on the one hand, desires to promote more 
humanistic techno-social values and on the other hand, funding agendas shaped around 
human capital theory and neoliberal market values. The incommensurable problem is one 
of hoping to lessen the instrumentalization of humans and society while at the same time 
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thinking in terms of policies and language that themselves facilitate this 
instrumentalization. Foucault (1975, 1995, 1990) and DeLauretis (1987) have showed how 
this proceeds through the disciplining technologies of the self and gender (which I will 
explain in greater detail in chapter 8). 
There is a kind of co-dependence in the persistent focus on statistics showing girls 
and women’s underrepresentation and the growing numbers of micro-stories focused on 
girls and women’s values-driven ethical orientations to technology. Throughout g/t micro 
stories, women not only are said to bring a different orientation to computing, this 
difference is stated to have the potential to reshape the society-technology relationship. 
Increasingly these narratives infer that women have an ethical responsibility to become 
more interested in technology. For example, Margolis and Fisher (2002) state: “In the long 
run, the greatest impact may be on the health of computing as a discipline and its 
influence on society. The near absence of women’s voices at the drawing board has 
pervasive effects” (p. 2). These kinds of discourses do not merely describe a universal, 
gendered ethical subject. They also help to discipline women into this subject who must fit 
herself to these kinds of expectations. The following example further illustrates how 
women’s subjectivities are located and used: 
Another first-year student, Louise, describes a difference she felt between herself 
and her male peers when she saw her peers’ nonchalant response to a lecture on 
ways that computers can be nonproductive in society: 
Everyone just said how boring it was: “Who cares that computers did not 
benefit anyone? We like computers! We love computers! We know 
computers! And who cares about the rest of the world” 
She describes herself, on the other hand, as someone who scrutinizes the worth of 
each computing project in terms of what it is doing to change and help the world. 
 … 
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 Jessica, a woman student who has always done well in math and science, 
feels deeply that computer science must “make a contribution”: “just…making 
video games” is not “worth the energy and talent that it takes.” She relates her 
interest in computer science to her concern for her grandmother’s medical 
condition. (p. 53) 
 
It is not the expectations inferred about women’s presence in computing that are so 
intriguing but instead, how these women’s self-accounts consistently seem to support this 
expectation. That is, within this g/t story, women’s technology narratives are first, 
represented as constant and dependable and second, easily cataloged to be available for 
objective analysis. Self-reports are reasonably expected to depict women’s seemingly 
universal and predictable social-ethical dispositions and interests in technology. The notion 
that women will bring a new values orientation to technology, which is in fact a quite 
powerful idea, largely skirts by as both expectation and fact. Women, in the g/t story, have 
become a singular entity and in this discursive merger, they signify, broadly, the right kind 
of “subject” on which we pin our hopes for bringing social values to computing and 
technology.   
What has happened in the g/t story is that technology and its values and politics 
have been artificially separated, just as boys and men have been put into another 
technological box. Technology on its own is value free and boys and men’s values are 
driven only by their fascination for technology and how far it can be pushed. This 
separation happens through discursive practices that locate and essentialize men and boys 
within a technological realm devoid of humanistic values and that articulate women as 
wholly driven by these otherwise missing values. A closer look reveals different twists and 
turns over the years. For example, although Turkle’s The Second Self (1984) is most cited for 
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her portrayal of hacker culture, she also devoted a chapter to PC hobbyists, another 
subculture that emerged when the PC first became available to home users in the early 
1980s. The desktop machine was perceived by these hobbyists to be a major opportunity to 
subvert the drone-like activity of programming for corporate mainframe computers. The 
PC offered a new affordability and one no longer needed to have a warehouse to park the 
thing; its desktop size and price shifted everything. What, however, did it shift? The 
dominant g/t story has had us focus on hackers and a masculinized computer gaming 
culture, thus lessening the visibility of other practices and interests. One missing actor is 
the PC hobbyist. In 1984, Turkle described this culture in the following terms:  
What is most striking in the story of the revolution that began with the Altair 
personal computer is that for many people the computer at home becomes a tool 
that compensates for the ravages of the machine at work.  
… 
They came on the scene at a time of dashed hopes for making politics open and 
participatory. Personal computers were small, individually owned, and when linked 
through networks over phone lines they could be used to bring people together.  
… 
Computers, long a symbol of depersonalization, were recast as “tools for 
conviviality” and “dream machines.” Computers, long a symbol of the power of the 
“big”—big corporations, big institutions, big money—began to acquire an image as 
instruments for decentralization, community, and personal autonomy. (1984, p. 
170-172)   
 
In its singular focus on hacker culture, the g/t story was able to lose this other narrative of 
socio-political engagement, where gender does not mark whether one thinks about 
computers in relation to societal concerns.79 We see instead that early on the PC was 
                                                
79 This aspect of computing, however, continues in community informatics (e.g. Chip 
(Bertram) Bruce and Anne Bishop) and in texts such Beyond Resistance!: Youth activism 
and community change; Ginwright, S., Noguera, P., Cammarota, J. (Eds); New York : 
Routledge, 2006. 
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viewed, in some circles, as the hope for a new engaged, political economy. It would provide 
the harried worker and citizen an outlet and hope for creative, self-directed, and fulfilling 
work, independent of the corporation. Similarly, artists (both men and women) adopted 
the computer to explore a radically new creative terrain, often blurring the boundaries of 
artist-programmer, artist-social activist, or art-technology.80 Kept out of the g/t story are 
these other stories where engagement with the computer has been driven by a host of 
values-driven interactions, such as community-building, facilitating social-political change, 
and quests for new aesthetic values. In the dominant g/t story, however, these values are 
expressed almost exclusively as the domain of women, framed within a liberal feminist 
ethic of care.   
 Winner (1995) has shown how Western moral philosophy separates technology 
from politics and in so doing, ignores the significant role that citizens should hold in 
articulating policy and in making choices about technological projects. As a result, citizens 
have been “isolated from the realities of technical practice and technical change” (p. 67).81 
Furthering this separation has been modern liberalism, which emphasizes individual 
enterprise, the accumulation of wealth, and technological progress as a driving rationale of 
society and human knowledge building (p. 72).82 Through such social-political practices, 
the political domain of technology has been kept separate from the technical domain, 
                                                
80 See for example, Char Davies, Lynn Hershmann-Leeson, or Anne-Sarah Le Meur. 
81 Winner attributes this divide to two sets of ideas – the ancient Greek idea of techné as a 
lesser form of knowledge-practice and to our modern understanding of “megatechnics” (p. 
67) 
82 This criticism is reminiscent of Taylor’s modern social imaginaries (although Winner 
and Taylor seem to cover different disciplinary terrain), wherein atomism and punctualism 
are highlighted as key aspects of our epistemological orientation to the world.  
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leaving the citizen marginalized from both. Winner (1986) deconstructs the ways in which 
the separation of technology from its political dimension masks an unreflexive 
technological determinism. He also argues that technologies sometimes contain or 
promote particular kinds of power independent of the political system from which they 
emerged. Thinking about technology and power in this way leads back to Foucault and 
grounds how I think about the g/t story as a disciplining technology. This technology not 
only describes girls and women (and technology), but also construes these actors for 
specific ends, in large part, by separating values from technology. Practices of separation 
make it possible to locate technology’s values in the feminine, rather than in philosophy, 
society, or in citizens of multiple persuasions and identities.  
The computer as a metaphor of mind.  As sociological, philosophical, or political 
perspectives of technology unfolded in response to the computer, it was given numerous 
characterizations. Some saw it as a radically new psychological, subjective, thinking 
machine (Papert, 1980; Turing, 1950; Turkle, 1984). The emergence of the computer, 
according to other scholars, was a major rupture to long-standing human-machine, 
technology-society, and human-society conceptions. For some, as the computer entered 
mainstream social consciousness, its tool nature intertwined with and promoted an 
information processing model of the human mind (Mazlish, 1967, 1989; Minsky, 1985; 
Moravec, 1988). This model became one of the dominant metaphors to emerge from 
computer science and AI research. Initially separating logic and reasoning from emotions 
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and affect, the model also facilitated a separation of men’s rationality and disengaged 
“tinkering” from women’s embodied ways of knowing and interacting with the world.83  
 In some circles, AI provoked deep philosophical reflection and debates (that 
continue today) over the meaning of the computer and whether we were (or are) at the 
precipice of a new human-machine relationship.84 One of these thinkers, Colburn (2000), 
argued that the computer and AI force a new encounter between science and philosophy, 
in that AI challenges long-standing traditional philosophical concerns over what it means 
to equate computational processing with the human mind and to represent this mind as 
separated from its body (hence, nature).  
 The point is that AI instigated a profound conceptual rupture to a social imaginary 
that had long presumed a fundamental and enduring distinction between machines and 
the human mind, be this in terms of intelligence or psychology. Minsky’s Society of Mind 
(1985) is a highlight of this period that promoted a computational model of mind and a 
belief in computers as the new hope of the school reform movement. In this milieu, a 
technological euphoria (Winner, 2005) presaged the new field of the learning sciences in 
education. This field pursued strong alliances with the cognitive, psychological, and 
behavioral sciences, far less so with philosophy or the arts. Building from an initial, 
instrumental understanding of technology, the computer, as it became part of the modern 
social imaginary and the new hope for education reform, facilitated a powerful human-
                                                
83 I do not want to dismiss the work being done with affective computing (e.g. Phoebe 
Sengers at Cornell), but discussing this work would diverge from my thesis.  
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machine metaphor that fostered an instrumental understanding of not only technology, 
but also, of humans and their social institutions.  
 The g/t story is built on transparent intellectual-social-political technologies that 
have made it possible to separate technology from its values and in turn, relocates these 
values within a universalized construct of woman. Built from these technologies and 
practices, the g/t story itself functions as a kind of technology. Through the meta story, 
women have been shaped into appropriate research objects and cultural subjects, becoming 
not only the holders of socio-technical values, but a subject who comes to see herself as this 
subject. In chapter 8, I delve deeper into how the g/t story itself is functioning as a kind of 
discursive, social and political technology that works in concert with a technology of 
gender. This technology of gender is both a product of, and a facilitator to, a techno-
rational political mindset complicit with the neoliberal project, as described by Brown 
(2005, 2006). The rest of this chapter discusses these two political technologies and their 
intersection with the g/t story. 
 
Two Political Technologies: Neoliberalism & Techno-Rationality 
 The g/t story conceives technology as tools and tool culture and this shapes the 
conceptual tenor of the story. It becomes a story that offers little opportunity for 
characterizing the techno-rational tenor of contemporary society and institutions or even, 
of technology. I have already characterized Heidegger’s (1977) analysis of our technological 
                                                
84 For example, the July 26, 2009 edition of the New York Times reported that in February 
2009, a group of prominent computer scientists met to discuss the potential consequences 
of AI advances (Markoff, 2009).  
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enframing and here focus more explicitly on some political dimensions of this enframing. I 
draw on two thinkers, recognizing that there are many others who could be considered. I 
first consider Wendy Brown’s analyses of a neoliberal political rationality that infuses social 
life to create new kinds of political subjects. Second, I focus on the techno-rational 
character of modern society as one driven wholly by technique (Ellul, 1964) from two 
perspectives. On one side is a society increasingly managed and justified through the 
primacy and efficacy of technique and instrumental rationality as a social-political ethic. 
On the other side is an emergent postmodernist mindset that remains beholden to 
industrial modernity yet has set in motion the nascent reflexive modernization of the risk 
society as characterized by Beck (1992; 1994). The risk society describes an emergent new 
relationship between individuals and institutions and between the politics of governing 
and the growth of technoscientific knowledge. It is characterized by the ways that (a) 
technological innovation and technoscientific knowledge become the driving rationale of 
society and (b) the fact that managing risks—as outcomes of techno-innovation culture—
becomes the dominant political-economic concern as the consequences of these 
innovations become increasingly unknowable. Reflexive modernization is Beck’s term for 
characterizing how an older, industrial form of modernity is being remodeled to a new 
stage of modernity. 
Neoliberalism. Brown (2005) is particularly helpful for the ways she locates our 
technological enframing in political terms. She explains how political governance in the 
West has shifted from liberal democracy to a neoliberal political rationality that shifts 
“subjects, forms of citizenship and behavior, and a new organization of the social” not 
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merely to produce economic subjects, but also, new types of political subjects (p. 37). 
Neoliberalism describes a social relationship that, when deployed as a form of 
governmentality, reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to education policy and 
practices of empire. Governmentality is a term coined by Foucault (Burchell, Gordon, & 
Miller, 1991; Foucault, 1975, 1995, 1990) to describe the shift to a form of power meant 
to govern populations economically by bringing the governed subjects into a kind of self-
compliance with the needs of the state. Technique, bio-power, and a new knowledge-power 
relationship characterize this political form (Burchell, et al., 1991). Neoliberal rationality, 
while foregrounding markets, is not only focused on economics, it also involves extending 
and disseminating market values to all institutions and social actions (Brown, 2005, pp. 39-
40).  
 Neoliberal political rationality, in Brown’s (2005) estimation, is not unintended. It 
is a constructed outcome, aimed at producing a particular kind of human subject as well as 
institutions that promote instrumental rationality and facilitate its growth. Individuals, 
practices, and institutions are re-shaped to become facilitators of a market rationality that 
in turn, requires a particular kind of atomized and entrepreneurial citizen who reasons 
instrumentally. The state must facilitate the production of this neoliberal subject. This 
subject is not, however, one that simply complies because of rules; neoliberal 
governmentality “orchestrate[s] the subject’s conduct toward him or herself…[and] 
convenes a ‘free’ subject who rationally deliberates about alternative courses of action, 
makes choices, and bears responsibility for the consequences of these choices” (p. 43). 
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“Freedom” becomes a means of control “because of neoliberalism’s moralization of the 
consequences of this freedom” (p. 44).  
 Brown’s analysis builds from Foucault’s technologies of the self (1975, 1995, 1990; 
Martin, et al., 1988), where she characterizes a political technique that transparently 
“molds and folds” individuals and groups into the neoliberal project by orchestrating these 
subjects into politically appropriate norms and practices that, although disciplined into 
compliance, appear to be outcomes of individual choices. Neoliberal governmentality has 
us thinking of ourselves as political-economic subjects and objects.  
The political rationale of technique.  Beck (1992; 1994) explains post-industrial 
society from a different perspective and argues that a new form of modernity is emerging. 
The risk society he articulates shifts the relationship of individuals and institutions, but 
does so based on relationships that diffuse or re-negotiate responsibility for these risks from 
their locus of production to their points of receipt. The production and management of, 
and responsibility for, risks of unknowable reach and consequence are mediated based on 
negotiators’ access to knowledge about potential risks. In this society, knowledge with the 
most argumentative, economic, and political power is techno-scientific, mirroring the shift 
to a techno-rational society. The quest for technological innovation, in search of better 
health, medical treatments, agricultural techniques, weapons, and so on, has reshaped 
society such that STEM knowledge is deemed the most respected and useful knowledge, yet 
the consequences of this knowledge and its innovations are themselves largely unknowable.  
Risk and access to knowledge frames this new phase of modernity, but these risks 
are of a heretofore unknown scale, are multi-dimensional, and shared globally and across 
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generations. Ever-present, incalculable risk shapes political power, agency, and the value 
attributed to bodies of knowledge. It brings with it a new concept of being where the self 
and society are thought about through relationships conceived around dimensions of risk. 
The locus of power or agency shifts from a consciousness focused on control, rights, or 
wealth to a consciousness that “determines being” (Beck, 1992, p. 23). In the risk society, 
“knowledge gains a new political significance” and having “knowledge about risks” is the 
primary source of power, because techno-scientific knowledge is accepted as the basis for 
reasoned argument concerning the management and distribution of risk (p. 24-25). Beck 
(1994) calls this reflexive modernization “a radicalization of modernity that breaks up the 
premises and contours of industrial society and opens paths to another modernity” (p. 3).  
Political disputes shift from trying to mediate distribution of wealth and resources 
to instead weighing in on negotiations over the management and assignment of rights that 
are held in the private sector but hold immeasurable risk for the public sector. Beck’s thesis 
is that this shift requires new approaches because the political and conceptual tools of 
modernity are inadequate for thinking about the scale or complexity that these risks 
represent. Thinking in terms of “perpetrator and victim” merely masks the subtle interplay 
of social, political, and cultural factors that should have a prominent voice in 
technoscientific project and policy deliberations.  
Paradoxically, modernist epistemology is inadequate to the task of considering the 
multi-dimensional character and consequences of mega-scale risk and yet we continue to 
depend on and idolize modernist epistemologies as the best way of building, evaluating, 
and justifying technoscience knowledge. This epistemology supports a political economy 
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that calculates risk through the concept of “the average” (Beck, 1992, p. 25). The problem 
Beck illuminates is that averaging diffuses two oppositions—no risk and high risk—depends 
on a concept of averaged risk. The problem of averaged risk is that it conceptually 
diminishes the scale of extreme risks as it diffuses these to a more moderate middle. 
Moreover, averaging makes much more invisible any consequences experienced in these 
margins because they too, are diffused into an average. By managing knowledge through 
such practices, power in the risk society becomes about access to and control of knowledge. 
The high status of economic, scientific, and technological knowledge keeps the focus on a 
logic of distribution even as understanding and evaluating these risks also requires social, 
cultural, and political knowledge for fruitful discussion.  
The sublimation of social knowledge and social-humanities disciplines becomes a 
political limitation. Beck (1994) argues that technoscientific knowledge is insufficient for 
assessing risk. Specifically, when consequences themselves are likely to be widely dispersed, 
large scale, or ongoing (e.g. nuclear plant failures, global economic meltdowns), trying to 
isolate causes is ineffectual when causes are “substantively-objective, spatially and 
temporally disparate…brought into a social and legal context of responsibility…[where] 
causality always remains more or less uncertain and tentative” (p. 28). Beck argues from an 
optimism that he locates in an alternative political relationship no longer bound to “old 
certainties of the industrial epoch” (p. 35). He finds hope by distinguishing between “rule-
directed and rule-altering politics” (p. 35). 
Essentially, Beck (1994) explains how sticking to an old, industrial era nation-state 
model of politics—dependent on highly structured knowledge and rule driven, top down 
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politics—is itself the limitation. In arguing for a re-imagination of the political as a kind of 
sub-politics, he is advocating for less hierarchy and trying to envision a ground level 
dissolution of enforced epistemological, social, and political structures. Long-standing 
political oppositions such as that framed by a right-left political metaphor shape how 
problems and their resolution are conceptualized as “safe-unsafe, inside-outside and 
political-unpolitical” (p. 42). The real problem becomes, at least in part, the endless 
disputes wrought by this model but more problematic is that the problems of post-
industrial society are of such magnitude and reach that they require not only a new 
metaphor, but new kinds of questions. The three that he highlights are: “What is your 
attitude towards, first, uncertainty, second, towards strangers and, third, towards the 
possibility of shaping society?” (p. 42). The problem Beck makes central is that of 
continuing to think in techno-rational terms when the problems we face extend far beyond 
the merely technical.  
Political technologies and the g/t story. Neoliberalism and techno-rationality 
function as political technologies that collaborate in shaping our political and 
technoscience driven metaphors and relationships that in turn, become dominant 
conceptual metaphors for thinking about subjects, objects, power, knowledge, and 
technological-political progress. Neoliberalism depends upon techno-rationality and 
together these have enframed modern social-political-institutional relationships and 
conceptions of how we are expected to be or think in these relationships, as subjects or 
objects. These technologies also shape and manage the g/t relationship as it is articulated 
in and through the meta g/t story. One way to observe how this happens is by reading 
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across multiple micro g/t stories, particularly those with more of a policy bent. Over the 
next several paragraphs, I highlight sections of three texts to illustrate some ways that 
political technologies underlie the construction and articulation of girls-women, boys-men, 
and technoscience in a complex relationship that nonetheless is framed only through the 
knowledges of technoscience, to ultimately play into the neoliberal political agenda. Given 
the status accorded increasing girls and women’s representation in computing, there is also 
a great deal of risk—economic and societal-moral—insinuated into girls or women’s 
disinterest in signing on to techno-culture.  
The examples I highlight in the following paragraphs struggle with the problem of 
girls-women’s representation in computing as a kind of risk situation, but they do so 
through the political agendas and metaphors of neoliberalism and techno-rationality. The 
Executive Summary of TechSavvy (AAUW, 2000) outlines a set of key themes we ought to 
be concerned about regarding girls and women’s participation in computing.  
Girls are not well-represented in computer laboratories and clubs, and have taken 
dramatically fewer programming and computer science courses at the high school 
and postsecondary level. Therefore, girls and women have been labeled as 
computer-phobic. The commission sees it differently: It interprets such behavior 
not as phobia but as a choice that invites a critique of the computing culture. We 
need a more inclusive computer culture that embraces multiple interests and 
backgrounds and that reflects the current ubiquity of technology in all aspects of 
life. (p. x) 
 
In this passage, the AAUW depends on techno-rational thinking to tackle the problem of 
an overly technocratic computing culture. They also deftly shift the problem locus from 
girls’ interests and history of non-technoscience course taking to problems within 
computing culture itself. Girls are portrayed as the canary in the mine; they have sniffed a 
problem with computing culture that is bigger than just girls’ interests—the culture itself is 
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quite unfriendly to outsiders. However, in the passage immediately following, the 
responsibility again falls to girls, who really do need to acquire a solid technological 
literacy, which is defined within specific parameters, as follows: 
Girls’ current ways of participating in the computer culture are a cause for 
concern. A common alternative to computer science courses—and a common point 
of entry for girls into the computer world—has been courses on computer “tools,” 
such as databases, page layout programs, graphics, online publishing, and other 
“productivity software.” The commission believes that while mastery of these tools 
may be useful, it is not the same thing as true technological literacy. To be 
“technologically literate” requires a set of critical skills, concepts, and problem 
solving abilities that permit full citizenship in contemporary e-culture. (p. x, bold in 
original) 
 
What constitutes sufficient involvement in technology is the driving question across the g/t 
story but the specifics of an appropriate techno-literacy varies somewhat depending on the 
focus of a given micro story. They tend to revolve around two core competencies: (a) 
technological literacy that would enhance workers’ skills that are seen as fundamental to 
sustaining the state’s economic competitiveness in producing technoscientific knowledge 
and innovation and (b) developing technological literacies that would mediate the cultural 
impact of technoscience. While the first literacy is broadly hoped for all citizens, subjects, 
and workers, the second is on the one hand still construed from within technoscience and 
on the other hand, is discussed through girls and women, themselves outsiders to 
mainstream technoscience in these discourses. Neoliberal governmentality disciplines girls 
and women to absorb an obligation to refit their interests and dispositions to serve the 
market. To be a good citizen nowadays is to become a usefully, techno-scientifically literate 
subject.  
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 The AAUW (2000) articulates a view of technological literacy that reflects the 
growing concern over worker skills and technological literacies in national science policy.   
As described by a National Research Council report, fluency with information 
technology requires the acquisition of three kinds of interdependent knowledge 
that must be taught in concert: skills, concepts, and capabilities. Skills are necessary 
for job preparedness, productivity, and other aspects of fluency. They include such 
things as using the Internet to find information, or setting up a personal computer. 
Skills change as technology advances: Using the Internet became essential in the 
past five years, and designing a home page will be essential soon. Concepts explain 
how and why information technology works. Capabilities, essential for problem 
solving, include managing complex systems as well as testing solutions. (p. xi) 
 
Evident here is that being fluent with technology also means being able to use it in multiple 
fields, to study languages as well as science. This way of thinking, however, makes it seem 
that the significant knowledge of technology lies entirely within the field of technology.  
Achieving computational mastery is the dominant literacy, although it might be applied in 
vastly different fields. Absent in this hierarchy of knowledge is thinking that other kinds of 
knowledge have something to contribute to understanding how technology “works” or 
what it does or means.  
While the AAUW’s thinking helps illustrate the techno-rational tenor of the 
debates, Rising Above the Gathering Storm (National Research Council, 2007) reveals a finely-
tuned neoliberal political agenda wherein to be good citizen-subjects we must become more 
techno-literate students and workers.  
The United States takes deserved pride in the vitality of its economy, which forms 
the foundation of our high quality of life, our national security, and our hope that 
our children and grandchildren will inherit ever-greater opportunities. That vitality 
is derived in large part from the production of well-trained people and the steady 
stream of scientific and technical innovations they produce. Without high-quality, 
knowledge intensive jobs and the innovative enterprises that lead to discovery and 
new technology, our economy will suffer and our people will face a lower standard 
of living. (p. 2) 
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The foundational notion embedded is that above all, the economy must thrive, and from 
this, so too might the people. The neoliberal subject is expected to comply and the 
consequences of not doing so are strongly articulated. More diffuse however, is the 
distribution of risk. There is no promise that all workers will prosper; instead, a political 
averaging of risk and benefit keeps those at the bottom of the political-social-economic 
hierarchy from visibly complicating the arguments for single-minded pursuits of 
technoscientific innovation. Economic and technological conceptions of society ground 
these political arguments as purely questions of a techno-rational nature.  
• The committee found that multinational companies use such criteria as the 
following in determining where to locate their facilities and the jobs that result: 
• Cost of labor (professional and general workforce).  
• Availability and cost of capital. 
• Availability and quality of research and innovation talent. 
• Availability of qualified workforce. 
• Taxation environment. 
• Indirect costs (litigation, employee benefits such as healthcare, pensions, 
vacations). 
• Quality of research universities. 
• Convenience of transportation and communication (including language). 
• Fraction of national research and development supported by government.  
    (p. 3) 
 
 UNESCO (Primo, 2003) also depends on these two political technologies to locate 
technological literacy and access to ICTs at the center of the political quest to improve 
women’s lives across the globe.  
Information and communication technologies could give a major boost to the 
economic, political and social empowerment of women, and the promotion of 
gender equality. But that potential will only be realized if the gender dimensions of 
the Information Society–in terms of users’ needs, conditions of access, policies, 
applications and regulatory frameworks–are properly understood and adequately 
addressed by all stakeholders. Poverty, illiteracy, lack of computer literacy and 
language barriers are among the factors impeding access to the ICT infrastructure, 
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especially in developing countries, and these problems are particularly acute for 
women. But women’s access to ICTs is constrained by factors that go beyond issues 
of technological infrastructure and socio-economic environment. Socially and 
culturally constructed gender roles and relationships remain a cross-cutting element 
in shaping (and in this case, limiting) the capacity of women and men to participate 
on equal terms in the Information Society. (p. 9) 
 
I do not mean to suggest that computers and ICTs are irrelevant in trying to improve 
communities and people’s lives. Rather, there is an idea promoted that these are the 
primary solutions, thus continuing the idea that technoscience is the solution to all sorts of 
social-cultural-political problems and inequities. Subjects, and their agency and power, are 
to be bettered to the degree that they achieve this technoscientific literacy or storehouse of 
technological skills. The social-cultural-political dimensions of communities and people’s 
lives or agency are folded into the technoscientific dimensions of progress.  
 
Conclusion 
The g/t story is a particularly useful technology for the ways it sits between the two 
political technologies of neoliberalism and techno-rationality, both dependent on Western 
epistemological conventions and binary thinking. Women are called upon to become kinds 
of subjects, who (a) in becoming appropriate political subjects will better serve a neoliberal 
political rationality, (b) carry within them the ethical dimensions able to monitor 
motivations or responsibility—of some subjects—in this technocratic risk society, and (c) 
function as a kind of mediating agent to an otherwise unknowable dimension of risk that 
technological progress is likely to unleash. That is, sometimes women are called upon to 
shore up the technological workforce and sometimes the rationale for more women in 
computing is that their values will intervene in technology-facilitated ruptures to our 
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human-centered social institutions. Women’s role is to mediate potential risk, but to do 
this, they must first “fit” as appropriate subjects—both the technologically literate subject 
and the gendered, ethical subject. Women are stretched to fit two different needs, in part, 
because technological knowledge is the only knowledge of significant value in the risk 
society. In the process of serving these two political technologies, women’s subjectivities, 
whether innate or re-molded, become a kind of substitute for other knowledges or 
philosophical reflections on techno-culture and the risk society. Technologies of the self  
and of gender facilitate the blossoming of this politically strategic subject, the argument I 
develop in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226 
 
 
Facet 8 
Disciplining the Constituted Outsider to Technology 
The meta g/t story is an interpellative social-political-intellectual disciplining 
technology through which women become subjects who take on, as their own, specific 
perceptions of and attitudes towards computing. The gendered subject sees herself in and 
through a specifically articulated relationship with computing and computing culture that 
has been tweaked and nurtured over thirty years. The meta g/t story not only facilitates a 
fully functioning technology of gender, it effectively and instrumentally disciplines the 
gendered constituted outsider to technology.  
My first aim in this chapter is to provide some substance to the claim that women 
and gender do not necessarily have to be described through the very limited construct of 
gender that the g/t story promotes (e.g. through an overreliance on Gilligan or continuing 
to draw on cultural-liberal feminism as its conceptual base). To use gender in this way is to 
lay the grounds for a technology of gender that depends on an instrumental understanding 
and use of difference as well as researchers’ limited view of that difference as their objective 
lenses are disciplined into a position of disengagement to meet the criteria of scientific 
value-neutrality. These disciplining technologies of difference, gender, and objectivity in 
turn demarcate the constituted outsider, which is the key interpellative production of the 
g/t story.   
Girls and women, shaped and disciplined into a useful and universalized subject, in 
turn serve a construct of gender positioned to act as a conceptual salve to smooth the raw 
edges where society and technological progress meet. Understanding this is central to 
grasping how gender functions as a technology that stands between anxieties over vanishing 
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traditions of industrial society and new anxieties surrounding the shift to a postmodern 
risk and techno-rational, scientific society (Beck, 1992). In the new risk society, 
technological progress itself has taken on a new tenor as it serves various and often 
competing institutional, political, or social interests. While technoscientific progress tends 
to be managed by technoscientific knowledge and experts, leaving aside philosophy and the 
humanities, the gendered other is used to fill the conceptual and ethical gap. 
Cast as outsiders in the techno-rational drive for progress, women’s values, 
dispositions, and priorities are available to intervene in the less humanistic aspects of this 
progress. Within our dominant enframings and disciplining technologies, this positioning 
of gender and women easily passes as a norm to the degree it fits within Western 
epistemological and technoscience conventions. Looking at the g/t relationship through 
the disciplining technologies of the self and gender, we see how women are discursively 
disciplined as a techno-ethical and socially concerned subject. In order to see this 
disciplining however, we need resources that extend beyond Gilligan’s (1982, 1993) 
differentiation of male-female ethics, wherein girls and women are said to have a 
fundamentally different kind of ethical orientation to the world and to technology.  
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the concepts of discipline and difference. 
Following this, I draw on Foucault’s technologies of the self (1975, 1995, 1990; Martin, et 
al., 1988) and Lauretis’ technologies of gender (1987) to examine how gender is disciplined 
in the g/t story, in part through a disciplining of objectivity that in turn makes possible the 
constituted outsider. I show how this outsider is constituted as a particular, gendered-
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ethical outsider who is strategically positioned to intervene in the dominant techno-culture 
and to mediate anxieties arising from the postmodern risk society.  
 
Discipline  
 An assumption made in the empirical study of subjects and objects—particularly in 
the meta g/t story—is that this research approach is fundamentally a problem of discovery 
and explication, dependent on techniques to ensure objective analysis and representation. 
Foucault shows, however, that these techniques are far more active than they appear and 
that the social sciences must be seen as harboring a set of practices that discipline subjects 
to better fit the norms and needs of society (1975, 1995, 1990). The sciences of education, 
psychology, and psychiatry (for example) are a disciplining “technology of the ‘soul’” (1975, 
1995, p. 30).  
Disciplining (Foucault, 1975, 1995) is a form of power that draws the body into its 
web in a kind of political compliance. Disciplining technologies reflect a bio-power that 
depends on a “multiplicity of often minor processes…[that] converge and gradually produce 
the blueprint of a general method” (p. 138) through which humans are studied in order to 
be improved. Foucault helps us see the less-than-benign aspects of these human sciences. 
The human sciences…have been able to be formed and to produce so many 
profound changes in the episteme…because they have been conveyed by a specific 
and new modality of power: a certain policy of the body, a certain way of rendering 
the group of men docile and useful. This policy required the involvement of 
definite relations of knowledge in relations of power; it called for a technique of 
overlapping subjection and objectification; it brought with it new procedures of 
individualization….Knowable man (soul, individuality, consciousness, conduct, 
whatever it is called) is the object-effect of this analytical investment, of this 
domination-observation. (p. 305) 
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These disciplines are an “apparatus of production” whereby humans become “objects for 
discourses that are in themselves elements for this strategy” and disciplines exercise “the 
power of normalization” that is integral to “the formation of knowledge in modern society” 
(p. 308).   
Techniques of generating, analyzing, and reproducing subjects’ accounts of their 
experiences, thoughts, and actions transparently enforce society’s expectations of women 
that in turn become women’s own self-understandings of how they are to be and think. 
This process of disciplining, whereby subjects fit themselves into a discursively disciplined 
mold, appears rather innocuous and looks something like the following: 
While rejecting generalizations about gender in the abstract, girls reveal a highly 
developed set of beliefs about how boys and girls differ in their relationship to 
computer technology. In other words, we found that girls observe and describe 
strong gender differences but do not have a language with which to talk about 
them. (AAUW, 2000, p. 7)  
 
There is a kind of black-boxed negotiation evident where girls are said to distance 
themselves from abstract gender essentializing, yet in many ways g/t researchers suggest the 
“missing language” that would make it more possible to articulate stable gender differences. 
These suggestions reflect and help to mold gender norms and expectations. Even the 
practice of asking for descriptions of gender difference subliminally infers that there is a 
difference that can be identified. Thus, ongoing dissections of girls and women’s different 
relationships to the computer become a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy or effectively 
support a transparent need for these kinds of differences to exist. Discursive repetitions of 
the idea that women have a different relationship to technology become internalized by  
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women, thus building a rationale for women to believe that their technology orientation or 
interest is different.  
The g/t story, dependent as it is on essentializing m-f differences, is a disciplining 
technology through which gendered differences towards technology both construct, and 
are constructed by, a belief in foundational difference and this belief grounds the 
excavation of women’s subjectivities. However, through techniques of articulation, 
gendered subjectivities or identities are not merely described and analyzed; they are molded 
and sustained through repetitions across narratives that are eventually normalized and 
embedded as typical and expected gendered identities and subjectivities (Lauretis, 1987).  
The analytic problem that is masked in the g/t story is an unresolved tension 
between desires to distance from one kind of gender stereotyping and the ways in which 
discursive constructions themselves participate in another form of gender disciplining, by 
monitoring what gendered subjectivities “normally” look like. Distinguishing and 
maintaining notions of normal, gendered subjectivities has some accrued value, as I will 
explain later.  
What is being disciplined? What, exactly, is being disciplined is often hard to 
discern because there appears to be two different ways that women’s subjective accounts are 
thought about within the g/t story. Sometimes individual subjectivities form the basis of 
broader accounts of girls or women’s experience and their “outsiderness” to computing, a 
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position reflected in the AAUW passage above.85 In other instances, methodological 
practices are criticized for the ways in which these same subjectively derived accounts or 
analyses exhibit a lack of objective rigor, as Cohoon and Aspray (2006a) suggest:  
The first condition is an inadequate understanding of the underlying and 
immediate causes. Much of what has been published is based on personal 
experience or observation of a single case, rather than being grounded in empirical 
evidence that can be generalized. (p. 137) 
 
The meta g/t story navigates three intersecting desires: (a) a desire to understand social 
phenomena or relationships through narratives of individual experience; (b) a desire for a 
broadly applied concept of gender difference sufficient to “explain” computing experiences 
and culture; and (c) a methological desire that the gathering and analyses of subjects’ 
accounts and experiences themselves be rigorously objective to in turn produce warrantable 
and broadly generalizable theory. Concerns framed around a perceived lack of objectivity 
or scientific rigor in turn assign a fundamentally benign authority to these techniques. The 
focus on the rigor of methods helps to mask the disciplining and constituting nature of 
these methods.  
An interpellative technology. Disciplining refers to the ways in which discourses 
and practices—in defining, classifying, representing, or locating human agents—function as 
interpellative technologies. Relationships and conceptions that are circulated through 
discourses are internalized by subjects and in turn become core self-understandings such 
that these subjects take on the self-understanding and responsibility of remaking 
                                                
85 My intent is not to dismiss a long tradition of interviewing and observing human subjects 
in order to better understand their perspectives and the social world, but to note that these 
practices are themselves constitutive in some fashion.  
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themselves to fit a set of societal norms or needs that discourse promotes (Foucault, 1975, 
1995, 1990; C. Taylor, 1989, p. 159). These discursive and disciplining technologies have a 
number of nodes of influence. They facilitate the shaping of selves into acceptable socio-
political-instrumental subjects and they provide the means of subjugating some knowledges 
while privileging others. Through the interplay of selves, social norms, and discursive 
technologies, subjectivities and the self are shaped through a relational, interweaving power 
that circulates through social discourse and other practices. One of these sites of power and 
discourse is the constructed story of gender and technology. 
 
Technologies of Difference, Gender, & Objectivity 
With the publication of The Second Sex in 1952 in the U.S. (1949 in France), 
Beauvoir skewered the idea of an ontological woman born into her nature; woman could 
no longer be understood as a being fully knowable through biology or sexual difference. 
Stating “One is not born but becomes a woman,” she took on the nature-nurture binary, 
arguing that nurture-culture constructs the feminine as the “other” to an also culturally 
conceived neutral and preferred masculine position (p. 267). This primary subject—male—
requires the feminine Other for its own articulation, but is itself never put in the position 
of the Other. Her radical insight was that this m-f difference is not innate. Women become 
Woman through culture, historical conditions, and education—nurture not nature.  
Subsequently, the notion of gender and femininity as social constructions entered 
mainstream discourse, embraced by the liberal feminist movement. However, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to divest from some form of binary thinking in conceiving of social 
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relations, actors, and difference. Thus, upon dismissing the biological sex binary, other 
kinds of oppositions filled the void and these have often focused around cognitive, 
psychological, and behavioral differences between men and women. As concerns about a 
g/t divide grew, so did articulations of the premises and locations of clearly bounded 
differences. Gilligan’s (1982, 1993) work has been used by g/t researchers in this way, to 
characterize two oppositional, gendered orientations to ethics and social values in the 
context of technology. This model grounds most of the g/t research produced since the 
1980s.86 Transparently functioning technologies of difference, gender, and objectivity work 
in concert to sustain certain kinds of differences for social or political ends. 
The problem of difference. The g/t story depends on a core belief in difference of 
a particular stripe. It predominantly construes the world through easily definable 
oppositions and otherness (even if these are socially constructed), rather than as 
interconnected interweavings of relational and contextual exigencies (as, for example, 
Derrida or Cornell suggest). This commonplace and starkly oppositional framing of 
difference is built on the conceptual technology of binary thinking. That is to say, through 
normal practices of dichotomizing society and persons, filtered through an imaginary of 
gender, it has become common practice in the g/t story to use gender to characterize two 
oppositional orientations to technology—the value-rational and the value-neutral. However, 
these depend upon a conceptual clarity in distinguishing gendered roles and beliefs, as in 
the following example, taken from “Girl Games and Technological Desire” (Brunner, 
Bennett, & Honey, 1999):   
                                                
86 Gilligan however, did not herself specifically use this to characterize the g/t relationship. 
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Our analysis of the adult fantasies [of men’s and women’s feelings about 
technology] focused on five major topics: 1) the role of technology in integrating 
people’s home and work lives; and technology’s relationship to 2) nature, 3) the 
human body, 4) the process of creation, and 5) the process of communication. 
…For the women in our sample, technology is a fellow creature of the earth, a child 
of humanity, promising but problematic…needing care and guidance to grow…The 
women wrote stories about tools that allow us to integrate our personal and 
professional lives and to facilitate creativity and communication. 
…In contrast, men’s fantasies were about mind-melds and bionic implants that 
allow their owners to create whole cities with the blink of an eye, or to have instant 
access to the greatest minds in history, to…see…what Ghandi might have thought 
about a problem they are facing in the office that day. In their stories, technology 
frees us from the earth, from social problems, possibly from humanity itself. (p. 74-
75) 
 
Through stories such as this, broad portrayals of women’s beliefs, dispositions, and 
fantasies express and locate conflicting desires and fears at the intersection of society and 
technology. First, these beliefs are separated based upon previously agreed upon concepts 
that suggest women and men are easily distinguishable. Second, it facilitates the 
composition of a discourse that articulates a mediatory function for gender, albeit invisible. 
Discourses are both constituted and constituting, but the processes of discourse make the 
oppositions articulated in the above passage seem inherently logical, even as they are 
products of our imaginaries and epistemologies.  
Differentiating difference. The meta g/t story makes it seem as if difference merely 
points to some fundamental otherness through which systemic, social inequities play out. 
Derrida’s work is most useful in this regard, to disrupt a complacency in thinking that a 
notion of difference is fully agreed on so as to be foundational. Portraying the diversity of 
thought regarding difference, Wood and Bernasconi (1988) posit an imaginary society of 
Heraclitus, Nietzsche, Saussure, Freud, Adorno, Heidegger, Levinas, Deleuze, and Lyotard 
to suggest that these “members are divided not only among themselves, but perhaps within 
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themselves too. United by their affection for difference, nothing ensures it is the same 
difference that counts for each, or that it counts in the same way” (p. ix). The problem they 
lay out is that difference itself is hard to pin down. 
 Derrida coined the word “différance” to bring into one concept a number of 
competing ideas about difference and to include a range of “logical, ontological, and 
(transcendental) aesthetic values” (Wood & Bernasconi, 1988, p. x). Différance pursues 
two parallel aims: (a) it brings together, without “exhaustively capturing” conceptions of 
difference articulated in Nietzsche, Saussure, Freud, Levinas, and Heidegger and (b) it 
accommodates reading and interpretation as non-reductive acts, where reading is never 
final or all-encompassing (p. xi). For my purposes, without delving into the controversies 
surrounding the interpretation of Derrida, this short deconstruction of difference suggests 
that women, men, and genders are not so easily or neatly differentiated as they are assumed 
within the g/t story.   
Difference in the g/t story. Difference, as it is conceived in the g/t story, makes it 
possible to locate a definable subject, who is differentiated through the conceptual 
conventions of psychology and related social sciences. Difference signifies what appears to 
be a kind of natural binary that is, on the one hand, not based on biology, but on the other 
hand, still depends on reductivist thinking about subjects or objects. Enframed in this 
worldview, the g/t story is built around a concern over the statistically documented trend 
that women’s representation in computing fields is, and remains, at a far lesser percentage 
than men’s. My argument, to be clear, is not the reality of underrepresentation, but rather, 
with (a) what we make of “it”—this it that is both a constructed number and a constructed 
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relationship between objects and subjects and (b) the facilitating practices that are said to 
be most significant in the persistence (or import) of this g/t gap.  
Reductive methodologies of the psychological-behavioral-cognitive sciences have 
provided the most consistent approaches to examining the g/t relationship. They appear to 
be objectively reductive and thus, analytically appropriate to the task they have been 
assigned. However, the ways in which these epistemologies actively construe a set of 
reduced, gendered, objects and subjects is more complicated because what difference is 
used to signify, or is able to signify, is far more nuanced than has been assumed in the meta 
story.  
Similarly, in the dominant epistemology of the meta story, theory is also a kind of 
object (albeit conceptual) and is taken to be an outcome of accurately defining, discerning, 
and explaining differences between subjects or objects. Theory should be explanatory and 
is therefore largely dependent on differences that can be conceptually and 
methodologically pinned down. The question that might be asked is  “What or who is 
being measured and theorized in the g/t story, how, and why?” 
Difference & second wave feminist theory. Reading through the meta g/t story, 
the influence of Carol Gilligan (1982, 1993) and second wave feminism is remarkably 
persistent twenty-five years later. From these ideas, there emerged a compelling picture of 
women ontologically driven by a unique and stable ethic of care, values, and community 
that bears some scrutiny in 2009. A particular idea of difference is behind this ethic that 
describes a dichotomous moral-ethical orientation to the world. Difference demarcates a 
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universal, yet binary, ethical sphere that is used to explain girls and women’s relationship 
to technology.  
 One significant characteristic of gender theorizing in the g/t story is that it is done 
from within a largely singular, conceptual, and disciplinary base where psychology, 
behaviorism, and cognitivism intersect. Because of this, a conceptual gap is left, thus 
underutilizing recent, more philosophical, political, or cultural studies perspectives. This 
gap helps to explain the perennial presence of Gilligan’s or other liberal feminist derived 
gender conceptions. The problem that this limited lens manifests is that gender too easily 
becomes a reductivist construct used to simplify and condense girls and women (as well as 
boys and men) in relation to technology. Another problem (discussed earlier) is that liberal, 
second wave feminism, outside its continued influence in the g/t story, has been heavily 
criticized by numerous scholars for the ways it has unreflexively relied upon a conception 
of women and their experiences that is largely articulated through a lens of white, Western, 
and middle or upper class women. 
Gilligan’s influence. The following example illustrates what this looks like when 
the AAUW relies on this kind of differentiation as a rationale for attending to gender 
differences in computing classrooms:  
Additionally, computer science courses would do well to discuss the interplay 
between computers and people in real-life situations, an aspect of the computer 
culture that girls say they value. Studies have shown that when teachers have tried 
to demonstrate how programming applied to real life, their classroom examples 
gravitated toward sports statistics, even when the programming task at hand was 
open-ended. (2000, p. 43) 
 
In this passage, sports are targeted as being a poor pedagogical example if girls are to be 
interested in the computing classroom. However this characterization depends on a 
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particular gender conception that ignores the debates that resulted in the 1972 Title IX 
education amendments addressing sex discrimination in the U.S. The amendments, in 
part, responded to girls’ demands for greater access to sports in school.87  
Relying on difference to characterize gender attributes, g/t narratives broadly blend 
culture, biology, and social roles, such that an abstracted universal woman is made 
available in both local and global terms as the holder of a society’s ethical values in a 
technological world. It is not within the scope of this dissertation to fully examine the 
veracity or possibility of this kind of statement. My aim is more focused, to point to the 
limitations of static, inconsistent, or dated constructions of gender and women. When 
difference is painted in black and white, it becomes quite difficult to accommodate other 
differences, e.g. those within groups or individuals, shifts in the beliefs or identities that 
mark such differences, or the grayness of differences.  
Additive differences in g/t research. In more recent g/t research, attempts to 
transcend a tendency to frame difference through a Western, white conception of women 
have largely embraced an additive approach wherein race and class (for example) are to be 
added to the identity mix. The aim is to promote research that better addresses 
intersectional race-class-gender (and so on) differences. This additive approach is described 
by Chanter (2006) as one that seems to create space for race and class analyses, but only as 
these fit within feminism’s narrow articulation of gender in a white, middle class 
conception. This model also keeps gender, sexuality, race, and class apart as separate 
                                                
87 See http://www.dol.gov/oasam/regs/statutes/titleIX.htm for the Title IX, Education 
Amendments of 1972. 
239 
 
 
differences. This model characterizes how the meta story tries to accommodate race and 
class as other analytic variables that, while separate, can be added together. These efforts 
remain bound to the same psychological-cognitive-behaviorist foundations of second wave 
feminism and its conception of difference. They adhere to a model that is ill suited to 
developing a more nuanced and contextually sensitive intersectional complexity. While 
these attempts at promoting diversity have noble goals, in effect, they simply build on 
current limitations in how the g/t relationship is construed, remaining theoretically 
insufficient. 
 To be fair, substantive, ongoing debates over what a feminist theory should look 
like, accomplish, or represent complicates any attempt at ultimately defining gender or 
women. One of the ongoing debates within feminism is whether, and through what 
dimensions, women can or should be pinned to a definition. There is an inherent 
contradiction between stated goals of g/t research in education and those driving 
postmodern and poststructuralist feminist approaches as these challenge the reductivist 
practices so pervasive in the former.   
Alternative lenses in theorizing gender difference. Contrary to assumptions made 
in the G/T story, there is no universal agreement on what “difference” construes or how it 
is to be noted. In what follows, I highlight several views of difference because 
understanding the contested nature and potentiality of difference is crucial to 
understanding what a theory of difference means for the g/t story. I offer a necessarily 
limited rendering of a few particularly salient ideas because it is not possible to go into the 
kind of depth and richness that current feminist thought deserves.  
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Irigaray on difference.  Irigaray (1985) examines psychology’s penchant for 
“econom[ies] of representation” (p. 22) and argues that constituting difference in this way 
reflects an organizing system wherein masculine subjects determine the “paradigms and 
units of value” that constitute women. Drawing from Derrida’s extensive work on 
différance, she suggests that subjectivity itself must be reconceptualized so that it includes 
both nature and culture, to accommodate a reality where men and women are equally 
present in both. It is not a masculinized transcendence that women need to aim for, but an 
embodied subjectivity. In Irigaray’s view, both philosophy and psychology have been 
complicit in theorizing negative views of women, lacking in subjectivity. Neither are the 
truth of women’s nature.  
Haraway’s cyborgian challenge to binaries. The cyborg is another concept through 
which scholars have tinkered with gendered and human-machine binaries for the way the 
cyborg, metaphorically at least, renders biology problematic or irrelevant. Haraway’s use of 
the cyborg (1991b) suppressed the biological body in order to challenge a Western 
subjectivity constituted through oppositions of nature-culture, m-f, and mind-body. The 
target was dominant Cartesian and essentialist models of knowing and her intention was to 
reposition knowing as a product of experience that is inseparable from the social and 
political position of the knower. One of Haraway’s targets was liberal feminism, which she 
saw as delineating a false unity of “women’s experience” or female subjectivity (p. 149). A 
key problem for her was how feminists had promoted women’s opposition to science 
through a strategy of resistance that itself depended on a separation of body-machine and 
nature-culture. This strategy was meant to dismantle oppressive regimes of white male 
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capitalism and its blind drive for progress through the appropriation of nature, which 
Haraway argued is a misunderstanding of science. Her cyborg was a plea to merge nature 
and culture and to dissolve the basis of a false gender binary that was limiting both women 
and science. It was a metaphor for a new vision of nature-culture-science and expressed the 
potential of women’s release from the self-imposed constraints of women’s own 
representation of their experience. Haraway’s cyborg was, metaphorically, a rupturing 
technology and what it ruptured, in part, was a particular concept of difference. Haraway 
negated the separatist notions of difference that themselves become determinist rationales 
and that Irigaray had identified as the problem.  
Alcoff & a metaphysics of difference. As it turns out, the intersection of 
essentialism with feminism is quite complex, intensely debated, but ultimately, the concern 
is how some beliefs about sex, gender, their intersection, and a theory of differences 
promote determinist thinking. Alcoff (2006) argues for a metaphysics of sexual difference 
that recognizes the natural, inescapable, reality of biological reproductive capacities, but she 
also believes that recognizing sex as a significant marker of difference should not lead to, in 
itself, pre-determined assumptions about roles, beliefs, or practices. 
Butler & performativity. Despite controversies over whether Judith Butler’s 
notion of gender as performance remains useful (see Alcoff (2006) for one criticism), her 
ideas are helpful in articulating how certain bodies are articulated “within the productive 
constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory schemas” (1993, p. xi). The g/t story can 
be viewed as one of these schemas. In essence, thinking about gender as something  
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performed rather than innate is a way of highlighting how some performances are cast to 
the margins of society. 
Theorizing difference to reduce gender & women. Running parallel to cyborgian 
challenges to a universalizing, gendered difference is the g/t story that seems to have been, 
and remains, blind to the possibility that m-f difference as it has been conceived in the 
story is itself a reductivist construction. I think it fair to characterize this conceptual gap as 
a blindness given that much of feminist technoscience has been left out. Thus, g/t 
researchers have themselves practiced a version of constituting the outsider to a dominant, 
perceptual norm. 
The problem is to decipher why the meta g/t story, which is both a gendered and 
gendering technology, remains so pervasive and seemingly useful.88 Gender-technology 
micro-stories support a meta g/t story that in turn has become the conceptual and 
productive space wherein a technology of gender blossoms. Given that there are other ways 
of thinking about gender and technology available, it becomes even more important to 
examine why the dominant story persists despite evidence of serious limitations. One 
alternative might be Halberstam’s (1991) use of the cyborg and AI to locate a postmodern 
incarnation of the technology of gender. Her cyborg dismantles the Woman = nature 
construct by locating a commonality in how gender and AI are processed and performed, 
as similarly functioning technologies: 
                                                
88If the g/t story were not so useful it would not be so persistent. After all, similar amounts 
of money, time, and research effort are not spent in trying to intervene (at least not to the 
same degree) in other long-standing gender gaps in the arts, academe, or the professions.  
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Learned, imitative behavior[is]…processed so well that it comes to look natural. 
Indeed, the work of culture in the former and of science in the latter is perhaps to 
transform the artificial into a function so smooth that it seems organic. (p. 443) 
 
Outside the meta g/t story, intersectional, multicultural, transnational, 
transgender, postcolonial (and so on) feminisms take issue with universalizing Western, 
white, Eurocentric theories or approaches to conceptualizing difference, gender, or women 
but they do so from across a number of disciplines. This wealth of alternative theorizing 
suggests another problem. The subtle alliances and underlying epistemologies of the meta 
story do not announce how they sustain specific practices of theorizing gender and women,  
Circumscribing gender. The following passage from Barker and Aspray’s Women 
and Information Technology (2006) illustrates how they navigate the problem of gender 
essentializing:  
Males and females may share many more similarities than research suggests, but 
authors frequently privilege statistical difference in reporting rather than not 
finding any variation.  
… Bennett, Brunner, and Honey (1999) argue that one should not be trying to 
reinforce existing gender stereotypes or be looking for the gender-neutral solution 
but rather should seek ways to validate both masculine and feminine views of 
technology. (2006, p. 10)  
 
Evident, in the first sentence, is a desire to accommodate a reality where it is difficult to 
classify all men or all women based on gender rules or expectations. The authors first offer 
a moderate criticism of research methods that emphasize difference for the sake of 
producing findings. However, in the second sentence their intentions are less clear. They 
want a language or gender theory that is better equipped to accommodate m-f difference 
but that does not merely reinforce common stereotypes. What they do not appear to have  
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is a theory that is sufficiently sophisticated. Instead, Barker and Aspray rely on Kenneth 
Howe and Nel Noddings’ theories as I explain in the next paragraphs.  
For Howe, the problem of gender theory in education is that it has overly 
emphasized equity. He posits that a better approach would be to focus on environments 
and how these may be “foreign or hostile to who they [girls or women] are” (Barker & 
Aspray, 2006, p. 11). Similarly, as explained by Barker and Aspray, Noddings’ sees a more 
gender friendly classroom as one that “would be broadened and customized to the 
particular set of students” and become less driven by the mechanics of computing (p. 13). 
What happens is that gender essentializing is not ultimately subverted in these approaches; 
instead, it is subsumed into a problem of teaching methodology and learning 
environments. Thus, the methodological problem to be “fixed” in solving the 
underrepresentation problem is more differentiated teaching methods and settings. I do 
not mean to suggest that this approach is of no pedagogical value; however, this strategy 
does not seem to escape an ongoing tendency towards reducing subjects to the degree they 
fit an explanatory theory. Moreover, these attempts to differentiate pedagogies are stymied 
as they meet up with other methodological disputes. 
This methods problem is illustrated by looking at another essay in the same edited 
volume, where Cohoon and Aspray (2006) argue that there are two highly significant 
contributing factors to ongoing gender underrepresentation.  
Our review of the literature on women in postsecondary computer science leads us 
to the conclusion that two conditions contribute to the persistence of women’s 
underrepresentation. The first condition is an inadequate understanding of the 
underlying and immediate causes. Much of what has been published is based on 
personal experience or observation of a single case, rather than being grounded in 
empirical evidence that can be generalized. (2006a, p. 137)  
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There is an underlying contradiction between the first essay’s criticisms of determinist or 
enforced gender stereotyping and this second essay’s criticism that g/t research has not 
produced broadly generalizable findings. It is hard to reconcile this latter concern with 
statements such as “what it means to be male or female is culturally and situationally 
variable” with the ongoing quest for generalizable interventions (2006, p. 9).  
 
A Theory of Difference vs. Theorizing Differences 
When theorizing gender and women in the meta g/t story, there is an ongoing 
paradox: on one hand are intentions to be open to specificity, and on the other, a 
methodological insistence on locating explanations that facilitate generalizable 
interventions. Standards for producing these explanations are often borrowed from the 
NSF. The following, among those cited by Cohoon and Aspray (2006), are the most 
relevant for making my point: 
• a cogent means of measuring outcomes 
• data from a sample larger than ten 
• a study design employing pre- and post assessments, a control group, or 
comparison (p. 144) 
 
A methodological conflict emerges on two levels. First is the barrier set up between a 
contextual or individualized practice of gender and the methodological requirements for a 
quantifiable set of research objects and a control group to facilitate comparison. If gender 
is highly specific, what is to be controlled? A further conflict becomes evident in looking 
more closely at the two understandings of “theory.” In discussing feminist theory, 
“theorizing” represents a lens onto the world that is not fixed nor proscriptive—it is 
interpretive. However, theory when used to argue for generalizability means something 
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quite different: “theoretical underpinnings are seldom articulated, and none of the studies 
we located were designed to test a particular theory. Still, movement toward more explicit 
consideration of theory might help advance empirical investigation” (p. 139). Here, theory 
refers to a testable explanation.  
 In the g/t story, theorizing typically refers to causal, explanatory theory. This use of 
theory suggests a reactive feminism that is organized around prediction and interventions 
conceived globally. Other scholars, working in other disciplinary homes, view feminist 
theorizing in a substantively different light. For example, Ella Shohat (2002) argues for a 
“relational feminism” that builds “a kind of kaleidoscope framework of communities-in-
relation without ever suggesting that their positionings are identical” (p. 69). Her vision is 
for a feminism that is not about difference per se, but a “multicultural feminism” that 
expresses difference through “a situated practice in which histories and communities are 
mutually coimplicated and constitutively related, open to mutual illumination” (p. 75). 
 In general, this latter notion of feminist theorizing might be broadly characterized 
by its commitment to rigorous and ongoing critique regarding the conceptualization and 
study of persons and their cultural-political positions, voices, and significance. Such a 
practice suggests, however, a high degree of reflexivity about not only women, but of the 
intersection of feminism with knowledge, methodology, and socio-political contexts. Joan 
Wallach Scott (2008) describes this feminism as  
Not a set of prescriptions but as a critical stance, one that seeks to interrogate and 
disrupt prevailing systems of gender, one that assumes that what worked in the 
1980s might not work in the early years of the new millennium, one that is 
committed to self-scrutiny as well as to denunciations of domination and 
oppression, one that is never satisfied with simply transmitting bodies of knowledge 
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but that seeks instead to produce new knowledge. This is feminism not as the 
perpetuation and protection of orthodoxy but feminism as critique. (p. 6) 
 
 “Feminism as critique” describes a critical stance from which to consider social 
reality where both subjects and objects are hard to pin down, thus interrupting at a 
fundamental level the methodological “finesse” of a reductivist and empiricist model of 
knowledge production. Theoretical limitation characterizes much of the g/t story that is 
written through methodological and disciplinary terms initially constructed back in the 
1970s-80s. Early on, the meta g/t story defined women and gender through a clearly 
defined difference. Complicating recent efforts to move beyond this circumscribed concept 
of woman is a methodological proscription that depends on stable and controllable objects 
and that has, in many ways, worked against its own transformative aims. This model makes 
it difficult to accommodate the ways in which the social-political-intellectual situation has 
shifted and thus, how feminism and women (and men) continue to evolve. These kinds of 
static formations are what Appadurai and Rizvi are responding to when they locate a 
research imaginary built upon an empiricist model of knowing (Appadurai, 1999, 2000; 
Rizvi, 2006). In a recent conference paper and thought experiment, Corneliussen (2009) 
plays with a similar notion, that g/t research has been quite static, even as computing 
technologies have been rapidly advancing. She suggests a focus on “change” in looking at 
the connection between gender and technology. 
 The g/t story, on the surface, seems positioned to ‘produce’ equity and to 
accommodate differences or at least create the conditions for attaining these, but this is not 
all that it accomplishes. This g/t story persists in using old and limiting ideas about women 
and this begs the question of why this model remains so popular. In particular, I am 
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interested in two questions: Why are these limited notions of gender, women, and 
technology so enduring and what sorts of social or epistemological relationships and g/t 
futures do they value and promote?  
 Scott (2008), in highlighting feminism’s “most potent weapon” to be critique, 
suggests that the essential motivation for feminism is “the exposure of the contradictions 
and inadequacies of any system of thought” (p. 7). I rely on this feminist stance with the 
specific intention of critically analyzing the ways in which a particular stripe of feminism 
has, in effect, been co-opted by a neoliberal politics. The twist is that the g/t story, in its 
conception or use of gender, also tries to stand between society and the increasingly 
instrumental quality of everyday life, in work, politics, health care, education, and social 
relations that neoliberalism promotes.  
 
The Disciplining of Gender & Women 
The conceptual disciplining of difference facilitates a fully functioning technology 
of gender, through which groups of “researched and reported on” women adopt the self-
understanding of being outsiders to technology, as the g/t story consistently suggests. This 
technology of gender depends on two key conditions: (a) a demarcation of women as 
outsiders to a masculine technological norm and (b) a set of practices through which that 
technology is put into play. Analyzing the technology of gender makes it possible to see that 
gender is used to differentiate and constitute a “normal” subject or object, and in turn, 
consider what that accomplishes. In order to understand the technology of gender, we 
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must first understand what Foucault’s technology of the self was intended to address and 
make visible.   
Technologies of the self. Foucault’s argument was that technologies of the self are 
interpellative practices “designed to confirm the behavioral norms of the society at large”; 
through these practices humans “construct…modes of discourse and…action through 
which we shape our conception of human nature” (Hutton, 1988, p. 25). His technologies 
of the self “are a kind of currency through which power over the mind is defined and 
extended” (p. 135). For example, in The History of Sexuality, Volume I (1990), the reader is 
witness to how desires, transgressions, thoughts, and actions are transformed through 
social and institutional practices into discourses that in turn function as technologies of 
the self. Subjects fit themselves into social-political norms by self-monitoring their desires, 
actions, and transgressive practices. Foucault identifies the social and psychological sciences 
as perpetrators of a set of technologies that promote and facilitate the transformation of 
the individual (Martin, et al., 1988). Through genealogic analyses of discourses and social 
practices (e.g. madness, sex, prison, and disciplines), Foucault (1975, 1995, 1990; Martin, 
et al., 1988) brought to light the interworkings of how a human subject is constituted and 
transformed in and through social scientific discourses and practices.   
A technology of gender. Gender, as it is used in the g/t story, is a technology in 
ways that are reminiscent of Foucault’s technology of the self. The connection between 
technologies of the self and those of gender was drawn by Lauretis (1987). The technology 
of gender, problematically for women, too often “translat[es] women into metaphor” 
(Braidotti, 1985 cited in Lauretis, 1987, p. 24). Through discursive practices, the 
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technology of gender has become a stable, reliable, organizing concept as it disperses 
expectations of gender through cultural markers and metaphors that are in turn, 
interpellated by women as they become “right” kinds of women (Lauretis). This technology 
of gender invisibly shapes women’s self-understandings of themselves in relation to 
computing and technology. A technological interplay between concrete, material and 
intangible, or socio-political technologies foregrounds the construction of a unifying theory 
of girls and women’s relationship to computing.  
 Women become the subject represented by the g/t story. As Lauretis (1987) states it, 
the “representation of gender is constructed by the given technology…and is absorbed 
subjectively by each individual whom that technology addresses” (1987, p. 13). Moreover, 
“gender is not a property of bodies or something originally existent in human beings, but 
‘the set of effects produced in bodies, behaviors, and social relations,’…by the deployment 
of a complex political technology” (p. 3). The technology of gender is also a revisiting of 
Beauvoir’s (1952, 1989) proposition that to become “Woman” is to be constituted without 
subjectivity, without the valued traits associated with masculinity, left with only the less 
valuable traits marking femininity. However, rather than understanding women as a social 
production constituted without masculine attributes (a deficit model), the technology of 
gender makes something else possible. It both recognizes yet skirts a biological difference 
that is redirected to psychology, behaviors, or cognitive capacities such that discussing this 
difference becomes a means for instilling cultural and political agendas as norms, based 
upon membership in a well-defined category of gender. This creates a social-discursive 
interplay in which representations of women serve as a facilitating technology through 
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which women are brought into a kind of gender compliance, thus fitting themselves into a 
cultural expectation or norm of how women are in relation to technology. The questions 
should be what this technology of gender is for and what role it serves. Why is the g/t story 
so compelling as a “proxy for a bigger concern” (phrase borrowed from Stolberg, 2009; sec. 
Week in Review, p. 1) 
The technology of gender is not unique to the g/t story. However, in this story, the 
technology of gender facilitates something specific, namely, girls and women’s self-
understanding and subjectivity expressed as a particular orientation towards computers or 
computing as well as the wide dispersion of this self-understanding and subjectivity. Thus, 
the g/t story is more than a description or explanation of women’s underrepresentation in 
computing. It is also a significant cultural story about how mainstream society, education, 
and engineering think about technology, women, and the society-technology intersection 
in terms of progress, values, and ethics in this technological era. It is, as well, a constituting 
story, one that promotes some kinds of relationships and subjectivities and marginalizes 
others.     
 Over the last thirty years, the g/t story has emerged as a disciplining story that both 
creates and monitors a normal picture of women and their relationship with the computer. 
It does not matter that we find this relationship problematic for numerous reasons. What 
does matter is how women themselves are disciplined into a kind of subject through the 
very techniques used to observe and explain their intents, behaviors, and interests.  
One way to see how this disciplining proceeds is to look at the picture of women 
and computing prior to the rise of the contemporary meta g/t story. Ada Lovelace is 
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considered the “prophet of the computer age” based on her work, around 1843, with 
Charles Babbage on the forerunner to the modern computer. According to the Computer 
History Museum (2008), Lovelace, in creating the technical and explanatory notes for 
Babbage’s engine, was the first to articulate “the idea of a machine that could manipulate 
symbols in accordance with rules and that number could represent entities other than 
quantity mark[ing] the fundamental transition from calculation to computation” (website 
2008). About a hundred years later, Grace Hopper’s contribution to computing was the 
first machine compiler, an invention that makes advanced computer programming 
possible. There are also the numerous women who worked as human computers during 
WWII, contributing their extensive mathematical reasoning skills to the war effort.  
By the early 1980s, the mainstream narrative of women and computing began to 
shift, emphasizing instead of women’s innovation and accomplishment, their computer 
reticence (Turkle, 1988), deficits (e.g. Hawkins, 1985; Kay, 1992; Sanders, 2005), or 
disinterest (e.g. Huber & Schofield, 1998; Morse & Daiute, 1992). By 2002, this updated 
g/t story was so well formed that Margolis and Fisher were able to convincingly articulate a 
set of seemingly normal or expected gender differences in students at Carnegie Mellon, one 
of the most elite computer science schools in the world. How was it that women’s 
subjectivities and self-accounts shifted so remarkably, such that women, who were, in fact, 
creators of the intelligence of the new thinking-psychological machine, could be so 
thoroughly, discursively and conceptually, located to the sidelines? This shift in women’s 
subjectivities and technological identities reveals the ways in which the g/t story itself has 
functioned as a disciplining technology such that women have learned to see themselves 
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through a set of norms that serve shifting societal expectations and concerns. The new 
norm serves a need for an intermediary to sit between our increasingly tenuous traditions 
and technological progress that quite often seems out of control.   
There are other, radical or resistive g/t stories that tell a different story than the 
dominant g/t narrative portrays. However, these too, remain marginalized. Some scholars 
have argued that the discourses of g/t and technology have themselves promoted a social  
construction of women as outsiders to computing. Henwood (2000), for example, aims to 
discredit the idea that mainstream g/t narratives are representations of an objective reality: 
In dominant cultural representations, men and women are constructed in 
oppositional terms: men as “good” with technology, women as technically 
“incompetent.” These representations, rather than being accepted as reflective of 
some “reality” or “truth” about men’s and women’s attributes, need to be 
understood as part of the broader picture of gendered discourse that surrounds 
technology relations and that positions men and women so differently. (p. 222)  
 
Bryson and Castell, in 1998, argued from a Marxist perspective to characterize gendered 
portrayals as expressions of adults’ wishes that girls become good consumers or 
commodities.  
We ought not to be surprised that it is in pink boxes that girls have learned to 
package their desire in our culture. But such desires surely have far more to do with 
the gender-identities developed by adult males than with those of children 
themselves, since it is masculinity that has always been the desired response to the 
question of what girls and women want.…We suggest that girls’ desires have far less 
to do with what girls want than with what kind of girl adults, whether in education 
or in the marketplace, want to produce. Reenacting the ancient Greek myth, they 
eagerly create and then consume their own children as commodities, hungrily 
introjecting adult fears and desires onto their children, in the name of satisfying the 
children’s own wants and fantasies.  
… 
Most importantly, are we producing tools for girls, or are we producing girls 
themselves by, as Althusser (1984) would put it, “interpellating” the desire to 
become the girl? (1998, p. 251)  
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 The fact that these kinds of analytic approaches remain rare and quite marginal to 
the mainstream g/t story suggests how the disciplining sciences also monitor the kinds of 
discourses let in to the discursive circle.89 Alternative narratives tinker too much with the 
dominant story that we, as a society, need in some way. Looking back to the early years of 
the computer, the picture is of women positioned at the forefront of technological 
innovation. Beginning in the mid 1980s, there was something new in the air that 
foregrounded a revving up of concerns about girls and women’s participation in 
computing. The computer was no longer simply a calculating machine—it emerged as a 
radical new kind of machine with the potential to radically shift the fundamental human-
machine separation and differences that had so long distinguished humanity from the rest 
of the world, most especially from the inorganic. Supporting this transparently functioning 
technology of gender is another technology—objectivity. I mean objectivity in the ways that 
it understood and invoked as a perceptual technology that makes the non-compliant or 
marginal subject (or story) invisible because these are taken to be irrelevant to the central 
story.  
 
A Technology of Objectivity   
We can think about the g/t story as having (at least) two nodes—a first node that is 
visibly promoted and a second node that is marginalized and relatively invisible. The first 
                                                
89 Phipps (2006) is an example of these resistive interventions to the dominant g/t story. 
These kinds of  approaches are more visible in the U.K. and Europe than in the U.S., but 
regardless of the location, this strand is not actively taken up or recognized in the 
mainstream story.  
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node is the meta g/t story and it is here that the technology of gender does most of its 
work. The second, marginalized, node is made up of those stories that resist, do not serve 
the right agendas, or are not visible within the scripted lens of the meta g/t story.  
The range of documents already discussed throughout this dissertation represents 
the first node. The second and far less visible story node is less cohesive and is told from a 
number of perspectives and intentions that might be corrective, resistive, oppositional, 
reconstructive, or aesthetic. In size (measured in terms of the number of studies, articles, 
and citations), the first story is impressively immense; the second story is dwarfed by the 
first. I describe some examples of the second story in the following paragraphs. These 
examples characterize significant strands and highlight many of the locations where this 
second story may be found. Within these stories, it is possible to locate what might be 
characterized as a grassroots movement or gathering around localized or special interests 
quite marginal to the mainstream story.90  
Outside the dominant & objective field of vision. I began writing this section on 
the first ever worldwide “Ada Lovelace Day” on March 24, 2009. Artifacts of the event may 
be found on blogs such as this: http://www.pledgebank.com/AdaLovelaceDay. The day 
was instigated by Suw Charman-Anderson as “an international day of blogging to draw 
attention to women excelling in technology. Women’s contributions often go 
unacknowledged, their innovations seldom mentioned, their faces rarely recognised” 
(pledgebank.com). One of these contributions hidden under the social radar is that made 
                                                
90 Some others that I do not have room to go into detail about, or whom I have mentioned 
earlier, are: Flanagan, Plant, Oldenziel, Wacjman, and earlier, Lockheed offered some 
insightful ideas. 
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by the women “computers” who provided a mathematical and computing prowess prior to 
(and later with) the ENIAC (the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer). These 
women were engaged as top secret computational workers and many went on to become 
the first women programmers. As were many women, these top secret “Rosies” were pivotal 
to the WWII effort. The women are documented in a movie, currently in production, 
directed by LeAnn Erickson (see http://topsecretrosies.wordpress.com/ for details).  
Other examples include de Castell and Bryson’s (1998) resistance to the material 
co-optation of girls for the consumer game industry and Flanagan’s “Hyperbodies, 
Hyperknowledge” (2002) that interwove feminist cyberpunk fiction writing and feminist 
technoscience theory to argue that the cyberworld is not as wholly masculine as it has been 
represented. Taking a different tack, Abbiss’ (2008) scholarship deconstructs the idea of a 
stable gender problem and problematizes the underlying reliance on essentializing ideas 
about both IT and gender. There are also a number of active list serves and online 
communities of female digital artists or gamers with regular refutations of the dominant 
g/t narratives.91 Also noteworthy are other locations and practices of resistance that often 
interweave interests in art, technology, and social justice.92 
These examples of a far less visible g/t story are arguably, a stronger “feminist” 
story. The other dominant and highly visible g/t story reflects a weaker feminism, not in its 
intentions for equality, but in the ways it transparently combines women into a unity that 
remains rather fixed in time and thought, which in turn continues to articulate women in 
                                                
91 FACES list serve: http://faces-l.net; womengamers.com; girl gamers, for example. 
92 Again, the FACES discussions often focus this way. Another example of youth-based 
social justice projects is Beyond Resistance (Ginwright, Noguera, & Cammarota, 2006).  
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rather limiting ways. Distinguishing a strong versus weak feminism makes it possible to 
account for the ways a contemporary feminist backlash often influences the kind and 
quality of feminist theorizing and practices that in turn influence research and policy 
making (e.g. Oakley & Mitchell, 1997). Specifically, an overly strong feminism has met 
some measure of resistance, and this is perhaps one reason for the second story’s marginal 
status. These more activist projects and positions have an explicit intention to visibly and 
vocally disrupt a dominant social norm that has been justified or organized around clearly 
defined gender roles. This norm has kept women and technology separate and disciplines 
women within a certain conceptual and social boundary. The technology of gender 
depends on a stable tradition or theory of gender. 
Phipps (2006) uncovers one aspect of a backlash in her study where she interviewed 
women scientists and technology professionals in England, who, despite their professional 
success, tended to intentionally distance themselves from any kind of overt feminism. Her 
argument is that women successful in STEM fields appear reluctant to do much more than 
reform an existing environment so that it becomes a better “fit,” maintaining a neutral 
relationship to feminism. The problem is that, even though women STEM practitioners 
may express some feminist ideals and be engaged in some form of activism, they specifically 
situate themselves outside of any identity with a more radical feminist project, instead 
holding to the idea that individual “excellence” will help them succeed. Phipps argues that 
these women reflect contemporary neoliberal politics as well as the neoconservative 
backlash against feminism. This state of affairs mirrors the trend towards greater 
government involvement in STEM issues in pursuit of national market competitiveness in 
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a global economy. Phipps portrays women in technology as situated within dominant 
“symbolic, cultural, and structural masculinities” that frame and characterize STEM fields 
as a whole. (p. 127) She argues that a dominant habitus (citing Bourdieu) “‘tends to  
reproduce the system of objective conditions of which it is the product’ and…this helps us 
to understand why there has been so little progress on the issue of women in SET [STEM]” 
(p. 133). 
In 1990, Perry and Greber argued that educating girls in computing is paramount 
to bringing feminist values to technology because advanced computer work is so often 
linked with the U.S. Department of Defense. The suggestion was that women might 
mount a radical feminist pacifist resistance to this co-joining of the military and 
computing. Women would counter the increasingly popular model that views the human 
mind as an information processor, albeit one that is highly complex. This model left us 
without a recognizable purpose as “social relations, artistic creativity, whimsical invention, 
imagination, faith, humor—all these drop away” (p. 96).93  The idea promoted was that an 
overly masculinized culture of computing, itself militarily focused, has cast more 
conventionally feminine traits to the margins, e.g. “the ability to care, to feel, and to 
connect with other human beings” (p. 97). Perry and Greber’s essay was resistive in two 
ways. It brought to light the early yet hidden formative contributions by women to the field 
                                                
93 Hayles describes one organizing opposition that is emerging in the twenty-first century as 
the tension between the “Computational Universe” and Mother Nature, where 
computational universe refers to the belief that “the universe is generated through 
computational processes running on a vast computational mechanism underlying all of 
physical reality” (p. 3). Thus, “my mother was a computer” functions, for Hayles, as a 
metaphor for “the displacement of “Mother Nature by the Universal Computer” (p. 3).  
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of computing and it argued an intriguing idea at the time, that bringing more women to 
computing would help to restructure work roles and thus, societal values.  
The idea promoted in the meta g/t story is that it is (or could be, if its techniques 
were more scientific) an objective story. That is, despite individual or potential flaws in its 
micro stories, the meta story itself represents itself as an objective and accurate rendering of 
the state of the gender-computing relationship. When marginal or resistive stories are 
acknowledged, it is to point to a gap in the explanatory reach of current g/t theory. Mostly 
however, these stories are relegated to the margins because they rely on an overly expansive 
notion of gender and women than the story can accommodate, given its epistemological 
foundations. These marginal stories are evidence of how gender and women are 
disciplined, but these stories themselves do not explain how women have been 
transparently reshaped and envisioned to accommodate the neoliberal project of subject 
formation and compliance, nor why this female subjective position is useful. One way this 
happens is through the disciplining of what constitutes a relevant perceptual field. 
Observing, as Haraway (1991a, 1997) suggested, is itself a limiting and constituting 
technology. 
An alternative objectivity. An empirical study—to meet criteria for objectivity—
should ensure a certain degree of neutrality in the observer-researcher as well as a high 
degree of honesty and reliability in respondents. What passes unnoticed or unaddressed is 
the way that objectivity (or its pursuit) functions as a technology in the way it closely guards 
the observational field from two perspectives. First, observers must adhere to prescriptive 
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methods that supposedly keep biases or preconceptions out of the research field and 
second, the research field itself must clearly delineate who or what is a relevant subject.  
In the following example found in From Barbie to Mortal Kombat (Cassell & Jenkins, 
1998, 1999b), there is an inferred objectivity to findings but this is in part dependent upon 
how one understands the sample of girls and women implied in a specific study. While the 
researchers do not claim these are attributes of all women, there is also no attention to 
other women who think otherwise. The perceptual lens only sees these women, with these 
characteristics. 
Women and girls are much more likely to be concerned with how new technologies 
can fit into the social and environmental surroundings, whereas men are much 
more likely to be preoccupied with doing things faster, more powerfully, and more 
efficiently regardless of social and environmental consequences. Women are also 
far less likely to push the technological envelope and tend to be willing to make do 
with available tools. Men, in contrast, tend to draw upon their technological 
imaginations to extend the capabilities of technologies and to attempt to ‘go where 
no man has ever gone before.’ (Brunner, et al., 1999, pp. 77-79)  
 
This observational boundary-making plays out across the g/t story. In the next example, 
women themselves are said to mirror what has been observed, yet the narrative strength of 
these self-reports is built from a lack of alternative narratives.  
Women students’ descriptions of why they are majoring in computer science are a 
“counternarrative” to the stereotype of computer scientists who are narrowly 
focused on their machines and are hacking for hacking’s sake. Instead, these 
women tell us about their multiple interests and their desire to link computer 
science to social concerns and caring for people. (Margolis & Fisher, 2002, p. 54) 
 
 Criticisms of methods that rely on self-reports tend to put the focus on whether 
self-reports are reliable data rather than how the perceptual field has limited what kinds of 
subjects or practices were visible. The arguments appear to be over methodology, masking 
how certain practices of objectivity come to define what is available to be seen or what kind 
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of observing is scientifically appropriate. Debates about objectivity continue to be debates 
over whether subjective accounts are sufficiently objective. Unquestioned is what 
objectivity enables or disables when it broadly paints the picture of “normal.” Objectivity, 
in the meta g/t story, refers to the disengaged, birds-eye lens of normal science that 
Haraway (1991a, 1997) deconstructs. She sees a highly limited objectivity that bounds the 
perceptual field in a way that enables the production of the constituted outsider—a product 
of a biased objectivity.  
An aura of expertise separating the higher echelons of computing from the rest of 
society is built on stories of a mystical convergence of passion, techno-virtuosity, and 
exclusivity (of interests, attributes, goals) in the masculine world of computing that in turn 
are made that much more exclusive through a strategic deployment of the constituted 
outsider. A bird’s-eye objectivity effectively separates women from technology in multiple 
ways. First, it locates the majority of women outside technology (e.g. maintaining the 
invisibility or otherness of users, artists, applied technologists, and so on), thus closely 
guarding the borders of what counts as “significant” participation. Even when occupying 
an insider position, computer science women are still constituted outside the male norm. 
Specifically, within the 0.3% of women who are identified as computer science majors, 
their different interests and values are always highlighted to characterize them as outside 
the dominant norm. In the g/t story, women’s significance looms large but its importance 
is framed around absence and otherness. Women are strategically located as outsiders to 
technology, most often based on their social natures and higher moral values. Women’s  
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continuing underrepresentation makes it possible to promote these values as the basis for 
intervening in techno-culture. 
The need to locate significant differences between men and women has remained a 
top priority, but the specific loci of concerns regarding differences remain in flux. That is, 
even though the specifics of difference have changed, the value and position of the 
constituted outsider to technology continues to hold steady or increase in value. In some 
sense, the constituted outsider is a prediction come true. For example, in 1985, Hawkins 
argued that computers would contribute to an already existing gender/STEM divide:  
The issue of equity of access to computers and learning about computers has 
become an important topic in education. It is a common concern that all children 
have equal opportunity and appropriate support for acquiring competence with the 
technology…Two important dimensions of difference are social class and sex. With 
respect to the latter—if current projections are accurate—girls are likely to learn less 
about and have less ability to control this increasingly important cultural tool. 
(Hawkins, 1985p. 165-166, bold added) 
 
For Hawkins, the problem was not just computers, but the ways their use in schools 
revolved around STEM interests. This would, in Hawkins view, lead to a continuing 
gender inequity in schools because girls already had shown less interest and or capacity in 
those STEM fields. Thus, the argument went, the computer had to be disconnected from 
math and science to be welcoming to girls. Notably, recent statistics indicate that girls and 
women’s participation in many STEM fields has increased substantially—except, 
specifically, in computing. The constituted outsider has, ultimately, remained one of the 
most stable ideologies of the meta g/t story, even as the specific conditions for this 
outsiderness change. The mystery is why. 
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Women’s rejection of the computer as an “intimate machine” was an idea 
popularized by Turkle in her 1988 essay that stated:  
The issue for the future is not computerphobia, needing to stay away because of 
fear and panic, but rather computer reticence, wanting to stay away because the 
computer becomes a personal and cultural symbol of what a woman is not. (p. 41) 
 
Both the computer and woman take on symbolic purposes that suggest an ontological 
ground for the constituted outsider—the preservation of the feminine, as something other 
than technological.  
The persistence of the constituted outsider in computing builds from these kinds of 
1980s configurations. For example, in 1999, Mörtberg (a computer scientist and g/t 
scholar in Sweden) wrote:  
Feminist researchers should therefore utilize the potential of feminist 
epistemological programmes in order to achieve a revision of the foundations of 
science and to intervene in knowledge processes and epistemological discussions. 
(p. 47)  
 
Mörtberg’s argument mirrors others that similarly aim to resituate women in relation to 
computing. In essence, these arguments reflect attempts to renegotiate and reposition the 
constituted outsider. Instead of emphasizing exclusion, underrepresentation, or ontological 
discomfort, Mörtberg’s and similar propositions arguing that women represent a different 
kind of opportunity or hope for technology are dependent on the constituted outsider to 
delineate a space for a feminine alternative ethics and values. Margolis and Fisher (2002) 
also rely on this outsider.  
In the long run, the greatest impact may be on the health of computing as a 
discipline and its influence on society. The near absence of women’s voices at the 
drawing board has pervasive effects.… 
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 Along with technology’s power come responsibilities to determine what 
computing is used for and how it is used. These concerns may not be on the minds 
of adolescent boys who get turned on to computing at an early age and go on to 
become the world’s computer wizards. (pp. 2-3)  
 
This idea—that women are motivated by higher values or utilitarian ideals, and will thus 
shift the values and aims of computing—has become a dominant thread in the story.  
A November 2008 article featured in the NY Times Sunday Business Section sums 
up the contested terrain of a g/t story where researchers still search for explanations of the 
gap. 
Justine Cassell, director of Northwestern University’s Center for Technology & 
Social Behavior…said…some people in the field still believed that the answer to 
reversing declining enrollment was building the right [computer] game. Another 
school of thought is what she calls the “we won” claim because women have 
entered computer-related fields like Web site design that are not traditional 
computer science. Ms. Cassell points out that it’s not much of a victory, however. 
The pay is considerably less than in software engineering and the work has less 
influence on how computers are used, and whether this actually accounts for the 
diminishing numbers of female computer science majors remains unproved. 
 
Ms. Cassell identifies another explanation for the drop in interest, which is linked 
to the pejorative figure of the “nerd” or “geek.” She said that this school of thought 
was: ‘Girls and young women don’t want to be that person.’ (Stross, 2008, par. 1) 
 
This 2008 article, while it does not offer new numbers, research, or ideas for intervening in 
the continuing g/t gap, does make clear a number of continuing assumptions or concerns: 
(a) the g/t gap is a problem of numbers of women such that there are few discussions of the 
quality of women’s contributions to computing; (b) computing careers will bring greater 
material rewards; (c) a continuing stratification that places traditional computer science 
and engineering at the top; and (d) a continuing focus on m-f difference and identities as 
explanations. These continuing concerns reveal how common it is to believe that we can 
clearly separate men from women, users from the technological sphere, and our materially 
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derived investments from our perceptions. From these practices, the position of the 
constituted outsider is marked and “scientifically” marginalized. This scientific 
construction, however, is itself a limitation. As Haraway (1991a) put it, limited perception 
constitutes a false objectivity. 
 
Disciplining Objectivity 
There are other, more robust ways to think about objectivity. Postmodern and 
poststructuralist scholars argue that the dominance of an empiricist, disengaged notion of 
objectivity keeps some subjects, objects, or ideas outside the observational field because 
they are, as data, invisible. This invisibility describes the position and effect of the 
constituted outsider (e.g. Haraway, Derrida, Butler, Bowker & Star). Haraway’s (1991) 
deconstruction of a god trick objectivity highlights the epistemological premises that define 
practices of dominant science criticized by, for example, Harding or Fox Keller. Portraying 
mainstream science as beholden to a disembodied, bird’s eye view of knowledge, Haraway 
argues that this is a view from nowhere that also makes it too easy for scientists to 
dissociate from any responsibility for knowledge created. Perceptual practices and the 
ideologies behind them leave some subjects outside the scientific field but also falsely 
construe the scientific observer as having no influence or perspective on science. Outsiders 
are only outsiders because they are made to be invisible—outliers, if you will, to, or because 
of, the dominant perceptual field.  
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Foucault also grapples with the problem of objectivity, but from a genealogic 
distancing. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, 1983) characterize this objectivity as one that 
“when viewed from the right distance and with the right vision, […ensures] a profound 
visibility to everything” (p. 107). Foucault argues for a kind of perceptual distance that 
makes it more possible to “see” patterns and discontinuities where temporal distance 
makes it possible to discern patterns that reveal assumptions of great meaning, which from 
a greater distance turn out to about something other than had been understood up close. 
The problem in essence, is that over-attention to hermeneutic depth makes a mountain out 
of a molehill, never really grasping the mountain or molehill’s intentions or meaning, all 
the while missing significant patterns in the mountain range and what these patterns 
illuminate. Foucault’s distinction between objectivity and objectification is useful in 
stepping back to reconsider the problem of g/t.  
In a sense, Foucault’s genealogy might be said to be a re-envisioning of objectivity. 
He articulates knowledge as a kind of objective truth that is at once rational and objective, 
rigorously analytic, pragmatic, historically and contextually situated, and embodied 
(Foucault, 1975, 1995, p. 166). This view of objective knowledge is not independent of, 
but rather reflects, an interplay of power and contexts as they play out in discourse and 
social practices. One of these practices is a disciplining of the subject. For Foucault, the 
disciplining of subjectivities and the processes of objectification are inseparable 
interpellative practices that intersect as a technology of the self. This technology is enabled 
in an interaction of social scientific practices, the disciplines, objectifying methodologies, 
and discourse practices.   
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Constituting the Gendered-Ethical Outsider to Technology 
The g/t story articulates two cultures of computing, one comprised of technological 
experts and insiders who are by-and-large male. The other culture is one of outsiders, 
whose natures or circumstances of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and so on pre-determine 
technological interests, access, or abilities and because of these, these groups are articulated 
outside the elite culture. Figure 9 illustrates the division. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Two cultures. 
Disciplined via technologies of difference, gender, and objectivity, the g/t story describes—
but not “objectively”—a conceptual space of oppositional domains and interests. This 
separation produces the constituted outsider.    
The constituted outsider. As I explained earlier, constituted outsiders are those 
objects-subjects who sit outside the observational or knowledge field because practices of 
scientific, disengaged observation have no other perspectives from which to see or account 
for those objects. The constituted outsider remains invisible because it is usefully so.  
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Through the technologies of difference, gender, and objectivity, the g/t story 
reduces constructs such as femininity, gender, and technology to their simplest, most 
accessible, or methodologically useful significations or relationships. These constructs, in 
turn, are meant to be studied from a neutral distance, without bias or involvement. This 
research convention became the objective glue through which the meta g/t story portrays 
computing culture as an independent culture, one that excludes not only women, but 
other disciplines, social groups, marginalized stories, and so on. In what follows, I show 
how this g/t story instead ultimately—and actively—constitutes women outside an 
insufficiently imagined culture of technology and that it does so by relying on a particular 
and limited notion of objectivity.  
A gendered-ethical outsider to reshape computing. The meta g/t story is taken to 
be a descriptive representation of reality, an assumption that needs to be queried. In the 
following passage, written in 1985, it is possible to discern a point where the g/t story 
began to take shape.  
The concept of the computer hacker or ‘Turing Man’ permeates our conception of 
computer users as insensitive rule-oriented males with a lust for winning. While 
this profile may characterize computer hackers, it does not characterize all 
computer users, and Turing’s men are not the only people who use computers. 
Writers, scientists, secretaries, choreographers, artists—to name but a few—use 
computers; many computer users remain sensitive to deep human motives, and 
many of them are women. So too are many computer programmers. Yet recent data 
on sex differences in computer use at home and at school support the idea that our 
culture is defining computers as preeminently male machines. What accounts for 
this, and what are the consequences? (Lockheed, 1985, p. 116)  
 
The author highlights an emerging paradox in how gender and technology were 
characterized in different domains in the early 1980s. Noting a wide diversity of computer 
users across professions, she emphasizes that across these fields, many are concerned with 
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human values, many are women, and many are programmers. Computing culture was not 
merely a hacker culture. However, studies focused on school versus home computing 
tended to foster a notion of computers as masculine. Lockheed’s questions make apparent 
how some kinds of users and creators are left out of the computing picture and how a 
singular picture is constructed by limiting the field of reference. By 1985, school-based 
studies of computing use (where home access and use was an indicator of school use and 
success) had articulated computing as male. We get a sense from Lockheed’s study that this 
two cultures divide was created by not attending to a more diverse reality.    
Lockheed (1985) raised an important question, thus it is pertinent to ask why the 
practice of characterizing computers, computing culture, and users based on their degree of 
separation from a narrowly conceived male hacker norm proliferated and became the gold 
standard. This standard became the measure of girls, women, and computing, defined by 
what became, essentially, the default vision of computing culture. An enforced separation 
of kinds of users and creators has helped to produce, in effect, a manufactured divide. 
Lockheed did not pursue this line of reasoning but instead suggested that the ways in 
which computers were described and located was a large reason for the emerging sex 
disparity. The computer was overly conceptualized as a “unitary object”—a singular kind of 
machine and site for programming and playing computer games (p. 118). Her idea was that 
if computers were viewed more expansively, “from the perspective of function (e.g. object 
of study, recreation, tool)” the g/t picture would be different. Looking back at the early 
1980s, two things are evident: (a) computing was a relatively diverse practice and (b) 
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techniques of observation and representation constructed computing as a masculine 
domain or limited who could be seen in computing.  
By the mid 1980s, women’s participation in computing began a three-decade 
decline and two additional phenomena should be noted. First, this decline was new, since 
women previously had been relatively significant persons in computing and second, the 
new female outsider to computing was an effect of emphasizing specific functions of the 
computer that in turn privileged different interests and interactions by construing these as 
pre-determined m-f differences (rather than differences tied to professional practices, for 
example). By limiting the observational lens onto computing culture, one specific role of 
the computer and computer hackers came to dominate. All other practices and actors were 
seemingly cast to the margins as inconsequential. In this way, other users and uses of the 
computer were constituted outside an exclusive and predominantly masculine hacker 
norm, even as this norm itself was never really an objective or all-encompassing 
representation of masculinity or computing. 
 The g/t gap itself became a kind of social imaginary and Lockheed (1985) as well 
became caught up in the tangle of explaining sex differences as they were correlated with 
different functions of the computer. This kind of cataloguing began the project of marking 
and measuring evidence of differences in m-f interactions with the computer and 
predicting their effects. Lockheed’s essay appeared as the frontispiece to a special issue 
devoted to girls and computers. Although intended to be cautionary, it ultimately helped 
to introduce an agenda that focused the blossoming of g/t research. Although insightful, 
Lockheed could not separate from the dominant research imaginary or our four-
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dimensional enframing and thus, the problem of a limited objectivity itself escaped 
analysis. 
 
Conclusion  
The idea that gender can be separated from technology seems inherently logical 
within the dominant research and epistemological imaginary. To make this possible, the 
g/t story depends upon four core oppositions: (a) femininity versus masculinity, (b) value-
rationality versus value-neutrality, (c) technology versus women, and (d) scientific knowledge 
versus politics. In relying on these oppositions, the meta g/t story acts as a constituting 
technology in creating two separate cultures, one organized around the feminine, where 
social, political, and ethical values may be brought to technology, and the other around the 
masculine, where the social realm and societal values are separated from both men and 
technology. The dominant technology of objectivity facilitates the continuance of these 
oppositions, but the underlying political technologies of neoliberalism and the knowledge 
economy of the risk society need this constituted outsider, both to accomplish certain aims 
and to mask their effects or offer some hope of respite. 
The constituted outsider accomplishes two things: (a) through such technologies as 
discipline, it emphasizes difference, gender, and objectivity and it forcefully yet artificially 
situates gender and women outside techno-culture and (b) the g/t story depends on this 
outsider for the conceptual viability of the idea that women’s higher ethical values will 
reshape not merely some specific technologies, but the field of computing writ large. A  
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question remains as to why it is so enticing to cast women as the agents who will reshape 
computing or society’s relation to technological progress.  
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Facet 9 
Techno Anxieties, Passions, & Values 
 Women’s interpellated subjectivity—managed through the technology of gender—is 
one major product of the g/t story. This story, however, sits within a transparent melding 
of discourses, social and methodological imaginaries, assumptions, and practices that 
reflect a four-tiered enframing of Western, modern society. On the one hand, the meta g/t 
story is a remarkably reductivist story, and yet on the other, it is also an enormously 
complex story that can be understood as one response to a host of anxieties pervading 
modern society. These anxieties may be traced through Beck’s (1992) characterization of 
the modern risk society as we increasingly face risks of a heretofore-unknown scale, where 
ecological and human survival may be sustained or annihilated through technological 
advances. As the potential consequences of techno-scientifically initiated risks have 
escalated, so have disputes over how these risks are to be calculated, monitored, or 
understood. In some circles, STEM knowledge is promoted as the primary literacy within 
this risk society. It becomes the only recognized knowledge for understanding and 
evaluating the products and effects of techno-science. In other circles, there is a pervasive 
suspicion that the knowledge and practices of technoscience are not the best (and must not 
be the only) lenses in assessing and mediating technological innovations or progress. The 
meta g/t story is situated in this complex milieu of explicit and implicit anxieties and 
controversies. The g/t story itself has become useful as a kind of intermediary between 
human-centered values and another set of values that put most value on techno-rationally 
derived progress. At the center is a tension between the modernist quest for certainty and 
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an alternative practice of ambiguity that many argue is essential to any sustainable 21st 
century posthumanist ethic.  
 As the meta g/t story increasingly focused on the problem of girls and women’s 
underrepresentation in computing, an assumption embedded itself that the problem of 
gender and technology was always about what we currently think about it. In this chapter I 
argue that the g/t meta story is about more than we have assumed. Specifically, it is a story 
that builds from—and uses—a technology of gender to position women as a kind of 
intermediary in a cultural climate of shifting and large-scale anxieties, many of which are 
linked to the rise of the computer. In this technology, girls and women’s play, passions, or 
desires become the ethical locus of attempts at mediation.  
I first unpack a trio of meta-anxieties to which the meta g/t story responds and 
argue that our concerns over the gender and technology relationship shift in relationship 
to other economic, cultural, intellectual, and political tensions and transformations. 
Following this, I show how portrayals of girls and women’s play, passions and ethics-values 
become strategies for mediating the techno-anxieties arising from the range of social, class, 
and work centered transformations that characterize either real or imagined effects of the 
computer’s growing influence in our lives. 
 
A Contemporary Milieu of Anxieties 
 The g/t story unfolds in a contemporary milieu that has been characterized by a 
number of scholars as an era of anxiety (e.g. Jacoby, Sennett, Stone, Heidegger, or the 
National Research Council). This era is characterizable as a set of responses to significant 
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ruptures in long-standing beliefs and unities that heretofore have held modern Western 
society together. One way of thinking about these anxieties is by cataloguing lists of binary 
tensions across a host of concerns such as old-new, tradition-progress, mind-body, and so 
on. This approach has some merit, but it further entangles us in a project of counting trees, 
missing the proverbial forest. It is more useful to think in terms of three “meta-level” 
anxieties.  
The first meta-anxiety reflects a continuing tension where fears and fascinations 
with technological progress reflect incompatible desires to maintain long-comfortable 
traditions that butt up against desires to move forward with techno-scientific progress. This 
plays out as we are faced with advances in reproductive and medical technologies, genetic 
engineering, robotics, and so on, where all of these have been made possible by the 
entrance of the computer and AI into nearly all aspects of modern life. A second meta-
anxiety is a response to a significant crack in what qualifies as reliable scientific knowledge 
as long-held ideas about knowers, their locations, and ideas about truth claims and 
methods are probed from numerous directions, in turn destabilizing traditional beliefs 
about predictable identities, subjectivities, and knowledge. As the humanities, social 
sciences, and natural science disciplines increasingly intersect, new ways of thinking 
challenge older assumptions and structures. A third meta anxiety reflects ongoing tensions 
of a social-political-economic nature; for example, in tensions between ideals of freedom 
and equity that often run counter to desires for material wealth, status, and control that 
technology promises. This is an anxiety emanating from the rising emphasis on 
technocratic market values at the same time these contradict our desires for and belief in 
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social democratic values (Muthuchidambaram, 1989, p. 227). These three meta-anxieties 
reflect what are often diffuse or seemingly irresolvable responses to significant shifts in our 
understandings of what it means to be rational, concerned, responsible, knowing, human 
subjects in an era of intellectual, political, social, economic, and technologically facilitated 
instabilities and risk.  
 The meta g/t story, as it is conceived and constructed, is a technology that unfolds 
in this milieu of meta-anxieties. This is portrayed in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. A story surrounded by anxieties. 
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The graphic begins on the left with statistics that suggest the significant g/t problem is a 
quantitative representation problem. This is a reasonable approach when the aim is to 
redress inequities and if the g/t story was really about this, its enframing in western 
epistemologies and concepts might not be a problem. However, the g/t meta story argues 
much more than this—girls and women’s ethics or values bring something new and 
necessary to the modern technological table. That is, an absence of feminine ethics and 
values in computing is used to forecast dire consequences for women, society, and 
computing, which sets in motion a different set of anxieties. These anxieties in turn 
multiply because the foundational epistemologies and conceptions driving the meta story 
are insufficient for dealing with the kinds of anxieties the g/t story itself identifies, nor is it 
conceptually able to recognize or address the backgrounded meta-anxieties that feed quite 
powerful notions that more women in technology is going to radically change things.      
Three meta anxieties. Within the active spheres of the meta g/t story—education, 
engineering, policy, and the popular media—the idea holding the most currency in recent 
years is that women hold the key to a future of more social and ethical or “values-sensitive” 
technologies. The belief tends to be carried along in discourse as a kind of meta-truth of 
women (in opposition to other “truths” of men and their technologies), needing little 
further analysis or justification. The idea plays out in rather explicit warnings suggesting 
that if more women do not get into the heart of computing, society will remain at the 
mercy of adolescent minded boy-men-hackers who will merely perpetrate whatever playful 
technological whim has captured their values-free attention. Two assumptions are at work 
here: (a) women alone have the necessary social values and commitments that boys-men do 
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not and (b) the future of computing, and society more generally, depends on women’s 
participation. This idea is strongly promoted in Unlocking the Clubhouse (Margolis & Fisher, 
2002): 
In the long run, the greatest impact may be on the health of computing as a 
discipline and its influence on society. The near absence of women’s voices at the 
drawing board has pervasive effects.… 
Along with technology’s power come responsibilities to determine what computing 
is used for and how it is used. These concerns may not be on the minds of 
adolescent boys who get turned on to computing at an early age and go on to 
become the world’s computer wizards. (p. 2) 
 
Similar formulations are to be found across the g/t story. For example, the 
Executive Summary of TechSavvy (AAUW, 2000) states it this way: “In some important 
ways, the computer culture would do well to catch up with the girls. In other words, girls 
are pointing to important deficits in the technology and the culture in which it is 
embedded” (p. ix). Similarly embedded in UNESCO’s Gender Issues in the Information Society 
(Primo, 2003) is the following: “This resistance of policy-makers to considering issues 
related to the gendered digital divide underscores the need for gender practitioners and 
researchers, NGOs and a range of stake-holders” (p. 25). The authors of TechSavvy locate a 
values deficient computing culture that girls are expected to “fix,” similar to the underlying 
argument made by UNESCO’s report, which is that “gendered” practitioners and 
researchers will solve a problem that policy makers and governments cannot, or at least, 
have not. 
 In order for this g/t narrative to be cohesive, much has been left out. Excluded are 
extensive historical contributions of women in computing, many of which were military 
based or who show no particular evidence of being driven by social values in the way the 
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g/t story currently predicts.94 Also discounted is the work of contemporary women who 
hold or have held major roles in the field of computing (e.g. Carleton Fiorina, former 
CEO of Hewlett Packard, Barbara Liskov, recipient of the 2008 ACM A.M. Turing Award, 
and others, most of whom are not noted for specifically humanistic contributions to 
computing). Also missing from view and mainstream discourse is the work of women 
artists who have built international careers (and those who are less visible, though not less 
technologically inclined or innovative) by pushing the boundaries of technology and its 
aesthetics (e.g. Laurie Anderson, Char Davies, Coco Fusco, and Lynn Hershmann).95 
Missing too, are the active online discussions that women artists or gamers engage in to 
ponder how to gain wider acceptance of the idea of women normatively engaged in 
advanced computing (see for example: http://faces-l.net/, http:// www.girlgamer.com/, 
http://genderchangers.org/). Also absent are examples of women’s bullying of other 
women in the workplace (e.g. Klaus, 2009) that complicate the meta story’s portrayal of 
women’s ethic of care and community. 
                                                
94 For example, those I discussed in Chapter 6, although there are many others who could 
be cited.  
95 Lynn Hershmann Leeson was awarded the ACM SIGGRAPH 2009 Distinguished Artist 
Award for Lifetime Achievement in Digital Art. Also left out are the male computer 
scientists who, arguably, have displayed or promoted extensive concern with social, 
aesthetic, and utilitarian uses and values of computers. Bill Gates is famous for having 
stated that a founding intention of Microsoft was to get a PC on every desk. While we 
could read this as a fascination with technology for its own sake, the statement also reflects 
a highly tool-driven motivation as well as an economic drive. Steve Jobs and Apple have 
given us the I-pod, I-phone – along with an entire culture of community building 
applications. And speaking of communication—a value largely ascribed as female—the early 
web was envisioned by scientists specifically to facilitate communication between scientists, 
globally.  
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It seems timely to ask why these stories, women, and their practices are shunted to 
the margins, rendered nearly invisible. How is it that a singular g/t narrative has acquired 
such a following, across educators, researchers, policy makers, and the public? As a story 
positioned as an intermediary to competing values and agendas, the meta g/t story and 
society have no pressing need for other hidden or alternative stories. 
Has it always been this way? The idea promoted by the g/t story is that a 
quantitative problem regarding women’s representation in computing has always been 
what we currently make of it. One way this belief is sustained is through a negation or 
absence of alternative evidence, examples, exceptions, or of incomplete analyses of what 
historical facts signify. Since I have already discussed how the g/t story is a disciplining 
story, through a technology of gender, I will just reiterate the following point: there are 
significant gaps in how the g/t story dichotomizes a social and values orientation to 
computing by locating it as women’s domain. Thus, this story is limited not only in its 
conception of gender and technology, but also, in how it considers the intersection of 
computing, values, learning, work, and the social realm. A major reason for this exclusion 
is that there has been little room, methodologically or conceptually, to accommodate the 
historical and emotional contexts of the computer’s emergence into society. Looking more 
closely at this cultural moment shows the g/t intersection to be more complex than g/t 
research or STEM approaches have made it out to be. The g/t story is itself a response to 
and manifestation of complex and competing anxieties about the increasing influence of 
technology across society that intersect with other political changes in both society at large 
and within the academy.  
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The next sections broadly characterize three meta-anxieties in play. Meta-anxiety #1 
responds to the ramping up of technological progress and reflects our fears of, yet desires 
for, this progress. Meta-anxiety #2 surrounds the controversies emanating from ruptures to 
long-standing stabilities in our understandings of what constitutes good science and 
knowledge. Meta-anxiety #3 describes the tensions arising from conflicting notions of what 
social transformation entails and oppositional drives for market rational policies and 
democratic values. I explain each in more depth in the following sections. 
Meta-anxiety #1: The ramping up of technological progress. The 1950s to 1980s 
might be cast as an era that signaled a new phase of intellectual and psychological ferment 
regarding what it means to be human. This was driven by some key technological advances, 
particularly as the personal computer (PC) and artificial intelligence (AI) captured both 
researchers and the public’s imagination in numerous ways. Many have argued that this era 
of the computer was a rupture to society because of the ways the computer shook long-
standing conceptions of the human subject as a unique thinking, feeling, and reflexive 
agent. This was the argument behind Turkle’s The Second Self (1984).  
It [the computer] changes people's awareness of themselves, of one another, of their 
relationship with the world. The new machine...is a machine that 'thinks.' It 
challenges our notions not only of time and distance, but of mind. 
 
The ‘subjective computer’ is ‘the machine as it enters into social life and 
psychological development.’ (p. 13) 
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Turkle’s text articulated the computer as a wholly new kind of machine, one that instigated 
a major challenge to the human-machine binary and to a long-held notion that only living, 
breathing, biological (and primarily human subjects) could think, learn, and feel.96  
The book examined how the computer had, by the early 1980s, captured the 
imaginations of seemingly everyone including preschoolers, teens, PC hobbyists (who were 
also computing professionals), and hackers, although in retrospect artists and mothers 
seem to be missing. She captured a sense, that at least in some circles, the computer was a 
new kind of mirror into the self and that it opened possibilities for selves to be re-
envisioned.  
Turkle’s anthropological-psychological research was based at MIT, an epicenter of 
cutting-edge work being done in artificial intelligence (notably by Marvin Minsky, Seymour 
Papert, and Joseph Weizenbaum). When she described the computer as a subjective and 
intelligent machine and second self, Turkle (1984) articulated, for a more general audience, 
a way of talking about an immanent rupture to the heretofore uniquely human traits of 
thinking and learning. With the introduction of the computer, humans seemingly lost 
their fundamental distinction from machines and the hacker became the public image of 
the perpetrator of this rupture. Putting the primary focus on the nerdy, anti-social hacker 
allowed us to “forget” the early contributions of Ada Lovelace, Grace Hopper, and WWII’s 
women computers who paved the way in helping to create the computer’s intelligence, or 
                                                
96 I am sidestepping any discussion of what kinds of animals (or plants) are able to think or 
feel as this is (a) too large an issue for my project, and (b) not particularly significant for the 
discussion at hand, although it is increasingly discussed in science studies (e.g. Haraway, 
2003).  
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to remember that men were more influential in creating its hardware. The era was more 
complicated than the hacker narratives infer. Thus, it is necessary to unpack some of the 
competing interests and depictions to understand not only the magnitude of the shift, but 
also the depth of anxieties as these played out (and continue) in the intersections of 
techno-science, education, and social life.  
Three characterizations help capture the extent and significance of the public 
discourse and reception of the computer and AI that often centered on how the computer 
would impact children’s identities and education. The most dominant ideas about AI can 
be traced through the work of three researchers. The rupture could be said to have begun 
with Turing’s famous AI test (1950) intended to prove that a machine can be made to 
learn. A second would be Weizenbaum’s ELIZA (1966) program that illustrated a natural 
language processing system by simulating a psychotherapist and an aspect of the 
therapeutic process, as a real person would spill their troubles to the virtual computer 
therapist. Third was Minsky’s (1985) work on AI that became the dominant model for 
machine intelligence research from 1969 to the mid 1980s (Wilson, 1998). This work 
conceived of minds, whether machine or human, as information processers, composed of 
discrete processes. Working with Papert, Minsky’s model was brought to education, 
through cognitive science, later initiating the new field of the learning sciences. The 
influential conception was the model of mind as machine and machine as mind, one 
mirroring the other. The human mind was not much different from the computer and this 
made the computer a potential competitor to human capacities for thinking, learning, and 
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teaching.97 Minsky’s work in AI upended longstanding beliefs in the supremacy of human 
thinking and feeling, as he stated:  
Most people still believe that no machine could ever be conscious, or feel ambition, 
jealousy, humor, or have any other mental life - experience. To be sure, we are still 
far from being able to create machines that do all the things people do. But this 
only means that we need better theories about how thinking works. (Minsky, 1985, 
p. 19) 
 
There were other models of machine intelligence, e.g. neural networks and parallel 
processing models, but according to Wilson (1998), Minsky and Papert’s success in 
suppressing these derailed the development of alternative models of cognition.  
 Responding to this radical unfolding of a computer-human parallel, Simon (1977, 
1989) stated that the key question regarding the computer is that of “what it has done and 
will do to man’s view of himself and his place in the universe” (p. 455). He viewed the 
intimate connection of the human and the machine as the most controversial of the 
arguments over how the computer revolution will change culture:   
There is a more fundamental question…the question that was raised by Darwinism, 
and by the Copernican revolution centuries earlier … whether the dignity of man, 
his sense of worth and self-respect depends upon his being something special and 
unique in the universe. (p. 456) 
 
The computer brought a new existential dimension to the question of who we are and who 
will we become. 
A second idea crossed into somewhat new territory by connecting human desires 
and fantasies with the computer in a way that some found exhilarating and others either 
                                                
97 This was not the only possible model. There was another model – neural networks – that 
Minsky fought for funding and prominence. This latter model is only now making a 
significant re-entry in a number of fields, e.g. neurobiology, sparking new ideas in political, 
feminist, and cultural thought. 
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threatening or just bizarre. Heim (1993) describes a technological eros different from 
Turkle’s focus on a new psychological and thinking machine: 
The computer’s allure is more than utilitarian or aesthetic; it is erotic. Instead of a 
refreshing play with surfaces, as with toys or amusements, our affair with 
information machines announces a symbiotic relationship and ultimately a mental 
marriage to technology. Rightly perceived, the atmosphere of cyberspace carries the 
scent that once surrounded Wisdom.…Our hearts beat in the machines. This is 
Eros. (p. 84) 
 
Boys and their fascination with computer games was another way of talking about machine-
human desire. Brunner, Bennett, and Honey (1999) drew from this idea to design a study 
of men’s and women’s fantasies about the computer. What they found was a distinct 
gender difference. The women portrayed “technology as a fellow creature on the earth, a 
child of humanity, promising but problematic…needing care and guidance to grow to its 
best potential within the balance of things surrounding it” (p. 74). Brunner et al. 
emphasized these fantasies as about women’s focus on tools that “allow us to integrate our 
personal and professional lives…to facilitate creativity and communication” but the strong 
anthromophorizing, which is itself a dimension of techno-desire was seemingly overlooked. 
It appears that the women wanted the machine to become “merely” a more instrumental 
version of a human.  
 Brunner, Bennett, and Honey (1999) saw a different kind of fantasy in the men’s 
reports. These were of “mind-melds and bionic implants that allow their owners to create 
whole cities with the blink of an eye…In their stories, technologies free us from the earth, 
from social problems, possibly from humanity itself” (p. 74-75). The significant phenomena  
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to note are that fantasies and desires of various kinds of human-machine crossovers became 
part of social and academic discourse.  
A third idea was a sense that technological progress was challenging some long-
standing structures and metaphors of modernity. Cyborgian science fiction began to blur 
borders of fiction and modern realities in virtual space rather than in real space. Moreover, 
the idea of the body itself was morphing in a “reconceptualization of the human body as a 
‘techno-body,’ a boundary figure belonging simultaneously to at least two previously 
incompatible systems of meaning—‘the organic/natural’ and the ‘technological/cultural’” 
(Balsamo, 1995, p. 5).  
The Internet inspired more disruptive narratives. For example, Stone’s War of 
Desire and Technology (1995) identified a new kind of multiplicity arising from the emergent 
phenomena of cyberspace and virtuality.  
Irruptively constituting identities that are simultaneously technological and social, a 
catastrophic emergence of the ludic and the unpredictable…the technosocial, the 
social mode of the computer nets, evokes unruly multiplicity as an integral part of 
social identity. (p. 42) 
 
No longer could we think about identities, the spaces they inhabit, or social-intellectual 
interactions as unitary or even “real.” The shift from the mechanical age to the digital 
brings a new kind of complexity and intersectionality where the real and the virtual 
interweave. The struggle that Stone notes is of “older structures stubbornly trying to 
reassert themselves in a techno-social milieu that to them seems to have gone berserk. 
These are the structures of individual caring, love, and perhaps most poignant, desire” (p. 
36). The transition to virtuality portends something radical as humans shift from the laws 
of the physical world to those of cyberspace. The radical shift was in part the blurring of 
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the machine-human dichotomy but more than this, it also facilitated the fracturing of 
homogeneity and mono-identities.  
 Responding to this techno-cultural moment, the special feature essay in Time 
Magazine’s “Machine of the Year” issue (Friedrich, Moritz, Nash, & Stoler, 1983) delved 
into the various ways the computer was expected to change social and work lives in 
fundamental ways. Computerization was expected to promote certain kinds of advances 
and yet also produce large-scale unemployment in some sectors. While some put great 
stock in how computers could transform schools and learning, others worried about the 
long-term effects of shifting thinking to the computer. The following summarizes the kinds 
of anxieties in the air regarding the future of the human in the era of the computer, at the 
start of 1983. 
Will the computer's ability to do routine work mean that human thinking will shift 
to a higher level? Will IQs rise? Will there be more intellectuals? The computer may 
make a lot of learning as unnecessary as memorizing the multiplication tables. But 
if a dictionary stored in the computer's memory can easily correct any spelling 
mistakes, what is the point of learning to spell? And if the mind is freed from 
intellectual routine, will it race off in pursuit of important ideas or lazily spend its 
time on more video games? (p. 14) 
 
With the computer and AI, humans faced a serious challenge to a self-
understanding that had been based on a supposedly unique intelligence and psyches.98 
                                                
98 Some key scholars in the philosophy of technology to write on the computer are: 
Colburn, recognized as one of the formative scholars in the emergent field of the 
philosophy of computing, argued that the computer signaled a new encounter between 
science and philosophy; AI presented a challenge to long-standing philosophic concerns 
about logic, philosophy of mind, and epistemology (2000). Penrose is another central 
figure, and in the introduction to The Emperor’s New Mind, he wrote: “We have long been 
accustomed to machinery which easily out-performs us in physical ways. That causes us no 
distress.…But to be able to think—that has been a very human prerogative. It has, after all, 
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Truths, fictions, and speculations blossomed. The g/t story must be understood as one 
facet of this larger cultural moment—a story built around, and a response to, a seemingly 
unprecedented mix of anxieties. By 1983, research on gender and computing in education, 
focused through psychology and cognitive learning theory, started to emerge as did, albeit 
separately, philosophical examinations of technology writ large. The latter pondered the 
implications of computing and AI to society and education, whereas the former tended to 
embrace the notion that computers would positively reform and reshape learning and 
schooling as long as it was fairly distributed and used in pedagogically sound ways. Notably, 
these two threads of inquiry run parallel but rarely, if ever, engage within the g/t story. 
Outside the story, a few more cautious voices have included Apple (1989), Bowers (1988), 
and Cuban (2001).  
Within learning sciences and educational technology circles, the computer is largely 
viewed as a tool that facilitates learning. While there is undoubtedly some value to this line 
of thinking, there is reason to think more broadly and philosophically about technology. 
Bringing philosophical reflection to an otherwise largely psychological-behavioral g/t story 
is more than an academic exercise. It helps in sorting out some of the assorted passions, 
emotions, and fears that accompanied the introduction of the PC and to understand these 
in a bigger context of social-political-intellectual anxieties that have troubled scholars, 
                                                
been that ability to think which, when translated to physical terms, has enabled us to 
transcend our physical limitations and which has seemed to set us above our fellow 
creatures in achievement.” For Penrose, the questions were more profound than whether a 
machine could think or feel: “The question touches upon deep issues of philosophy. What 
does it mean to think or to feel? What is a mind? Do minds really exist? Assuming that they 
do, to what extent are minds functionally dependent upon the physical structures with 
which they are associated?” (p. 3).   
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politicians, executives, workers, and educators as society has navigated the challenges of 
industrial modernization and now, the digital era.  
Technology has been at the center of both revolutions, but the tenor and locus of 
concerns has shifted with the turn to the digital. Common to both has been a fascination 
with technological progress and tools. Dewey (Hickman, 1990) and Heidegger (1977) 
identified an aspect of an ontological human-technology connection, each revealing that 
there is no getting around the fact that as humans we are intimately connected to 
technology. As Dewey explained, human intelligence, inquiry, and technology are so 
intertwined that “thinking is a technological task” reflecting a “process of extraction, 
refinement, and manufacturing” (Hickman, 1990, p. 50). Such an intimate connection to 
technology also has a dark side, which focused much of Heidegger’s thinking. Some 
examples are the atom bomb, the punch-time clock (and surveillance technologies more 
broadly), the 24/7 phenomenon, global outsourcing of jobs facilitated by technology, and 
so on. It also has positive effects as evident in the ways it has helped to reconstruct 
“deficits” of the physical or mental body (e.g. prostheses and assistive technologies).     
The computer however, escalated the tensions between our desires, ontologies (e.g. 
how m-f differences fit in this new landscape), and fears. Its introduction ruptured the 
boundaries between man and machine, stabilities of m-f identity, virtuality (simulation) 
became equally as real as reality (e.g. Baudrillard, 1981, 1994; Benjamin, 1973 [1936]), and 
it challenged our historical sense and experience of time and space. Franklin (1990, 1999), 
for example, argues that technology “changed our realities of time and space ... planning 
and forecasting” (p. 3-4). Focused specifically on the Internet, Youngs (2001) brought to 
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light a hidden political economy of time as a way of understanding the inequalities that are 
embedded in the interaction of technology and globalization. It is not just access to 
technologies, but access to time itself that technology reshapes in complex ways. Agascinski 
(2000, 2003) argues that technological development has unfolded largely through Western 
paradigms of time and that in this era of globalization,  
Henceforth, technical advances alone will determine the hierarchy of societies, 
which, by means of the global establishment of that same imperative for 
development, are integrated into a world and a unique time. Globalization is the 
unification of the world’s rhythms, all adjusted to the Western clock, that is, to 
contemporary chronotechnology. (p. 5) 
 
That is, our way of being in the world shifts in relation to the dominant technologies we 
create and which become a kind of temporal-cognitive-psychological paradigm. 
Computing meshed, collided with, or reshaped human experience and perception 
in multiple and complex ways. Our relationship with technology was at best, rendered 
ambiguous and the notion that the computer might indeed overtake the human mind, 
exhibiting ever greater capacities for independent thinking, stirred a number of 
philosophical, moral, technical, and pedagogical anxieties. In philosophy and the 
humanities more generally, scholarship on this interplay is vast. However, the 
psychological-engineering bias of the meta g/t story in large part pushes this additional 
analytic lens to the sidelines. In this very partial picture, women’s psychological distancing 
from the machine makes it seem that we can hold on to a kind of hope that the computer 
will not overtake humans and society.  
Nonetheless, techno-anxieties persist. After Weizenbaum created ELIZA (1966) he 
became disturbed by what people, among them computer scientists, were claiming it 
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foreshadowed. His subsequent book, Computer Power and Human Reason (1976), pondered 
what he saw as the central question of the time—not whether computers can or could be 
made to think, but whether this ought to happen. In essence, the question of significance 
shifts: “Should man be the instigator of his own automation?” In a recent example of this 
kind of reflection, the July 26, 2009 issue of the New York Times (Markoff) reported on a 
meeting of scientists concerned about the degree to which computers are taking over so 
much of what was formerly the domain of humans in terms of their workload and 
responsibilities.  
Impressed and alarmed by advances in artificial intelligence, a group of computer 
scientists is debating whether there should be limits on research that might lead to 
loss of human control over computer-based systems that carry a growing share of 
society’s workload, from waging war to chatting with customers on the phone. 
 
Their concern is that further advances could create profound social disruptions and 
even have dangerous consequences. (para. 1-2) 
 
It is probably reasonable to surmise that this group of scientists was at a minimum 
composed of a number of men, suggesting that maybe it is not just women who have been 
concerned over the changing dimensions of human and machine capabilities. Regardless, 
anxieties over this shift of human capabilities to the machine persist. 
Meta-anxiety #2: Controversies over science & knowledge. Weizenbaum’s (1976) 
reflections on what science ought to pursue, rather than what is possible to pursue 
foreshadowed a growing concern over the reach of knowledge and science. These concerns 
were expressed in a number of ways. One concern focused around what constitutes 
warrantable scientific knowledge and the role of methods in producing this knowledge. 
These were debates over whether science should be left to self-monitor its ethics and 
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consequences of its knowledge, but also, over what kinds of knowledge would be good to 
pursue. Weizenbaum attributes his heightened awareness of the issues to being “deeply 
involved in a concentrate of technological society as a teacher in the temple of technology 
that is the Massachusetts Institute of Technology…There I live and work with colleagues, 
many of whom trust only modern science to deliver reliable knowledge of the world” (p. 
10). Concurrent with the emerging work in computer intelligence at MIT was a parallel re-
examination of whether there ought to be limits to the pursuits of scientific research, 
which challenged the dominant model of science as a sole pursuit of expanding science. 
The debates over knowledge have since taken many twists and turns. One target has 
been the role of academic disciplines for the ways they separate the natural sciences from 
the humanities or the behavioral sciences from philosophy and the more politically and 
culturally oriented disciplines. The extent and significance of these disciplinary separations 
has been argued by scholars such as Bateson (1972, 2000), C.P. Snow (1965), Kuhn (1962, 
1996), Dewey (Hickman & Alexander, 1998), Wallerstein (1997; Wallerstein & 
Gulbenkian Commission, 1996), and so many more. Advocates of a transdisciplinary 
approach (for example Nowotny & Gibbons, Klein, Lawrence, or Barad) argue that the 
structures of academe have effectively limited scholars’ resources for thinking and 
understanding, effecting a distancing of the ethics-politics of knowledge from the 
production of that knowledge. The concern has been that in keeping science and 
philosophy separate, knowledge of the world becomes overly compartmentalized. The 
separation has fostered a climate where technical rationality becomes the driving 
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justification for techno-science such that human-centered concerns and values become, at 
best, secondary.  
Some argue that when techno-scientific knowledge is privileged, so too are techno-
science experts. This is Winner’s (1995) concern when he examines the ways in which 
citizens are effectively distanced from participating in discussions over the socio-political 
dimensions of technological production. Similarly, Gibbons et al. (1994) argue that Mode-
2 knowledge is replacing Mode-1. Mode-2 knowledge is much more application oriented 
and socially grounded, whereas Mode-1 knowledge has long been the domain of experts. 
Mode-2 knowledge is more responsive to real world concerns of the lay populace and 
strives for reflexivity, transdisciplinarity, and heterogeneity. In a follow-up book, Re-Thinking 
Science: Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty (2001), Nowotny, Scott, and 
Gibbons suggest that society and science are themselves in flux, and therefore are 
“transgressive arenas”(p. 4). The new society-science relationship is a radical break from the 
culture of science that drove industrial modernity.  
Nineteen ninety six was the year that the journal Social Text published a special 
issue on the “Science Wars.” The issue put itself at the center of escalating controversies 
regarding the dominance of technoscience and its exclusive and hegemonic methodologies 
and practices. Ross, in the issue’s introduction, located these new concerns through Beck’s  
articulation of the modern risk society that offered a “radical critique of the very scientific 
rationality that served as the vehicle of industrial society” (1996, Spring-Summer, p. 2). 
Rose (1996, Spring-Summer) in the same issue, characterizes some of the tenor and 
tensions of the time. 
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In these wars, the self-appointed defenders of Science are seeking to police the 
boundaries of knowledge and to resurrect canonical knowledge of nature, against 
the attempts of the Others (including feminists, antiracists, psychoanalysts, post-
colonialists, leftists, multiculturalists, relativists, postmodernists, etc., etc., in all our 
bewildering diversity) to extend, transform, or maybe even dissolve the boundaries 
between the privileged truth claims of science and other knowledges. But first, just  
because any of us may find ourselves among the Others under attack, I must 
emphasize that this commonality may not automatically generate bonds of 
solidarity between this ‘us.’ My enemy's enemy is-only perhaps-my friend. (p. 61) 
 
Rose reveals that the debates were not limited to oppositions of Us versus the 
Others, because there was also dissension within the ranks of the Others in taking a 
position on technoscience. Similarly, Weizenbaum’s (1976) reflections indicate that within 
the ranks of hard-core scientists there were similar disputes.  
Not everyone saw this postmodern shift or critical-linguistic turn as productive or 
even reasonable. Published in Social Text’s science wars issue was Sokal’s “Transgressing the 
Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” (1996, Spring-
Summer). The article itself is now famously known as “Sokal’s hoax” and became a kind of 
marker to the rising tenor of the methodological debates across the academy. The essay 
presented itself as sympathetic to postmodern, interdisciplinary, and hermeneutic 
approaches. Sokal portrayed these as reasonable criticisms of positivism, Cartesian-
Newtonian metaphysics, and other dominant, Western epistemologies but did so with the 
specific hidden intent to parody and intellectually embarrass the journal and castigate the 
academic left and humanities-science critics or scholars. The day the issue was published, 
May 18, the front page of the New York Times announced the hoax. In a recent re-
examination its impact, the editors of The Sokal Hoax: The Sham that Shook the Academy 
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(Editors of Lingua Franca, 2000) summarize Sokal’s political-intellectual motivations as 
follows: 
By his own account, physicist Alan Sokal was inspired to submit such a piece of 
writing out of a growing concern over the state of the political left. He felt that a number of 
leftists (mostly academics in the humanities) were betraying their cause by challenging 
standards of logic, truth, and intellectual inquiry, in general, and the role of these concepts 
in the natural sciences in particular. (p. 1) 
The debates are complex but the key point for my argument is that the science wars 
were (a) quite charged and (b) reached farther than science or the academy. They reflect a 
deep and growing unease with a hegemonic technoscience that touched the natural and 
social sciences as well as the humanities. The anxieties permeated into the popular press to 
heighten a contemporary climate of uncertainty.  
The intellectual debates over knowledge extended to concerns over methodology in 
the social sciences and educational research, where they are often framed as a qualitative-
quantitative opposition (Schwandt, 2006). Arguing for an alternative to a dominant 
empiricist model of normal science, Denzin and Lincoln (2003) suggest “a profound 
rupture occurred in the mid-1980s…[which was] the crisis of representation” (p. 25). This 
crisis was in part due to the rising influence of qualitative inquiry in the academy that 
broadly characterized those scholars searching for “new models of truth, method, and 
representation” (p. 26).  
Schwandt (2003) locates qualitative inquiry as “a reformist movement that began in 
the early 1970s in the academy” that represented more than a set of alternative 
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methodologies (p. 293). It is also conceived as a major site of intellectual and political 
struggles within the academy regarding “what constitutes the appropriate goals and means 
of human inquiry” (p. 293). Schwandt’s argument is that doing qualitative inquiry is not 
simply a gathering and analyzing of data; it requires a convergence of “acting and thinking, 
practice and theory” where theory is not something static and given, but intertwined with 
evolving understandings of “what constitutes knowledge and how it is to be justified” (p. 
295).  
While computer scientists were busy breaking down the boundaries between 
humans and machines, putting out into the world a model of human thinking as not much 
different than an information processor, other scholars were arguing something wholly 
different, that human meaning making and contexts are inseparable from the production, 
understanding, or value of scientific knowledge.  
Some years earlier, Foucault (1972, 1975, 1995, 1980a, 1990) argued that the 
methodologies of the social sciences were complicit in shaping selves, social relations, and 
institutions, not merely describing them. For him, the emergent, significant questions were 
quite fundamental: “What is a science? What is an oeuvre? What is a theory? What is a 
concept? What is a text?” (1972, p. 5). Foucault’s work characterizes how the rules of 
language and discourse themselves came to be viewed as non-neutral and key constituting 
297 
 
 
practices. Scholars could no longer understand the sciences or human social life without 
implicating discourse and related social practices.99  
It might be said that the science wars represented different takes on the significance 
or durability of the Cartesian separation of mind and body. Controversies heightened over 
whether the Enlightenment had given us a flawed conception of mind-body, reason-affect, 
and thus, of science itself. James (1997) argues that the problem is not so much Cartesian 
science, but what has been left out, forgotten, or misinterpreted about that era over time. 
In Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, she suggests that 
twentieth century philosophy has misconstrued the role of the passions in Enlightenment 
thought. In her view, the twentieth century separation of science from philosophy is a 
manifestation of a flawed understanding of Cartesianism and thus, the reason-affect or 
mind-body division of modern science is itself built on a misreading of seventeenth century 
philosophy. The ensuing mind-body separation has dissociated scientific rationality from 
the passions but this depends on an opposition that she argues was not true in the 
seventeenth century.  
The meta g/t story must be seen as situated at the center of these disruptions and 
tensions regarding how to think about and produce science, knowledge, truth, or minds 
and bodies. The story is fundamentally one that cannot be separated from how we locate 
the intersection of humans with technoscientific knowledge and its production. James 
(1997) helps illuminate a significant problem—in the g/t story, psychology has dominated 
                                                
99 Other scholars were working in this area, particularly in STS fields (e.g. Latour, Harding, 
Fox-Keller, Suchman, Bruce, and so on) and I do not want to dismiss their contributions 
nor the complexity of ideas in circulation. 
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the conversation, to the exclusion of philosophy. The g/t story self-organizes around two 
threads—techno-scientific methods and objectivity and a gap in locating a sufficient theory 
of subjectivities—both examined independently of philosophy and the humanities. The 
story misses some big-picture anxieties emanating from the science wars or presumes they 
have little to do with its own narratives.   
The meta g/t story depends on a host of practices or assumptions regarding the 
nature, location, monitoring, and production of science, learning, work, and social 
interactions. As the story tries to manage a stew of desires and anxieties seemingly about 
access to technology, it does this by holding on to beliefs about knowledge, technoscience, 
subjects, and representations that have been contested elsewhere. The resulting anxieties 
are twofold. On the one hand are those due to the extent and longevity of the science wars 
and on the other hand—within the meta g/t story—anxieties stem from an inability to 
connect the meta g/t story to these other anxieties. The problem and anxieties escalate 
because of a too narrow store of resources for thinking.  
 The controversies in the academy over what constitutes rational, scientific truth or 
knowledge continue in the “anti-rationality” argument that Jacoby (2008) partially 
associates with the political right and an overly influential and anti-intellectual popular 
culture. However, she also takes on a contingent of cultural studies in the academy as well 
as other pursuits that disparage logic and reason. The problem in America, in Jacoby’s 
estimation, is a contemporary populace without the intellectual tools to do or judge good 
thinking. Hers is also a complex argument, and I highlight only two ideas. One is 
America’s overvaluation of technocratization: It is “a culture...with an endemic predilection 
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for technological answers to nontechnological questions and an endemic suspicion of 
anything that smacks of intellectual elitism” (p. xvii) A second is that this ignorance reflects 
and serves “as both cause and effect…an absence of curiosity about other points of view” (p. 
xix).  
 Thus, the second meta-anxiety reflects an uncertainty about knowledge and knowing, 
both battered from a number of sides. On one side, scientific-technical rationality is 
lauded, on another side, a dominance of “over-rationality” is severely criticized from a 
number of intellectual positions, and from a third side, science, reason, and intellectualism 
are disparaged by a large percentage of Americans. In this milieu, there is little consensus 
on what to know or how to justify it. 
Meta-anxiety #3: Radical social change. The meta g/t story is also, in part, a 
response to the stirrings of social ferment that began in 1968 and culminated in the 
feminist and civil rights movements. Student riots that began in France set off an era of 
intellectual and social disruption that contested long-standing norms and socio-political 
structures that are still being debated. The result was a number of challenges to long-
standing beliefs about what constitutes history, knowledge, power, and the state but also to 
expectations about rights and privilege. The g/t story is situated in this larger cultural 
context and its intentions to transform a number of social inequities reflect two influences. 
One is the social-political effects of the civil rights and feminist movements and the second 
is tied to expectations that the computer would facilitate radical social transformation or 
conversely, stand in its way. 
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Time Magazine (Rosenblatt, 1983) named the computer its “Machine of the Year” 
in 1983—giving the computer its traditional, annual Man of the Year honor. It recognized 
the PC’s enormous intellectual, economic, and political impact on society. The magazine’s 
cover image showed an active computer screen but seated in front of it was a pale gray and 
seemingly inert, nondescript (except for his whiteness and maleness), expressionless male. 
The cover story portrayed the computer as evocative, ironic, hopeful, or cautionary, 
depending on the reader’s circumstances: 
This sweetheart here, this little baby, looks like any ordinary machine, isn't that so? 
A mess of screws and buttons, a whole heap of plastic. Comes with new words too: 
RAMS and ROMS.…The computer is made of you, lady. It's got you all inside it. 
You wished it here. No, not to do your taxes or to teach you German or to whip 
you in Pac-Man four out of five. You wished it here because the country was 
running low on dream time. 
 
Which provides equal time. I'm talking social equality. I'm talking freedom with a 
capital F, like when the railroad first rolled in 150 years ago, roaring and puffing 
over the countryside, scaring the chickens and the cows, but offering everyone a 
ride all the same, that's everyone, I say, giving the Republic to the people. Just like 
the computer. (p. 12) 
 
In 2009, it is hard to know whether this was a tongue-in-cheek rendering, but that 
is not so important to sort out here. More importantly—at least in some circles—the 
computer brought with it hope for a new communitarian and egalitarian future (e.g. 
Turkle’s (1984) discussion of PC hobbyists). Rosenblatt’s words portray an explicitly anti-
instrumentalist vision. He describes a machine for dreams, not word processing or 
calculating. Despite this glorious honor and evidence of great hopes for social-political 
renewal, other narratives provoked a different kind of awe, fear, or potential for abuse by 
special interests by emphasizing the hacker or relentless automation, outsourcing, time-
stamping, and new forms of surveillance.  
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As the computer entered the public arena in the mid 1980s, it portended a merger 
of the human mind with a new, heretofore unrealized intelligent psychologizing machine. 
Happening alongside this turn of events and unfolding new relationships were other 
cultural and political reshapings of existing gender-race-class structures that in turn collided 
with a host of other embedded practices, hierarchies, or beliefs.100 Taken together, these 
realignments manifest as major changes to the character of society, many of which may be 
attributed to the digital revolution.   
On the one hand, the g/t story, claims to be motivated by gaining equity for girls 
and women in schools and jobs and thus, the important event would seem to be the 
feminist movement. However, too much focus on this aspect has given insufficient 
attention to the significance of the digital transformation of society and introduction of the 
personal computer (PC) in education and as the locus of school reform initiatives. As the 
PC became increasingly visible as a radically new and intelligent machine, educators also 
adopted it as the promising new tool for transforming education and schooling.   
Since its introduction to mainstream society, the computer has become a symbol 
and tool for a number of competing agendas, desires, and interests. In education, the 
computer has been embraced as the tool that will finally transform education, learning, 
and the social-economic standing of anyone who can harness its power and potential. 
However, this tool also became the locus and personification of continuing inequities and 
                                                
100 One of these is the glass ceiling used to denote the difficulty women have reaching top 
management levels in organizations. Similar limitations continue in academia and in the 
arts. Others to note are controversies over theories of intelligence and abilities, classified by 
gender or race and others, shifts in ideas of what constitutes family, and so on. 
302 
 
 
injustices marked by gender, race, class, or other categories of difference. Largely because of 
a meta story focused around equity, g/t research has only peripherally acknowledged other 
significant challenges that the computer portended for a large swath of human activities 
and relationships. Moreover, these challenges were (and are) not universally experienced. 
For some, the computer held the promise of great wealth, power, and new forms of 
intellectual or playful fascination (iconic examples are Bill Gates (Microsoft founder), Steve 
Jobs (Apple founder), and Marc Andreessen (Netscape founder). For others, the computer 
augured new forms of compliance, domination, marginalization, or tedium (e.g. those 
noted by Postman (1993) and Illich (1973)). Running parallel to discourses of computers 
enhancing learning are others concerned with how it will deskill teachers (e.g. Apple 
(1989); these latter discourses compete with promises of new opportunities for active and 
engaged learning experiences, where the computer is the newly relevant and qualified 
teacher.101  
  An ambiguous relationship to technologies and technologically driven progress 
accompanies a belief that it is possible to demarcate a clear border between the computer 
as tool and the rest of society. In the actual practices of everyday life and being, this 
supposed boundary is more a manifestation of our modern enframings and social 
imaginaries and apparent blindness to the ontological connection between humans and 
technology. In our modern, Western epistemologies the intersection of gender and 
                                                
101 Relevant research on this focuses on cognitive tutors, where an intelligent computer 
becomes either the tutor or tutee (e.g. Brophy, Biswas, Katzlberger, Bransford, & Schwartz, 
1999; R. P. Taylor, 1980). Sometimes computer games are discussed in a similar way (for 
example, if schools and teachers were more like games, students would pay attention and 
learn (e.g. Gee, 2003; Kafai, 2006; Squire, 2006).  
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computing is oversimplified and thus, it has become too easy to focus on the statistics of 
underrepresentation rather than the complicated and shifting social-political milieu within 
which the g/t problem is narrated.  
 This complex and disruptive background of computers and technological progress 
is a significant contributor to what Beck (1992; 1994) understands as the modern risk 
society. Intersecting anxieties and desires backdrop the meta g/t story and its facilitating 
technology of gender, which in turn functions as a kind of technology to stand between 
unresolved (and perhaps irresolvable) anxieties that manifest in response to complex and 
competing expectations, roles, and interests that meet in the intersections of the vast social, 
political, and economic changes that accompany the computer.  
 In October 2004, Sennett’s “The Age of Anxiety” was published in the Guardian in 
the U.K. It was billed as a taking stock of the cultural and political temperature of New 
York City, post 9/11. The article was written during the time the Patriot Act II was under 
debate in the U.S., which Sennett saw as signaling a new era where American citizens as 
well as non-nationals could be stripped of their rights.102 A good deal of this political shift 
was facilitated by technology. The Patriot Act was not only intent on setting rules for 
dealing with political transgressions, but also, setting rules for preventing what might 
happen or policing what individuals or groups might be thinking. It represented a shift from 
                                                
102 This act was the February 2003 response to terrorism by the U.S. Department of Justice 
and Homeland Security. Some sense of the expected impact was discussed on the PBS 
website: http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/lewis.html; the act itself may be found here: 
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-low.pdf.  
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monitoring the actual to monitoring (and sometimes punishing) the possible that Sennett 
describes as a kind of emergent soft fascism: 
Soft fascism is not so much a velvet glove as an invisible hand, the operations of 
control hidden from scrutiny as Patriot Act II, and more, internal repression 
presented to the public as merely preventive action against threats that have yet to 
materialise. The Bush administration acted in this preventive way, for instance, by 
shutting three of the larger Muslim charities in America, not for anything they had 
done, but for what might happen, some time, somewhere. In hard fascism the state 
exploits concrete fear, in soft fascism the state exploits diffuse anxiety. (para. 8) 
 
Sennett draws a parallel influence in reality TV, through which the boundaries between 
public and private are increasingly disassembled. Similarly, high technology and 
corporations are complicit in culling and selling citizens’ private data for corporate profit.  
Government destruction of private rights thus become ‘naturalised’: the public 
already enjoys the act of stripping people naked, and this intrusion is just an 
extension of how business gets done in the computer age. 
 
Diffuse anxieties only add further fuel to this ‘naturalized’ process. Insecurity about 
what might happen, some time, somewhere, becomes an ongoing state of mind; it 
co-habits with preventive measures, but these draconian measures do not erase 
unease. Indeed, as the state machine acts stealthily to prevent things happening, as 
its technologies become built into the fabric of everyday business practice, there can 
be no defining moment when an ordinary citizen could declare, ‘now I am more 
secure.’ (para. 9-10) 
 
Sennett's argument is that terrorism provoked a pervasive anxiety but also, the intersection 
of domestic politics, corporate profit motives, and high technology converge to produce a 
general state of diffuse anxiety. The focus on terrorism however, both gives a focus to the 
public’s anxiety and acts as a cover for an evolving soft fascism from these other directions.  
 Sennett also sees a major contributor to this diffuse anxiety as the changing status 
of the middle class. As people’s economic well-being is increasingly jeopardized by various 
factors outside their control (e.g. hard work, loyalty, values, or hard earned skills become 
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increasingly irrelevant), they try to find something on which to assign “blame” which in 
turn breeds anxieties that become a fear of something or some other who may in fact be a 
placebo. 
The class map is shrinking the number of people who matter, who are included. 
The new class map breeds fear, and the counter to fear is to assert that the old 
values matter. By shifting the centre of gravity, you assert your own value when 
confronted with conditions you can do nothing about. (para. 18) 
 
Sennett’s analysis might be said to summarize a decades long transition in 
American politics and economics as these were influenced by technological advances.  
Seven years earlier, Stone (1995) painted a different kind of picture of the transition from 
an industrial to a technological society.   
Suffused with that electronic glow, her face almost seems to be taking on an 
illumination of its own. She seems to evince a generous permeability, an electronic 
porosity that is pathognomonic of the close of the mechanical age…and as I glance 
up at the image I can see the machine doing it too, as they both hover on the brink 
of collapsing into each other…here at the close of the mechanical age, where 
neurology and electronics, musculature and hydraulics, biology and technology, all 
hover on the edge of a stunning and irrecuperable mutual annihilation. (p. 166) 
 
In Stone’s (1995) vision, annihilation and transcendence seem to merge and 
contrary to conventional depictions, the computer is rendered in the feminine. It is hard to 
decide whether what is happening is a threat or a wondrous future, but there is no missing 
that something momentous is happening. The passage is Stone’s description of her two-
year old daughter sitting at a computer and she explains what the image means to her as 
follows: 
For me she represents not only her own future but our future. Hers, mine, and 
yours. The importance of this habit of mine for our purposes lies in the simple 
aphorism that software produces subjects. When we engage with symbolic 
structures of sufficient complexity, to a certain extent we synchronize our own 
internal symbology with those structures. In this we are carrying out our own 
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programs as social beings….interactive entertainment software, the Internet, 
cyberspace, and virtual reality, are not a question of market share or even of 
content. In a fundamental McLuhanesque sense these things are parts of 
ourselves…it’s hard to see what they do, because what they do is structure seeing. 
They act on the systems—social, cultural, neurological—by which we make meaning. 
Their implicit messages change us. (1995, p. 167) 
 
 Earlier in the book, Stone (1995) describes some of the early history of computer 
game development and its early sexism and fascination with violence. She notes the 
progression from small groups of boys making games for themselves to a culture of a 
slightly larger group of boys making games for not only themselves, but for “millions of 
other boys” and sees a culture rather devoid of ethics (p. 163). Stone escalates the problem 
from one of merely boys’ computer games to what she calls the “ludic dimension of 
human-computer interaction” (p. 163). Concerned that these games are quite limited in 
their ability to stretch “players’ imaginations and skills beyond the ability to hit targets and 
dodge obstacles, she asks: 
How is it that the very young, the very talented, don’t perceive the incredible power 
for change that has fallen to them by default—and the hideous consequences of 
failing to grasp that weapon when it’s offered? (p. 164) 
 
 Stone captures three momentous relationships or situations. One is a prophetic 
merger of the human with its technological creations, as her daughter metaphorically melds 
with the computer. A second is that we humans have both the opportunity and 
responsibility to think about what kinds of human-computer interactions we want to create 
and support. A third is the multiplicity of options and the vast scale of the ethical, human, 
and technological consequences tied to how we proceed as the industrial age gives way to 
the digital.  
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 Capturing an entirely different kind of anxiety is Gates’ written testimony to the 
U.S. House of Representatives (Gates, William H.) to mark the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the House’s Committee on Science and Technology.  
Today I am here to highlight the gathering threat to U.S. preeminence in science 
and technology innovation, and to propose a four-part plan that I believe will help 
us maintain our position as the world’s innovation leader. 
 
During the last 50 years, the world has witnessed truly revolutionary advances in 
science and technology. We as a nation can take pride in knowing that American 
scientists, researchers, and entrepreneurs have been at the forefront of many of 
these advances. Our unmatched ability to turn new ideas in science and technology  
into thriving businesses has been the engine of growth and job creation that has 
made our economy among the most dynamic and competitive in the world. (para. 
2-3) 
 
Gates’ anxieties emphasize a different angle where the fear is a loss of American stature as 
the premier technoscience innovator. One anxiety is a concern over an unprepared and 
insufficient STEM workforce in the U.S.; second is an anxiety over the prediction that the 
U.S. will lose its dominance in technoscience because of this workforce inadequacy; and 
third is a perceived insufficient level of federal support for basic scientific research.  
I believe this country stands at a crossroads. For decades, innovation has been the 
engine of prosperity in this country. Now, economic progress depends more than 
ever on innovation. And the potential for technology innovation to improve lives 
has never been greater. If we do not implement policies like those I have outlined 
today, the center of progress will shift to other nations that are more committed to 
the pursuit of technical excellence. If we make the right choices, the United States 
can remain the global innovation leader that it is today. 
 
These four policy prescriptions – strengthening educational opportunities, 
revamping immigration rules for highly skilled workers, increasing federal funding 
for basic scientific research, and providing incentives for private-sector R&D – 
should in my view be top priorities as Congress and the Administration consider 
how to maintain the nation’s leadership in science, technology, and innovation. 
(Conclusion) 
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Although the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is committed to the improvement of 
lives across the globe, Gates’ congressional testimony reflects a different tenor of concern 
than does Stone’s. However, concerns over flawed or limited techno-literacies and vision 
drive both of their arguments.  
The anxieties are not whether we are in the midst of a paradigm shift, but rather, 
much of the anxiety is due to the fact that there are so many competing interests, 
expectations, and visions of what this transition entails and what waits at the other end. 
The questions are not merely pedagogical nor are they questions of what new technologies 
will capture our attentions and pocketbooks. The crux of the anxieties stem from the ways 
in which the technological era signals the likelihood of significant socio-political economic 
realignments as well as fundamental shifts to who we are and how we are in the world.  
 Beck’s reflexive modernization (1994) suggests that while there may be much to be 
optimistic about in the transition to a post-industrial form of modernity, this transition is 
not without, at a minimum, significant readjustments to a large number of social, 
economic, and political structures and relationships. For many, realizations that both the 
risks of the transition and the spoils are not equitably distributed weigh heavily.  
 Situated in this complex and often incommensurable stew of anxieties is the g/t 
story, problem, and relationship. In this stew, sometimes women and technology are 
brought together to help women better participate in the economic and political spoils of 
high technology culture; sometimes women are needed as workers to support an economic-
political-technological shift that they may not in fact reap many benefits from; and 
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sometimes the meta g/t story has women situated at the center of these far reaching yet 
largely diffuse anxieties as a kind of mediating force of technological progress itself.  
 
Gendered Play, Passions & Values to Mediate Techno-Anxieties  
Tools, toys, and passions. In The War of Desire and Technology (1995), Stone draws 
on the anthropological work of Barbara Joans to describe a hierarchical and conceptual 
divide between two cultures of technological development. Joans had classified cyberspace 
workers into two groups—an instrumental culture and a visionary, play culture, calling the 
latter “Creative Outlaw Visionaries” and the first, “Law and Order Practitioners” (p. 14). 
The distinguishing characteristic is that “one group has the visions; the other group knows 
how to build stuff and get it sold. One group fools around with technology and designs 
fantastic stuff; the other group gets things done and keeps the wheels turning” (p. 14). 
According to Stone, Joans saw these cultures operating oblivious to each other and Stone 
elaborated on this point, arguing that the utilitarian culture reflects an older paradigm of 
computers as tools and the visionary culture, a new play ethic that mirrors, on the one 
hand, a new paradigm for corporate agendas and on the other, a highly situated and elite 
culture. Stone’s depiction of this elite culture helped her unpack a new idea about presence 
to understand networking in the age of the virtual. I use her (and Joans’s) work for a 
different purpose, to think about how girls and women’s desires, play, or passions are used 
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to articulate or guard a set of values-ethics and to intervene in a number of anxieties that 
manifest in the human-technology intersection as it plays out in school, work, and play.103  
 Specifically, within the g/t story are numerous accounts suggesting that girls and 
women self-attribute their preferred—and morally superior—connection to the computer as 
one that is tool-oriented, utilitarian, and socially directed. Known as the “tool-toy” divide, 
the distinction is thought to be quite significant, to the extent that there is now an 
increased focus in computer science education in accommodating girls’ desires that social 
and utilitarian aspects of computing receive more attention early in the curriculum 
(AAUW, 2000; Margolis & Fisher, 2002). I do not mean to suggest that rethinking 
computer science education is not needed; my interest here is to investigate some notions 
about women, creativity and passions, and utility that seemingly precede these efforts. One 
way these play out is in a conflation of creativity-passion, play, and computer games—a kind 
of triad that in turn is used to frame a relationship where highly playful and passion-driven 
computer engagements by boys are described in opposition to girls and women’s social and 
humanitarian values or ethical core.  
 For example, the g/t story identifies early passions for computing as a defining 
characteristic of boys, and through this, either derides or exalts boys’ obsession for 
computing. This is in part possible because girls are depicted as lacking this level of 
passionate engagement with computers. In addition, there is a belief that play and gaming 
                                                
103 I use values-ethics here for two reasons. One, both words deserve in depth development 
to unpack their meaning and intellectual or practical meanings. Second, I do not have time 
or space to do this, and so take this short cut, which in turn reflects the limited explication 
either term receives in the texts I cite, or across the g/t story.   
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are likely to be mitigating factors for future and ongoing success in computing across 
groups and individuals. An individual or group’s disinterest in computer games or 
passionate hacking is measured in terms of degrees of passion or as a marker of gendered 
interests. In this way of thinking, other kinds of interests or passions become invisible or 
are eliminated as relevant factors; for example, examinations of preferences for visual, 
textual, or musically focused technological tinkering rather than more standardized game 
playing are quite rare.  
In Unlocking the Clubhouse (2002), Margolis and Fisher make a point of highlighting 
boys early and sizzling passion for computing to contrast this with girls more tempered 
explorations. Early in the book they state:  
Most of the men describe an early, sizzling attraction to the computer. It is as if they 
fell in love at first sight.…The computer became his ultimate plaything.…I just 
played with the computer, and that was like my big toy, and that’s pretty much how 
everything happened. (p. 16-17)  
The language used to describe girls’ activities is quite different: “Many girls are also 
interested in games but not generally with the same focus” (p. 40). A bit further on 
Margolis and Fisher add:  
Girls want to make things…are interested in games with engaging characters, 
opportunities for communication and collaboration, a rich narrative, and roles 
involving positive social action. (p. 45)  
 
The idea promoted is that girls engage with technology because of its social potential. 
However, suggesting that there are some core contradictions in the meta story, TechSavvy 
commissioners argue, when talking about teachers, something quite different, that women 
find little social value in computing: 
K-12 public education is one of the more prominent “pink collar” occupations, 
employing three women to each man. Realistically, the question of teacher 
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education becomes an issue that must be highly sensitive to issues of gender. But 
research on educational technology has too often treated teachers as an 
undifferentiated population. Teachers’ concerns about technology use echo 
women’s greater skepticism about technology’s ability to solve complex social 
problems. (p. 13-14) 
 
In the Carnegie Mellon study (Margolis & Fisher, 2002), the driving gender 
narrative is that girls are drawn to computing for how it might help society and say they are 
driven by the opportunity to connect computing with social agendas. However, when the 
AAUW (2000) describes teachers, they are characterized has having little belief that 
technology has much social value in terms of solving the kinds of problems we can surmise 
drive the women at Carnegie Mellon. I have no specific answer to this riddle. The 
discrepancy might reflect a digital divide between experts and users rather than women’s 
innate understanding of computing. However, it is important to note that gender specific 
characterizations are often slippery in the story.  
The point that is largely glossed over in the meta story is that Margolis and Fisher’s 
research participants were, by-and-large, an elite class of women academically and 
professionally well-positioned to enter the kind of creative, visionary computing culture 
that Joans identified (Stone, 1995). In the g/t story, it is this visionary passion that never 
really meets up with characterizations of girls and women, who tend to be described in 
ways more like the following: 
Women commonly saw technological instruments as people connectors, 
communication, and collaboration devices. Their technological fantasies were often 
embedded in human relationships and they served to integrate their public and 
private lives. (Honey, et al., 1991, sec. 2, para. 2) 
 
Highlighting this contrast, Honey et al. portray a male computer scientist’s fantasy as 
follows: “A direct brain-to-machine link. Plug it into the socket in the back of your head 
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and you can begin communications with it” (para. 5). Picking up the thread of the earlier 
TechSavvy quote, the AAUW continues its focus on how teachers might develop a greater 
sense of the social value of computing: 
Teachers’ concerns about technology…also echo women’s lack of interest in 
understanding technology “for itself.”…these perspectives ‘can be seen as a healthy 
counterbalance to a more masculine technophilia’ in K-12 education.…research 
suggests that what teachers need is sustained and ongoing education about how to 
integrate technology with curricular materials and information about how to make 
technology part of a humanistic classroom culture. (p. 14) 
 
 Blurry across the meta g/t story is the interconnection between play, passion, 
teaching, gender, and a values orientation to computing. On the one hand, the story 
portrays competing narratives about how women view computers in terms of social value. 
Moreover, there seems to be a discursive move that wants to position teachers to support 
this values orientation. On the other hand, there is some indication that passion and 
gender are never in the same picture. Sometimes this lack of passion seems to be 
ontological in girls, as in the AAUW (2000) report and in other studies, gendered ‘passion’ 
might be construed as socially constructed (e.g. Castell & Bryson, 1998). My argument is 
that girls and women’s passion or values-ethics are strategically used depending on the 
context or scale of anxiety under discussion.   
On the FACES list serve, the following narrative was posted on November 16, 
2007, with sentiments meant to contest mainstream positionings of women and 
technology: 
In the spirit of sharing cyberfeminisms I want to post that just this week I've been 
sticking all my videos up on YouTube, including 'lovehotel' from 2000 which uses 
the text, voice and gorgeous visage of Francesca Da Rimini. You can almost read all 
the text !! via the serious compression. It includes the line "cyberfeminists, data 
deviants and pathogenic vectors" which may or may not include you. Francesca, like 
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her 3 other VNS Matrix collaborators, was kind of 'living online' for a lot of the 
nineties and lovehotel charts the period of writings from 1994 to 1997.104 (2007; 
cited with permission)  
 
This is merely a taste of the cyberfeminist discourse, but it suggests a level of engagement—
passion—that is missing from the mainstream story. In the dominant meta g/t story, 
women and gender tend to mediate a host of anxieties society carries about the human-
technology intersection and resist an overly passionate engagement with computing that 
seemingly provokes some of these anxieties. In portrayals of disparate levels of engagement 
with the computer, the discursive demarcation is largely one of a significant gender 
difference regarding passions and the erotic as these play out in too close, or not close 
enough, associations with the computer. Too close and not close enough suggest 
oppositional anxieties about a deep human-technology connection as these oppositions 
play out in the spaces of gender difference. 
Disciplining passion to preserve society. One production of the g/t story has been 
a governing of girls and women’s desires as these meet the computer. In the g/t story, girls 
are said to naturally hold the computer at bay (for example, Turkle’s “Computational 
reticence” (1988)), but there is evidence to suggest that sometimes this distancing is a result 
of which stories are allowed into the mainstream story. Castell and Bryson (1998) argued 
along these lines, that desire itself was a construct used by both the marketplace and 
conventional schooling to construct girls to fit into the “unwritten law of Gender” (p. 251). 
They posit, rather forcefully, that 
                                                
104 It was shot in New York (with Francesca), and Japan in 1998. Find it at 
http://www.youtube.com/user/machinehunger 
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Girls’ desires have far less to do with what girls want than with what kind of girl 
adults, whether in education or in the marketplace, want to produce. Reenacting 
the ancient Greek myth, they eagerly create and then consume their own children 
as commodities, hungrily introjecting adult fears and desires onto their children, in 
the name of satisfying the children’s own wants and fantasies. (p. 251)  
 
The Stone quote I cited earlier (p. 271) portrays a girl in what appears to be a rather 
extreme, intimate unification with the computer. More commonly, in the meta g/t story, 
women and desire are on opposite sides. Stone (1995) however locates desire differently, 
where desire itself is not in opposition with social values. 
I see…identities engaged in a wonderful and awesome struggle, straining to make 
meaning and to make sense out of the very idea of culture as they know it, 
swimming for their lives in the powerful currents of high technology, power 
structures, and market forces beyond their imagination. In this struggle I find 
certain older structures stubbornly trying to reassert themselves in a techno-social 
milieu that to them seems to have gone berserk. These are the structures of 
individual caring, love, and perhaps most poignant, of desire. (p. 36) 
 
Taking a different path, Haraway (1991b) also wants to integrate a kind of passion 
and desire with responsibility and social values and she does this through the cyborg, itself 
a merger of machine and organism, in part gendered, and in part neutralized. The 
machine, and playful engagement with it, facilitates a future dissolution of gender and the 
limitations it has wrought:  
The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics…a condensed image of both 
imagination and material reality…the relation between organism and machine has 
been a border war. The stakes…have been the territories of production, 
reproduction, and imagination. This chapter is an argument for pleasure in the 
confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction…an effort to 
contribute to socialist-feminist culture and theory…and in the utopian tradition of 
imagining a world without gender. (p. 150) 
 
Characterizations of women’s relationship to things technological are evidence of a 
discursive disciplining of girls and women in the mainstream g/t story. In this disciplining, 
316 
 
 
there is also resistance, but this too, shifts. The question is what is being resisted or 
disciplined. 
The mainstream g/t story carefully separates boys and men’s techno-passions from 
girls and women’s social-ethical interests. It is not just the different foci or drives associated 
with genders that should be noted but also, the differing tenor of the engagements. Boys 
and men have desires and passions whereas girls and women have interests.  
These girls’ descriptions of what boys are doing with technology are missing some 
very important elements. There is strong value in boys’ activities that girls are quick 
to denigrate. For example, there is intellectual importance to getting to understand 
computers from the “inside out” and developing skills and an intuitive feel for 
programming. There is intellectual value in tinkering with technology. And there is 
no question that there is defensiveness in the way girls denigrate these activities. 
But it is also clear that getting girls involved with computing will require 
overcoming resistance based on their negative feelings about getting involved with 
the machine “for itself.” This resistance also stems from girls’ view that a machine-
centered, technical worldview is what the computer culture is all about. Girls reject 
a computer culture that they see as primarily focused on playing with machines. 
(AAUW, 2000, pp. 9-10)  
 
In their analysis, the AAUW commissioners find something desirable in boys’ passions for 
computing but they re-envision the quality of the engagement for women. Here, passions 
become intellectual and social values.  
The idea that women’s passions should be monitored, for the protection of society, 
is not new. Lacqueur (2003) identified the new nineteenth century habit of women’s 
passions for reading novels alone as something of enormous concern in Victorian society.  
Reading in private…especially by women, was thought to inflame desire, encourage 
both prurient and romantic curiosity, and permit the reader to withdraw from 
society into a rich and seductive world in which self-absorption had no 
consequences or benefits other than individual pleasure. (Maines, 2004, p. 479)  
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Women’s solitary reading had to be monitored because society could not afford to have 
women secede from its cultural norms by reading novels, which, Lacqueur argued, 
Victorians feared would lead to women’s withdrawal from heterosexual sex; the concern 
was that they might find greater satisfaction in reading. This would lead to “withdrawal 
from the material and economic world” and “the social fabric would collapse as formerly 
productive individuals vanished into private worlds of the imagination” (p. 479). 
 Connecting Victorian era concerns over solitary reading of novels—that society’s 
new cultural form—and our contemporary concerns over video games and the Internet, 
Lacqueur (2003) argues that both reflect a fear that social norms were and are under siege. 
In the nineteenth century, women reading alone were perceived to be not simply reading;  
instead, this act signified a threat woven of desire, the imagination, and solitary sexual 
pursuits that, as women took them up, signified the immanent demise of society.  
A monitoring of risk, passions, and play pepper the meta g/t story, often centered 
around computer gaming. Jenkins, in his essay “’Complete Freedom of Movement’: Video 
Games as Gendered Play Spaces” (1998), develops a thesis of gendered play spaces by first 
examining nineteenth century gendered play cultures in relation to contemporary video 
games. In the former, boys’ freedoms to explore the outdoors allowed them “recognition 
from their peers for their daring…stunts” (p. 271). Similarly, he argues, today’s video games 
provide boys a culture where they are encouraged to “gradually develop their mastery over 
the entire digital terrain …by passing goal posts or finding warp zones” (p. 271). Jenkins 
draws a number of parallels between boys’ Victorian era and modern video game play (e.g. 
mastery, social hierarchies, violence and aggression, “scatological humor”, and role playing 
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and bonding) activities that mirror the adult, business, and fraternal world (p. 273). In 
contrast, he sees girl-oriented games as transposing “traditional feminine play cultures into 
the digital realm” (p. 276). Jenkins’ suggests that contemporary girls’ express desires for 
different kinds of video games than do boys; these spaces are characterized as spaces for 
“solitude and introspection…spaces…full of life…less to master nature than to understand 
how we might live in harmony with it” (p. 282). Evoking a different sensuality to women’s 
games—as a contrast to the high risk and violent experience of boy’s games—he states: 
“Unlike twitch-and-shoot boys’ games, ‘Secret Paths’ [his girl game example] encourages us 
to stroke and caress the screen with our cursor” (p. 282-283). 
 Our attitudes towards women and girls’ sexuality may have evolved from the 
strictures of the nineteenth century, at least as Jenkins portrays them, but women and girls 
retain their role as signifiers of values in danger of being lost; separated m-f passions is one 
way this is managed. In his exposition of the gendered nature of video game play, Jenkins 
illustrates that while 19th century girl play promoted domesticity, in contemporary game  
culture it appears that the feminine role has expanded outward, situated to protect our 
relationship to nature as well as a broad range of social values.  
A methodological question is how women and gender become positioned to 
manage our socio-techno anxieties, but the more significant question is why. Lacqueur’s 
Victorian analysis of 19th century solitary fiction reading suggests it not improbable to link 
fears over society’s future to emergent new forms of activities that challenge conventional 
social norms around passion and desire and the transformations they might provoke. Our 
anxieties thus may be said to reflect a number of tensions over concerns about the 
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continuity of sociality and traditions, the rising need for a productive (and cooperative) 
workforce, and anxieties provoked by the computer with its potential to reshape not only 
social-economic relations, but also, the core of what we have thought, to date, makes us 
uniquely human subjects, in terms of our thinking and the objects of our passions. 
Gender, passions, and desire are used to respond to or mediate these anxieties. 
Passions, play, values, & social class. In focusing on gender, the ways in which 
socio-economic class plays a role is often glossed over (while I do not exclude race as 
another significant site of analysis, I am not clear how it fits in this specific analysis). 
Throughout the g/t story are examples of micro-stories that describe girls and women’s 
socially driven or innate technological reticence that portray women as not particularly 
passionate about computing. The narrative created blurs several strands of thought, as if 
they are talking about the same things. First is the concern that with so few women in 
computing, society loses too many ethically concerned, potential workers. This notion of 
workers, however, is more multifaceted than its use in the story explicitly recognizes. 
Sometimes, these workers are in the elite domains of computing (e.g. the women studying 
at Carnegie Mellon, on paths to the creative center of technology design); in other stories, 
“workforce” is used more specifically to infer lower level technology workers. These 
workers tend to be trained in particular skills but their jobs are more mundane and 
regimented than those in the elite, creative class, as Jones or Stone (1995) suggest. The 
connection between technology, opportunity, and play is more socio-politically nuanced 
than is represented in the g/t story. Thus, a play ethic and culture  
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Is only possible for workers of a certain type and at a certain job level…it is only 
possible to the communities who are perhaps best described as hackers—mostly 
young…mostly educated…mostly white…and mostly male. (Stone, p. 15).  
 
 Stone’s analysis is useful for the way she explicitly acknowledges the elite position 
that precedes the possibility of inclusion in—or relevance of—play culture and its associated 
passions. This problem of elites and workers is not new. While new technologies tend to 
create opportunities and creative challenges for some, they also become a means for 
deskilling or disempowering others into drones. In the g/t story, there has been a tendency 
to overlook the complex interplay between class status and the possibility of integrating 
play and “work” in real terms. This is far too complicated to pursue here, except to note 
that a playful and passionate connection to computers is so often offered as an explanation 
in micro g/t stories. Certain kinds of play—as Jenkins alludes—are taken to reflect gendered 
dispositions or expectations as well as beliefs about what kinds of technologies and  
technological experiences men and women might deliver, if they become designers. The 
opposition presented is of women’s versus hackers’ values. 
Stone (1995) suggests an alternative perspective, by offering a description of 
hackers’ play and culture in highly social terms: 
In particular, because they [hackers] are thoroughly accustomed to engaging in 
nontrivial social interactions through the use of their computers—social interactions 
in which they change and are changed, in which commitments are made, kept, and 
broken, in which they may engage in intellectual discussions, arguments, and even 
sex—they view computers not only as tools but also arenas for social experience. (p. 15)  
 
The hackers in Stone’s world are tinkering with the human-machine relationship, not to 
displace or ignore the social, but instead, to enhance this aspect of their lives. Stone sees 
identities in flux, negotiated in relation to technological experiences,  
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The critters we ourselves are in process of becoming, here at the close of the 
mechanical age…identities engaged in a wonderful and awesome struggle… 
swimming for their lives in the powerful currents of high technology, power 
structures, and market forces beyond their imagination. (p. 36) 
 
In an era of radical, technological change, Stone locates evidence that even those at the 
vortex of this change hold on to “structures of individual caring, love, and perhaps most 
poignant, of desire” (p. 36).  
 The problem for future thinking about g/t seems to me to be how to connect a 
number of heretofore disconnected or conflicting threads, experiences, insights, and 
analytic positions. Stone was interested in how we hold on to human social values and 
practices as we transition from the mechanical to the digital era. I have tried to highlight 
how Stone, Castell and Bryson, and Haraway, each in their way, subvert or contradict 
dominant conceptions of the g/t story that depend on a separation of women, men, 
passions, and technology.  
 
Conclusion 
 The mainstream g/t story must be seen as a response to a number of anxieties 
provoked by new realities and challenges that the shift to the digital era foreshadows. Just 
as g/t research has not given sufficient space to the social-political-historical background, 
neither has it acknowledged advances in theory that bring helpful and important ideas to 
the table for thinking about the complex issues at stake. Kurzweil, in The Age of Spiritual 
Machines (1999), predicted that although the problems that humans have tried to solve 
over the centuries have remained fundamentally similar over the centuries, this will not be 
true in the 21st century: 
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Before the next century is over, human beings will no longer be the most intelligent 
or capable type of entity on the planet…The truth of that last statement depends on 
how we define human. And here we see one profound difference between these 
two centuries: The primary political and philosophical issue of the next century will 
be the definition of who we are. (p. 2)  
 
If we are on the road to becoming other than we have been, or at least, in need of a new 
understanding of who we are and can be in the digital era, is it not also likely that we could 
use a new way of approaching the problem of gender and technology? The next chapter 
considers some possibilities. 
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Facet 10 
Thinking, Theorizing, & an Ethics of Reimagining 
 
De-Essentializing the G/T Story 
 The standing meta g/t story describes a relationship framed around ten concerns or 
ideas. To recapitulate, these are as follows. First, the story black-boxes long-standing binary 
oppositions of nature-culture; m-f; body-mind; human-non-human (e.g. animals or 
technologies); and subject-object; and because of this, there seems to be no reason to think 
or perceive in any other way—the story remains within a closed, recursive system of 
thinking. Second, theorizing as well as analytic and representational strategies remain 
grounded in reductivist thinking and subject-object relations derived almost exclusively 
from the psychological, behavioral, or cognitive sciences that share an ethical ideal with 
cultural-liberal feminism. This is a totalizing approach that supports either the liberal or 
neoliberal subject that provides no resources for thinking beyond limited and limiting 
conceptions of human-centered social-political relations so that they could become more 
responsive to the social-political-intellectual re-adjustments characterizing post-industrial 
society. Third, standing notions of disinterest or passionate engagement within the g/t 
story (e.g. discussed as concerns over masculine, elite, or adolescent irresponsible play) are 
constrained within these same essentializing oppositions. Fourth, technology is singularly 
conceptualized as tools or tool culture and this constrains thinking more expansively about 
technology in the bigger picture (e.g. in the learning sciences, the computer is, ideally, a 
transparent tool or environment to support learning). Fifth, there is a notable absence of 
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contemporary feminist thought in this “feminist” intentioned story. Sixth, the story 
remains bound to representationalist, reductivist, constructivist, and determinist 
epistemologies and practices that have given us valuable information, yet contemporary 
conditions and relationships require new perceptual lenses and positions. Seventh, a black-
boxed mixing up of ideals of equity and a neoliberal politics and economics better serves 
the market than it does individuals, and serves capitalist interests more than democratic 
ends. Eighth, the g/t relationship is articulated through a liberal humanist concept of 
women’s ethic of care, morality, or values and yet these ideas remain under-defined and 
under-conceptualized. Ninth, the story remains bound to a liberal humanist tradition that 
is now thought, by a large number of thinkers, to be insufficient for understanding the 
complex problems we face as a society. Tenth and last, the role of education in this 
intersectional stew could be more powerfully explicated.  
Taken in its entirety, the g/t story articulates a political intent to transform or 
intervene in an oppressive and circumscribing masculinized computing culture. However, 
this story, and the relationship it tries to describe and remake, is about much more than 
this. The problem is that we cannot see this ‘more’ unless we access resources that are 
currently outside the conceptual reach of the story, e.g. posthumanism, feminist 
technoscience, and new materialist ideas. These new resources reflect a contemporary 
postindustrial struggle over how to articulate a new ethics-aesthetics-politics and to create 
both the space and means for a radical shift in how we think and relate. This new ethic 
and ways of thinking are fundamentally in tension with a number of traditions and beliefs 
that dominate approaches to thinking about STEM education and educational research 
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and policy. In this new thinking, ontology supersedes epistemology and connectedness 
becomes more significant and useful than reduction and essentialization (e.g. Barad, 2007; 
Colebrook, 2009; Haraway, 1997). In this new model, research, methodology, and theory 
building are recognized to be not merely outcomes of correct executions of scientific 
principles, but also, and more importantly, exercises in responsibility and relationships of 
being as well as knowing. Dynamism becomes the ontological and conceptual paradigm 
most relevant for thinking through the problems and interconnected relationships of this 
new era (Braidotti, 2002, 2006; Colebrook, 2009).  
These new resources of posthumanism, feminist technoscience, and new 
materialism suggest a new way of thinking that is concerned not only for human futures, 
but also, for the rest of the world, where nature and culture are conceived as 
interconnected and co-evolving. This new thinking is also intersectional, non-
dichotomizing, and non-essentializing. For example, in this new paradigm, nature and 
culture, ontology and epistemology, being and knowing, and so on are no longer viewed as 
oppositional conditions or positions. This chapter explains these ideas and resources, 
describes the opportunities that this new thinking opens up, and explores a shift to a 
posthumanist ethic through the lens of the g/t relationship and story. Finally, the chapter 
articulates the significance of this conceptual and ethical shift for educational research and 
STEM pedagogy in ways that extend beyond and challenge current STEM initiatives and 
pedagogical emphases.  
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Getting Over the Liberal-Humanist Ethic-of-Care  
Pervasive across the meta g/t story is the notion that bringing more women into 
technology fields will fundamentally change technology, inferring an “easy” solution to a 
pervasive discontent with many of the effects of technological progress. As g/t micro-stories 
unfold and collide, women and gender are used to mediate a broad set of ill-defined 
complex technology associated anxieties that in turn are manifestations of a number of 
problematic, black-boxed conceptualizations and beliefs.     
Re-imagining the g/t story is an opportunity to consider more closely what is at 
stake when it is suggested that bringing more women into computing will change 
computing, its culture, or the kinds of technologies developed. In these narratives, much is 
attributed to women’s ethic-of-care, yet this ethic itself has been well-criticized within 
feminism. Thus, an important question to consider is what is at stake in articulating the 
g/t relationship as this kind of ethical, transformative agent. This ethic-of-care is 
inseparable from liberal-cultural feminism but both have met substantial criticisms by 
major feminist and feminist technoscience scholars.  
The idea that women will dramatically alter or transform the field of computing 
largely builds from liberal feminism’s conception of a gendered ethic-of-care that has been 
articulated through the work of Gilligan (1982, 1993) and Noddings (1984, 2003), among 
others. In the g/t story, this ethic, in part, is positioned to soften the blow of technological 
progress and the instrumentalization of technology by neutralizing the “technology for 
technology’s sake” play ethic of boys and men. As I argued in chapter seven, the technology 
of gender both constructs and relies upon a gendered object functioning as a kind of 
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apparatus to both serve and mediate technological progress. One significant problem is 
that this gendered liberal-humanist ethic of care is unreflexively used and under theorized. 
Another is that it understands the gendered subject or object (and its “ungendered” 
opposite) as improbably static as well as too facilely locatable or fixable. New theories 
coming out of neurobiology (Damasio, 1994, 2005), posthumanist and new materialist 
scholarship (e.g. Braidotti, 2006; Colebrook, 2009; Hayles, 1999), and feminist 
technoscience studies (e.g. Barad, 2007; Haraway, 1991b, 2003) bring new ideas for 
rethinking the core questions, theories, and methodologies that have grounded the g/t 
story. The liberal ethic-of-care, specifically, is found to be wanting. In essence, my argument 
is that the meta g/t story to date has been quite constrained but it can be opened up with 
some radical conceptual intervention and by moving away from the constraints wrought by 
Gilligan’s ethic-of-care.  
 
Shifting Paradigms: From Humanism to the Posthuman 
The g/t story has largely been taken to be a descriptive story with two key 
intentions: (a) constructing explanations and causes of the gender gap in computing and 
(b) transforming women, computing cultures, and computing education. While the first 
goal has been more successfully realized, the second has not—largely because its underlying 
premises are insufficient to the task. 
In essence, the g/t story has been largely ineffectual in its aims as a transformative 
or interventionist narrative because it remains wedded to ways of thinking no longer 
sufficient for understanding the increasingly complex intersections between humans and 
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non-humans (e.g. Haraway, 2003; Latour, 2005) and nature and culture (Barad, 2007; 
Grosz, 2005; Wilson, 1998). Posthumanist, new materialist, and feminist technoscience 
scholarship has much to offer in re-imagining the significance and subsequent study of the 
g/t relationship, particularly as it continues to play out in the ways STEM education and 
research are themselves conceived.105 
Ways of thinking that have served modern science’s quest to control nature are 
dependent on a separation of humans and human culture from nature. Located within the 
domain of nature have been emotions, affect, and intuition. This suggests how women, 
too, have been largely situated within nature rather than culture. In this way of thinking, 
culture has been understood to move forward exclusively through the intentions of man 
and reason. Thus, a central organizing feature of modern thinking has been that the 
rational mind functions independently of its body. I will not delve into these complex ideas 
here, as my intention is merely to highlight the dominance of this modernist, 
Enlightenment notion of thinking as the conceptual framework behind the g/t story. This 
framework, in its transparency and dominance, severely limits the possibility of thinking in 
terms of connections and non-essentialisms. In essence, we have become so comfortable in 
a way of thinking (much of this comfort achieved through schooling) that it requires 
significant, reflexive effort to begin to articulate and think through a different kind of 
thinking.  
                                                
105 I am not specifically addressing race, class, or other categorizations because (a) I do not 
have space and (b) I am not convinced that the additive treatment called for in mainstream 
g/t research is sufficient. That is, race, class, ethnicity, disability, and so on—in relation to 
technology—might benefit from substantively different analyses. For example, Alcoff makes 
a compelling case that race and class do not constitute a similar metaphysics as does sex.  
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For example, the old thinking depends on dichotomous conceptions of men versus 
women in essentializing a techno-patriarchy that a liberal feminist ethic is intent on 
disrupting. Similarly, social constructivist arguments depend on a form of essentializing 
and dichotomous thinking that becomes determinist and fixed even as it wants to describe 
dynamic social interactions. Re-imagining, in the ways that I use it, refers to a process of 
drawing on new concepts that may help us get more comfortable with thinking that is less 
dichotomous, reductivist, essentializing, determinist, or static. 
My argument has been, in part, that limited conceptual frameworks constrain the 
g/t story. Following Braidotti, a responsibly evolving feminist imaginary requires 
countering old ways of thinking not because they were wholly wrong, but because they are 
no longer sufficient to the problems we face or thinking about the ways in which nature 
and culture themselves are evolving (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008; Barad, 2007; Colebrook, 
2009). Before discussing in more depth these new ways of thinking, it is important to 
understand what is meant by posthumanism and new materialism, the arguments being 
made by feminist technoscience scholars, and why these are so significant. 
 
To What Do Posthumanism, New Materialism, & Feminist Technoscience Refer? 
Posthumanism, new materialism, and feminist technoscience draw on a set of 
shared ideas about ontology, ethics, agency, and connection. Thus, each notion or field is 
difficult to define independent of the others. Posthumanism might be described as a shift 
away from thinking about humans as singular and dominant agents with the resources to 
control nature and drive culture. Instead, there is a growing recognition of and respect for 
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a multiplicity of agents, which might be organic or inorganic, human or non-human, 
natural or cultural and who each contribute to an evolving nature-culture in some way. 
This intersectional and interspecies perspective necessitates a new ethical orientation to the 
world, in part, because humans are no longer viably the dominant agent at the helm.   
New materialists argue that the material world carries implications central to ethics 
and politics. They emphasize a shift from “ethical principles to ethical practices” and from 
rules to “embodied, situated actions” (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008, p. 7). New materialist 
thinking reflects a dissatisfaction with thinking about nature, culture, or the body as 
products wholly of discourse or as independently functioning entities. It also emphasizes a 
shift from discourses about the body to thinking about “the body itself as an active, 
sometimes recalcitrant, force” and how attending to material realities informs the 
construction and progression of discourses (p. 4). It is a turn away from the dominance of 
discourse and the motivation is a new ethics concerned with being, ontology, and 
experience. Together, posthumanism and new materialisms dismantle the grounds for 
thinking in terms of masculine hegemony. 
Feminist technoscience draws from posthumanism and new materialisms to think 
about technology more expansively, in a way that ontologically connects “the human, 
nonhuman, technological, and natural as agents that jointly construct the parameters of  
our common world” (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008, p. 5). It is also concerned with the 
implications of this ontology and interaction for women (broadly construed).106   
                                                
106 I highlight several women scholars, but some significant others who also work in this 
landscape of technoscience theory are Bruno Latour and Andrew Pickering 
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What becomes evident in feminist technoscience scholarship is the value of 
embodied-situated, intersectional, diffractive, or transdisciplinary methodologies in 
effecting a change in our ethical relationship to technology, nature, and culture. These 
conceptual and methodological strategies refer to a way of thinking about problems and 
questions as having multiple, intersecting nodes of influence and interests, none really 
separable from the other. Rather than reifying oppositions and essentialisms, they suggest a 
critical engagement with “mattering” (Barad, 2007). Thinking in this way, the significance 
of science, politics, knowledge, bodies, philosophy, the arts, and education (to name some) 
is not their singular or self-sufficient bodies of knowledge, but their intersection as a 
multiplicity of lenses for thinking about the relationship between nature and culture. This 
quest is a search for a dynamic, responsive, complex, and interspecies sensitive ethic of care 
(Barad, 2007; Haraway, 2003). To focus on one location—e.g. women or technology, nature 
or culture, art or science—is to leave out what in reality cannot be reduced or left out.  
 Much of my thesis has emphasized the limitations of the g/t story due to the way it 
has been conceptualized through psychology, behaviorism, and cognitive science. While I 
believe the criticisms to be fair, this is not to wholly dismiss any of these out of hand. The 
problem is the way in which these conceptualizing tools are used to construct a totalizing 
story that enframes women, men, nature, technology, culture, and education. For g/t 
research to be substantively transformative, it must rethink the kinds of questions asked as 
well expand the base of theory and concepts that foreground research questions and 
agendas.  
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Posthumanism, new materialism, and feminist technoscience appear to be 
unfamiliar terrain for g/t researchers or policy makers within education, who tend to be 
more versed in psychology, evaluation, or the learning sciences. Moreover, these ideas 
remain controversial within feminism and other research discourses. Nonetheless, the ideas 
are compelling for the reasons I outlined in earlier paragraphs and might be viewed as 
responses to a growing dissatisfaction with essentializing, cultural, discursive, or 
postmodern or relativist explanations of socio-political-technological relationships or 
subjectivities (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008; Barad, 2007; Grosz, 2005; Haraway, 1997).  
 Both posthumanist and new materialist scholars attack two long-standing 
oppositions: epistemology versus ontology and language versus reality. Posthumanism and 
new materiality aim to move beyond the limitations of dichotomous thinking that drive 
both modernist and postmodern epistemologies (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008; Barad, 2007; 
Colebrook, 2009; Connolly, 2002; Grosz, 2005; Haraway, 1997). These ideas suggest a 
better approach to theorizing, conceived as a dynamic enterprise that permits “a 
deconstruction of the material/discursive dichotomy that retains both elements without 
privileging either…to more productively account for the agency, semiotic force, and 
dynamics of bodies and natures” (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008, p. 6). Realigning how we 
think about the intersections and co-existence of humans and non-humans along with 
nature and culture is not merely an abstract theoretical exercise—it is an ethico-political 
shift that brings together, as fundamentally inseparable, a number of longstanding 
oppositional constructions: materiality and language; human and non-human agencies; 
epistemology and ontology; mind and body; and the natural (human) and technological. 
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 The posthumanist turn is also an ethical and political shift away from liberal 
humanism. For example, Colebrook suggests “a feminist politics that ‘frees matter from the 
human through the human’” (cited in Alaimo & Hekman, 2008, p. 11). Hayles (1999) 
characterizes the posthuman as follows: “There are no essential differences or absolute 
demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism 
and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals” (p. 3). Posthumanism is a 
critique of sorts, of the liberal humanist subject, thought to be endowed with free will and 
at the center of the world, yet in service to the market. The humanist subject is no longer a 
viable conception theoretically, in actuality, or ethically, which Hayles explains as follows:  
If ‘human essence is freedom from the wills of others,’ the posthuman is ‘post’ not 
because it is necessarily unfree but because there is no a priori way to identify a self-
will that can be clearly distinguished from an other-will….the construction of the 
posthuman does not require the subject to be a literal cyborg. Whether or not 
interventions have been made on the body, new models of subjectivity emerging 
from such fields as cognitive science and artificial life imply that even a biologically 
unaltered Homo sapiens counts as posthuman. The defining characteristics involve 
the construction of subjectivity, not the presence of nonbiological components.  
(p. 4) 
 
Hayles’ project in How We Became Posthuman (1999) is to retheorize the interplay of 
embodiment, materiality, subjectivity, and information, to contest, as she puts it, the 
“materiality/information separation” that has been presumed across the cybernetic 
movement (p. 12). Posthumanist and new materialist feminisms emphasize a turn to 
“theorizing”—rather than “proving theory”—to better construe an ethical realignment of 
subjects and objects, theorizing and ethics, and materiality and language. The intent is a 
return to thinking about reality and being without the empiricism of modernist, human-
centered epistemologies. As Barad (2007) puts it, the aim is to make room for matter to 
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matter. Moreover, these intersecting relationships are dynamic and thus, another ideal is a 
return to uncertainty and ambiguity as an ethical stance. Relational unfolding, rather than 
singular accomplishment or final explanations takes center stage.  
Feminist new materialist and posthumanist thinking is itself highly multi-faceted 
but overall, it reflects a deep ethical concern for how we think about the intersection of 
nature (the body, the material world, the environment and animals), culture (language, 
mind, cultural artifacts, and technology), and technoscience (tools, non-humans, 
knowledge, or methodology). These are complex ideas to navigate or connect, which is why 
an intersectional and diffractive methodological lens becomes useful and necessary.   
 
Articulating a New Intersectional Ethics  
The gender gap addressed in the meta g/t story is not a falsehood, but it has been 
miscalculated. First, it is not sufficiently or appropriately “objective” as an explanatory 
narrative and the story itself has become a limitation for both women and society. Second, 
rather than a representation of disparate abilities, interests, or access, the gender gap and 
g/t story are products of how we construe women and what society wants or needs from 
women, as much as for women. It is also a narrative that reflects a conflicted and 
insufficiently articulated understanding of both the intersections of technology, progress, 
and education and the dynamic relationship between science and politics and nature and 
culture. The g/t story tries to mediate our human condition and ethical position in this 
technological era, but relies on an insufficient arsenal of conceptual tools.  
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Re-imagining the story and g/t relationship presents an intellectual and ethical 
challenge and significant conceptual reframings are needed to open up how we think about 
the intersection of gender, technology, education, and society. At stake is an opportunity 
for examining and integrating new yet potentially controversial ways of thinking that put 
the focus back on ontology and foreground the increasing interdependence and complexity 
of nature with culture and mind with body. In this understanding, scientific knowledge, if it 
is to be objective, must be grounded in contexts of knowing and being; it cannot be 
disengaged from the embodied knower. Although STEM literacy, equity issues, worker 
productivity, more human-centered technologies, or sustaining America’s global 
competitiveness have been the overarching concerns of U.S. g/t research and policy, what 
is ultimately at stake, as Heidegger suggested, is the future of an interconnected nature and 
culture and how we think about our human role in shaping this future. This suggests that 
what we need is not merely technocratic, skills driven STEM education, but a more 
philosophically attuned set of pedagogies and policies. These should be at least as 
concerned with building critical and reflexive “ethical” dispositions for thinking forward as 
they are with building technological literacies, as these have been commonly understood. 
By commonly understood techno-literacies I mean views that have narrowly defined and 
focused technical competencies as well as those that push literacy a bit farther to  
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encompass the socio-cultural contexts and influences on learning (e.g. Gee, 2003; 
Lankshear, 1999). In all of these however, individual competencies as users, teachers, or 
consumers of technologies have been central. 
That is, STEM education, while preparing students to become literate in the 
techniques and knowledges of STEM fields could attend equally to developing the kinds of 
highly nuanced techno-ethical dispositions that our contemporary situation demands. The 
challenge is how to integrate posthumanist and new materialist ethics as a core aspect of 
STEM learning, thus bringing ontological and philosophical thinking together with the 
techno-scientific.  
One of the driving concerns in these new ways of thinking is how to think outside 
dominant and long-standing oppositional framings that, for example, have separated 
humans from the rest of nature or technology, tried to articulate gender as a social 
construction independent of biology, or argued for the independence of scientific 
knowledge from the producer of that knowledge. Haraway (1991a, 1997), Barad (2007), 
Braidotti (2002, 2006), Colebrook (2009), Grosz (2005), Hayles (1999), Alaimo & 
Heckman (2008), and Wilson (1998) each suggest a complex intersectionality wherein 
technology and humans, along with nature and culture, have evolved to be so intertwined 
that we need to be thinking in posthumanist terms.107 Posthumanist, new materialist, and 
feminist technoscience thinking open new opportunities for both g/t research and for 
                                                
107 Other scholars address some of these concerns, many of whom I have highlighted in 
earlier chapters. Here I largely focus on this group because of the ways in which they bring 
together ideas about women, technology, society, and ethics in a search for alternatives to 
dominant binaries and the assumptions that they have fostered.  
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thinking about STEM education as a disposition rather than merely a skill set. The next 
sections explicate five shifts in thinking that move towards this new intersectional techno-
ethical literacy: non-dichotomizing, non-essentializing, non-determinist, intersectional, and 
dynamic-nomadic.   
  
Five Shifts in Thinking  
1. Non-dichotomizing thinking (reconnecting mind-body and nature-culture). A 
significant limitation of the g/t story is the way it depends on fixed ideas about gender as 
an identifying marker sufficiently stable so as to be locatable and easily available for re-
engineering to meet societal needs. One reason that gender is such a key signifier is that it 
facilitates a way of talking about a number of dichotomous relationships, e.g. m-f, nature-
culture, and technoscience-values. Braidotti’s (2006) reading of Haraway explains this as an 
ideology dependent on an epistemology tied to normal science’s reliance on oppositions of 
nature-culture and subject-object, which depend on conceptualizations built around 
“patriarchal, Oedipal familial narratives”(p. 5).108  Within this epistemology, even a socially 
constructed notion of gender or the g/t relationship has great difficulty escaping 
dichotomizing (and determining) oppositional constructions. “Opposition” is the 
conceptual framework of the g/t story, which can be seen clearly as a lineage that traces 
through Chodorow’s The Reproduction of Mothering, Turkle’s The Second Self, to Margolis and 
                                                
108 This idea refers to the ways in which liberal feminism draws on a Freudian psychology 
framework that delineates boys and girls at an early age through their differing 
relationships to the symbolic mother or father.  
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Fisher’s Unlocking the Clubhouse. The following illustrates Margolis and Fisher’s attachment 
to that lineage: 
Turkle (1984) describes the constraints of computer games as ‘those imposed by 
rule systems, not physical realities or moral considerations.’…She finds a 
compelling explanation in the writings of…Chodorow…[who] explores how boys’ 
gender identity development is linked to their awareness, at around four or five 
years old, that they are different from the mother…They must separate and become 
autonomous from their mother…girls experience no need for separation, and girls’ 
and women’s style of relationship is therefore based on intimacy and closeness. 
(2002, p. 42)  
 
From this conceptual position, the g/t story largely plays out as a problem of minds and 
culture. Psychological, behavioral, and cognitive theories frame the oppositions as innate to 
the object (e.g. male or female aptitudes or interests) but these differences are conceived 
around matters of mind where biological m-f sex differences are of nature, and thus, not 
deemed relevant. Discursive perspectives suggest that gendered behaviors and beliefs are 
products of culture. Nature, understood as something apart from culture, has been 
relegated to the margins as the problem that constructivist practices shape and reshape 
(Braidotti, 2006; Haraway, 1997).  
 In the view of new materialist and feminist technoscience scholars, the nature-
culture and m-f binaries must be rethought in order to reflect interconnections rather than 
oppositions. Following this challenge, g/t researchers might productively consider the 
significance of this turn to ontology, materiality, change, and embodiment. To do this will 
require expanding both the conceptual lenses in use and the notion of theorizing itself. In 
essence, within g/t research and policy-making, materiality and the body, which are central 
in engaging with the world, seem to have gone missing due to methodological and 
dichotomizing concepts and practices that have privileged lenses of the psychological, 
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cognitive, and behavioral sciences. Arguably, this is in part an outcome of the strong 
methodological dependence on the methods of disengaged, unbiased normal science that 
in turn are the basis of believing that the g/t story is a broadly encompassing and 
explanatory portrayal of women, gender, and technology, where researchers can draw on 
the past to predict the future. The meta story has something in common with earlier 
feminist critiques of science (e.g. those of Fox-Keller or Harding), that “have argued that 
‘culture’ is more important than ‘nature’’ (Valentine, 2008, p. 356). Feminist 
technoscience scholars argue however, “in fact, it is the other way around” (p. 356), but not 
in an oppositional way.  
2. De-essentializing concepts. Feminist scholars have long grappled with the 
question of sex versus gender from a number of perspectives and disciplines. Alcoff (2006) 
states “the philosophical core of the debate over essentialism was a debate over the 
metaphysics of gender” (p. 153). Her argument is that in making essentialism the focus, 
both cultural feminists—in insisting on differences—and poststructuralists—in taking a 
wholly anti-essentialist position, are both headed in an unproductive direction. Neither 
sufficiently attends to historical, contextual, or embodied realities of being female—in 
essence, they all ignore the metaphysical dimension of being and of sex. Alcoff suggests that 
even poststructuralist feminist positions still rely on a nature-culture binary and thus fall 
into the trap of reifying the very position that they criticize—that Enlightenment reason can 
prevail over nature. The problem is falling into the conceptual trap of thinking that nature 
can be transcended and mastered (e.g. that bodies do not matter, for example, as 
technologies increasingly intervene in bodily functions). She suggests an alternative, where 
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“our cultural practices and productions occur within a material world, which would eschew 
both a neat nature/culture divide and the commitment to transcend and master nature” 
(p. 161).  
 Also challenging modernist conceptions that dismiss biological essentialism, Wilson 
draws on Damasio’s (1994, 2005) work in neurobiology and an historically neglected 
neural network model of computing and human intelligence. In Neural Geographies (1998), 
she counters both feminist anti-biology stances and the dominance of models of mind and 
AI fostered by cybernetics (e.g. Minsky’s symbolic processing model of computing). 
Additionally, she suggests that feminism’s insistence that women not be defined by the 
biological has severely limited the usefulness of feminist psychological theory. Similarly, in 
her estimation, Minsky and Papert’s success in suppressing the neural network and parallel 
distributed processing models of computing derailed the possibilities of these connectionist 
models for developing better models of cognition.  
Wilson’s (1998) concern is that cultural feminism has been too successful in 
rendering the body abiological as an object shaped and understood exclusively by culture, 
psychology, and experience (1998, p. 15). New work in neurobiology and neurocognition 
opens ways for biology to become more useful to the feminist project and to social 
transformation. In arguing for a new significance to ontology, Wilson suggests a 
reconnection of critique and science that will be better positioned to overcome or unravel 
a history of “debts and disavowal” that have kept these domains separate and consequently 
have supported the contemporary neoliberal project. In her estimation, feminist thinking 
must reorder its focus—through ontology—to be more critically cognizant of how bodies 
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operate as a filtering mechanism and where feminist psychology, in its theoretical 
distancing from biology or ontology, has unproductively aligned itself with empiricism and 
liberal humanism. The reconnection of nature and culture is a return to ontology 
grounded in ideas that cross philosophy and science. Moreover, within this intersectional 
thinking is the basis for deconstructing the essentialisms derived from dichotomizing 
epistemologies.   
3. Non pre-determined thinking (rethinking objectivity & causality). Ever more 
precisely articulated methods and unbiased scientific objectivity are increasingly argued to 
be the needed corrections to improve educational g/t research (e.g. National Research 
Council, 2002). However, the notion of objectivity in play in these arguments has been 
increasingly recognized as not viable (nor particularly objective) by major feminist and STS 
scholars. Specifically, feminist technoscience regards mainstream science’s dogma of 
objectivity as an apparatus of patriarchal science and a practice that ultimately produces a 
flawed and limited objectivity and ethic. Haraway (1991a, 1997) deconstructed the 
epistemology behind an all-knowing view-from-nowhere, which has been key in this critical 
conversation. New thinking is that knowledge and objectivity require contextual and 
embodied engagement without which both the quality of this objectivity and its ethical 
basis must be questioned.  
In pursuit of a similar correction, Grosz’s Time Travels: Feminism, Nature, Power 
(2005) puts temporality at the center of a new ethics. She resuscitates Darwin’s theory of 
evolution for feminism. She posits a way of thinking about the interconnected, temporal 
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Moreover, she provides a way around concerns about the efficacy of prediction based on 
historically bound causal relations by thinking in terms of becoming to make it possible to 
responsibly respond to the increasing interdependence of nature and culture, humans and 
non-humans, and science and politics. Rather than oppositions, she suggests a way of 
thinking in terms of continuity: 
These ‘others,’ these inhuman, subhuman, and extrahuman forces—forces that 
structure culture, the law, representations, and all the other products of the 
human—need to be understood in terms of a continuity with rather than in 
opposition to the human. (p. 4-5) 
 
At the center of this shift is a re-appreciation of ontology as “the center of knowledges and 
social practices” (p. 5). Ontology, previously thought to refer to “static, fixed…universal 
principles or ideals, indifferent to history, particularity, or change,” is reconceived to refer 
to a material world that is always in becoming through the ongoing interplay of “history, 
biology, culture, sexuality”; ontology is “what is fundamentally at stake in such struggles” 
(p. 5).  
Grosz (2005) states that her essays are “experiments in practical philosophy, 
philosophy harnessed to explore various social, cultural, and epistemological practices… 
from the point of view of their dynamic direction forward” (p. 1). Her thought experiments 
in Darwinian theory offer several opportunities to g/t researchers and policy-makers in 
education. First, she articulates a way of thinking about differences that both matter and 
evolve in relationship, over time. This is something other than the quest to identify 
differences that continue a line of oppositional hierarchy building that can only be 
predictive as long as the objects so differentiated remain as they were, indefinitely and 
predictably. In Grosz’s view, feminist theory must recognize its own limits as an explanatory 
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force and be willing to transform as circumstances, subjects, and objects change. The same 
might be said for g/t research, which seems bent on strengthening its ties to a dated 
feminism and to a modernist epistemology that runs counter to the underlying ethical 
narrative of g/t research.     
Grosz (1995) specifically argues that Darwin’s theory “provides a striking response 
to various theories of oppression” (p. 28). Life proceeds as an interplay of “struggle and 
development” that forecasts “a more ‘postmodern’ concept of emergence” rather than the 
model of oppression relied on in liberalism (p. 29). Similarly, the dominant g/t story, in 
the ways it supports market-driven agendas, reveals how political agendas tend to be hidden 
behind a wall of modern science’s ideologies and epistemologies. Ultimately, the value of 
Grosz’s work for thinking about g/t lies in the way she articulates an ethics of theorizing. 
She finds in Darwinian evolution much to think about in terms of bringing to the 
foreground the value of ontology, rethinking the nature-culture opposition, and examining 
power as an outcome of both top down and bottom up relations. Her idea that feminist 
theory must evolve in relation to shifting realities seems to me to be an argument for a new 
approach to theorizing. This is an ethic of thinking relationally where theory itself must be 
responsive and emergent. This ethic is sensitive to temporality and differences that are 
both ontological yet intertwined and always dynamic. This theorizing builds from a practice 
of ambiguity and it rejects pre-determined thinking. 
Driven by similar concerns, Dewey suggested a flaw within an epistemologically 
construed “dogma of the superior reality of ‘causes’” (Hickman & Alexander, 1998, p. 
136). He argued that the central “fallacy converts consequences of interaction of events 
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into causes of the occurrence of these consequences…‘Matter,’ or the physical, is a 
character of events when they occur at a certain level of interaction” (p. 139). These efforts 
at articulating nature-culture and the interactive nature of events endeavor to 
accommodate dynamism as more significant than is a focus on cause-effect relationships. 
The thinking is that dynamism better conceptualizes relationships that are inherently 
always in flux and in relationship. 
These ideas seems useful for thinking about the g/t relationship, which to date has 
largely been conceptualized through an ethic of care articulated through Gilligan (and 
Freudian psychology) that in turn relies on liberal humanist values that place human 
culture at the center of the world. Liberal feminism’s ethic of care aims to give women an 
equal status to men in this human centered conception where human culture is a triumph 
over nature. New materialist inspired feminist technoscience argues a different kind of 
ethic where nature and culture and the human and non-human are intimately 
interdependent. As Barad (2007) suggests, reconnecting nature and culture necessitates 
rethinking our conception of causality. I do not have a definitive answer here, but rather, 
propose that a productive next question would involve connecting posthumanist, new 
materialist, and feminist technoscience and examining what such a connection offers for 
thinking about g/t and STEM pedagogy and research. How might these ideas help in 
thinking about not only STEM curricula and individual student and teacher literacies, but  
also make central the ethical dimensions where technology, humans, and education 
increasingly intersect?  
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4. Intersectional thinking. The emerging ethic of care also rethinks assumptions 
about the Cartesian split between mind and body, reason and affect. One example of this 
thinking is Connolly’s Neuropolitics (2002) wherein he builds on Damasio’s work to argue a 
political perspective that ontologically recognizes a body-brain and affective-reasoning 
network that is central in thinking about culture wholly interconnected with nature. 
Nature, in Connolly’s view, can no longer be viewed as separate from culture. Also useful 
in making this shift is James’s (1997) work that suggests that modern science has 
misconstrued Descartes such that our twentieth century mind-body dualism is our own 
construal. Her argument is that in the 17th century the passions were more integral than 
we have presumed and that revisiting this period will help us in better understanding the 
role of the passions and recognizing the centrality of the body and emotions where 
previously the mind was thought to rule.  
Intersectionality and diffraction are a means of bridging these polarizing 
oppositions in search of better conceptions and ways of knowing. As an example of what is 
at stake, James’s (1997) work on the passions aims to bridge the gulf between psychology 
and philosophy and argues that grasping the significance of the passions in the seventeenth 
century brings the body and its affective states back to philosophy, healing the modern 
intellectual rift between mind and body.  
More specifically, for the purposes of thinking about g/t, passion is another 
concept overused and underdefined in g/t research. It is used to explain gendered 
engagements with computers through oppositions of utilitarian versus playful dispositions 
to the computer as either tools (girls and women) or toys (boys and men). Grounding these 
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oppositions are the psychological constructs enabled by the modern insistence on 
separating mind and body, reason and affect, enabled by reductivist epistemologies. The 
g/t story has used passion to explain both an instrumental orientation to technology and to 
posit women’s ethic of care not blinded by this passionate connection to the computer. 
The g/t story is often framed around ideas about passion and reason but neither have been 
particularly well explicated. James (1997) offers an analytic that suggests these are 
connected in ways not evident in the g/t story. As she states: 
The seventeenth century continues to be portrayed as the dawn of modernity, the 
cradle of a culture in which man becomes set over against nature and nature takes 
on a purely instrumental significance, and in which a range of emotional responses 
to the natural world give way to dispassionate calculations of utility. (p. 17) 
 
What she argues is that emotions (the passions) are contained through a cultural impetus 
for utilitarian arrangements. I see here a potentially useful thread of inquiry that would 
support the development of more sophisticated conceptions regarding how the passions, 
instrumentality, and suppositions about m-f natures are utilized in thinking about the g/t 
relationship or STEM education.   
I highlight this because the mind-body separation, in many ways, forms the 
conceptual basis of the g/t story. Mind is reason, logic, and abstract thinking and is most 
often associated to the masculine; its oppositions—passion, intuition, and concreteness—are 
given over to the body and women. This binary is quite strong yet its application within the 
g/t story is conceptually thin and because of this, a concept of passion too easily “travels” as 
an attribute given to men or women, depending on the hypothesis being promoted. For 
example, throughout the story, men’s connection to the computer is described as 
passionate, and yet women are articulated as the more emotional and engaged gender. The 
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conceptual gap is in explicating the connections (or lack thereof) between mind-body and 
passion-emotion (or affect).109 James (1997) troubles the assumed veracity of this binary in 
two ways that are particularly relevant to thinking about gender and technology. First, she 
argues that feminism has too easily criticized Cartesian-inspired philosophy as a patriarchal 
structure that “served to attach women more firmly to the physical world, and a 
comparable split between reason and passion condemned them to the realm of affect” (p. 
18). In her estimation, this assumption has become a limitation for feminism, arguing that 
long-held beliefs about Cartesian philosophy are ripe for reexamination. At stake is an 
opportunity to realign the mind and body relationship to better serve feminism and to 
support an ethical realignment by bringing together philosophy and psychology where the 
emotions become more central to philosophy. To be gained is a better understanding of 
“moral motivation and growth, the springs of action (rational and otherwise), and the 
nature of reasoning” (p. 22).  
5. Dynamism & a political nomadic knowing. Feminist technoscience scholars are 
revisiting Darwin’s theory of evolution as a theory of dynamism and intersectionality most 
useful in helping to articulate the ontological questions and relationships thought to be at 
stake. Building from Darwin, Grosz (2005) suggests that nature and culture are inseparable 
and that both evolve, as must feminism, technology, or politics, through “continuous 
revision and revitalization” (2005, p. 28). As she thinks about Darwinian evolution and 
                                                
109 Also quite relevant to this discussion, although I do not have space to go down this 
path, is the recent scholarship on affect theory, e.g. Massumi, B. (2002). The autonomy of 
affect Parables for the virtual: Movement, affect, sensation. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press; and Connolly, W. E. (2002). Neuropolitics: Thinking, culture, speed. Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press.  
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articulates its usefulness for feminism and for “explain[ing]…languages, technology and 
cultural practices” (p. 26), it is an “ingenious temporal machine for the production of the 
new” (p. 25). Grosz’s insight that time itself is not a unity but contains the past (as virtual 
memory), the real (present), and an unknowable future seems to me to be a significant 
opportunity for thinking about the intersection of g/t research and STEM pedagogy as 
serving ethical commitments of significance to both culture and nature, humans and non-
humans. The thread of g/t research and policy that suggests women’s ethic of care will 
change technology seems to be struggling for an appropriate conceptual language. At the 
least, there is evidence of a growing discontent with the status quo of current g/t research.  
Colebrook argues (2009) that our contemporary, humanist “ethic of care” just 
repeats a long-standing human cultural dominance and patriarchy. Her concern is the 
environment in particular, but this same ethic of care pervades the g/t story. Drawing on a 
post Damasio conception of life, conceived around notions of dynamism, creativity, and 
“life always in meaning,” she suggests that man is no longer best conceived as a calculating 
animal but as a dynamic organism of nature as much as of culture. The logic of humanism 
and anthropomorphism is, in Colebrook’s (2009) estimation, ultimately fatal. The self-
preservation motivations of humanism are ultimately a path to eventual self-extinction 
because they are so exclusively focused on human survival. (This idea resonates with 
Heidegger’s explication of our modern relation to technology as an imperative to control 
nature.) Colebrook, building on Braidotti’s seminal work, makes a case for a nomadic 
posthumanism-feminism better situated to allow thinking in terms of interconnections that 
fracture the comfort zone of human centered, knowable boundaries. She posits a new 
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notion of vitalism able to extend beyond the centrality of Western man, of oppositions of 
male-female, and of the human-non-human. Moreover, she suggests that as high 
philosophy increasingly turns to cognitive science, referring to Heidegger becomes a 
necessary, even oppositional, practice.  On the one hand, biology becomes increasingly 
significant, but the nature and significance of biological difference itself is being 
reconceived.  
Concurring with Colebrook, Braidotti suggests that new materialist feminism shifts 
the location of otherness from axes of difference and from the limitations of m-f 
oppositions.110 In a posthumanist conception, liberal sex and gender oppositions are no 
longer useful. Instead, the focus shifts to acknowledging transversal connections between 
multiple kinds of subjects and subjectivities. This is the terrain broached by Barad’s (2007) 
agential realism as she too, offers an argument against the limitations of a liberal humanist 
conception of agency. For Barad, agency is not something one has or can deny, but instead 
manifests as a relational ontology where interactions are never determining, but instead, 
outcomes of entangled doing and affecting. At stake, in her estimation, is how to rethink 
an ethic of causality to better accommodate the interactive nature of actions, community, 
relationships, and disparate actors. She wants a re-envisioning of causality and temporality, 
where time is not universally given but resynchronized through various practices: the future 
is not what will unfold and there is no inherent determinism between past, present, and 
future. There can be no undoing of the past but instead, productive reconfigurations that 
                                                
110 Braidotti’s response is to Colebrook’s keynote address at the 7th European Feminist 
Research Conference: Gendered Cultures at the Crossroads of Imagination, Knowledge 
and Politics, (2009), Utrecht.  
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bring to the foreground the centrality of an ethics that is about mattering and that 
responds to the other in a responsible way. Barad’s voice contributes to feminist 
interventions that are interweaving ethics-scholarship-science; hers is an ethical-ontological-
realist holism that carves a path around dualisms and the limitations of critique, as it has 
heretofore been practiced.111 
 
New Thinking for a New Techno-Ethics in STEM Education 
If humanism, representationalism, scientism, binarism, and constructivism are the 
limiting ideologies to be transcended, what does this mean for education’s g/t story, 
pedagogies, research, and policy-making? To consider some possibilities, I return to 
Haraway. Braidotti (2006) develops Haraway’s thesis that situated knowing facilitates a 
greater objectivity than does normal science. In contrast to Enlightenment epistemologies 
of disembodiment, post-humanism describes an embodied, engaged, and situated stance in 
knowledge building and being-in-the-world—fully interconnected across nature and culture. 
The shift is from reductions to thinking in terms of process, time, contexts, and 
connections. Braidotti explains this as follows: 
Philosophical post-humanism does not…result in anti-foundationalism. It rather 
stresses the need for process ontology. Thinking is a nomadic activity, which takes 
place in the transitions between potentially contradictory positions. It is not 
topologically bound, especially in the age of the global economy and telematic 
networks, but this does not make it ungrounded, like a view from nowhere. To be 
in process or transition does not place the thinking subject outside history or time: 
postmodernity as a specific moment of our historicity is a major location that needs 
to be accounted for. A location is an embedded and embodied memory: it is a set 
                                                
111 This references Barad’s teleconferenced interview format keynote at the 7th European 
Feminist Research Conference.  
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of counter memories, which are activated by the resisting thinker against the grain 
of the dominant representations of subjectivity. A location is a materialist temporal 
and spatial site of co-production of the subject, and thus anything but an instance 
of relativism. The politics of location, or situated knowledges, rests on process 
ontology to posit the primacy of relations over substances. (2006, pp. 4-5) 
 
At the center of new materialist and posthumanist feminism is a renewed valuation of 
ontology that resituates the body, nature, perception, knowledge-science, and dynamism as 
essential conditions and ways of knowing or affecting the world.  
European g/t scholarship appears more advanced in this area than it is in the US. 
For example, Corneliussen’s thought experiment asked “what…can [we] learn from 
focusing on change, and exploring what seems to be a gap between the theoretical and 
empirical level of gender research” (abstract). Her move to highlight change reflects a major 
shift from what has been promoted in the two broad-based reviews of the g/t literature I 
examine in this dissertation (Cohoon & Aspray, 2006a; Singh, et al., 2007) or in the NSFs 
funding agendas, all heavily concerned, ultimately, with a search for explanations of 
relationships that emphasize a causal interplay dependent on the old ways of thinking 
through reductions and oppositions. 
Thinking about the world in ontological and non-dichotomous, non-essentializing, 
and non-determinist terms also requires a new conception of causal relations that might 
better be framed as an intersectional ethics conceived of intentions, thinking, and 
consequences. My remaining questions consider the significance of shifting the ethical 
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locus from one that is primarily human centered to one that benefits a multi-actored world 
and how this might help g/t researchers and STEM educators.112  
Significance of This Thesis for Education 
In order to better address the challenges of a postmodern and posthumanist era 
and the ethico-political-conceptual concerns and dilemmas that drive g/t and STEM 
research agendas, g/t and STEM research and education need to be reconceived. If, as I 
have argued, the meta g/t story is an expression of our attempts to mediate a set of socio-
techno anxieties bound to a liberal humanism that itself is wanting, how might feminist 
technoscience, new materialisms, or posthumanist intersectionality and related 
methodologies better engage or develop this new ethic of connectivity and dynamism? 
What does posthumanist, new materialist feminist technoscience have to do with 
education?  
 
What’s at Stake in Re-imagining Through a Posthumanist Lens? 
The problems that the g/t story tries to mediate are something greater than girls 
and women’s underrepresentation in computing or an overly masculinized computer 
culture. Hence, there is ultimately, or alternatively, something more at stake in articulating 
the g/t relationship as an ethical mediation trying to intervene in a pervasive dissatisfaction 
with the instrumental turn of society or a no longer sufficient liberal humanism. What is at 
stake is a an opportunity for g/t researchers, policy makers, as well as feminist 
                                                
112 Also pertinent is Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, which I have not elaborated on, 
but which also has much to offer for future thinking.  
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technoscience, new materialist, and posthumanist scholars to think across fields and 
practices to engage in conversations bent on articulating a set of dispositions relevant and 
necessary to a posthumanist understanding and ethics of technoscience and techno-ethical 
literacy. In this intersectional thinking, STEM education, and technology orientations 
more broadly, will engage more with feminist technoscience studies. Similarly, 
technoscience scholars would become more engaged with the issues, policies, and 
pedagogies relevant to K-16 education.  
Posthumanist, new materialist, and feminist technoscience studies articulate a 
practical philosophy of technology that is of great significance for how we think about 
STEM education and offer some key opportunities for rethinking some core beliefs and 
pedagogies. In this new model, the point of STEM education becomes not merely about 
fostering traditional STEM competencies (e.g. calculating, programming, the scientific 
method, or the acquisition of scientific knowledge), it becomes more fundamentally about 
preparing critically reflexive learners able to think in ethical—rather than merely 
technocratic—terms.  
To date, STEM education and research has over-emphasized skills. In the US this 
has meant a proliferation of programs designed to (a) get more students interested in 
STEM fields, (b) to push the teaching of STEM competencies to the foreground of 
educational policy agendas, and (c) build an evaluation and assessment culture that 
measures the success of the first two programs. The ways in which this is thought about are 
somewhat varied, ranging from using computer games to make learning and schooling  
354 
 
 
more fun or emphasizing the practical applications of technology to better appeal to 
students’ social-utility concerns or interests.  
The significant question that is not sufficiently addressed in current STEM policies 
and pedagogies is how to better engage and prepare students and citizens for the challenges 
of a “posthumanist” future. Moreover, feminist, posthumanist, and new materialist 
scholars do not, by and large, concern themselves with K-16 pedagogies or policies. 
However, the feminist stake in technology is also a broader social stake that should include 
education as the site wherein crucial dispositions are shaped and fed. The significant 
question is how, specifically, technology, education, and feminism might better intersect as 
we evolve into the 21st century?   
In order for these intersections to happen, some key ideas, assumptions, and 
orientations need to be opened up. Specifically in need of reconceptualization or 
repositioning are the following: (a) conceptions of “the subject” and subjectivities; (b) 
objectivity; and (c) the networked interconnections between multiple kinds and locations 
of actors and relationships conceived as other than oppositional (e.g. humans and 
technology, mind and body, male and female). Also, (d) how to better transcend the learned 
impetus towards oppositions, negativity, or being consumed (instrumentalized) as the other 
(Braidotti, 2006, p. 15); and (e) how to locate technology research and education within an 
ethic of care that serves the interests of both nature and culture. Addressing these will 
necessitate a reconsideration of the connections between tradition (which some frame as 
nostalgia or a continuation of old hegemonies), progress, and disciplines.  
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There is moreover, an ethics at the center of the mainstream story’s relegating 
much of this “humanizing” element to the feminine dimension. One concern has focused 
on the way in which a utilitarian ethic supposedly separates women from creative 
engagement with technology. Can women be part of a technological story that imagines 
new futures and potentialities rather than simply as signifiers or keepers of values that a 
male culture of technology is thought to trample? These are significant problems that in 
numerous ways, the g/t story attempts to navigate. However, it has been unable to consider 
these ideas in more than a superficial fashion. In the meta g/t story, women, technology, 
and theory have been reduced and ossified and continue to serve a modernist, liberal 
humanism that itself is insufficient in the face of rapid technological, cultural, and natural 
change.  
Addressing these significant challenges requires that education (in its pedagogies, 
research, and policy-making) address the underlying concerns and incommensurabilities in 
the g/t story because these are not so evident as dominant research questions and funding 
agendas have led us to believe. To date, the drive in g/t research has been producing a 
better descriptive and authoritative theory of g/t that might ultimately both explain and 
rework the gender gap in computing. The argument has been that more scientific and 
objective methods are the means to a better theory. My thesis has argued in part a flawed 
notion of objectivity built around methods, but more significantly, a limited and limiting 
notion of theorizing.  
 Although theory and theorizing are a significant concern and thus, opportunity, 
this problem extends to the ways in which research questions are conceived and, 
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subsequently, pursued. This thesis argues that some of the core questions of g/t research 
and policy need to be rethought. Current problem or question formulations have limited 
the transformative potential of g/t research and run the danger of being either 
disingenuous about the effect of bringing more women into technology or conversely, of 
underestimating the potential impact. The significant work to be done is a clearer sorting 
of problems, concerns, and what is at stake. For example, the tendency has been to blur 
concerns about re-engineering women’s interests to address market needs, promoting 
democratic aims of social transformation, and articulating an ethic of care that will mediate 
technological progress. We need to better articulate how and why values-ethics are 
“assigned” and mediated in and through subjects and objects and what this means for 
STEM education and g/t research and policy. 
 Another contribution of this thesis is methodological. Representational and 
reductivist epistemologies present a significant obstacle in moving towards a new ethic of 
dynamic relationality. This thesis illustrates how an intersectional methodology makes it 
possible begin to unravel difficult or black-boxed problems. It suggests the value in (a) 
rethinking ideas about causality, dynamism, and ontology—even as these are not normally 
part of STEM conversations and research; (b) expanding how subjectivity and objectivity 
are thought about and in turn, suggesting reasons to extend borders of knowledge, 
knowing, knowers in search of an “ethic of care” that itself is intersectional; (c) insisting on 
greater sensitivity when promoting programs bent on generalizability and scalability that at 
the same time must accommodate local needs and interests and (d) expanding how theory,  
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objectivity, and causality are not only conceived and pursued, but why they are deemed so 
valuable.  
 
Ongoing Challenges  
Despite potential opportunities, substantial challenges remain and are made more 
visible as posthumanist, feminist technoscience perspectives problematize a number of 
long-standing and comfortable beliefs and practices. Some of these are a persistent 
scientism-empiricism and the ways democratic or ecological concerns transparently overlap 
with neoliberal politics and economics. For example, Rising Above the Gathering Storm: 
Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future (National Research Council, 
2007) is an example of how science dominates the conversation. In addition, I suggest we 
might be more concerned about the conservative nature of national research funding 
agendas, where  
funding largely goes to safe bets likely to produce results, rather than to risky yet potentially 
more transformative projects.  
Educational research is usually faulted for a perceived lack of rigor or ‘quality,’ 
which is something different than I mean here (see Scientific Research in Education (National 
Research Council, 2002)) for this type of discussion). In educational research, these 
methodological and epistemological concerns have taken precedence over vision and risk-
taking. As an example of the problem I am trying to articulate, the June 27, 2009 issue of 
the NY Times (Kolata) featured the article “Grant System Leads Cancer Researchers to Play 
It Safe.” The author argues that cancer research is not providing any significant leaps 
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forward towards cures or prevention because national research funding agencies have been 
taking it too safe by funding projects that are generating results of little consequence 
because they were viewed as more certain to produce findings of something even if of little 
consequence. Risk avoidance has thus steered funding away from higher risk projects that, 
if successful, could be more transformational.  
Another way vision gets constrained is by closing the gates to other kinds of 
theories and conceptions. For example, in physics, Amy Bug (2003) notes the resistance 
within physics to consider influences from feminist theory on physics (that is, for anything 
other than considering alternative pedagogical strategies to accommodate “others” - those 
not white and male). The significant challenge is how to bridge the gap between 
educational research centered around psychology, technology and cognitive science to also 
include studies of technology from the perspectives of feminist, cultural, sociological, 
political, and philosophical thought. While methodological rigor is not to be dismissed, it 
must not be pursued without due consideration of the values and goals framing research 
agendas or without deeper reflections on what objective rigor entails. Educational research 
without vision or a politics-ethics seems to portray research as a view from nowhere, which 
to paraphrase Haraway, is not really possible.   
 The last challenge that I want to briefly mention is that of moving from an 
educational culture-politics built around instrumentality and assessment to one more open 
to imagination. That is to suggest that the overarching federal emphasis on standards and 
testing is a large barrier to overcome. 
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Conclusion 
  The overlooked question of prime significance is why we care so much about 
women’s representation in computing. A similar drive for research or programs addressing 
women’s underrepresentation is not considered nearly as pressing in a multitude of other 
professions where women have actively been clamoring for greater opportunities.113 My 
thesis argues that the focus on equity, representation, or economics masks the ways in 
which the g/t story represents a struggle for a new ethics. This new ethics itself is 
intersectional in the ways it recognizes a broader conception of agents and subjects as co-
participants in shaping the world. Two significant themes emerge as potentially significant 
for STEM education. One is the re-emergence of ontology that suggests, for example, that 
how we conceptualize human and non-human agents should carry at least as much weight 
as the epistemologies relied on to study them. The insufficiency of dichotomous and 
essentializing conceptions is the other significant theme, and one not readily addressable if 
epistemologies themselves are not revisited. That is, the new ethic understands nature and 
culture as two parts of a whole yet the language of STEM education is currently not 
equipped to think in this way.  
Generally, STEM education pedagogies and policies depend on a way of thinking 
that served a modernist epistemology and ethic when humanity was viewed at the center of 
the world, ready and able to dominate nature. This ethic, in many ways, has not served 
humans or the world particularly well. The significant opportunity and challenge is finding 
                                                
113 One need only look to women’s representation numbers in the US Senate, the Supreme 
Court, with the rank of full professor in higher education, or in the arts, across a wide 
spectrum of occupations. 
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a way to connect this posthumanist ethic, with its regard for ontology and connection, with 
pedagogical strategies that have tended to focus on instrumental competencies, individual 
achievement, and assessments. Exactly how to do this is beyond the reach of this 
dissertation, but beginning to think, research, and assess through alternative epistemologies 
will help in moving away from the problems of the standard reductivist and recursive 
epistemology. This suggests that a new ethic requires a greater cross-disciplinarity in both 
research and pedagogy. Similarly, given the increasing perception that education is the 
necessary prerequisite for both an economically and socially productive life, education (e.g. 
colleges of education and national policy regarding STEM pedagogy) needs to think about  
technology more expansively than merely how or what people can learn through 
technology tools and environments. 
I have tried to show that in many significant ways, gender and women are at the 
center of technology, rather than at the margins, as is most often portrayed in the g/t story. 
Dominant concepts and techniques used to characterize and separate women and 
technology have become tools for managing a number of competing anxieties and desires 
regarding technology in all its multi-faceted aspects. This thesis serves as an argument to 
begin to conceive of the g/t story and relationship as not so much as something to “fix” by 
dwelling on inequities and power struggles, but rather, as story that reflects or expands 
through the social imagination and in how we construe the intersection between science-
philosophy and nature-culture.  
My intention has also been to highlight a core dilemma, wherein the process and 
the mindset necessary to explicate, appreciate, and teach or research from within our 
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background social imaginaries or enframings requires, on the one hand, critically 
examining transparent practices and ideologies while also living and thinking within these 
same paradigms. This is the problem of enframing. Transparent ideologies are only a 
barrier to the extent that we reject intersectional thinking, complexity, and ambiguity to 
instead settle for what we already know and expect. In many ways, the social imaginary and 
our enframings present a similar challenge to the one Heidegger unfolded in “The 
Question Concerning Technology” (1977): How open are we to becoming a society that 
embraces reflexivity, ambiguity, and diffractive thinking? Are we open to seeing the value, 
and perhaps inevitability, of ambiguities and multiplicities inherent in understanding the 
complex interactions that infuse social life and its study, particularly as these intersect in 
educational research? 
 Education and educational research and policy need not so much a better, 
generalizable and replicable theory of gender and technology, but an expanded way of 
thinking in intersectional ways. This new thinking would draw from social, philosophical, 
and scientific theories, recognizing that these evolve in response to the dynamic interplay 
of nature-culture, science-politics, mind-body, as these intersect with education and our 
drive for progress—whether focused on democratic ideals of equity through learning, 
improving the quality of human life, or respecting and supporting our environment. 
Significantly, this suggests an opportunity for education to become more central rather 
than reactive in this techno-social and nature-culture dynamism.  
STEM education is about building a range of competencies that are both 
instrumental (skills or knowledge focused) and ethical. The g/t story seemingly locates the 
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latter within women, based on some old ideas. Moreover, a tendency to think in 
oppositions mirrors an epistemology that is insufficient for thinking about the shifting 
natures of women, men, technologies, politics, culture, nature, and education. My 
argument has been for more ambiguity, intersectionality, and complexity in search of 
greater objectivity and a stronger and more relevant ethics that serves a dynamic nature-
culture relationship and that does not deny the deep intersections across humans, 
technology, and non-humans. This brings me back to Calvino’s Marco Polo (1972, 1974), 
to suggest that dominant, reductivist lenses of the g/t story describe and explain girls, 
women, and men in ways “too probable to be real.”  
“I have also thought of a model city from which I deduce all the others,” Marco answered. “It 
is a city made only of exceptions, exclusions, incongruities, contradictions. If such a city is the 
most improbable, by reducing the number of abnormal elements, we increase the probability 
that the city really exists. So I have only to subtract exceptions from my model, and in 
whatever direction I proceed, I will arrive at one of the cities which, always as an exception, 
exist. But I cannot force my operation beyond a certain limit: I would achieve cities too 
probable to be real.” (p. 69; italics in original) 
 
While there is reason to be optimistic about the future of g/t, there remains the 
problem of a particularly far-reaching techno-rationality that infuses so much of 
contemporary life, especially as economic and the political agendas persist in efforts to 
produce workers to sustain states rather than benefiting citizens and their environments or 
neighbors. This disposition also infuses much of education and policy agendas. The 
significant obstacle of g/t story making is a tendency to want clearly defined variables, 
explanations, and outcomes of research studies (producing widely generalizable theory), 
even as we accept a fuzzy delineation of the core concepts and problems. The intersections 
between women, men, expertise, society, nature, and so on are quite complex. In essence, 
363 
 
 
the reasons why we care about women’s intersections with technology are not merely more 
ambiguous than it has seemed, but the reasons and the questions that have been put forth 
largely divert our attention from the real issues at stake. Posthumanist, new materialist, and 
feminist technoscience argue for a new kind of thinking as a new ethical disposition to the 
world. A willingness to re-imagine some of the longstanding beliefs and epistemologies that  
have driven g/t research and STEM thinking is a first step in moving towards this new 
ethic. The questions driving this new ethic are existential, and far less so, epistemological. 
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Facet 11  
What Ought To Be Done? 
The temptation is to expect (or demand) a concrete solution to the g/t problem—
e.g., to define just what the NSF should do or how it should change. My first inclination 
was to comply, and I started to flesh out that premise. Upon further reflection however, I 
do not believe this is the essence of the “problem” or where my thesis leads. Yes, the NSF 
might think more expansively about gender, technology, and how to teach and promote 
STEM, but given the mission of the NSF, they are probably relatively on track.114 It would 
be so much easier to say that if the NSF did x, y, and z things would turn around. This is 
what the dominant g/t story has already argued, in essence, yet women’s under-
representation continues and political concerns escalate.  
Thinking about the gender-technology relationship in terms of ethics necessitates a 
different approach than does framing the problem in political or scientific terms. Thinking 
politically foregrounds concerns over a hegemonic computing culture, oppressive or 
gendered pedagogies, (in)equity, and so on. The quest for scientific answers to these 
political or educational problems put the hope in “better research methods” that would 
better locate appropriate educational or political interventions. These are not 
                                                
114 This NSF mission is “’to promote the progress of science; to advance the national 
health, prosperity, and welfare; to secure the national defense…’” and “NSF's goals--
discovery, learning, research infrastructure and stewardship--provide an integrated strategy 
to advance the frontiers of knowledge, cultivate a world-class, broadly inclusive science and 
engineering workforce and expand the scientific literacy of all citizens, build the nation's 
research capability through investments in advanced instrumentation and facilities, and 
support excellence in science and engineering research and education through a capable 
and responsive organization. We like to say that NSF is ‘where discoveries begin.’” 
(http://nsf.gov/about/glance.jsp; para. 1 & 3) 
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inconsequential tasks. However, they have diverted attention from ethical concerns that are 
no less significant. These necessitate that we think differently about the significance we 
attach to the g/t relationship. Thinking in ethical terms, it becomes clearer that what we 
desire is a better set of ideas for thinking about how we are in the world—especially in our 
relationship with technoscience—that goes beyond an equal representation of genders in 
computing. It elevates existential thinking that is values driven and brings these values into 
the circle of STEM practices and pedagogies.  
Questions of “what’s to be done” to fix underrepresentation have, to date, focused 
on better taught and more equitably distributed STEM skills and opportunities and a more 
welcoming computing or STEM culture. Re-defining the problem of gender representation 
as a quest for a new ethical relationship to STEM fields is an opportunity to critically 
expand how we think about technology, STEM pedagogy, and the STEM and research 
imaginaries that have served and produced our modern epistemologies and techno-rational 
thinking. These imaginaries and our techno-rational enframing have made the desired new 
ethic elusive and enormously difficult to conceptualize or access. Without dismissing 
problems of STEM competency, what we ought to do is expand the notion of what 
constitutes competency and value. That is, if the new desired ethic decenters the human, 
thinks in terms of dynamism and ambiguity, and does not conceive of workers, researchers, 
nature, technology, or knowledge merely as political-economic tools but rather, as nodes in 
a complex system of mattering, what does this mean for STEM pedagogy and policy or for  
women and technology?  What kinds of cultural “noise” distracts us from this essential 
question? 
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It is hard to miss the cacophony of voices concerned with the small number of 
women in computing. For example, I have followed the ACM TechNews listserve for many 
months and my informal observation is that, at a minimum, every couple of weeks there is 
a link to a new article or research finding focused on the lack of women in computing.115 In 
a November 2008 New York Times article (Stross), Justine Cassell cautioned against 
viewing women’s growing representation in applied computing fields (e.g. web design or 
computer animation) as progress of any real significance. She dismisses this reality when 
she states, “it’s not much of a victory, however. The pay is considerably less than in 
software engineering and the work has less influence on how computers are used.” Looking 
at her research profile on her Northwestern website it is clear that she is an exemplar of 
how social values can be integrated with a technical research agenda.116 Nonetheless, for 
her, technoscience seems to be the center, which suggests why she considers more applied 
fields as too far outside this center and lesser in the hierarchy of significance. Cassell’s 
thinking reflects how the g/t problem continues to be argued in political and scientific 
terms even when ethical concerns or social values are the motivations for pursuing 
technoscience. 
 The case could be made that concerns about women’s underrepresentation in 
computing are often disingenuous or convenient distractions. A recent issue of the New 
York Times (Dargis, 2009) carried an article discussing the fact that although women fill 
                                                
115 technews@hq.acm.org 
116 “to develop technologies that evoke from humans the most human and humane of our 
capabilities, and to study their effects on our evolving world” 
http://www.soc.northwestern.edu/justine/   
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movie seats and portray many of the characters that captivate audiences, women are rarely 
directors of these films. This gender gap in Hollywood film directors was evident as far 
back as the 1920s and persists relatively unabated. The disparity I want to highlight is that 
there is no national policy agenda or funding agency charged with rectifying this 
underrepresentation of women film directors. I am not going to dwell here on the multiple 
fields that now count a higher percentage of women in graduate programs (all fields except 
for engineering, the physical sciences, and business (Bell, 2009)) that have not translated to 
higher representations of women in these professions, at least in the highest levels. These 
kinds of comparisons raise numerous questions and challenges but the one I want to 
highlight, specifically, is that there is both a quantitative and qualitative difference in the 
meaning and significance attributed to the gender gap in computing than there is to 
gender disparities in these other fields.  
The hidden problem is a misconstrued and overly simplified theory of gender, 
technology, and “ethics” that presumes that equity and representation are the core issues.   
The dominant theory of gender and technology has two main suppositions: the equity 
problem is central and can be remedied with proper interventions and doing so will, in 
turn, fix computing and its culture. Given the degree of institutional complacency 
regarding the ongoing underrepresentation of women in other professions, what would 
fixing the gender problem in computing actually fix? That is, the gender gap in computing 
seems to be more troubling than other gender gaps (e.g. in the number of women judges, 
senators, or film directors) and this suggests that the operational theory of gender and 
technology represents a strategy of following a path of “least” resistance but high visibility. 
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Focusing on gender underrepresentation in computing is a way of not dealing with the 
problems that arise from competing fears and fascinations over the changes computing 
brings and the responsibilities that we ought to bear, as a society, in either serving or 
impeding technological progress.  
The NSF’s role is to promote science and other STEM fields and to see that 
research and education are duly supported. It also carries the responsibility to evolve an 
ethic of science and technology that serves both technoscience and society’s needs. While 
the success of each might be disputed, the primary emphasis is on the first, and fewer 
resources are devoted to ethical questions. This does not necessarily place the (full) burden 
on techno-science or the NSF. The primary ethical burden is on society and the programs 
and policies we choose to support. (I am not going to get into the difficulty of rational 
debate in the current political climate except to recognize the enormous challenge.) 
Women and gender have transparently become both the site and means of finding and 
fixing the ethical dimension of technology, yet the assumptions supporting this are both 
poorly defined and broadly assumed. The ethical gap is not merely a product of women’s 
underrepresentation in computing and a problem of gendered STEM pedagogy, although 
education could be the best way to begin to change things. In current policy and thinking, 
the g/t story mirrors a contemporary social imaginary that is increasingly STEM-centric. 
Thus, a new ethical relationship to technology is fundamentally connected to how we think 
about STEM pedagogy more broadly. 
The evidence is everywhere. For example, and to be brief, one could look to 
funding amounts awarded to the NSF and two other agencies, the National Endowment 
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for the Humanities and the National Endowment for the Arts.117 Even the two words—
foundation and endowment—suggest differences in stature. Foundation refers to a tenet or 
grounding principle and to a permanently funded organization, where funds are provided 
for future as well as present needs. An endowment, while still prestigious and funded, 
infers more that monies are given as a kind of dowry, which does not carry the weight of 
longevity; it is more of a gift than a grounding principle. A recent essay in Time Magazine 
(Brinkley, 2009) portrayed the current fascination with STEM—increasingly positioned as 
the only solution to the country’s flaccid performance in innovation—as akin to thinking 
with half a mind. Moreover, this partial mind sees a very rose-colored picture of STEM as 
the solution to a multitude of contemporary woes, from education to maintaining the 
country’s global domination in innovation. This in turn mirrors an increasingly 
technocratic social-political ethic, in turn sustaining an imaginary where the humanities, 
arts, social sciences, and education increasingly must be filtered through this STEM 
imaginary for their justification.  
These arguments are not particularly new. My contribution is in extending them to 
how we think about a theory of gender and technology, through two convergent ideas. 
First, our concerns about women’s underrepresentation in technology have become less 
about equity and more about a desire for women to save us from a dominant 
technoscience (and to make it seem that as a society we actually care about gender, racial, 
or class equity). We want to think the problems we have with technology can be attributed 
                                                
117 2008 Congressional appropriated funds: NEA 2008: $119.604 million; NEH: $144.707 
million; NSF: $6.065 billion; (National Endowment for the Arts, 2008; National 
Endowment for the Humanities, 2008; National Science Foundation, 2008) 
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to a culture of boys devoted to technology who pursue technological innovation just 
because it is fun and challenging, akin to climbing Mount Everest. This belief becomes a 
convenient way of sidestepping the roles we share in promoting a social imaginary that 
overly privileges technoscience and where the dominant ethic is not so much masculine 
hegemony, but technocratic, as Heidegger (1977) and Gadamer (1977) argued years ago.  
 
Is the Problem the Question? 
 National priorities, evident in NSF funding agendas, presume a primary question: 
“Why are girls and women (or other groups) underrepresented in computing and what 
factors will allow us to change these numbers?” This research question, in turn, has 
depended on inappropriate and narrowly conceived concepts of gender, women, 
technology, and research, to name the most salient and recurrent. Similarly, educational 
researchers rely heavily on a highly problematic liberal feminist “ethic of care” that has 
shaped the tenor of the gender and technology question. If researchers, policy makers, 
educators, and women were to become more critical and reflexive about how girls and 
women (along with race and class, etc) are conceptualized or used, the primary research 
questions would shift. Moreover, if women were more assertive in pushing not only for 
“equity” but also for the right to a place as creative and visionary beings in our increasingly 
technological world, the arguments and stakes might also change. That is, the question or 
problem of gender and technology, as it is has been framed, is a mirror to the stakes we 
attach to the problem. If the problem is however, not so much equity but a desire for a new 
ethics, should the research questions also change? Moreover, is it not reasonable to argue 
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that a theory of gender and technology ought to be sufficiently dynamic to reflect the 
changing nature of technology, women’s roles, globalizing relationships, and our growing 
ethical awareness of the ramifications of these relationships? 
 
Thinking for Change  
Agendas and thinking in national STEM policy. If we are serious about change, 
organizations and agencies that play a role in setting policy in the STEM fields, such as the 
NSF, could lead the way by supporting research aimed at identifying new or alternative 
foundational research questions. Specifically, funding policy might shift to become more 
open to research questions that examine existing assumptions made about the nature and 
significance of the gender gap and to critical lenses that provide additional ways of thinking 
about constructs and problems associated with gender or STEM. Current funding policies 
tend to pre-define primary research questions without also creating space for examining 
underlying beliefs that make it seem that the primary research questions are what we need 
to know. For example, if there were more institutional support for alternative lenses on 
foundational ideas—e.g. in what ways is it useful to intersect technology, gender, 
innovation, and ethics—the theories grounding gender-technology research could also 
develop in more responsive ways. Instead, there tends to be a theoretical complacency in 
STEM research that functions, in practice, as a kind of theoretical illiteracy. This is one 
area where cross-disciplinarity has much to contribute towards the conceptualization of 
concepts. Specifically, critical conversations between intellectual cultures—STEM and 
philosophy, political theory, feminist, or cultural studies, for example—offer a way of 
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building a more comprehensive and sustainable techno-cultural literacies and theories, 
where theory is something to think with rather than a tool for prediction, and literacy 
includes becoming conversant with these ideas. 
Do we know what we want from education? We have become so steeped in an 
instrumental way of being that we now assume STEM curricula should normally and 
always be about tool literacies, access, and careers and that STEM success is the means for 
curing a host of ills. Ideas advocating a more critical or reflexive STEM curricula are not 
themselves all that new, but they seem to have been cast aside in recent years, following the 
humanities into the pile of disregarded pursuits. Thus, a re-invigoration and updating of 
STS and philosophical or critical perspectives, as an integral element of STEM education 
and research or policymaking, could foster a more civic, ethical, and reflexive technological 
literacy.118 However, this too is not a new idea, but it butts up against another 
contemporary imaginary and rose-colored optimism wherein computers and ICTs will 
fundamentally change education.119 A less instrumental STEM curriculum, focused not 
merely on tool literacies and technical careers, but one that recognizes in a fundamental 
way, technology as our way of being in and relating to the world and to each other has 
some merit. If this case has already been made—and it has, by many—why is change so 
                                                
118 I merely introduce this idea here; it will be expanded in a separate article by tracing the 
shifts in STEM thinking within the NSF. 
119 For examples of some earlier arguments to replace an overly technocentric and scientific 
approach to teaching STEM with one that brings social and ethical values to the 
foreground, see: Kumar, D. D., & Chubin, D. E. (Eds.). (2000). Science, technology, and 
society: A sourcebook on research and practice. New York: Kluwer Academic; Waks, L. (1995). 
Technology's school: The challenge to philosophy. Greenwich, CT & London: JAI Press. 
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difficult? It has become too easy to want to insert women into STEM instead of balancing 
the scales of technoscience and the humanities. 
 Since objectivity has been promoted as the prescription for a better theory of 
gender and technology, objectivity itself is opened to question. It might be helpful to start 
to think about objectivity as not merely the means to a true representation of reality. 
Instead, how we think about objectivity reflects an ethical stance towards the world and 
towards knowing this world in its diverse and complex relations. The notion of objectivity 
driving the mainstream theory of gender and technology is tied to a belief in a quantitative 
or procedural notion of equity. It pursues a flawed idea that either technology or gender 
can be pinned down. Objectivity itself is not to be dismissed. However, women and society 
could benefit from a more expansive, dynamic, and reflexive ethical concept and language 
in search of a more dynamic and responsible objectivity.  
 This new ethical discourse might make it possible to address the ways in which an 
overly instrumental view of women and technology functions as a conceptual limitation to 
transformation and the project of developing a literate, capable, or creative citizenry or 
workforce. On a policy level, this suggests that greater openness to fundamental 
ambiguities could better meet an ever-shifting ground. Thus, a respect for uncertainty and 
for the dynamic quality of social life is essential to the quest for explanatory theory. Among 
other things, the new ethic is about a respect for intersections among concepts, subjects, 
objects, and contexts that cannot depend on a fixed or exclusionary objectivity or problem.  
Do we know what we want from women? I argued in chapter 9 that both gender 
and women are used to a culture of anxiety to suggest that this use of women becomes a 
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way of keeping women outside the center of technology. Expanding the conceptual lens 
through which we theorize both technology and gender is a way of showing this division to 
be rather disingenuous. However, and this is the essence of the problem, just as we both 
fear and desire technological progress, we also both fear and desire a greater participation 
of women in computing; how this plays out is dependent on who’s asking or doing, and in 
what context. 
It has not escaped my notice that my own “relationship” to technology shifted in 
unforeseen ways when I moved from the arts to education for my doctoral studies. I 
experienced firsthand education’s instrumental orientation to technology, in particular, 
computing. On the one hand, this instrumentality is visibly tied to the increasing 
technocratization of society and to the learning science’s embrace of the computer as a tool 
that facilitates learning. I suspect that this instrumentality also has something to do with 
the fact that education is overrepresented by women, and so the circle goes around.  
However, there are two quite different effects. On the one hand, these computing 
tools do offer valuable new opportunities for facilitating learning. On the other hand, an 
over instrumentalization often extracts the life out of these same technologies. That is, in 
writing my way through the mainstream gender-technology story, I came dangerously close 
to writing myself out of technology. I could become the gendered outsider to technology, if 
only I better fit the profile of gender as it is used in the gender-technology story. I do not, 
which I bring up to remind us that the dominant theory of gender and technology is 
flawed because of an insufficient objectivity tied to a desire for a widely conceived 
generalizability and scalability. These desires serve an overreaching idea about objectivity 
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that in reality cannot be separated, even in science, from an ethics of knowing and being. 
The resultant knowledge (or theory) derived from this objectivity is not so much a 
representation of reality, but a mirror to how we understand that reality to function. 
Any useful theory of gender and technology must address such existential questions 
to encompass concerns over the intersection of education, ethics, technoscience, and 
research or policy. Any “solution” lies in our ongoing, individual, or societal pursuits of 
questions about the role of technoscience and women in society in both political and 
ethical dimensions. These are foundational questions, yet the circumstances or answers will 
likely always be in flux.  
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